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F O R E W O R D
The profession of arms is the most physically and intellectually de-
manding profession that exists today. The main reason for this is that 
we rarely get the opportunity to actually practice our profession, but 
we need to be ready in an instant to do so. When you combine these 
challenges with the realization that we are not good at predicting 
where the next fight will occur, or the character of that fight, it makes 
for a pretty steep learning curve, all while we and the people we lead 
are in harm’s way. This is a very daunting proposition and the only 
reasonable response is to continuously study our profession as close-
ly as possible, with particular attention to the changing character of 
warfare. This situation is directly related to technological changes, 
and as we have all seen, the pace of those changes has increased 
dramatically. The price of falling behind or ignoring key aspects of the 
changing character of warfare can be as dramatic as the British ex-
perience at the Battle of the Somme on 1 July 1916. Because they did 
not adequately understand the combined impact of the technological 
changes that developed prior to World War I, they had the worst day 
in the history of the British armed forces after suffering almost 60,000 
casualties, with close to 20,000 of them killed on the first day of the 
battle. 
The key to success in the profession of arms is continuously 
honing judgment through warfighting, training, and education. War-
fighting refers to the conduct of war against thinking adversaries who 
counter your moves and decisions, as well as incorporating all the 
things we anticipate we will have to deal with in the future operating 
environment. Training prepares us for those things we know we will 
have to do in combat and to develop instinctive reactions to enable 
surviving first contact so that we can accomplish the mission. Edu-
cation prepares us for what happens next, which is always unknown. 
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When you combine the three elements, you ensure that you have 
competent, confident forces who can recognize what is happening in 
short order and then deal with anything that is thrown at them. While 
we know we are challenged in predicting the next fight, Sir Michael 
E. Howard reminds us that we should always seek to be not too far off 
the target, but rather have the mental agility to adapt quickly once we 
get into that fight.1 
This volume represents an effort by military professionals to 
meet the aforementioned challenges and provide solutions to these 
challenges. It is an effort to understand the changing nature of urban 
conflict in particular, because many of the trends we are seeing now 
indicate that the potential for this to be our next battlefield increases 
every year. When you consider that the majority of the world’s popu-
lation now lives in cities and the trend continues upward, it does not 
take much imagination to understand that urban centers will continue 
to be an increasing source of unrest and conflict. When you also add 
the consideration that many militaries around the world realize how 
complex and difficult urban fighting is, it is no wonder that Saddam 
Hussein was advised in 2003 to concentrate his forces in major urban 
centers to draw us into protracted and bloody fighting, which would 
also counter many of our technological strengths. He could win by 
outlasting us. Fortunately for the U.S. and Coalition forces involved, he 
was not smart enough to heed this advice. 
I have seen the difficulty of operating in an urban environment 
firsthand in the 19 months I spent in and around the city of Fallujah, 
Iraq, after which I coauthored Fallujah Redux: The Anbar Awakening 
and the Struggle with Al-Qaeda (2014). The enemy could easily blend 
into the dense urban population, snipe from urban hides, emplace im-
provised explosive devices (IEDs) in the normal detritus on city streets 
and sidewalks, and use mortars and machine guns in areas where 
the surrounding buildings amplified the noise and made it impossi-
ble to pinpoint where the fire was coming from, which worked to our 
disadvantage. We had much better equipment and training, but we 
1 Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” Journal of the Royal United Ser-
vices Institute for Defence Studies 119, no. 1 (March 1974).
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were hard-pressed in that environment to get to the point that we were 
clearly winning. Due to our history of overwhelming strength, if we are 
not clearly winning, we are losing in the eyes of all concerned. The 
tactics of the weak work very well in urban environments and those 
around the world who wish us ill are very well aware of that fact.
More recently, I was the target engagement authority approving 
air strikes in support of Iraqi forces as they tried to retake ar-Ramadi 
in 2015–16, which set the stage for the much bigger and more difficult 
fight to retake Mosul in 2016–17. Watching both of these fights close-
ly, including how a technologically savvy enemy used every aspect of 
the urban jungle, particularly the extensive use of underground tun-
nels and facilities, to counter our technological advantages was eye 
opening. While I would never say that the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL or Daesh) forces were anywhere near peer competitors, 
they were certainly more formidable than the insurgents we had faced 
in Fallujah a decade before, and the Iraqi armed forces had a very dif-
ficult time rooting Daesh out of Iraqi cities and towns. 
There are many other instances of urban fighting in our long 
history with varying degrees of complexity and difficulty. Grozny, the 
capital of Chechnya, was particularly rough, as has been much of the 
fighting in the urban areas of Syria. Whereas other forces seem to be 
unconcerned with collateral damage and civilian casualties, this is-
sue is always a major consideration for the American way of war. It is 
part of who we are and can never be brushed aside. Our foes know 
this and frequently use it to their advantage. Even when not involved 
in large-scale combat, megacities are also the sites of massive pro-
tests that have enabled regime change; this phenomenon was seen 
in Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, and Ukraine, and attempted in Syria. All of 
this means that cities really matter because this is generally where 
decision makers and opinion shapers, especially the media, live and 
work. When they can influence millions to do their bidding, the impact 
of that effort cannot be ignored as we try to avoid urban centers for 
more favorable terrain on which to fight.
All of the above is bad enough, but when you start to look deeply 
into the world’s megacities, with populations in the millions and with 
large areas of slums and shantytowns that are a nightmare to travel 
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or fight through, we need to take this subject more seriously. How will 
our air support assets, particularly helicopters, deal with the wind pat-
terns in urban canyons as well as people firing down on them from the 
higher floors of tall buildings? How do we effectively deal with mass 
migrations out of areas where the fighting is occurring, especially if 
the enemy is trying to keep them from leaving? How do we deal with 
infrastructure damage that allows massive amounts of raw sewage 
or potent industrial chemicals loose from their usual confines? These 
are just a few of the considerations that will have a massive impact on 
our ability to fight effectively in urban centers. 
The answer to these challenges is that we need more members 
of this profession, in the words of Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper 
(Ret), to cast their net widely—read, study, and reflect on the chang-
ing character of warfare. We need to be honest about our own limita-
tions in understanding and to seek ways to better understand these 
challenges through honest wargaming as well as the exploration of 
existing megacities with staff rides and discussions with city officials 
who deal with these challenges every day. We also need to be humble 
enough to learn from others’ experiences, such as that of the Brazil-
ian armed forces. How did they deal with the large gangs of children 
running loose in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro to provide security and 
stability for the 2016 Olympic games? Have any of the Services asked 
them or visited to get a boots-on-the-ground perspective of the ter-
rain? These are the activities professionals must perform, but we also 
need to ensure we listen and learn, an unfortunate and reoccurring 
shortfall from the past. All of the elements that left the battlefields 
of World War I in carnage (e.g., fast-firing artillery, barbed wire, and 
machine guns) existed during the 1904–5 Russo-Japanese War and 
European and U.S. forces sent observers to see what we could learn. 
Apparently, it was not much, as evidenced by the events of 1914–18. If 
we can get this approach right with regard to humble, inquisitive lead-
ers who are in a never-ending quest to better understand a profession 
that we can never hope to master, these same leaders will build the 
foundation of the future force and mentor those coming along behind 
them who will take that force into battle.
This publication, as well as many of the efforts currently under-
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way across Marine Corps Training and Education Command, pushes 
away from Industrial Age learning processes and gets to those more 
appropriate to the twenty-first century, seeking to better understand 
future requirements. We cannot avoid unpleasant truths or uncom-
fortable environments. We have to face things head-on, experiment, 
and fail, but then learn from those failures to ensure that we have the 
type of military force we need for the operational circumstances of the 
near future. A century ago, our predecessors did not get it right and 
the butcher’s bill was significant. We owe those we lead a great deal 
more than trying to figure it out as casualties mount from our mistakes. 
In most professions, that behavior would be considered malpractice, 
and it is simply unacceptable for the U.S. military.
Major General William F. Mullen III
Commanding General
Training and Education Command
U.S. Marine Corps

c o m p l e x t e r r a i n

3Introduction
Henrik Breitenbauch, PhD, and Benjamin Jensen, PhD
The future is urban, and so the future of strategic competition and 
warfare also reside inside the city. For millennia, people have moved 
from the countryside to villages and towns that have grown to cities 
and, increasingly, megacities. People do so to benefit from the net-
working advantages that a high population density provides in terms 
of opportunities, services, and order. In the West, this urban trend ac-
celerated with industrialization in the nineteenth century.1 Globally, 
urbanization is now on the uptick too, and it is one of the fundamen-
tal trends driving the evolution of human societies worldwide.2 But as 
global population growth continues, so too will security problems of 
and in cities, including those where military means are perceived as 
warranted, utile, and legitimate. 
This book explores military operations, including indirect sup-
port to other interagency actors and functions in dense urban terrain 
and megacities. Dense urban terrain describes urban areas with high 
population densities that, in the developing world, often outstrip the 
1 For a historical overview of early patterns of urbanization, see Kingsley Davis, “The Origin 
and Growth of Urbanization in the World,” American Journal of Sociology 60, no. 5 (1955): 
429–37; A. M. van der Woude et al., eds., Urbanization in History: A Process of Dynamic 
Interactions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, an imprint of Oxford University Press, 1995); and 
Richard T. LeGates and Frederic Stout, eds., The City Reader, Urban Reader Series, 5th 
ed. (New York: Routledge, 2015).
2 For an overview of the relationship between globalization and urbanization in this regard, 
see Christopher Chase-Dunn and Bruce Lerro, Social Change: Globalization from the Sto-
ne Age to the Present (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
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capacity of local governance systems to exert formal control.3 The 
term megacity describes a city with a population of 10 million or more. 
These environments define patterns of human settlement. In 1950, 
only 30 percent of the world’s population lived in cities compared to 
more than 55 percent in 2018.4 Much of this growth is concentrated in 
large, urban centers that connect a global flow of goods and ideas. By 
2030, there will be more than 40 of these megacities.5 
These cities act as hubs in a global network, connecting both 
formal and informal flows and transnational groups competing for 
power and influence.6 As such, they mark the new strategically im-
portant terrain in global competition. In the developing world, many 
of these rapidly growing areas are defined by informal settlements, 
corruption, illicit networks, and a wide range of grievances produced 
among competing groups. For this reason, David Kilcullen defines 
urbanization as one of the defining trends shaping the character of 
warfare.7 Along with population growth that amplifies scarcity and the 
geographic location of most megacities in the littorals, these urban 
areas have the potential to be sites of future great power competition, 
irregular warfare, and battles for the U.S. Marine Corps.
The cityscape presents the military tool, organization, and pro-
fession with a number of challenges. It offers conditions that differ 
radically from those found in the countryside. Some of these condi-
tions challenge the military ethos to focus and sharpen its edge as 
3 For an overview of dense urban terrain, see David N. Farrell and Dr. Megan E. Ward, U.S. 
Army TRADOC G-2 Mad Scientist Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Initiative: Data Col-
lection and Analysis (Hampton, VA: MITRE, 2016); and “Urban Warfare Project,” Modern 
War Institute, U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
4 “World Urbanization Prospects 2018,” United Nations, Department of Economic and So-
cial Affairs, Population Division.
5 Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future 
(Washington, DC: Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Department of the 
Army, 2014); and The Character of Warfare 2030 to 2050: Technological Change, the In-
ternational System, and the State, with a foreword by Benjamin Jensen and John T. Watts 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Future Studies Group, 2018).
6 On global networks and military competition, see Charles Cleveland et al., Military Stra-
tegy in the 21st Century: People, Connectivity, and Competition (New York: Cambria 
Press, 2018).
7 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013).
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they exacerbate well-known problems in traditional military operations 
by compressing space, time, and the tactical to strategic continuum. 
Other aspects of cityscapes call into question issues taken for 
granted by many within the military profession. They challenge us to 
be less hell-bent on hard distinctions between military and nonmilitary 
tasks, and to approach security problems more holistically. For Amer-
ican and other militaries that are subject to the laws of war and a par-
ticular set of politically decreed normative demands about the ways 
of warfare that they are expected to deliver, the city’s compressed 
character poses a particular operational problem and operational 
challenge. 
Because of the urbanizing megatrend, modern military organiza-
tions have no choice but to embrace and react to these conceptual and 
practical challenges related to warfighting as well as to stabilization, 
peace, and policing operations in an urban setting. This book explores 
how different aspects of these challenges are being identified and an-
alyzed, how they are being solved or addressed, and how to think con-
ceptually about them as a first step toward incorporating them into the 
ways—doctrinal or otherwise—of our strategic approach.
The 13 chapters in this book explore different aspects of the 
sociopolitical and strategic conditions underlying and shaping ur-
ban military operations. The analyses play out and examine tensions 
between two poles, one more traditional, linear, and purely military, 
the other more nontraditional, nonlinear, and less purely military. The 
more traditional pole includes issues related to warfighting, top-down 
organization, and supply driven approaches. The other includes is-
sues related to peace and security operations, bottom-up organiza-
tion, and demand-focused approaches. The analyses show that the 
conditions offered by the city, including its human terrain, bring out 
tensions between the two poles, feeding new operational dynam-
ics. These tensions can be conceptualized through three distinctive 
markers. 
Distinguishing between issues related to warfighting in a narrow 
sense on the one hand and to broader security efforts to create or 
sustain peace on the other makes sense in the urban environment 
because of the ubiquitous presence of civilians and civil society. 
INTRODUCT ION
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For example, Pakistani Marine Lieutenant Commander Muhammad 
Maooz Akrama explores the utility of enhanced company operations 
in a hybrid police-military model with a starting point in bottom-up 
competition for authority from embedded nonstate actors. He argues 
that paramilitary forces can indeed exert policing functions, provided 
they have the proper skills and intelligence. U.S. Marine Corps Ma-
jor Alexandra V. Gerbracht proposes how, in an urban setting, military 
lessons can be drawn from conditions, strategies, and practices of 
police. David E. Johnson and M. Wade Markel examine the more war-
fighting-related case of the battle of Sadr City, Iraq, in 2008. Here, the 
objective was “not to take and clear Sadr City, but to create conditions 
that would make it impossible for the insurgents to operate effectively 
and possible to restore security to the broader population.” The com-
manders were inspired by Julian S. Corbett’s defensive logic to shape 
the battlespace through the construction of a long wall to “bring the 
enemy to you.” Even if the operation had a traditional “focus on enemy 
fighters and their capabilities,” this was still a case where offensive 
and defensive operations were streamlined into a larger operational 
framework that included stability or reconstruction efforts.
U.S. Marine Corps Major Robert D. Barbaree’s chapter further 
explores the consequences of such comprehensive approaches to 
call for an “operational art beyond military considerations” that in-
cludes integrated interorganizational cooperation. One conclusion that 
emerges from this discussion is that it would be a “mistake” to “ad-
dress urban warfare from a purely military perspective.” Marine Corps 
Major Jonathon T. Frerichs, in a comparison between a Colombian 
and Russian case, also draws on Alfred T. Mahan and Julian Corbett 
to explain the two approaches: “mass and attack” versus “influence at 
decisive points.” Where the Colombian government applied a political 
strategy, only intermittently with military means, the Russians did the 
opposite. For the Colombians, a Corbettian approach meant disrupt-
ing and influencing city lines of communication, including in a struc-
tural way, to produce political and social efforts to mend economic 
inequality, reform the political and security system, and so on. Thus, 
“maneuver for the Colombian government was obtained by generat-
ing and exploiting advantages simultaneously along multiple lines of 
INTRODUCT ION
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operation for systemic effect.” In conclusion, Corbett wins over Mahan 
as “control and isolation” are not “realistic” options in a megacity, but 
influence, instead, “is achievable.” 
In their chapter, Henrik Breitenbauch, Mark Winther, and Mikkel 
Broen Jakobsen propose a new way to think about the divide between 
warfighting, peace operations, and special operations. They organize 
them as corners of a triangle whose internal space then offers logi-
cal subdivisions of practical operational challenges. They argue that, 
while megacities challenge militaries to think more holistically and 
embrace police/peace operations, their size also renders territorial 
control—the aim or presupposition of both war fighting and peace 
operations—almost impossible. Operational conditions for both thus 
become more like those that underlie special operations, though with-
out territorial control. 
The distinction between supply versus demand focuses on the 
interplay between the solutions and diagnoses offered in the shape of 
efforts, plans, and analyses by the military operations provider on the 
one hand and the problem sets and issues as they are experienced by 
sociopolitical states and communities, as well as on the individual lev-
el in the cities themselves, on the other. Top-down versus bottom-up 
captures the distinction between organized, linear problem-solving 
and strategy-making by centralized state and multinational authori-
ties contrasted with more emergent, informal, and localized forms of 
solutions and order. Together, these distinctions help us focus on how 
well solutions fit the problems, and how and by whom problems are 
perceived and formulated. 
For example, as with other contributors, Barbaree approaches 
the system that planners must analyze and consider addressing in a 
wider, interorganizational approach even at the operational level to 
achieve a more ground-based unity of effort between civilian and mil-
itary supply-side actors. Frerichs proposes a concept of distributed 
influence to repair the fact that “current urban warfare concepts fail 
to set the conditions for maneuver by military forces in a megacity.” In 
essence, the military organization has a hard time understanding the 
complexity of the megacity. This must be understood as a system of 
nodes with underlying subsystems. It is the connectivity or pattern of 
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connection of these nodes that is decisive for planners. Frerichs pro-
poses the adoption of a systemic operational design that goes beyond 
targeting to aim instead for distributed influence to critical nodes that 
builds on a systems approach. 
Air Force Major Christina L. Manning focuses on how the sys-
temic approach means that the opportunities for manipulation of 
networks goes both ways; irregular actors can also exploit and shape 
these to their advantage. Planners consequently cannot ignore the del-
icate balance that exists between population and resources. Drawing 
on Kilcullen, Manning proposes a symbiotic warfare concept where 
the object is to control resources without disrupting daily operations 
of community—to gain influence with the destruction that follows a 
siege. Colleen Borley also proposes a megacity concept of operations 
that embraces the systemic and civil-military mix. Here, the analysis 
and deep knowledge about weakness and connectivity of the city sys-
tem to its surroundings appear key to bringing about, in the terms of 
Sun Tzu, a “victory without fighting.”8 
More specifically, Colin R. Relihan examines the opportunities 
and challenges that arise from modern digital communication tech-
nologies for local populations to organize from, including those in a 
counterinsurgency setting. Control of related physical infrastructure, 
including the ability to destroy or protect, thus becomes a central el-
ement in a wider struggle over virtual resistance networks that the 
counterinsurgent can sustain and support. Marine Corps Major Jo-
seph I. Farina also examines the role of modern communications and 
social media in urban operations and notes how the utility of cyber-
space empowers both nation-states and nonstate actors relative to 
the United States military. Modern communication channels enable 
instantaneous, localized mobilization of a cyber levée en masse to 
converge on a technologically superior adversary. Marine Corps Ma-
jor Nathan J. Storm, in examining the problem of air dominance in a 
complex cityscape, points to the utility of small, distributed air systems 
as a response to the practical problem it poses. An increased reliance 
8 Sun Tzu on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World, trans. Lionel Giles 
(London: Luzac, 1910).
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on unmanned aerial systems would employ less expensive schemes 
in higher numbers to ensure sufficient density of presence or even 
swarming effects. However,  such practical problems also point to deep-
er conceptual issues, as Storm argues, and this change to support the 
commander would also require a change in the air theory of victory.
In the end, urban topography presents the military operator with 
difficult challenges regardless of the nature of the operation. Warfight-
ing versus peace and security operations, top-down versus bottom-up, 
and supply versus demand are supplementary rather than mutually 
exclusive categories that can help us understand and navigate these 
challenges. Many, but not all, things that count as supply would fall 
under top-down. Looking for supply that is or can be bottom-up, or 
for how demand issues also get shaped by bottom-up dynamics may 
be a productive way to ask questions. Taken together, they prod us 
to realize how the city setting brings forth classic tensions between 
the intent behind military operational design and how things actual-
ly work on the battlefield. Carl von Clausewitz famously warned that 
the gravest error the field commanders could commit is to not clearly 
acknowledge the character of the conflict in which they partake. The 
cityscape makes this potential schism between the tools that we bring 
to the fight and the fight itself even more acute. 
The chapters of this book testify to the rich and varied ways in 
which urban military operations appear as a salient policy issue and 
object of study. As they reflect a variety of aspects of military opera-
tions in dense urban terrain, the contributions also indicate how the 
city as a backdrop for military operations exemplifies a number of 
traits that are likely to shape future warfare and its conditions more 
generally. It is a truism that, in war and strategic affairs, quantity has a 
quality of its own. The city presents us with a comparable argument: 
much as diamonds result from the compression of carbon, the urban 
battlespace, by compressing time and space, accentuates and high-
lights aspects of modern warfighting as well as of broader security 
operations. In that way, we argue, where the cities and their military 
operations go, so goes the war and security agenda more generally. 
Each of the chapters in this volume contribute in concrete ways 
to our understanding of challenges facing current urban operations. 
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For that reason, it is our hope that this volume will find an audience 
beyond scholars and that it will be read by and shared among thinking 
practitioners of urban military and security issues whether they are 
in uniform or not. Learning and adaptation is an iterative process that 
begins with an open and inquisitive acknowledgment of whether for-
mal and informal ends, ways, and means are aligned and, if not, asking 
what can be done to make them so. We hope this book encourages 
scholars and practitioners alike to ask better questions about supply- 
side assumptions and strategies as well as the dynamic demand side 
of the urban battlespace. 
1 1
C H A P T E R O N E
Third World Megacities
An Illusion of Control
Lieutenant Commander Muhammad Maooz Akrama, 
Pakistan Marines
August 2017 in Karachi, Pakistan, was the height of a gang 
war in the notorious neighborhood of Lyari, people armed 
with rocket launchers fired on two police armored vehicles. 
One rocket destroyed the lead vehicle, as gunmen sprayed 
the officers with bullets. These veterans of Pakistan’s urban 
war bristled at the obstacles facing their efforts when com-
batants in the streets carried more modern weapons than 
the police force. In days not too distant, Lyari’s police would 
expend more than 3,500 rounds on a busy day and pick up 
bodies lying in the piles of garbage. Since then, paramilitary 
forces patrol Karachi’s streets and attacks of magnitude 
have become rare. While the police crackdown has been 
effective, it has empowered the military with a level of con-
trol that may be difficult to pull back, in spite of the costs 
that now strain the national budget.
INTRODUCTION
Rivers were once an important part and center of development for hu-
man civilizations. The easily cultivated land around them provided the 
opportunity for livelihood. As industrialization grew and science and 
technology advanced, the bulk of economic activity shifted from the 
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agricultural lands to the industrial cities. As some cities became more 
dynamic in their economic activities, the influx of people increased 
and enlarged to the point where those cities converted into megaci-
ties with a population of more than 10 million each. Prior to 1950, only 
New York City had achieved this population, though with the coming 
of the twenty-first century, 37 cities now hold this distinction. The civi-
lizations that sprang up around the rivers are now growing around the 
densely populated and networked environment of megacities. This 
phenomenal population growth has created a control dilemma for 
government authorities faced with meager resources and the growing 
influence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in most develop-
ing megacities. As cities grow, often unplanned, they become increas-
ingly difficult to control. This control dilemma is a defining feature of 
conflict in dense, urban terrain. 
THE RESILIENCY AND COMPLEXITY 
OF MEGACITIES
Resiliency
The development of cities into megacities is not a complex phenom-
enon in itself. The complexity arises due to its unique character and 
behavior, which are entirely different than that found in a basic urban 
environment. These cities generate the capacity to provide and ab-
sorb, attracting larger and larger populations. As the population in-
creases, it produces the economic activities that attract multinational 
companies and transnational organizations, which further connects 
the city to the global commons.1 As the process continues, the influx 
of people rapidly increases—even faster in third world or developing 
countries—to the point where the change depletes its ability to fulfill 
social and security requirements of the population. However, the meg-
acity continues to generate economic activities and opportunities. As 
1 The term global commons refers to resource domains that do not fall within the juris-
diction of any one particular country and to which all nations have access. International 
law identifies four global commons: the high seas, the atmosphere, Antarctica, and out-
er space. Nico Schrijver, “Managing the Global Commons: Common Good or Common 
Sink?,” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 7 (2016): 1252–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436
597.2016.1154441.
CHAPTER ONE
13
the city expands exponentially, the governing body loses its control. 
As more national and international organizations, companies, political 
parties, and ethnic groups become part of that system, the megacity 
develops a complex network of different social, economic, religious, 
and ethnic groups. All the networks exert their influence on the soci-
ety. This situation provides ample opportunity for criminals, terrorists, 
and illegitimate organizations to infiltrate the community and merge 
into its existing networks.
David Kilcullen describes the cities in this new emerging en-
vironment as a living, breathing organism.2 Analyzing the concept 
of living organisms in the context of megacities is interesting. As an 
analogy, the human body is an amalgam of various systems working 
together. No one system can work without the help of others, so they 
are strongly interdependent. Thousands of arteries, veins, and blood 
capillary networks in the human body interconnect with each system. 
The systems and functions of an urban setting work in the same man-
ner. As the brain controls the function of the body parts, the state/
government plays the role of the brain in the society. However, megac-
ities’ high level of resiliency makes them self-sufficient. In the case of 
nonavailability of any system, or if the government is unable to provide 
the requisite resources, megacity organisms build their own systems 
through the interconnected network environments. Sociologist Man-
uel Castells from the University of Southern California argues that the 
power in the network society exercises through networks.3 All the le-
gal or illegal organizations, national or multinational, nonstate or state 
actors, exercise their influence over the behavior of the habitats of the 
megacity. Castells claims that “all networks of power exercise their 
power by influencing the human mind predominantly.”4 
As the vested interests of many multinational, transnational, and 
national organizations, criminal organizations/gangs lie within the 
megacity, they all play their part to produce the necessary resources 
2 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 50.
3 Manuel Castells, “A Network Theory of Power,” International Journal of Communica-
tion, no. 5 (May 2011): 773.
4 Castells, “A Network Theory of Power,” 785.
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to run the system. The more megacities produce with their system out-
side the official network through NGOs, the weaker the government’s 
span of control becomes, which creates an illusion of control. This 
phenomenon is more pronounced in the megacities of developing 
countries than in developed countries, due to their meager resources.
A megacity’s dynamic economic activities play the role of an 
economic nucleus for that country. This role becomes more powerful 
in the developing world. According to an estimate from The Nation, 
Pakistan’s news agency, Karachi alone contributes 42 percent of Pa-
kistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 70 percent of the total tax 
revenue, yet represents only 10 percent of the country’s total popula-
tion.5 Megacities are efficient, dynamic entities that aggregate wealth, 
cluster cheap labor, and provide opportunities for advancement. Jon-
athan Kalan focused on the World Bank’s development unit: “As the 
countries develop, people and economic activities always become 
more concentrated in urban areas. This process of ‘agglomeration 
economics’ is a good thing because it reduces production costs, al-
lows the businesses to share infrastructure, and provides large labor 
markets.”6
Complexities and Networked Environment
As the megacity generates high levels of social and economic activ-
ity, it also generates a conflict environment. Kilcullen describes the 
drivers of this activity as megatrends: urbanization, population growth, 
littoralization, and connectedness.7 He argues that most of the urban-
ization happens in the developing world, and population growth is be-
coming an urban phenomenon. He further explains that, as people 
concentrate in cities of poor countries with the scarcity of resources 
in poorly governed areas, it generates a contested environment for the 
resources. This hypothesis may be true for a normal urban environ-
ment, but in case of a megacity, it may be debatable. Kalan considers 
that millions of people may live in poverty, but the vast, dense con-
5 “Karachi Contributes Rs [Rupees] 16 Billion to GDP a Day,” Nation, 9 April 2012. 
6 Jonathan Kalan, “Think Again: Megacities,” Foreign Policy, no. 206 (2014): 70. 
7 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 28.
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centration of people in megacities in developing nations can benefit 
from the economic output the megacity generates and the opportuni-
ties it provides.8 He also briefly covers the idea of a resilient megac-
ity system, which can generate self-support. For example, Karachi, a 
megacity of Pakistan, has a high rate of violence and accidents. The 
government emergency services are far from effective. The lack of re-
sources and the government’s inability to provide adequate care to 
the effects of violence left the city to fend for itself, resulting in the 
city’s first and largest volunteer ambulance service through the Edhi 
Foundation begun by philanthropist, humanitarian, and social activ-
ist Abdul Sattar Edhi. The Edhi Foundation runs eight hospitals, nurs-
ing homes, orphanages, rehabilitation centers, and women’s shelters 
within Karachi. It also operates an air ambulance service, surgical 
units, mobile dispensaries giving free medical care, and two blood 
banks. Additionally, 15 Edhi homes provide the necessities of life to 
destitute, unwanted, and disabled children as well as shelter and so-
lace to runaways and homeless people and the unwanted elderly.9 
These homes are the main lifeline for the people living in slums. The 
Edhi Foundation runs solely on donations arranged by a network of 
thousands of volunteers and professionals working around the globe 
for this charitable organization.
Another distinctive characteristic of a megacity is its connected-
ness. Kilcullen describes it as an internal and external phenomenon.10 
He argues that, with the advancement in communications, people liv-
ing in slum areas of a megacity are still connected to the world. This 
social and economic connectivity of a megacity with other regions 
increases its sphere of influence. This connectedness, however, can 
cause the spillover of any conflict from the megacity into the other 
region. A densely populated environment also can give way to terror-
ists, gangsters, smugglers, and criminal organizations to nest within 
the society in a “black market economy.” They turn their black money 
8 Kalan, “Think Again,” 70. 
9 “About Edhi Foundation,” Edhi.org.
10 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 32.
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white by merging it with the legitimate network.11 These criminal orga-
nizations, as part of their connection to the system, provide resources 
and support to the society to gain influence, all while operating their 
illegitimate networks. Kilcullen expresses the view that any network is 
just a means of connectivity; it is the behavior within the network that 
is licit or illicit.12 Castells explains the importance of programmers and 
switchers in the megacity network system—the programmers have 
the ability to constitute a system, and switchers have the ability to con-
nect that system through other networks. This is the counterargument 
proposed by Castells that focuses on the concept of programmers and 
switchers, whereby programmers constitute and reprogram a network 
and switchers connect it with other networks to ensure support and 
strategic cooperation.13 In a megacity networked environment, it is an 
extremely arduous process to identify black from white as its density 
makes everything lie in a spectrum of gray; licit activity may support 
an illicit cause. Thus, the credibility or status of the programmer and 
switcher and their objective makes a network licit or illicit. 
The point of concern for the megacities is not the availability of 
a life support system for its inhabitants, but the transparency of the 
organizations in the network providing a support system while op-
erating outside the government realm. The growing influence of the 
NGO over the megacity weakens the government’s span of control. 
This influence allows different legitimate or illegitimate organizations 
to move and operate freely in the megacity. In this regard, a small case 
study from 1992 about a political organization active in the megacity 
of Karachi in the late 1980s is relevant. The political party Muttahida 
Qaumi Movement (MQM), or United National Movement, started an 
ethnicity-based people’s rights movement in the rural area of the prov-
ince against the ruling government. The movement gained rapid pop-
ularity among the masses of Karachi residents from all walks of life, 
especially the poor and middle class. As the group gained popularity, 
11 Adil Anwar Daudi, “The Invisible Bank: Regulating the Hawala System in India, Paki-
stan and the United Arab Emirates,” Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 
15, no. 3 (2005): 619–54.
12 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 34.
13 Castells, “A Network Theory of Power,” 776.
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it exerted greater indirect influence over the government, because it 
controlled the laboring and working classes of the city, causing the 
government to lose control of the city. The movement became so in-
fluential that a militant wing gained power in its ranks, harassing the 
elite and business classes for ransom and occasionally violently con-
fronting law enforcement agencies (LEAs). By way of contrast , LEAs 
avoided confrontation due to MQM’s strong hold on the public and its 
influence within government agencies. The situation worsened and 
reached its tipping point when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto launched 
a full-spectrum army operation against MQM—Operation Clean Up. 
The movement was so well-organized that MQM had a repre-
sentative on every street of Karachi. As the operation pushed forward, 
the militant wing quickly dissipated, and some of the top leadership 
of MQM fled the country. The Pakistan Army’s role in this operation 
caused great public outcry, not just in the national media but also in-
ternationally, forcing the army to abandon it without much success. 
Into this vacuum, the MQM militant wing regrouped vigorously, be-
coming much more violent, not just toward the LEAs, but the general 
public as well. The organization converted into a militant party with 
a political wing. The government operation failed due to its lack of 
control over Karachi. It could not afford to eliminate the party with-
out disrupting the city, which was now wholly controlled by MQM.14 
Any disruption in the city meant the disturbance of the lifeline of the 
country as Karachi serves as the economic hub of the nation. This 
demonstrates the ease with which the government can lose control in 
a megacity. If a terrorist group combined forces with a party like MQM, 
it would give them not only a safe haven and freedom of movement, 
but also a larger connectivity to the world. Such situations would then 
require military intervention, possibly from outside the state.
In a megacity, many things can induce military intervention. De-
spite being resilient, the megacity cannot prevent a nonstate actor 
from being an irrational one, operating from a megacity while taking 
advantage of its dense, networked, and complicated environment. 
14 Steve Inskeep, Instant City: Life and Death in Karachi (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 
168; and Mobeen Azhar, “City at War—Where a Police Officer Is Killed Every Day,” BBC 
News, 19 November 2014.
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The military operations conducted in a megacity may range from stag-
ing a full-spectrum war to achieving a limited objective. These opera-
tions may be carried out against the state or a nonstate actor who may 
be in consonance with, or against the will of, the public. Regardless 
of the actor, operations within megacities require a special operating 
concept that varies from basic urban operations, keeping in view the 
unique, complex challenges posed by the megacities. Most of the 
world’s armed forces are organized, trained, and equipped to fight in 
a basic urban setting. It will be a significant challenge for them to pre-
pare for operations in a megacity. 
MEGACITY CHALLENGES TO MILITARY 
OPERATIONS: KARACHI CASE STUDY 
OF URBANIZATION AND ETHNIC MILITANCY
As industrialization grew with the advancement of science and tech-
nology, the bulk of economic activity shifted from the agricultural 
lands to the industrial cities. As cities became more dynamic in their 
economic activities compared to their surrounding areas, the influx 
of people increased and continued to the point where those cities 
became megacities. The rapid growth of megacities, combined with 
insufficient resources, creates a central dilemma for governments—a 
phenomenon more pronounced in developing countries. In this re-
gard, the case study on Karachi’s ethnic militancy and failed military 
operation provides an opportunity to analyze how the government 
can lose control in a megacity, due to reasons ranging from increased 
urbanization, lack of resources in the hands of different nonstate ac-
tors and NGOs, and the problems inherent in a military operation in 
a megacity environment. This situation also explains how megacities 
build their resiliency in a networked environment, despite the lack of 
resources and government control.15 
15 For more information on these concepts, see Seth G. Jones and C. Christine 
Fair,  Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2010), 33–84; Zia ur- 
Rehman, “Crime Down in Karachi, Paramilitary in Pakistan Shifts Focus,” New York 
Times, 7 November 2015; and Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali, “The Battlefields of Karachi: Eth-
nicity, Violence and the State,” Journal of the International Institute 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996).
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Historical Background
In the eighteenth century, Karachi was a small fishing town until 
traders started to use the location as a natural port, and settlement 
increased as a result. By 1839, when the British captured the city, it 
already held significant value as a port city. Realizing the importance 
of this coastal town, the British built an infrastructure that included the 
port, roads, and railway lines and connected Karachi with the rest of 
India and other cities of the world. By the twentieth century, the city 
was well established and was the home of people from mixed eth-
nic and religious backgrounds, largely traders and businessmen. Four 
major waves of migration occurred in the decades that followed.
When Pakistan achieved independence in 1947, Karachi was 
chosen as its capital. The partition of India and Pakistan resulted in 
one of history’s largest migrations.16 Karachi received a massive in-
flux of Muslim refugees from India. Those refugees were common-
ly known as Mohajir, or Urdu-speaking Muslims.17 The population of 
Karachi increased dramatically with their arrival, growing 432 percent 
between 1941 and 1961; this is a rate of growth that has never been 
experienced by any other city of the world in human history.18 The Mo-
hajirs quickly established themselves and became a dominant force 
in Karachi, in government, and in trade due to their higher level of ed-
ucation.19 By the 1960s, the city was well on its way toward the eco-
nomic and infrastructure development it would need to become an 
important hub of trade and economics of Southeast Asia, or the “City 
of Lights.”20 The development of Karachi caused a secondary wave of 
internal migration by other ethnic groups, of which the Pashtuns were 
the most prominent. The third phase of migration occurred from the 
16 Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zaminder, “India-Pakistan Partition 1947 and Forced Migra-
tion,” in Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2013), 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444351071.wbeghm285.
17 Azhar, “City at War.”
18 Arif Hasan, Understanding Karachi: Planning and Reform for the Future (Karachi: City 
Press, 2002), 521.
19 Nadeem F. Paracha, “The Evolution of Mohajir Politics and Identity,” Dawn, 20 April 
2014.
20 Nadeem F. Paracha, “Visual Karachi: From Paris of Asia, to City of Lights, to Hell on 
Earth,” Dawn, 26 September 2014.
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1980s to the 1990s, when an Afghan refugee influx occurred due to 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.21 The fourth phase of migration 
occurred from 2004 onward, when a large number of internally dis-
placed people from Federally Administered Tribal Areas migrated to 
Karachi as a result of military operations.22 Presently, Karachi has the 
largest Pashtun population of any city in the world, even more than 
Peshawar, Pakistan, or Kabul, Afghanistan, representing almost 25 
percent of the population.23 Karachi has been called a microcosm of 
Pakistan because of its ethnic diversity. 
The Conflict
The ethnic diversity of Karachi also became the root cause of its 
political violence. Ethnic clashes grew in intensity as civic resourc-
es became more strained with every wave of migration. As Kilcullen 
describes, the drivers of conflict are megatrends, such as urban-
ization, population growth, littoralization, and connectedness.24 He 
explains that, because people concentrate in cities in poor coun-
tries, the scarcity of resources in poorly governed areas generates 
conflict over the resources. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, eth-
nic violence increased between university student organizations of 
Pashtun and Mohajir ethnicities, and it subsequently turned into 
political violence. Two students from Karachi University started the 
ethnic-based students’ organization, All Pakistan Mohajir Students 
Organization (APMSO), which later converted into the political par-
ty MQM, to advocate for the rights of the Mohajir community. Due 
to its ethnic focus, the party quickly became popular in the Moha-
jir community, which accounts for almost half of the population of 
the city.25 As the MQM grew in strength and numbers, the clashes 
21 At the time of the intervention, the area was still known as the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, or the Soviet Union; however, by 1991, the Soviet Union would cease to exist, 
becoming known globally as Russia or the Russian Federation.
22 Masroor Ahmed and Afifa Kiran, Karachi: A City that Refuses to Surrender, vol. 5, no. 
1, NDU monograph series (Islamabad, Pakistan: National Defence University, 2014), 8.
23 Zia Ur Rehman, “Demographic Divide,” Friday Times (Lahore, Pakistan), 15–21 July 
2011. 
24 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 28.
25 Rehman, “Demographic Divide.” 
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with Pashtun ethnic groups became more violent on different is-
sues. In the early 1980s, the large influx of both legal and illegal 
Afghan refugees increased the size of the Pashtun community. 
As the Russian war in Afghanistan progressed, weapons and per-
sonnel were transported through Karachi to Afghanistan; however, 
not everything reached its destination. Arms and drug dealing in-
creased drastically with the influx of refugees, and the local gangs 
and criminals also had easy access to weapons. The ethnic and 
political parties also established militant groups armed with ille-
gal weapons. In this volatile atmosphere, the Pakistani government 
lost control of the city.
The Consequences
Megacities are efficient, dynamic entities that aggregate wealth, con-
centrate cheap labor, and provide opportunities for advancement. The 
sheer volume of economic activity makes them extremely resilient. 
Everybody working in the megacity has some vested interest in its 
success. Despite the lack of control by the government and LEAs, the 
system was still functioning, even with the absence of the basic ne-
cessities of life and the violent engagements between the ethnic and 
religious groups in Karachi in the late 1980s. The NGOs were able to 
support their local communities, exercising more control on those ar-
eas, which were mostly slums in the suburbs of Karachi. Few nonprofit 
organizations came to provide the basic facilities for the poor people 
in Karachi. The different ethnic groups provided security to their own 
communities against the other ethnic groups. 
The point of concern for megacities is not the availability of 
life-support systems for their inhabitants but the transparency of the 
organizations in the network that provide support systems, operat-
ing outside of the government. The growing influence of NGOs over 
megacities weakens the government’s span of control. Because the 
vested interests of many multinational, transnational and national or-
ganizations, and criminal organizations/gangs lie within the megac-
ities, they all contribute to produce the resources to run the system. 
The more megacities produce with their systems through outside offi-
cial networks and NGOs, the weaker the government’s span of control 
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becomes, until it finally stands largely as an illusion. Karachi is an ex-
ample of this theory in practice. 
The unprecedented boost in the population of Karachi puts the 
governing bodies in a difficult situation. Currently, the city is growing 
at a rate of 5.4 percent annually, making it one of the fastest growing 
cities of the world. An estimated 1 million people from the different 
parts of Pakistan migrate to Karachi and take up residence in un-
planned slums, which are growing at a rate of 100,000 plots annually.26 
Half of Karachi’s population still lives in unplanned urban areas, where 
the government authorities have failed to provide even the basic fa-
cilities of life. Most of these social services are being provided by the 
private sector, where the mafia has filled the gap. These mafias are 
controlled by different ethnic groups. The major militant ethnic groups 
have the political backing from segments of the government. This sit-
uation has made the life of LEAs even more difficult, as they cannot 
operate against those groups and, in some cases, cannot even enter 
the militants’ safe havens. As Anthony Davis wrote of Karachi in Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, 
Mafia bosses shelter behind politicians; politicians cultivate 
the mafias and hire their trigger-men; armed party activists 
moonlight as bandits; and common riff-raff move in on the 
mayhem. Intelligence agencies, meanwhile, use terrorists 
to counter terrorists; while the police, corrupt, demoralized 
and under-manned, resort to terrorist methods themselves. 
Normal citizens survive as best they can.27 
The government did not pay particular attention to the increasing eth-
nic violence and failed to realize the criticality of the situation until the 
early 1990s.
Military Operations and Lessons Learned
In the early 1990s, the lawlessness in Karachi reached its peak, with 
26 Salman Qureshi, “Karachi’s Population Explosion Far Greater than Experts’ Calcula-
tions,” Pakistan Today (Lahore, Pakistan), 6 December 2011. 
27 Anthony Davis, “Pakistan: State of Unrest,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11, no. 1 (1999).
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gangs related to political parties running extortion rings, performing 
targeted killings, ransoming businesses, as well as stealing and rob-
bing. A systematic weak response by the state further escalated the 
situation. The political affiliations of the militants with the ruling party 
damaged the institutions and governance of the city.28 The politici-
zation of the police played a pivotal role in the downfall of the police 
department of Karachi. In many cases, the police officers who threat-
ened politically affiliated criminals were sidelined or removed from 
their posts by officials. In extreme cases, militant gangs actively tar-
geted police officials. In 1992, the Pakistan Army launched Operation 
Clean Up against the militants in Karachi to clear the Mohajir neigh-
borhood of radicals.29 
The military operation launched by the Pakistan Army did not 
have much success. While the army did apprehend a number of gang-
sters, militants, and criminals, it failed to break the gang networks. The 
military operation also caused the defamation of the army countrywide 
due to extrajudicial killings and hatred among the local populace. The 
army also failed to install a long-term, follow-on security mechanism 
that could further improve the security situation. Some of the major 
causes of this failure include:
 • The army was operating in bigger (company-size) teams, 
which restricted its movement in the congested areas and 
caused considerable delay in search operations. The mili-
tants moved in very small groups, they were swift in their 
movement, and they were well versed with the internal 
routes.
 • The army did not try to maneuver through the networks in 
which the different gangsters and militants operated, which 
offered an easy escape to those network operators and to 
some of the higher commanders of the groups.
 • The militants’ intelligence network moved much faster than 
the army units operating in the city. The militants’ ability to 
28 Huma Yusuf, “Conflict Dynamics in Karachi,” Peaceworks, no. 82 (October 2012): 8.
29 Amir Mir, “General Janjua—The Man Behind 1992 Operation,” News Daily, 4 Septem-
ber 2009. 
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quickly blend into the community as normal citizens made 
the job of search and identification more cumbersome in 
densely populated areas of Karachi.
 • The army did not directly involve the local police depart-
ment, which was better acquainted with the geography and 
the dynamics of the local populace.
 • The army could not completely isolate the densely popu-
lated areas during their search operations, which gave the 
militants ample chance to escape.
 • The army tried to counter the local influence of the MQM by 
creating another faction named MQM-Haqiqi; however, the 
idea backfired, and the violence between the two groups 
further deteriorated the security situation of the city, which 
was already in a fragile state.30
 • Before the operation started, the government failed to re-
alize how deeply MQM was connected to the different 
networks that run the daily systems of the megacity: labor 
unions, port organizations, industrial unions, student or-
ganizations, metropolitan organizations, and other small 
unions of the city. Through its networks, MQM disrupted 
the economic cycle of the city in retaliation for the army op-
eration.31 
After the termination of the army operation in Karachi, the mili-
tant group slowly gathered adherents and initiated activities again in 
30 Fazila-Yacoobali, “The Battlefields of Karachi.” 
31 According to a report on conflict dynamics of Karachi by United States Institute of 
Peace, “Karachi accounts for more than 25 percent of Pakistan’s gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), 54 percent of central government tax revenues, 70 percent of national in-
come tax revenue, and 30 percent of industrial output. In 2007 Karachi’s per capita 
output exceeded that of the country by 50 percent. Since Karachi generates 2 billion 
rupees (equivalent to $21 million) in daily tax revenues, the slightest disruption in the 
city’s economic activities affects the national economy.” See Huma Yusuf, “Conflict Dy-
namics In Karachi,” Peaceworks, no. 82 (October 2012): 4. Due to the economic impor-
tance and global connectivity of Karachi and the daily loss to the economy due to the 
army operation, which was becoming untenable, the central government had to cease 
the operation, as they did not have much control over the city. Nichola Khan, Mohajir 
Militancy in Pakistan: Violence and Transformation in the Karachi Conflict (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 8.
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1994 and 1995, though this time with more assertiveness. According 
to a report by Jane’s Intelligence Review, more than 400 of the officers 
who took part in operations against the MQM were subsequently mur-
dered as retaliation.32 The continuing violence against and victimiza-
tion of the LEAs resulted in a devastating effect on their morale and 
efficiency, leading to the neglect of their regular policing functions. As 
the lawlessness and ethnic and religious violence remains a system 
problem in Karachi, the people remain hopeful and able to function 
within the system of the megacity and its networks. Many of the peo-
ple in Karachi migrated from different parts of the country in search 
of a better life. Even though large amounts of residents live in slums, 
the hope of a better future for their next generation, which they expect 
in the construct of a megacity, keeps them motivated to support the 
functioning system despite all odds. That belief builds the resiliency of 
any megacity. 
The megacity may not provide everything to everyone, but it 
does provide something for everyone. The resilient nature of Kara-
chi remains the backbone of the economy of Pakistan and the hopes 
of millions of people connected to it. The government, however, re-
mained negligent and deluded about the internal security situation 
of Karachi and did little to address the crime, targeted killings, gang 
fights, religious and ethnic militancy, politicization of the police, and 
corruption in local government bodies. All political and religious par-
ties, along with government agencies, are equally responsible for the 
chaos in this megacity.33 By 2006, this lack of control and lawlessness 
led to a bigger storm: the Talibanization of Karachi.34
The continuous operation of the Pakistan military against Tehrik- 
e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), one of the largest and deadliest militant 
umbrella organizations, in the Swat District, Waziristan, and other 
ungoverned areas near the Afghan border, forced a large number of 
Pashtuns to take refuge in Pakistan’s largest city in search of a liveli-
32 “Breaking Apart—Militants and Gangs Fight for Control of Karachi,” Jane’s Intelligence 
Review (2014). 
33 Yusuf, “Conflict Dynamics in Karachi,” 7.
34 Alok Bansal, “The Ongoing Talibanization of Karachi,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, no. 209 
(2013).
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hood.35 However, this influx of refugees, which Karachi still receives, 
also included TTP members from the northern areas of Pakistan.36 As 
the stage was set for them to continue their terrorist activities without 
much trouble in Karachi due to the ineffective LEAs, they took full ad-
vantage of the lawless and violent environment of the megacity. As the 
activities of TTP increased in the city from 2009 onward, the other eth-
nic militant groups also became the target of the TTP. The local police, 
who were used to crimes such as robbery, targeted killings, kidnap-
pings, and shootouts between armed ethnic groups, were not alarmed 
by the initial activity of TTP. The other ethnic groups also blamed each 
other for the criminal activities. However, when TTP initiated major 
terrorist attacks and suicide bombings against disparate government 
organizations and LEAs, the government and other political parties 
became aware of the active threat of the presence of TTP in Karachi. 
Until 2014, TTP had inflicted some major blows, which includ-
ed attacks on military bases, law enforcement agencies, high profile 
politicians, and Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport.37 The growing 
influence of TTP and its activities in Karachi are now a significant 
concern for the government. With an already weak economy, Paki-
stan cannot afford the Talibanization of its economic hub. The ethnic 
diversity, densely populated areas, international connectivity, weak 
governance, poor law and order situation, and ethnic violence in the 
megacity offers the perfect hideout for the TTP terrorists to carry out 
their activities without being threatened or detected. However, the re-
silient nature of the megacity did not give TTP success in the mass 
mobilization of the people against the government based on their so-
called jihad narrative.38 Nonetheless, TTP did create fear among the 
masses and carried out its activities due to lack of governance and 
security in the city. The inspector general of Sindh Police reported 
the total strength of Karachi police at 32,524, out of which 12,000 are 
35 Declan Walsh and Zia ur-Rehman, “Taliban Terrorize Karachi as the New Gang in 
Town,” New York Times, 29 March 2013, A1. 
36 Bansal, “The Ongoing Talibanization of Karachi.”
37 Azhar, “City at War.” 
38 Waqar Ahmed, “TTP’s Failures begin to Mount,” News International (Karachi, Pakistan), 
12 June 2017.
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deployed for special security details, which leaves only 20,000 for po-
licing almost 18 million people, or 1 police officer per 992 citizens.39 
No accurate estimate exists for the exact numbers of TTP in Karachi, 
but some sources hypothesize it is around 7,000.40 The concern for 
the Pakistan Army, which is fighting against TTP in tribal areas, is the 
fundamental shift of tactics by TTP in Karachi, which previously used 
the city only for sanctuary or fundraising through different criminal ac-
tivities, such as ransom and bank robbery.41 However, now that the 
TTP has become emboldened and commenced more direct terrorist 
attacks on government organizations and personnel, the TTP has be-
come a much greater concern for the Pakistan government and the 
army, which is also fighting the Taliban in the northwestern mountains 
of Pakistan. 
Inferences
This case study of Karachi addresses the control dilemma for the dif-
ficult nature of control of megacities by governing authorities. As the 
trend of urbanization continues to increase rapidly in developing meg-
acities, it will likely generate a conflict environment due to the lack of 
resources and the inability of governments to provide the basic facili-
ties. The resilient nature of the megacity can generate support for its 
citizens, but this support ultimately weakens the span of government 
control in the shape of lawlessness, violence, and criminal activities. 
The trend can be seen in other developing megacities, such as Mum-
bai, India, and Lagos, Nigeria, where growing urbanization and eth-
nic violence has created a similar control dilemma for the governing 
authorities.42 The worst part, however, is when a nonstate actor or a 
terrorist organization exploits the situation and makes it harder for the 
LEAs to operate against them in the dense, crowded, and connect-
ed environment of the megacity. With rapid urbanization and lack of 
39 Qaiser Zulfiqar, “Karachi Suo Moto: Verdict Out,” Express Tribune (Karachi, Pakistan), 6 
October 2011. 
40 Riffath Khaji, “The Karachi Taliban,” Peaceworks (June 2014). 
41 Alex Rodriguez, “Taliban Finds Room to Hide in Karachi,” Los Angeles (CA) Times, 2 
March 2010; and Zia ur-Rehman and Amna Jamal, “Karachi Bank Heists Blamed on Mili-
tants,” Central Asia Online, 17 December 2011.
42 Inskeep, Instant City, 168. 
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control and the growing networks of terrorism, developing megacities 
will remain vulnerable to the nonstate actor or terrorist activities, as 
the construct of the megacity makes detection difficult and provides 
terrorists with global connectivity in a highly networked environment 
through illicit or licit networks. The likelihood of future intervention of 
the United States in a megacity may not be against a state but rather 
against a nonstate actor that is both connected and unconnected to 
the political and economic systems of the city government. Some im-
portant deductions from the case study in any such situation includes:
 • The resilient nature of megacities will not help the terrorist 
mobilize masses. The same resilience can be used to fight 
against nonstate actors. The security of the community and 
its resources will be a key factor to repel the terrorist organi-
zations from getting any support.
 • The local police, and not the military of the host nation, 
remain the key players in the long-lasting fight against the 
militants within the megacity. The local police, who are 
more familiar with the local networks and organizations at 
street level, must be given more leverage and depoliticized 
before the start of any operation. 
 • The terrorists in megacities operate in smaller groups to 
avoid detection and direct confrontation. Thus, small and 
light forces are best suited to operate against the terrorists.
 • Any operation requires a small team effort of intelligence, 
aviation, special operations forces (SOF), and local LEAs to 
operate against the target.
 • The littoral connectivity of the megacities makes opera-
tions through a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 
possible, without establishing a foothold in the host nation. 
 • The global connectivity and increased cooperation and in-
formation sharing of the police intelligence communities 
in megacities can increase the effectiveness of the LEAs 
against global terrorist organizations and build trust among 
them.
These lessons learned from Pakistan’s Army operations leads 
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to the conclusion that the military cannot be successful in megaci-
ties with their traditional methods of urban warfare. This situation has 
further increased the importance of the local police department and 
exploring new warfighting concepts for megacities, given their spe-
cial characteristics. The importance and role of police in antiterrorist 
operations will be discussed next, including the shortfalls in the local 
police departments of developing megacities, recommendations for 
basic changes, and a discussion of the latest trends in policing.
POLICING IN DEVELOPING MEGACITIES: 
AN ACHILLES HEEL
From problem framing and case study discussion, we can conclude 
that the complexities of megacities require a different approach toward 
warfare from traditional urban operational concepts. Furthermore, the 
continual growth of megacities in developing countries, such as Mum-
bai and Delhi, India; Karachi, Pakistan; Lagos, Nigeria; and Mexico 
City, Mexico, will likely create an environment of conflict due to limited 
resources. Such an environment can easily be exploited by local and 
transnational organizations of criminals, militants, terrorists, and drug 
cartels. In the construct of these megacities in a developing country, 
they can easily establish their illicit network while staying under the 
radar and remain globally connected. This operational concept aims 
to establish a framework for the megacities of developing countries to 
counter the threat emerging from nonstate actors. 
The Threat Spectrum
The primary threat in a megacity likely emanates from nonstate actors, 
including ethnic militants, criminals, transnational terrorists, and drug 
cartels. These illicit organizations can slowly grow their influence over 
the functioning system of the megacities through networks. Operating 
within the networks, the nonstate actors avoid escalation of conflict 
to the level where the government might be forced to take decisive 
action against them, particularly if they have yet to achieve any strong 
influence within the functioning system of a megacity. Peter M. Haas 
likens their strategy to the often-repeated story of the boiling of the 
frog that is placed in cold water that is gradually heated. In this anal-
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ogy, it is  the gradual buildup of danger or discomfort by the nonstate 
actors that make it not as noticeable or threatening to the government 
until it is too late.43 The recent examples from the Taliban’s operation 
in Karachi, drug cartels in Mexico, and gang wars in Mumbai follow 
this analogy, which seems implicit in the kind of conflict that megaci-
ties, particularly in developing countries, may face in the near future. 
The Approach
We may consider whether police should only perform rule-of-law 
policing to secure a community and attend to public grievances, or 
whether they should become a highly trained force to fight and act as 
a bulwark against terrorism by performing counterterrorist operations. 
Even Western nations have dealt with this issue for some time. But 
the reality is that the emerging threat of terrorism and the complexity 
of the megacity requires police to handle both tasks simultaneously. 
Police capacity to fight terrorism and insurgencies remains crit-
ical. Many scholars have established that the police force is more ef-
fective than the military to perform this task.44 Georgetown University’s 
Christine Fair writes that “a police-led effort would be better than one 
led by the army, as the history of successful insurgency movements 
in disparate theatres across the globe shows.”45 Kalev I. Sepp’s article 
“Best Practices in Counterinsurgency” also explains the centrality of 
the police role while describing the effectiveness of “Police in lead; 
military supporting,” and the importance of a diversified and expanded 
police force.46 To fight nonstate actors in the complex environment of 
megacities, this section develops an operating concept centered on 
policing efforts in concert with the military support of the host nation. 
Some arguments for why the military should not lead counterter-
rorism efforts in a megacity include:
43 Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities, Constructivism, and International Environmen-
tal Politics (New York: Routledge, 2016).
44 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering 
al Qa’ida (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2008); and Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterin-
surgency,” Military Review (May–June 2005): 8–12. 
45 C. Christine Fair, “Policing Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal Asia, 30 June 2009.
46 Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” 8–12. 
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 • Military operations in a megacity can disrupt the flow of the 
system, which can adversely affect economic activity and 
inflict heavy financial losses on the government, civilians, 
and businesses.
 • The military has a larger physical footprint and centralized 
forces, which creates issues maneuvering forces through 
the dense population and the loss of surprise and speed. 
Conversely, terrorists operate through networks with a 
very small footprint. The shelf life of the intelligence in the 
megacity environment is very short, requiring immediate 
responses.
 • Military operations have an inherent risk of immense collat-
eral damage given the sheer mass of the city and its popu-
lation. 
 • The traditional methods of cordon and search are rendered 
almost impossible in the dense environment of the meg-
acity. Surge operations in urban areas have mostly proven 
counterproductive as a result.
 • Limited relationships with the local community and knowl-
edge of local conditions can affect the military’s intelligence 
operations. 
 • The military is more focused on countering the terrorist 
than securing the populace and its resources.
 • The military offers a short-term solution. The long-term de-
ployment of military forces in a megacity will degrade their 
conventional warfighting skills. The situation creates frus-
tration among the troops, which may result in mistreatment 
of the populace by military personnel, further exacerbating 
the situation for the government. 
The Importance of Policing a Population 
Analyzing the disadvantages of military operations in a megacity, the 
policing option seems most suitable. The police forces are more de-
centralized than the military and better connected to the community. 
As members of the same community, police have a better intelligence 
network at the local level. Police also are more inclined to protect the 
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community and its resources. They can play a more significant role 
in exploiting the resiliency of a megacity with their local knowledge 
and networks within the community, using the NGOs and their net-
works to guide their efforts effectively. Police from most megacities 
in developing countries are organized and trained to deal with com-
mon criminals and law enforcement. However, the complexities in 
the megacity environment and the emerging transnational terrorist 
threats require militarization and mass transformation in the capabil-
ity of the police force. 
Most of the police forces in megacities of developing coun-
tries require modernization. Some basic problems, such as a lack of 
resources, technology, and manpower are made even worse due to 
corruption and politicization, which are common in the police forces 
of these areas. 
Therefore, it is important to analyze some of the basic problems 
and capability shortfalls that have caused the police failures. Based 
on the case study and research work done on the problems of com-
bating terrorism in Karachi, this section explores the fault lines in 
the city’s policing system. This analysis will help us understand what 
needs to be done and formulate the way forward to reform the police 
in megacities. This process also provides some insight to American 
counterparts about some of the problems in developing countries 
with regard to the police department. The Karachi Metropolitan Po-
lice (KMP) will be discussed as a case study. The problems of KMP 
have many similarities with those of the Mumbai, Lagos, and Mexico 
City police. 
Historical Factor
Policing in many developing countries was introduced during colonial 
rule. The major purpose of police in the colonies was to coerce and 
control the local populations. Police infrastructure inherited by both 
Pakistan and India was established during the British Raj, or British 
Indian Empire, as the Police Act, 1861.47 Instead of using the London 
47 Srikanta Ghosh and K. F. Rustamji, eds., “Medieval India, East India Company and British 
India,” in Encyclopaedia of Police in India (New Delhi: Ashish Publication House, 1993), 
16–45; and The Police Act, 1861: An Act for the Regulation of Police, Act V of 1861 (1861).
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model of policing, the British introduced the Irish model of policing.48 
The purpose of this police force was not to enforce the rule of law 
but to enforce the law of the ruler. Rule of law systems function as 
“transparent systems of making laws and . . . [enforcing] laws that are 
applied predictably and uniformly. Openness and transparency are 
essential.”49 In the law of the ruler system, however, police remain loy-
al to the rulers instead of the state. This model provided an authori-
tarian and unaccountable police force. Unfortunately, both India and 
Pakistan inherited the same model, and it continued in Karachi until 
2002. Politicians continued to use the police force the way it was used 
during the British Raj, which created a lack of confidence in the police 
by the public, compounded by corruption and inefficiency in the po-
lice department. In 2002, new reforms were introduced; however, the 
general mind-set within the police department and the government 
remained the same, illustrating the elusiveness of long-lasting and ef-
fective solutions to this problem. 
Problems and Shortfalls
The primary by-products of the politicization of the police are cor-
ruption and inefficiency. Employment with the Karachi police force is 
based primarily on political affiliation. The senior police officers are 
not promoted on the basis of merit, but on their affiliation with the rul-
ing political party. 
Police stations in Karachi are divided according to the geograph-
ic areas they cover, not based on population. In Karachi, 330,000 po-
lice personnel are placed in 113 police stations.50 This method may 
be effective in rural areas, where the population is more evenly dis-
tributed, while in Karachi, the population density varies across a large 
spectrum. The overall police population ratio is also low; out of 33,000 
police personnel, approximately 12,000 are employed on different ad-
ministrative, protocol, and VIP escort duties, leaving a city of almost 18 
48 David Arnold, “The Police and Colonial Control in South India,” Social Scientist 4, no. 12 
(1976): 3–16, https://doi.org/10.2307/3516332.
49 Part I: What Is the Rule of Law? (Chicago: American Bar Association for Public Educa-
tion, n.d.), 5.
50 “Policing Karachi,” Dawn News, 23 February 2014.
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million people with a law enforcement ratio of 950:1.51 In comparison, 
the overall police force ratio of Pakistan stands at 1,000:2.52 
Today’s police force lacks resources and funding, which in turn 
affects their capability to implement law and order; the military re-
ceives a majority of the resources and a large percentage of the fed-
eral budget. In Pakistan, approximately 18–20 percent of the federal 
budget goes to the military, whereas Sindh Police, which is part of 
the Sindh provincial government, only sees 8 percent of the total pro-
vincial budget.53 KMP receives 1 percent of the overall Sindh budget. 
Police personnel are severely underpaid and see few incentives or 
promotions. Their monthly pay amounts to about U.S. $100, and their 
duty hours often exceed 14 hours a day.54 These issues may be the 
basis for increased corruption and lack of motivation in KMP.
The major problem in most of the megacities is that the provin-
cial and city governments fail to realize that, with the present threat, 
the police force needs to earn the trust of the public and modernize 
on all fronts to counter the threat of instability and violence in the 
megacity. Police forces who have been successful were organized to 
counter low-level crimes in rural and basic urban settings. With the 
advancement in technology, the tactics employed by the criminals 
have changed. The police, however, did not adopt these changes; as 
a result, the criminals have gained a strategic advantage with their 
new tactics as the police have been unable to adapt to the rapidly 
changing environment. The ethnically based militancy and terrorism 
in Karachi skewed beyond the capacity of the police to handle. 
Military dominance in developing countries is another major 
hindrance in the modernization of the police force. According to the 
current Pakistani philosophy, the military can do everything, whether 
it is through conventional warfare, counterterrorism, or disaster relief 
51 Qaiser Zulfiqar, “Karachi Suo Moto: Verdict Out,” Express Tribune (Karachi, Pakistan), 6 
October 2011.
52 Hassan Abbaas, Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure: Is It 
too Flawed to Fix? (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011).
53 Ankit Panda, “Pakistan Expands Defense Budget,” Diplomat, 12 June 2014; and Budget 
Analysis, 2014–15 (Karachi, Pakistan: Finance Department, Government of Sindh, 2015). 
54 Hassan Abbas, Role of Pakistan Police in Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Brook-
ings, 2009).
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operations. At the time, the police position and role in the megacity 
was not understood or utilized. The overreliance on the military un-
dermined the importance of the police force, and it was never able 
to reach beyond the status of the national military service. Counter-
terrorism issues and operations are primarily dealt with by the army, 
and the police force had not been part of the plan. What Pakistani 
governments failed to realize is that the military can operate in the 
northwestern mountains of the country, where they can evacuate the 
districts and villages for operations against the Taliban; however, the 
military cannot operate with the same strategic mind-set in the meg-
acity of Karachi against terrorist networks.
Lack of technology represents the most significant failing of the 
KMP. Prior to 2000, Pakistan’s police departments barely had access 
to a forensic laboratory; to date, each province houses a single foren-
sic office.55 Poor data collection and matching capability resulted in 
lost records and inaccurate movement of criminals. The KMP lack ba-
sic electronic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabil-
ities, which has restricted them to relying on human intelligence only. 
Insufficient and old communication equipment also placed limits on 
operational capabilities. 
Lack of coordination appears to be the most significant issue 
between all forms of government LEAs in Pakistan, resulting in a dis-
connect between KMP and other law enforcement agencies. Military 
forces and intelligence agencies neither trust the police nor share in-
telligence information with them. For example, if a police constable 
wants to trace the call records of any individual, they must first send an 
official request to the intelligence agencies. The organization houses 
20 different LEAs working under a federal government (figure 1.1).56 
These organizations rarely coordinate or share their operations. With 
the exception of other provincial police organizations, almost all oth-
ers have a presence in Karachi, but no central authority coordinates 
the counterterrorism efforts in the city. Although counterterrorism is 
being addressed through a whole-of-government approach, the army 
55 Abbaas, Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure. 
56 Abbaas, Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure.
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is the main organization fighting the menace. All the resources and 
intelligence go to the army, which is one reason why the police never 
operate in Karachi at full capacity. 
Differentiating between a terrorist, a militant, and a trained crim-
inal in Karachi remains a real issue when each is tightly connected 
through a network. Many legitimate organizations are connected to 
the illicit ones, and they all operate within the spectrum of the meg-
acity. Unfortunately, this structure lies beyond the capacity of the 
metropolitan police to separate and operate. The army is heavily en-
gaged in the operations against the Taliban in the northwestern parts 
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of the country and also is deployed on the eastern borders. They are 
not ready or prepared to operate in Karachi, which is clear in the lack 
of strategy by the government to combat terrorism in Karachi, where 
more than 13,000 people died from terrorist incidents in the last five 
years.57
The sole purpose of analyzing the case of Karachi is to explain 
the reasons for the failure of the government to implement law and 
order and counterterrorism. Most of the megacities in developing 
countries are suffering the same fate. For example, during the ter-
rorist attack on Mumbai in September 2008, Mumbai police failed to 
prevent the attack or control the situation during the attack.58 In many 
instances, governments in developing countries have overrelied on 
military operations and undermined the importance of police in the 
megacities. The reform of the New York Police Department (NYPD) 
after the attacks on 11 September 2001 serves as a perfect example 
of transformation for a police force to tackle the modern-day security 
threats that are unique to megacities due to their complexity. The 
NYPD made revolutionary changes in training, capability, interagen-
cy coordination, foreign partnership, intelligence gathering, and field 
operations. 
Basic Reforms and New Policing Concepts
To fight counterterrorism in the megacity, the KMP needs revolution-
ary changes. Some of the problems are very basic, but the police force 
needs advanced training and innovative skills. The mind-set and cul-
ture of the police force needs to change. The colonial-era mentality, 
where police served the ruler and their efforts to control and coerce 
the people, needs to be replaced with the philosophy of the police as 
a service rather than a force, which would develop trust by the local 
community. 
Police personnel salary must be increased to motivate the indi-
57 Rabia Ali, “Death Toll Rises: Over 3,200 Killings in Karachi Make 2013 Deadliest Year so 
Far,” Express Tribune (Karachi, Pakistan), 18 January 2014; and “78 Children among 2,909 
People Killed in Karachi: HRCP,” Dawn, 7 January 2015. 
58 Arundhati Roy, “The Monster in the Mirror,” Guardian, 12 December 2008.
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vidual and to reduce corruption at an individual level. A merit-based 
induction and promotion system rather than political affiliation would 
also improve the current standard of police advancement. 
Community-based policing is another important area that re-
quires evaluation. This concept ensures that the community is part 
of the solution rather than the problem, which could play a vital role in 
exploiting the resiliency of the megacity. Community-based policing 
also builds relationships in the community, providing intelligence net-
works within the community. Most of the personnel in the KMP, how-
ever, are not from the city. The junior officers typically come from the 
rural parts of Sindh due to the quota system that currently supersedes 
merit-based selection. To support the community-based policing con-
cept, recruitment must take place in the local community. 
The police require extensive modernization and enhancement of 
their capabilities in everything from weapons to intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment. KMP’s present ISR capa-
bility is restricted to human intelligence. Otherwise, the department 
depends on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) headquartered in Is-
lamabad, Pakistan, and the Intelligence Bureau (IB), headquartered 
in New Delhi, India, for ISR. Police personnel also need to upgrade 
their basic communication equipment and systems. Communication 
scanners, jammers, and secure wireless communications must be in-
stalled at all police stations. 
The KMP must participate in progressive training to learn mod-
ern tactics, training, and procedures (TTPs). They should send officers 
for training with world-renowned police forces, such as those in NYPD 
and London’s Metropolitan Police (a.k.a. Scotland Yard). The Pakistan 
Army can support training on basic urban warfare tactics. The main 
purpose is not to train only special or elite forces but to increase the 
skill level of the entire police force. 
The interoperability of Karachi police with other LEAs remains 
paramount to achieving success in the complex environment of the 
megacity. This includes sharing information and coordinating collab-
orative operations, but the government must also understand that the 
army cannot solve the issue alone. It has to assign responsibilities to 
the police, especially in cities such as Karachi. A joint operation center 
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should be available to share information and coordinate counterterror-
ist operations. 
The KMP needs to organize based on the size of the population 
rather than the size of the area. To cover the population of Karachi, 
police forces should improve their ratio from 900:1 to 400:1, which is 
a basic United Nations (UN) requirement to maintain law-and-order. 
If this is the case, Karachi needs almost twice the size of the  present 
force strength for effective counterterrorism activity. In a counter- 
insurgency scenario, Bruce Hoffman suggests the ideal police-to- 
population ratio of 1,000:20.59
The police stations represent the smallest independent unit of 
the force. Their area of responsibility is marked geographically, and 
they do not operate outside their area of jurisdiction, creating an in-
flexible organization during operations. With the latest human terrain 
mapping concept, the city can be divided virtually on the basis of such 
factors as grievances, ethnicity, or religious affiliations. Those virtual 
boundaries can be allocated to different teams for operations, irre-
spective of geographical boundaries. Multiple social media sources 
can map the city according to different factors.
With some basic modernization, developing countries can apply 
some of the new trends in policing that have been adopted by some 
of the Western megacities. These trends support better strategies 
against terrorism and nonstate actors.
Predictive Policing
Coined in 2009 by the National Institute of Justice, the term predictive 
policing refers to gathering data from disparate sources and analyzing 
them. The results will then be used to anticipate and prevent future 
crimes and respond more effectively as they happen in real time.60 
For example, in 2012, the New Orleans Police Department and data- 
59 For more on these concepts, see Promoting Health, Security, and Justice: Cutting the 
Threads of Drugs, Crime, and Terrorism, 2010 Annual Report (Vienna, Austria: UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime, 2010); and Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in 
Iraq (Washington, DC: Rand, 2004).
60 Beth Pearsall, “Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?,” NIJ Journal, no. 
266 (2010): 16–19.
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mining company Palantir partnered to deploy a predictive policing sys-
tem in the city in the hopes of combating New Orleans’s staggering 
crime rates.61
Hot Spots Policing
The concept of hot spots policing shifts the paradigm of crime con-
trol from personnel to places. David Weisburd, director of the Center 
for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University, ex-
plains that most crimes are concentrated in specific urban areas.62 
Plotting crime locations can show the hot spots where most of the 
crimes are committed. Based on those hot spots, random patrols 
can be directed to high-risk areas to decrease crime rates. While 
somewhat similar to predictive policing, the focus here shifts to 
where the crimes occur.
Community Policing
The concept of community policing promotes the systematic use of 
partnerships to proactively mitigate the risks of crime or social disor-
der due to certain conditions. Neighborhood Watch is a community 
crime-prevention program in the United States and the United King-
dom (UK), where residents and businesses in neighborhoods reduce 
crime by looking out for suspicious activity and reporting it to the po-
lice. It is based on the idea that residents of the neighborhood serve 
as the eyes and ears of the police, which might discourage criminals 
if they are aware that local residents are willing to report suspicious 
behavior or activity.63
Social Media
Several police departments use social media effectively to convey 
their message and gather information to prevent crime. The Los An-
61 Ali Winston, “Palantir Has Secretly Been Using New Orleans to Test Its Predictive Polic-
ing Technology,” Verge, 27 February 2018.
62 David Weisburd, Future Trends in Policing (Washington, DC: Office of Community Ori-
ented Policing Services, Police Executive Research Forum, 2014).
63 T. Bennett et al., The Effectiveness of Neighborhood Watch (Oslo: Campbell Collabora-
tion, 2008), 18.
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geles Police Department (LAPD) integrated a social media branch in 
its structure to brief the incident commander about activities in the 
region. LAPD also surveils large social gatherings and adjusts its dai-
ly deployment accordingly.64 In a 2008 Mumbai attack, the terrorists 
were updated by their handlers about the movement of security forces 
from updates on social media.65 
To fight against terrorists in a megacity, it is imperative to en-
hance the ability and capacity of the police department to gain any 
kind of result. The military alone cannot take the burden of policing 
in an insurgency. To fight against the criminal networks, both police 
and military forces should complement the other’s capabilities. The 
next portion of this chapter will establish a combined police-military 
operational concept to counter terrorists and criminals. 
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT: 
HYBRID POLICE–MILITARY APPROACH
The complexity of fighting wars in urban areas is not new; even Sun 
Tzu noted that attacking cities is the worst wartime policy.66 Densely 
populated areas with high connectivity and productivity make it more 
difficult for the operating forces to apply traditional methods of war-
fighting in megacities. The rapid growth of urbanization in developing 
countries with a significant lack of resources creates governance and 
law-and-order issues, which in turn provide illicit organizations an op-
portunity to operate in the megacity construct without constraint. The 
transnational terrorist and criminal organizations that used to operate 
from remote areas are much more comfortable and safer in megaci-
ties, whose density provides them cover. The lack of governance gives 
them the opportunity to merge with the local economy to raise mon-
ey, and the highly connected environment provides them networks to 
operate globally. The global interconnectivity of the terrorist and crim-
inal organizations are becoming a major concern for the international 
64 Weisburd, Future Trends in Policing.
65 Mumbai Attack Analysis (New York:  NYPD Intelligence Division, 2008), 42–54.
66 Sun Tzu, Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 
78.
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community. The military forces operating against illicit organizations 
in the megacities find it difficult to counter these organizations using 
basic urban warfare concepts. 
Purpose 
The concept of the police and military working together gives a frame-
work of how the military—in support of the metropolitan police—can 
be task organized to fight in the megacity with a minimum footprint 
and disruption in the city and to establish networks to counter growing 
terrorist networks. This concept mainly revolves around police-military 
hybrid operations. It is important to note how police can take the lead 
generating intelligence-based targeted operations against nonstate 
actors in quick and efficient ways, without damaging the infrastruc-
ture and economy of the megacity, based on enhanced capability and 
military support. 
The concept of joint police-military operations may not work in 
all circumstances, primarily because of the varied conditions in differ-
ent countries. As in most developing countries, the military has very 
little role to play concerning civilian matters within the country and 
no single agency is responsible for antiterrorist operations within the 
country. Nevertheless, in many developing countries, the military is re-
sponsible for internal security, mainly because of the lack of capability 
of the police department. For example, Pakistan and Mexico’s militar-
ies play a vital role in operations fighting criminal elements. In such 
cases, these militaries may be ready to collaborate with the police; 
however, the larger part of this chapter’s argument contends that they 
need to raise the level of police capability because these militaries 
cannot fight alone in the megacities. While the military in megacities 
may achieve temporary success against the nonstate actors, the ul-
timate fate of the insurgency will be decided by the performance of 
police due to the longer nature of such wars.
Assumptions and Risks
After carrying out the literature review and case study on the megaci-
ty, the concept of operations has been developed based on the follow-
ing assumptions: 
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 • The resilient nature of megacities may deny support to the 
terrorists. The same situation can be exploited by LEAs in 
favor of operating forces.
 • The likelihood of a full-spectrum war against a state in a 
megacity remains remote due to the national and regional 
importance of the city; however, the possibility of opera-
tions against terrorist and criminal organizations continues 
to increase.
 • To counter terrorist networks, LEAs have to operate with-
in and through these networks, which will increase their 
speed and flexibility.
 • The capability and the responsibility of the police and mili-
tary forces must overlap on many domains while operating 
against terrorists or criminals in a megacity. Police, be-
ing more familiar with the local networks and community, 
represent the better option to operate within a megacity 
against terrorists.
 • For the purpose of this concept, we assume that police in 
a developing megacity have upgraded their surveillance 
and intelligence capabilities, with requisite manpower and 
weapons.
Military Problem 
Megacities pose a significant challenge for future military operations. 
The issues of operating in a megacity do not originate solely from its 
massive, dense urban setting, but also its highly networked and flu-
id environment. The high speed and flow of information will create a 
challenge for intelligence operations. The dense and connected envi-
ronment will be a dilemma for maneuver, which may need to be car-
ried out on all three planes: land, air, and space (cyber). As the enemy 
operates in networks, maneuvers will now be made on those networks 
to capture the terrorists. The concept of control, contain, and isolate 
may appear obsolete in a population of 20 million people connect-
ed by thousands of internal and external networks. Important tactical 
grounds (ITGs) may not lie in the physical plane, but rather at the nodal 
convergence of different networks, communication centers, and ener-
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gy and food resources. The effects of disruption within the economic 
system of a megacity can resonate nationally and globally. 
The terrorist and criminal organizations are effectively using 
the high density and connectivity of the megacities to coordinate 
and operate in hundreds of networks, while security forces are bound 
by physical areas of operation and beholden to fixed response time 
lines to operate against those illicit networks within very brief win-
dows of time. The military requires an operating concept that gives 
them flexibility and mobility to operate in support of police forces in 
megacities through networks and multidomain capable task forces, 
such as enhanced company operations (ECO) with combined arms, 
air, logistics, and SOF elements, which can be expanded to person-
nel from all the branches of service and interagency organizations 
under one roof.
Synopsis 
This concept of operations revolves around two concepts. First, we 
must rely on the resilient nature of the megacity to deny any support 
from the community for the terrorists and criminals, but instead to the 
advantage of the operating forces, including the involvement of local 
police forces as part of setting up the network. The growing threat of 
terrorism in a megacity may be best dealt with by the local police rath-
er than the host nation or foreign military due to their inherent knowl-
edge of the area and the local networks. By developing the capability 
of the police forces in megacities, especially in developing countries, 
and by uniting them in a network to fight against the global terrorist 
and criminal networks, they can better prepare for future threats. This 
network could share intelligence, develop common operating proce-
dures, and establish trust among agencies. These networks also can 
work to benefit the operating force tasked with fighting the terrorists 
or providing humanitarian aid in the megacity.
Second, the task organization of the military force must be ac-
complished to support policing operations in the most flexible and 
swift manner. After analyzing the complexities of megacities and the 
problems of a conventional military force in the dense urban environ-
ment, particularly the second- and third-order effects of its operations, 
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the most suitable option may be the ECOs developed in 2008 by the 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory.67 The purpose of ECO, as ex-
plained by General James T. Conway, is “an approach to the operation-
al art that maximizes the tactical flexibility offered by true decentralized 
mission accomplishment, consistent with the commander’s intent 
and facilitated by improved command and control, intelligence, logis-
tics, and fires capabilities.”68 ECOs give an infantry company the arms 
capability to operate independently of its battalion. 
The ECO in this operational concept is used more as a theory 
than a model. For the purposes of our discussion, ECOs serve as a 
military force small enough to offer a minimum footprint inside a 
megacity, but large enough to support multidomain capability from 
combined arms for independent operations. ECOs represent a prime 
example for conventional militaries, such as the Pakistan Army, that 
still have to learn the art of decentralized operations with small teams, 
especially in Karachi. The smallest organization with combined arms 
capability in the Pakistan Army is the Independent Infantry Brigade, 
which is still a large force to operate in a megacity. The essence of 
the ECO-type small unit success relies not on the number of troops, 
but on the variety of capabilities across multidimensions. Depending 
on the situation, whether fighting a counterinsurgency in a megaci-
ty or performing a humanitarian aid mission, the ECO can provide a 
good platform for all the services, including interagencies, intelligence 
agencies, and special forces to function collaboratively. Connecting 
these entities who play a role in the battlespace at much smaller lev-
els supports more cohesion and unity of effort and will save time from 
vertical coordinations. The multifaceted capability of this type of unit 
will help forces react swiftly to the identification and elimination of the 
enemy networks without disturbing the city system. This ECO concept 
67 Col Vincent J. Goulding Jr., USMC (Ret), “Do: More than Two Words,” Marine Corps 
Gazette 92, no. 4 (April 2008): 77–78; and Col Vincent J. Goulding Jr., USMC (Ret), “En-
hanced Company Operations in High Intensity Combat: Can Preparation for Irregular 
War Enhance Capabilities for High Intensity Combat?” (master’s diss., Marine Corps 
University, Command and Staff College, 2009), 18–19.
68 James T. Conway, “A Concept for Enhanced Company Operations,” Marine Corps Ga-
zette 92, no. 12 (December 2008): 57–58. 
CHAPTER ONE
46
can also generate a quick humanitarian aid response with the help of 
host nation forces. 
The most important piece of the concept is how the ECO military 
unit works in collaboration with the police, whereby both forces com-
plement the other’s efforts and capabilities. Collaboration ensures the 
security of the community and their resources in the megacity, further 
building the relationship between the operating forces and the com-
munity and exploiting the positive resiliency of the megacity for the 
advantage of the forces operating in the city.
APPLICATION AND INTEGRATION 
OF MILITARY FUNCTIONS
Command and Control
The concept of command and control is not much different to the 
mission-command philosophy or centralized command and decen-
tralized control. As defined by the Department of Defense (DOD), the 
term command and control refers to the authority of a commander 
over forces to accomplish a mission.69 The control piece, howev-
er, makes the difference. The fusion of the police network with the 
military is the most critical part of command and control. The overall 
command of the operations will be controlled by the highest city de-
partment official assisted by a senior military advisor and city police 
chief. The relationship between the police and the military will work 
like a mutually beneficial relationship. 
The initial phase of the operation—phase 0 or in phase 1 of police 
operations—can be supported by the military to establish networks 
and to enhance battlefield awareness and intelligence gathering. In 
phase 2 or 3, which is more kinetic in nature, the military will be sup-
ported by the police in active targeting of the criminals. In phase 4, 
which serves as more of a stability phase, the military will act in a sup-
porting role to the police (figure 1.2). 
A combined operations center of police and military staff, along 
with the staff from city government, will support all the requirements 
69 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Association Terms, Joint Publication 
1-02 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), 47, hereafter DOD Dictionary.
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of field operating forces. The city can be divided into four to six sec-
tors, with each sector having their own police operations center. Each 
sector can be allotted an independent ECO from the military forces. 
The subsequent subsectors of the police can be assisted by the pla-
toons and squads from the ECO, but they will only be divided once re-
quired. It is important that, while operating through multiple networks 
in the megacity, small groups be given much more leverage to operate 
swiftly and independently. Depending on the situation, each indepen-
dent company can be provided with representatives from the State 
Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), in-
telligence departments, air elements, and SOF teams. The ECO can 
operate within the battalion framework and directly report to the Ma-
rine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) commander or geographic combatant 
commander (GCC). 
Intelligence
Intelligence remains the centerpiece of this concept. The entire con-
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cept of megacity warfighting hinges on intelligence operations. Intel-
ligence operations are not only important to locate enemy networks 
but also to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the society and 
to establish friendly networks. The accuracy of the intelligence also 
plays a vital part in ensuring minimum destruction and disruption in 
the megacity. Intelligence and operations are complementary to the 
functionality of the process. David Kilcullen describes the relationship 
between maneuver and intelligence as:
Your operations will be intelligence driven, but intelligence 
will come mostly from your own operations, not as a “prod-
uct” prepared and served up by higher headquarters. So 
you must organize for intelligence. You will need a company 
S2 [intelligence] and intelligence section.70
The notion of winning a war in the megacity is directly depen-
dent on the success of intelligence operations. Intelligence  operations 
combine services and interagency operations that require a wide and 
dynamic range of intelligence resources, from satellites to human intel-
ligence and open source social media, all at the discretion of the inde-
pendent company commanders reinforcing the intelligence-gathering 
efforts of the police network in the megacity. Police intelligence will 
come from human intelligence resources through the local community 
network. Some of the latest trends in policing, such as community and 
hot spot policing, build the network further. 
Maneuver 
Maneuver in the megacity is mostly done through the primary nodes 
of the different networks, which may lie in both physical and spatial 
planes.71 Nodes refer to the intersection of different networks created 
by a person, organization, or an ideology. Policing operations can be 
70 LtCol David Kilcullen, Australian Army, “Twenty-Eight Articles,” Marine Corps Gazette 
91, no. 10 (October 2007): 53.
71 For the purposes of our discussion, maneuver refers to the “employment of forces in 
the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of 
advantage in respect to the enemy.” DOD Dictionary, 168.
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effective to catch the terrorists and criminals operating and interacting 
through different social networks. 
The main components of maneuver are the combined small 
local subsector police teams and squad-level military teams func-
tioning under independent companies allocated to each sector. The 
squad-level teams under an ECO will mainly deploy on the concept of 
distributed operations (DO). DO refers to a form of maneuver where 
highly capable small unit teams are distributed across a large area of 
operations to achieve an advantage over the enemy through separate 
but coordinated tactical actions. The independent company will rely 
both on aerial and ground assets. These teams will travel light and 
move quick. Predictive analysis, crime mapping, and hot spot polic-
ing are but some of the methods to facilitate police force maneuvers. 
Each police station or subsector will have small, light, and well-trained 
quick reaction forces that will partner with the small military operation 
teams. An important factor of the maneuver is the ways the police can 
use social media networks, local partnerships with business commu-
nities, and other NGOs to support and mobilize the masses for  both 
counterterrorism operations and relief operations. 
Fires
Fires in a megacity require more precision than mass. In this  instance, 
the term fires refers to using weapon systems to create specific lethal 
or nonlethal effects on a target.72 Terrorist groups typically operate in 
smaller units within the population centers. Smaller teams operating 
against them may not need heavy fire support, but what they will re-
quire is timely support given that their window of opportunity will be 
brief. Traditional fires from indirect weapons may not be effective in 
the megacity; thus, unorthodox fire capability through drones, cam-
copters, and micro air vehicles will work as a force multiplier for the 
small units.73 The fires will be coordinated at sector and company level. 
72 DOD Dictionary, 100.
73 Drones, micro air vehicles, and camera or quadcopters are all considered unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV). See “Quadcopter vs. Drones: What’s the Difference?,” Fortress UAV, 
16 January 2018; and “Micro Air Vehicles,” AVID.com.
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Force Protection 
Force protection success depends on a small footprint of collateral 
damage, minimal disruption to the community, and community sup-
port. In this situation, force protection refers to the preventive mea-
sures a police or military force takes to mitigate hostile acts.74 The 
military units will neither perform the patrols nor man the checkpoints, 
ensuring minimum exposure. They will mostly assist in targeted oper-
ations or humanitarian aid missions. 
Networking 
Networking in classical warfare is part of the intelligence process, 
but because of its overall importance in this operational concept, 
we will discuss it as a separate warfighting function. The purpose of 
networking is to defeat the enemy’s system, while converting the mil-
itary structure into a flexible empowered web. Networking will allow 
forces to disseminate information faster, supporting quick decision 
making and action. Distributing small teams in a large area under the 
ECO builds that network. Networking is much more than a medium to 
exchang data; it leverages cultural and physical proximity, develops 
relationships based on trust, and contributes to the decision-making 
process. The police-military hybrid approach in a megacity bridges 
the gap between the community and security forces and builds net-
works to defeat and disrupt terrorist networks.
Necessary Capabilities 
The necessary capabilities required to fight a war in the megaci-
ty may not be altogether different from combat in urban areas or in 
counterinsurgency operations. They do differ, however, in how they 
are organized and employed in the megacity. The independent mili-
tary companies functioning on the lines of an ECO will require com-
bined arms capabilities, logistics elements, intelligence and air assets, 
SOF teams, and personnel trained for security partnerships. The force 
also should be capable of employing the latest ISR available to the 
military. The capability of police in most developing megacities needs 
74 DOD Dictionary, 105.
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enhancement from traditional to contemporary policing methods. ISR 
platforms, communication equipment, mobility assets, and enhanced 
combat training represent the most significant needs. 
CONCLUSION 
The future operating environment will bring multiple challenges for 
military forces. No single solution will apply to all battlespaces, rein-
forcing the need for continually evolving operating concepts. Meg-
acities in developing countries will pose a unique challenge to their 
militaries, though not necessarily from the enemy but from its own 
peculiar and complex environment that renders traditional warfight-
ing concepts ineffective and requires innovative thinking for multiple 
solutions. The concept of enhanced company operations within the 
hybrid police-military model of operations in the megacity represents 
an effort to move in the same direction. The concept exists at a very 
nascent stage in its development, and employment requires further 
deliberation within civilian and military agencies responsible for local 
security. However, the basic framework exists, which should serve as 
fodder for new developments for the future of urban combat in the 
megacity environment. 
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CHAPTER TWO
Territorialization of the Megacity
Exploiting Social Borders
Major Alexandra V. Gerbracht, U.S. Marine Corps
On 18 March 2018, police in Sacramento, California, shot 
an unarmed black man 20 times in his backyard. Officers 
claim to have been responding to calls of suspicious activ-
ities related to vehicle burglaries in the area. Without iden-
tifying themselves, they entered Stephon Clark’s property, 
fatally shooting a man holding only a cell phone and failing 
to render aid for more than five minutes after he collapsed. 
Mass protests erupted across the city in the midst of local 
and national debates on gun laws and police brutality.1
INTRODUCTION
Within a megacity, grievances exist, stemming from social anxiety that 
accumulates over months and years. These grievances translate into 
a heated national argument while marginalized sectors of the pop-
ulation wait to address their grievances. Then, an event sets off the 
frustrated masses of a densely populated area; crisis and chaos be-
come quickly amplified in a densely populated area. However, through 
preparation and understanding the social map, coupled with the fore-
1 Sam Levin, “ ‘They Executed Him’: Police Killing of Stephon Clark Leaves Family Shat-
tered,” Guardian, 27 March 2018; and Jose A. Del Real, “Hundreds at Sacramento City Hall 
Protest Police Killing of Stephon Clark,” New York Times, 27 March 2018.
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sight to draw boundaries, a national security apparatus can limit the 
impact of a potentially costly uprising. 
Megacities are defined by their dense populations, networks, 
resources, and life-support systems. As such, influencing possible 
security events—threats—by defining territories of informal social 
and economic similarities and civil structures, and identifying griev-
ances is a challenge. How are megacity conflicts that arise from col-
lective behavior limited? Government influence must limit turmoil by 
identifying and protecting targets, while also enabling mobility of the 
populace. In addition, physical constraints, grievances, and collective 
behavior in a megacity define territories, which affect the dynamics of 
a crowd and identify targets of collective violence. Mapping these in-
formal networks within a dense environment allows maneuver around 
and through crisis areas; and understanding grievances allows for tar-
get identification and protection. Thus, when governments see and 
identify high-risk enclaves, they can limit the impact of a crisis. 
Megacities foster territorial collective behavior that reflects both 
political and economic grievances.2 Existing physical constraints limit 
and define the behavior, though collective behavior and group dynam-
ics can develop into collective violence. Violent actions, such as riots, 
result in rational targets, which stem from grievances within the pop-
ulation. As a result, transient masses and belligerent actions combine 
to form the collective behavior that defines the boundaries of a crisis. 
By understanding group formation and grievance development within 
a densely populated area, state agencies can more effectively identify 
areas of risk. Exploiting the nature of these territories may in fact limit 
the impact of conflict and increase the influence of the state. Identi-
fying the targets of collective violence and their territorial boundaries 
creates mobility corridors and supports state forces with maneuver 
space to set up logistical operations, blocking forces, channels for the 
enemy, and humanitarian relief.3 
This chapter links territory-based collective violence with a forc-
2 For the purpose of this chapter, territories are networks associated in time and space, 
the physical boundaries of a group of people, places, and/or things. 
3 Collective violence generally falls into three categories: situational (e.g., barroom fight), 
organized (e.g., lynching), and institutional (e.g., the national guard policing a riot).
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es’ ability to exploit maneuver space and define targets. The research 
applies to physical and nonphysical targets across international bor-
ders. Territoriality is not restricted to the megacity geography of dense 
human populations. To combat an unconventional enemy, formal net-
works must influence the informal ones that define the territories. Col-
lective behavior is by definition an informal network. When collective 
behavior evolves into a crisis, state forces must limit the collective vio-
lence by mapping and estimating targets. Based on the 1992 Los An-
geles and 2005–6 Paris riots, the following case study will look closely 
at collective behavior, existing territories, transient mass generation, 
security responses, and targets to develop a concept for defining ter-
ritories of collective behavior threats and exploiting boundaries to in-
crease state influence and to protect targets. Identifying key territories 
and targets prior to, or at the onset, of a conflict in a densely populated 
environment will shorten that conflict and reduce the amount of col-
lateral damage.  
COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 
The basis of this research revolves around several key definitions that 
link progression from grievances and collective behavior to territori-
alization. The linkages are broad and derive from a variety of factors. 
Understanding the process and theories behind the social actions of 
collective behavior through transient mass to collective violence may 
clarify the creation of territories.  
Grievances
We must first focus on the concepts of political and economic griev-
ances. These complaints develop in megacities through the margin-
alization of certain ethnicities and economic classes and the limited 
opportunities available to them.4 There is a large body of work in the 
political economy and sociology fields comparing greed versus griev-
ance as a motivation for conflict. Self-enrichment incentives serve as 
motivation to continue conflict, including access to resources, and 
4 Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons 
from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict (New York: International Peace 
Academy, 2003). 
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also as a form of greed.5 The intent of this study is to look at horizon-
tal inequality grievances, or those among culturally defined groups 
that amplify the potential for conflict, to identify the territories creat-
ed by grievance. These grievances relate to resource availability or 
unavailability and the social groups who have access to them.6 As 
such, physical and economic resources define both territories and 
the grievances created therein. For example, in a tenement house far 
from public transportation, physical transportation capabilities limit 
employment opportunities, creating obstacles to opportunity and up-
ward mobility. This chapter focuses on physical territories but as they 
apply to both physical and nonphysical boundaries and targets. Griev-
ances also derive from physically separated marginalized groups, as 
reflected in architecture and urban-enclavization or imposed territori-
alization.7 
Collective Behavior
The predominant theory on collective behavior comes from Neil J. 
Smelser’s The Theory of Collective Behavior, which defines collec-
tive behavior as the spontaneous emergence of social groups outside 
of the norm, but other definitions also focus on collective behavior 
between both institutional and emergent behaviors.8 Jack M. Weller 
and Enrico L. Quarantelli claim collective behavior links to emergent 
5 The International Peace Academy’s Program on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars case 
studies compiled by Ballentine and Nitzschke place both greed and grievance into the 
category of “incentives for self-enrichment and/or opportunities for insurgent mobiliza-
tion.” Ballentine and Nitzschke, Beyond Greed and Grievance, 2.
6 Edward Aspinall, “The Construction of Grievance: Natural Resources and Identity in a 
Separatist Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 6 (December 2007): 950–72.
7 Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (New York: Verso, 
1990). Davis defines enclavization in Los Angles as the separation between economical-
ly disparate communities. The Hollywood neighborhoods wall themselves off and hire 
armed private guards. Short distances away are low-income areas. The author describes 
how the obsession in Los Angeles with physical security has led to these walled private 
communities. Enclavization is evident in any modern city and gentrification often empha-
sizes the separation; southeast Washington, DC, is the perfect example. The neighbor-
hood immediately adjacent to the Marine Barracks at 8th and I Streets and the Navy Yard 
is upscale, replete with expensive boutiques and bars, but just a few blocks away the 
community suffers frequent street crime.
8 Neil J. Smelser, The Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1962).
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and institutional social relationships and norms.9 As seen in figure 2.1, 
three out of the four quadrants of collective behavior lead to some 
level of violent masses.
Richard A. Berk notes evidence of rational decisions in a riotous 
environment as a manifestation of collective behavior. Berk studied 
group decision making by considering the underlying causes behind 
collective violence. He used game theory and an action list to deter-
mine acts based on rationality and the personal cost of involvement.10 
Berk’s research found that the selection of targets is not a result of 
mass irrationality but rather the conscious and subconscious thought 
behind collective violence. Although the target (e.g., vehicle, store 
window, etc.) may be the closest object to a crowd, the target may 
9 Jack M. Weller and E. L. Quarantelli, “Neglected Characteristics of Collective Behav-
ior,” American Journal of Sociology 79, no. 3 (November 1973): 665–85, https://doi.
org/10.1086/225589.
10 Richard A. Berk, “A Gaming Approach to Crowd Behavior,” American Sociological Re-
view 39, no. 3 (June 1974): 355–73. 
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actually be the neighborhood itself or the symbols of economic pros-
perity. His case study looked at an anti-Vietnam protest that took place 
on the campus of Northwestern University in Chicago. The event in-
cited enough fervor that protestors blocked off major roads as a form 
of immediate protest.11 The act took place without a well-defined goal; 
however, the participants shared a grievance against the Vietnam War, 
whereby blocking the road served as an immediate announcement to 
nonparticipants of the grievance. Targets may be tied directly to the 
grievance or simply an unfortunate target of opportunity.
For the purposes of this discussion, collective social actions 
form a cohesive group or transient mass. This chapter will demon-
strate that spontaneous behaviors define territories when they lead 
to collective violence. Roberta Senechal de la Roche sees collective 
violence as a deviation from social control and common norms. These 
manifestations of collective behavior can happen quickly in the form 
of transient mass, where the mass may not be violent but will respond 
similarly to collective behavior with shared information driving its ac-
tion. Collective violence manifests in the form of violent crowds, riots, 
lynching, vigilantism, and terrorism.12 The latter two events tend to be 
well-organized and longer lasting in duration, although all may be ev-
ident in a megacity environment. For the state to best react to these 
acts of violence, it must define the space around them. 
Territories
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term territories as an area 
of knowledge, activity, or experience, or as land with a specified char-
acteristic. Representations of regions or territories are discussed at 
length in conflict studies. The most prevalent border disputes are inter-
state, but those same definitions and historical associations of social 
borders apply to enclaves within a densely populated environment.13 
In the context of this discussion, territory is much more fluid than state 
11 Berk, “A Gaming Approach to Crowd Behavior,” 355.
12 Roberta Senechal de la Roche, “Collective Violence as Social Control,” Sociological 
Forum 11, no. 1 (March 1996): 97–128.
13 Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, “Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and 
Conflict Escalation,” International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 1 (March 2006).
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borders and reflects social rather than formal lines. The changing role 
of boundaries at the national and megacity level has been the subject 
of formal research. Friedrich Kratochwil studied territorial social or-
ganizations and their effect on the international system. His research 
revealed how modern attempts to create functional regimes better 
managed the conflict resulting from lack of access to resources and 
political interest.14 In this instance, the social organization borders 
were more efficient managing resources and changed the formal defi-
nitions of territory to a social focus. Another study on territories looked 
at social and economic borders in Los Angeles, where luxury lifestyles 
are physically defended to create a culture of physical security, as pre-
viously described in Davis’s book City of Quartz.15 
John Gerard Ruggie defines territory in relation to collective be-
havior as a “spatial extension” and “the social facility of any spatial 
extension in turn implies some mode of differentiating human col-
lectivities from one another.”16 Many sociology and political science 
studies on territories relate directly back to group collective behavior. 
For the sake of this discussion, the term territories represents any de-
finable physical area containing multiple possible targets and avenues 
for maneuver.
State Influence
Our discussion will frequently focus on the goal of state influence. In 
a densely populated environment, collective behavior often leads to 
state security losing the ability to influence or minimize the negative 
impact of a violent situation. The case studies discussed below illus-
trate two such examples of local legitimate security forces losing con-
trol of a situation. Control is not the goal in a densely populated area, 
as one group may never have complete control. However, influenc-
ing the action of collective behavior groups to protect resources and 
property is the goal of state security influence.
14 Friedrich Kratochwil, “Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the For-
mation of the State System,” World Politics 39, no. 1 (October 1986): 27–52.
15 Davis, City of Quartz, 223.
16 John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in Internation-
al Relations,” International Organization 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 148.
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Megacities operate based on numerous variables regarding 
transient mass populations and collective behavior. The case stud-
ies below operate on a few assumptions. Megacities exist in a state 
strong enough to support existing political and economic systems in 
place, and these systems have the capability to respond to grievances 
and threats to security. In the Los Angeles and Paris riots, the existing 
security system was the local police force. A megacity’s character-
istics also include a breadth and depth of character, meaning there 
will exist, in relatively small spaces, a variety of social and economic 
classes. Territories already exist within densely populated areas, and 
they are capable of fostering collective behavior.
Collective behavior and grievances drive the creation of physi-
cal territories. The physical attributes of a city can influence collective 
violence by allowing fluidity of forces or influence around the territo-
ries supporting collective behavior/violence. The attributes associat-
ed with territorialization from collective behavior empower a military 
force attempting to minimize the impact of conflict, particularly when 
these territories have borders and targets that can be exploited by mil-
itary operations. 
Drawing borders around these territories and identifying tar-
gets allows for the maneuver of security forces within an area already 
plagued by collective violence. The 1992 Los Angeles and 2005–6 
Paris riots case studies evaluate how collective behavior developed 
because of existing grievances, territorialization, and transient mass 
formation after specific events. Our discussion will conclude with an 
assessment of state security responses and the specific targets of 
the collective behavior. These cases amplify the patterns of collective 
behavior based on grievance and translate the grievances into territo-
ries. In both cases, the initial security response did little to quell the 
riots. However, the aftereffects formed the basis for a military concept 
that will use territorialization to minimize the impact of collective vio-
lence and to maximize state security influence. 
CASE STUDIES
On 29 April 1992 in Los Angeles, the jury’s findings from the Rod-
ney King trial were released. The court had found the four white Los 
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Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers not guilty of beating an 
unarmed black man, Rodney King, the previous March. Bystanders 
videotaped the entire attack. The court decision met with protests that 
spread across the city, eventually causing the mayor to request mili-
tary assistance after five days of riots, looting, and arson.
On 25 October 2005 in Clichy-sous-Bois on the outskirts of Paris, 
a group of teens on their way home from playing soccer were loiter-
ing near their homes and a concerned citizen called the police. As 
squad cars approached, the youths fled from the officers and three 
were electrocuted when they hid near a power substation. Zyed Ben-
na and Bouna Traoré both died as a result of their injuries. The public 
believed their deaths were directly linked to the officers failing to act. 
The unrest escalated in Clichy-sous-Bois in the form of rioting crowds, 
which then spread around the country in the following weeks, causing 
a state emergency. By January 2006, the French government passed 
legislation addressing the grievances about unemployment for immi-
grants identified as a critical factor during the riots. French citizens 
repealed the legislation in April 2006 after massive opposition.17 
By delving into these two cases, we can correlate empirical ob-
servations about each of the events. The existing grievances and terri-
tories relate directly to how the events unfolded and what the violence 
targeted. Building a military concept around this logic illustrates the 
nature of combat stemming from these types of conflicts in a pop-
ulation-dense environment. The case studies highlight six concepts: 
collective behavior, existing grievances, existing territories, transient 
mass generation, security responses, and targets of violence.
Collective Behavior 
As discussed above, Smelser breaks down social tenets in detail and 
describes how collective behavior actions take place in a cluster of 
time and in specific cultural areas. These collectivities can be bro-
ken down into physical and temporal collectives.18 Groups coalesce 
through social, cultural, and proximity behaviors, and collective behav-
17 John P. Murphy, “Protest or Riot?: Interpreting Collective Action in Contemporary 
France,” Anthropological Quarterly 84, no. 4 (2011): 977–78.
18 Smelser, The Theory of Collective Behavior, 1–5.
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ior stems from some level of communication and interaction. This as-
pect of his theory aligns with the concept of territorialization of social 
behaviors, where shared grievances facilitate common understanding 
among individuals. Territories then form from these numerous griev-
ances and previously existing physical or social commonalities.
The combination of aggrieved and compressed populations in 
territories leads to collective behavior, but it can manifest into col-
lective violence in the form of riots or civil disturbance with the right 
window of opportunity for transient mass creation. Both the Los An-
geles and Paris events are examples of collective behavior that turned 
violent. Population-dense environments facilitate collective behavior 
through territoriality.19 Collective violence is a form of social control to 
get a group to mimic each other’s behavior. Mobs thus are a manifes-
tation of grievances to vent anger.20 Mobilizations represent the local 
social or kinship bonds that have been created. Creation of groups 
bound by collective behavior according to spatial proximity or griev-
ance identification set the stage for collective violence.
The examples from Los Angeles and France both show existing 
marginalized populations who attempted to address economic and 
social marginalization through the political system. Modern megac-
ities are a hybrid of networks that link people with similar interests 
and backgrounds; in this instance, the populations from Los Angeles 
and Paris shared grievances. In both cases, the grievances stemmed 
from systemic economic discrimination against immigrant and minori-
ty populations, resulting in physical territorialization. These obvious 
physical boundaries represent the first step in territorialized collective 
behavior of similarly aggrieved people in one area. 
Existing Grievances 
Sociopolitical differences lead to grievances within population-dense 
environments of vastly different social classes in close proximity, 
which can exemplify those differences and make grievances more 
prominent. Grievances develop when a population or territory does 
19 Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond,” 150.
20 Senechal de la Roche, “Collective Violence as Social Control,” 98.
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not have access to basic life necessities or resources. These resourc-
es can be as complex as economic opportunities, political influence, 
and education, or as simple as clean water and sewage systems.
Grievances also are related to structures and existing territories. 
Common grievances are the glue that forms territories from common-
alities between the aggrieved. The immigrant populations in Paris had 
similar religious views.21 With continued immigration, both legal and 
illegal, and a slowing economy, the job market dried up as some areas 
saw almost 30 percent unemployment.22 Attempts were made at inte-
gration policies to curb Islamic radicalism but instead limited Islamic 
identity.23 In March 2004, the Jacques R. Chirac government passed 
a secularization law banning religious symbols in public primary and 
secondary schools; for example, Islamic girls could no longer wear 
traditional headscarves.24 Despite continued cultural integration of 
second- and third-generation immigrants, there was a general dissat-
isfaction with the unfulfilled promise of economic and political inte-
gration.25 
Existing Territories
The creation of territories and identifying borders and targets can be 
done within social, nonsocial, physical, and economic borders; for ex-
ample, the space between public transportation stops or a neighbor-
hood and business area that shares a language forms physical borders. 
States further define territories in megacities through civil planning 
characteristics: zoning, property taxes, and services provided. Non-
social territorialization can be seen in public transportation, which is 
21 Jason Burke, “Fires of ‘Civil War’ Erupt in Paris,” Guardian, 29 October 2005.
22 Craig S. Smith, “Immigrant Rioting Flares in Northern France for Ninth Night,” New York 
Times, 5 November 2005.
23 Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, “Urban Riots in France,” SAIS Review of International Af-
fairs 26, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2006): 51, https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2006.0032.
24 French Law No. 2004-228 from 15 March 2004 applies the principle of the separation of 
church and state and concerns wearing symbols or garb that show religious affiliation in 
public primary and secondary schools.
25 Raphaël Canet et al., “France’s Burning Issue: Understanding the Urban Riots of 
November 2005,” in Crowd Actions in Britain and France from the Middle Ages to the 
Modern World, ed. Michael T. Davis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), https://doi.org 
/10.1057/9781137316516.
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defined as a physical representation of network pathways and ave-
nues of approach. These avenues delineate territories and offer utility 
for maneuver during a conflict scenario. Space plays a central role in 
social change and collective action and defines perceptual avenues 
for action.26 Social space includes physical resources such as busi-
nesses or essential services. Perpetual avenues for action are repre-
sented by the major highways defining neighborhoods, causeways, 
or canals that form physical borders or territories. Territory creation 
in megacities happens through geographic, ethnic, and economic 
boundaries and common grievances that all lead to collective behav-
ior. A common grievance might be poor access to employment oppor-
tunities due to the lack of public transportation. Unemployed people 
from one territory use the same limited resources, and frustration with 
the limited resources leads to collective behavior. Territories are com-
plicated—like the stories of William Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet 
and Arthur Laurents’s West Side Story—the populations live with each 
other but divide socially or politically.27
Territorialization began in France in the 1960s with an influx of 
immigrants from North Africa and the Maghreb regions during re-
construction. These marginalized newcomers lived in large-scale 
public housing projects and were subjected to the French form of 
cultural integration.28 Many of the second- and third-generation im-
migrants had culturally assimilated but remained on the outskirts of 
society—physically and figuratively—because of entrenched anti- 
immigrant xenophobia and economic discrimination. These districts 
were economically isolated and physically disconnected from public 
transportation and city centers. In 2005, conflicts constantly erupted 
between police and Muslim youth. The segregation of neighborhoods 
26 Robert Beauregard, “Time, Action, Space” (masters diss., Graduate School of Architec-
ture, Planning, and Preservation, Columbia University, 2011), 365.
27 Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 99.
28 The French integration system in place from the nineteenth to the twentieth century 
rested on three pillars: school, compulsory military service, and work. For more on the 
French Republican model, see Yann Algan et al., “Cultural Integration in France,” in Cul-
tural Integration of Immigrants in Europe, ed. Yann Algan et al. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660094.003.0002.
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further compounded the problem by discouraging assimilation with 
the French population.29 Failed attempts at engaging political tools left 
these North African and Arab populations frustrated and intentionally 
territorialized. In October 2005, French Minister of the Interior Nicolas 
Sarkozy had begun a new offensive against 25 tough neighborhoods 
across France.30
Just as in Paris, a history of racial and economic segregation was 
prevalent in Los Angeles. In 1992, the LAPD responsibilities were bro-
ken down by regions, bureaus, and divisions.31 These divisions aligned 
with the relative economic classification of the neighborhood. Mike 
Davis discusses the lack of public spaces (e.g., public restrooms kept 
nonresidents away from certain commercial areas) for all the class-
es to commune due to a defense of luxury lifestyle and an obsession 
with physical security.32 Los Angeles territories further developed 
along lines of economic distribution. Black gang culture evolved in the 
1970s along clear territorial lines. Decades of gang and drug violence 
had partitioned off the city into small social and economic territories 
(figure 2.2).33 As a result, gangs as social groups act as motivation for 
collective behavior and collective violence. In both Paris and Los An-
geles, the violence happened in the vicinity of the belligerents, and 
the people involved in the crimes did not leave the area. In both cas-
es, the existing territories affected how the crowds reacted and where 
they operated. Decades of segregation and marginalization festered 
beneath the surface of a population ripe for action.
Transient Mass Generation
We respect the republic; the republic has to respect us. 
~Siako Karne34
29 Wihtol de Wenden, “Urban Riots in France,” 47–50.
30 Burke, “Fires of ‘Civil War’ Erupt in Paris.”
31 Burt Useem, “The State and Collective Disorders: The Los Angeles Riot/Protest of April, 
1992,” Social Forces 76, no. 2 (December 1997): 362.
32 Davis, City of Quartz, 266.
33 Davis, City of Quartz, 267.
34 Brother of a teenager whose death sparked the 2005 riots as quoted in Burke, “Fires of 
‘Civil War’ Erupt in Paris.”
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Mobilizing agents exploit critical events and manufacture windows of 
opportunity. They seek to leverage a shocking event to mobilize oth-
er citizens. Smelser describes collective behavior actions as taking 
place in a cluster of time and in specific cultural areas.35 Physical ter-
ritories created by the geographic containment of specific social and 
immigrant groups in both Los Angeles and across France defined ar-
eas ripe for collective behavior. The timing required a specific event, 
which generated action against the government’s security. Opportuni-
ties for collective violence originated in Los Angeles with the release 
of the results of the case against the officers who beat Rodney King, 
and in Paris with the death of innocent Muslim teens outside of Par-
is. The collective behavior actions in both cases represent transient 
mass generation, which evolved into collective violence.
35 Smelser, The Theory of Collective Behavior, 23. 
Figure 2.2 1972 Figueroa Street gang map.
Davis, City of Quartz, 301
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The Los Angeles riots spread because of the immediate news 
coverage of the action that began at Florence and Normandie avenues 
in South Central Los Angeles. The city’s habit of live broadcasts for un-
folding crimes had the unintended effect of serving as a call to action 
for other rioters. When they arrived on the scene, crowds targeted and 
drove out the police officers. The actions at that intersection were the 
flashpoint for the riot, and by early evening on 29 April, the intensity of 
the protests prevented the LAPD from gaining control.36 
The Paris riots also spread quickly but were not limited to that 
city. The North African and Muslim populations had an existing social 
network, and the fervor spread throughout the social organization of 
marginalized peoples. News articles kindled years of frustration with a 
system that focused on socialization and not racism, whereby citizen-
ship provided for integration regardless of ethnicity but did not represent 
reality.37 France met Smesler’s time and space requirements for the col-
lective behavior from October 2005 to spread throughout the country.
The transient mass generation in both cases had a great deal 
to do with the population density in small areas with groups sharing 
a grievance. The shared narratives led to collective action through 
information sharing. The aggrieved people needed a single event to 
set off the collective behavior and turn it into civil disobedience. The 
territorialized grievances separating populations and denying op-
portunities are the necessary condition; windows of opportunity for 
civil disturbance are the black swans.38 However, the government’s 
reaction to the violence can reduce its spread.
Security Responses
Collective violence refers to coordinated destruction in which groups 
specialize in the deployment of coercive means to “undertake pro-
grams of action that cause damage,” according the Charles Tilly.39 Ri-
36 Useem, “The State and Collective Disorders,” 364.
37 Wihtol de Wenden, “Urban Riots in France,” 51; and Murphy, “Protest or Riot?,” 981.
38 Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s definition for the term black swan refers to an event that comes 
as a surprise, has a major effect, and is often inappropriately rationalized after the fact 
with the benefit of hindsight. See Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of 
the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 2010).
39 Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence, 26.
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ots are a perfect example of social or political grievance manifesting 
into action. Social violence stems from a continuation of the politics of 
resistance through other means. The response of governmental secu-
rity forces is imperative to understanding how territorialized collective 
behavior can shift.40
In 1992, LAPD responded to their first calls about rioters and pro-
testers at 1720 in the evening at Florence and Normandie avenues. 
It was a primarily residential area with the two cross streets as main 
thoroughfares through the community. Approximately 100 people had 
gathered, and the police responded within minutes of the initial call 
with 20 officers. The officers and their vehicles immediately became 
the target of physical assaults and projectiles. The officers withdrew 
to the 77th Street community police station more than a mile away.41 
As the civil disturbance expanded across numerous neighborhoods 
during several days, LAPD and the mayor asked for help. The National 
Guard mobilized and Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTF-LA) formed 
with active duty military forces from the region. The military forces as-
signed to the civil disturbance mission conducted mostly point and 
area security missions.42 
The immediate response to the uprising in Clichy-sous-Bois mer-
ited the action of more than 200 riot police officers who were fighting 
a street battle. The French police also requested support from the 
French Army, as they had little training for riots.43 In Paris and Lyon, 
France, police banned public gatherings, and the government de-
clared a state of emergency in Paris and 30 other areas. The Paris 
police brought in 2,000 additional officers to handle the escalating 
situation.44 After almost three months of violence, the French govern-
40 Not all collective violence occurs between citizens and authorities, but for the purposes 
of this discussion that is the only case that will be addressed.
41 Useem, “The State and Collective Disorders,” 363.
42 Army doctrine on civil disobedience included a large spectrum of operations to com-
bat possible insurgent operations (e.g., snipers, bombing, and hostage situations). JTF-LA 
fell outside the anticipated spectrum of the mission. Operations Other than War, vol. III, 
Civil Disturbance—LA Riots, Newsletter No. 93-7 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army 
Lessons Learned, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 1993); and Civil Disturbance Opera-
tions, Field Manual 3-19.15 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2005).
43 Burke, “Fires of ‘Civil War’ Erupt in Paris.”
44 “Riot Erupts in French City Centre,” BBC News, 13 November 2005.
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ment responded with legislation addressing economic grievances 
caused by lack of access to employment opportunities. This law was 
similar to America’s affirmative action and intended to allow the im-
migrant North African and Arab populations more access to the job 
market by encouraging employers.
The significant challenge to the security forces in both the Los 
Angeles and Paris cases was the requirement to respond to multiple 
areas of disturbance simultaneously, which required significant co-
ordination efforts beyond that of just local law enforcement. Engage-
ment from national security forces is often necessary for collective 
behavior events that spread beyond one area or city. Regular law en-
forcement officers are not trained to deal with large violent crowds, 
and the military had to step in for both situations. Aside from coordina-
tion efforts for security missions, the forces must be concerned with 
targeting the collective violence.
Targets of Violence
Collective violence can have specific targets.45 Targets in the Los An-
geles riots started out as the responding officers and their vehicles. 
The collective violence spread to looting, assault, robbery, and assault 
with a deadly weapon. An unfortunate target of opportunity was found 
in Reginald Denny, a white construction truck driver, who came to a 
stop at the corner of Florence and Normandie due to the crowd of 
people blocking the street. Rioters pulled him out of his vehicle and 
beat him as a news helicopter hovering overhead caught the entire 
scene on camera for a live broadcast.46 The mob mentality exacted 
revenge for the beating of Rodney King by conducting the same kind 
of attack. The Paris riots also saw more than 10,000 cars burned and 
200 public buildings damaged.47 In this case, the destruction of pub-
lic buildings was a representation of grievances with the government 
system that marginalized these communities. The Paris riots also re-
45 Andrew W. Martin et al., “Why Targets Matter: Toward a More Inclusive Model of Collec-
tive Violence,” American Sociological Review 74, no. 5 (2009): 821–41, https://doi.org/10 
.1177/000312240907400507. 
46 Useem, “The State and Collective Disorders,” 363.
47 Murphy, “Protest or Riot?,” 978.
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sulted in makeshift barricades canalizing any security response and 
accentuating existing territories.48 The initial targets—police and their 
vehicles—were clearly symbols of LAPD, whose actions were the 
cause of social distress. 
Grievance symbols offer an easy target. The Occupy Wall Street 
movement was a transient mass targeted against wealth distribution 
in America. They targeted and physically occupied a park near the 
symbol of American wealth: the New York Stock Exchange.49 Sharing 
information on how the target applied to the grievance is important 
to targeting collective behavior. In Los Angeles, privately owned ve-
hicles and storefronts were symbols of the economic prosperity not 
enjoyed by the marginalized populations in the area. It is easy for tran-
sient mass to exploit targets out in the open. Self-enrichment, looting, 
or greed may also encourage targeting. A collective behavior event 
exacerbates looting because the perceived cost of self-enrichment is 
low. The news helicopters showed numerous incidents of theft and 
burglary without repercussions from law enforcement, so other indi-
viduals made the conscious decision to conduct similar behavior.
MILITARY APPLICATION
If social violence is a continuation of resistance to policy though oth-
er means, there is basis for action—grievance and transient mass—
which drives the creation of conflict territories. Understanding the 
social environment and grievances in a population-dense environ-
ment will make the conflict easier to fight, though megacity conflicts 
stemming from collective behavior are hard to predict, limit, and fight. 
Military units operating in dense environments can identify targets 
of collective violence and conflict territories as key terrain. Under-
standing these features of the battlefield allow for maneuver, while 
knowing the key terrain allows the security force to take advantage of 
resources. Fighting in megacities requires an understanding of social 
grievances, overlaid with the physical terrain that people inhabit, to 
48 Burke, “Fires of ‘Civil War’ Erupt in Paris.”
49 Todd Gitlin, “Occupy’s Predicament: The Moment and the Prospects for the Move- 
ment,” British Journal for Sociology 64, no. 1 (March 2013): 3–25, https://doi.org/10.1111 
/1468-4446.12001.
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see territories. Common targets, windows of opportunity, and existing 
grievances further define these territories. 
Grievances against the government then manifest as threats to 
government buildings or infrastructure. Territories defined by grievanc-
es can be as simple as one side of the train tracks with all the industry 
and no commercial venues or as complicated as small neighborhoods 
of a few square blocks that share a language. Military operations must 
exploit the characteristics of these territories by understanding how 
to move around them or through them and to use the resources found 
there. This operational concept establishes principles for combat in 
population-dense environments during conflicts of collective violence 
to minimize damage and quickly regain state influence. Effectively 
operating a military force in a megacity requires an understanding of 
social territories to use available resources and to minimize conflict.
A megacity houses vast swaths of social identities with dispro-
portionate resource distribution. Sociopolitical differences can lead to 
grievance, especially between the haves and the have-nots.50 Many 
of these groups in close proximity share grievances, which develop 
when a population or territory does not have access to physical, politi-
cal, or economic resources.51 Urban areas support territories of differ-
ent social classes in close proximity, which amplifies the experience 
of difference. Social identity theory states that individuals will cate-
gorize themselves within a specific group or groups as part of their 
social identity, and they will act on behalf of that group’s interests.52 
Territories of social difference define urban terrain, and within these 
50 Ballentine and Nitzschke, Beyond Greed and Grievance; and Davis, City of Quartz.
51 Ballentine and Nitzschke, Beyond Greed and Grievance, discusses the concepts of 
justice-seeking grievance versus loot-seeking greed.
52 Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” Social Psy-
chology Quarterly 63, no. 3 (September 2000): 225, https://doi.org/10.2307/2695870. 
Through the process of self-categorization or identification, an identity is formed. Social 
categories in which individuals place themselves are part of a structured society and exist 
only in relation to other contrasting categories (e.g., black versus white); each has more 
or less power, prestige, status, and so on. Further, these authors point out that the social 
categories precede individuals; individuals are born into a prestructured society. Once in 
society, people derive their identity or sense of self largely from the social categories to 
which they already belong.
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territories exists the possibility of collective action. As such, collective 
behavior territories evolve from common grievances and existing so-
cial boundaries. Understanding key terrain allows militaries to narrow 
operations in a megacity conflict. Physical territories created by the 
geographic containment of specific groups defined by grievance are 
ripe for collective behavior or the spontaneous emergence of social 
groups outside the norm.53 These groups can evolve into collective 
violence in the form of violent crowds, riots, and terrorism.54 
The Marine Corps’ concept publication Expeditionary Force 21 
embraces fighting in small units in a distributed fashion.55 Fighting in 
a megacity against collective violence requires fighting in a dispersed 
manner. Security operations during a conflict in a population-dense 
environment would mimic local policing in many ways. Local law en-
forcement has the advantage of understanding the local areas, griev-
ances, and existing territories. Community-based policing focuses on 
understanding the low-level local dynamics of a neighborhood. Crime 
prevention and quality of life improvement are the focus of community- 
oriented policing.56 However, information gained from close involve-
ment with a community would be invaluable to determining territorial 
borders, grievance targets, and resources available during a collective 
violence event. Coordination with local law enforcement or communi-
ty organizers is imperative to any security action taken in a megacity. 
WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS
Meeting the demands of combat in a population-dense environment 
requires in-depth understanding of the social terrain and locally avail-
able resources. The following principles tailor warfighting functions to 
operating in a population-dense environment by taking advantage of 
collective behavior territories:  
53 Smelser, The Theory of Collective Behavior. 
54 Senechal de la Roche, “Collective Violence as Social Control.”
55 Expeditionary Force 21: Forward and Ready—Now and in the Future (Washington, DC: 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2014).
56 Allison Taylor Chappell, “Learning in Action: Training the Community Policing Officer” 
(PhD diss., University of Florida, 2005).
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 • Command and Control: megacity conflict environments  
require distributed operations and effective communica-
tion. 
 ¤  Mission orders with clear constraints enable small units 
to operate independently. 
 ¤  All elements must remain connected with local law en-
forcement and joint forces to coordinate efforts at all  
levels. 
 ¤  Take advantage of existing law enforcement relation-
ships and command and control assets. 
 ¤  Coordinate with community-oriented police officers, and 
use existing police facilities where possible. 
 • Force Protection: fight in small units. 
 ¤  Understanding the culture and the specific identifying 
symbols of social groups will help the force identify in-
dividuals as part of the conflict.57 Additional cultural un-
derstanding symbols prevent a force from offending the 
local population or preventing positive influence.
 • Intelligence: maximize human terrain mapping. 
 ¤  Identification of grievances, collective violence targets, 
and existing physical boundaries (e.g., a bad neighbor-
hood) creates territories within a megacity. 
 ¤  Any intelligence preparation of the battlefield must in-
clude social groups, income levels, age of neighbor-
hoods, and assessments of horizontal inequality (e.g., 
existing gang territories). 
 ¤  Investigate local grievances or historical protests to bet-
ter identify possible targets (e.g., local government build-
ings, schools, or police stations) if there is a grievance 
with government representation.
 • Fires: use precision and small caliber fires. 
 ¤  The goal is to minimize impact to a densely populated 
area. 
 ¤  Ensure targeting does not amplify the initial grievance 
57 Stets and Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” 226.
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(e.g., destroying the only water-purification plant in a 
desert is counterproductive). 
 ¤  Use smaller caliber weapons will reduce ordnance ap-
proval requirements.
 • Logistics: use lines of communication that flow between 
territories and take advantage of existing resources or cre-
ate your own. 
 ¤  Take the road that runs between two rival factions. Lack 
of coordination between groups works in favor of mili-
tary forces. 
 ¤  Use all the dimensions of an urban environment for re-
supply. Small, unmanned aerial delivery systems (e.g., 
KMAX or CRUAS) provide fast resupply without long 
supply lines.58 
 ¤  Use three-dimensional printing or existing resources 
(e.g., water sources that can be purified or local food) 
to further minimize resupply requirements and improve 
maintenance and repair part requirements.
 • Maneuver: move in small units from different assembly ar-
eas and simultaneously converge on one objective. 
 ¤  Territory borders form from social, nonsocial, physical, 
and economic borders, including racially or economical-
ly exclusive neighborhoods, areas physically confined by 
infrastructure, or neighborhoods with shared traits for 
marginalization. 
 ¤  Establish maneuver corridors between neighborhoods 
and factions. 
These principles for combat in megacities are attainable with 
minimal adjustments to existing acquisition plans. The Department of 
Defense has already invested in developing the technology needed 
58 Richard Scott, “Unmanned K-MAX Wins Praise for Afghanistan Cargo Resupply Opera-
tions,” Jane’s Navy International, 25 July 2012.
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for improved logistics.59 A number of strategic and operational impli-
cations are associated with operating under this concept. Doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and 
facilities changes are minimal with this operating concept. 
CONCLUSIONS
Concepts from Expeditionary Force 21 and the new U.S. Army Operat-
ing Concept note the character of conflict in dense urban environments, 
but it will take more than simple tactics to win in a population-dense 
environment.60 Knowing the ground and the social possibilities helps 
inform the warfighter of possible targets, available resources, and ma-
neuverability corridors. An emphasis on understanding the social ter-
rain of the urban battlefield is imperative to minimizing the long-term 
impact of conflict. If social violence is a continuation of resistance to 
policy through other means, then the military must understand the 
cause of resistance to combat the violence. Fighting in a megacity 
requires an understanding of the social environment and how existing 
grievances and boundaries form territories. Knowing what the terri-
tories hold allows effective maneuver on the battlefield by a security 
force, thus minimizing the impact of a conflict formed by collective 
violence. 
59 Nick Brown et al., “Make and Mend: The Revolutionary Promise of 3-D Printing,” Interna-
tional Defence Review, 16 September 2014.
60 The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020–2040, TRADOC Pam-
phlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014).
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CHAPTER THREE
The 2008 Battle of Sadr City
Implications for Future Urban Combat
David E. Johnson and M. Wade Markel
U.S. and Iraqi troops clashed in Sadr City, where many of 
the Shiite militants are loyal to cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and 
his Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi). The fighting intensified  
on 25 March, when the Iraqi government announced a crack-
down on criminal elements in al-Basrah, a Shiite stronghold 
in southern Iraq. The violence soon spread through south-
ern Iraq’s Shiite heartland and into Shiite neighborhoods in 
the capital. The number of Iraqi civilians killed and wound-
ed nationwide continued to increase—February saw 633 
deaths and 701 wounded; March saw 923 deaths and 1,358 
wounded; and April saw 969 deaths and 1,750 wounded. 
The U.S. military, particularly the Army, devotes considerable effort to 
the difficult challenges of combat in urban areas, particularly in meg-
acities.1 The strategic importance of cities is timeless. From Troy to 
Baghdad, their significance remains consistent because, as Carl von 
Clausewitz wrote in Principles of War : “In order to seize the enemy’s 
1 The chief of staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group and the U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) have both made megacities an area of inquiry. See Mi-
chael Bailey et al., “A Proposed Framework for Appreciating Megacities: A US Army Per-
spective,” Small Wars Journal 10, no. 4 (2014): and Kevin M. Felix and Frederick D. Wong, 
“The Case for Megacities,” Parameters 45, no. 1 (Spring 2015).
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material forces we should direct our operations against the places 
where most of these resources are concentrated: principal cities, 
storehouses, and large fortresses. On the way to these objectives we 
shall encounter the enemy’s main force or at least a considerable part 
of it.”2 Capital cities were of particular importance to Clausewitz: “Pub-
lic opinion is won through great victories and the occupation of the 
enemy’s capital.”3 
Russia’s experiences in Grozny, Chechnya (1999–2000), and the 
U.S. fight in Fallujah, Iraq (2004), are two recent examples of modern 
urban combat operations that accomplished their objectives. In both 
of these cases, the objective was to destroy enemy forces that had 
made the city their base of operations. The battles of Grozny and Fal-
lujah were remarkably similar: the city was surrounded, noncomba-
tants urged to flee, and combined arms forces went block-by-block 
killing or capturing their adversaries until the city was cleared. Unsur-
prisingly, the levels of destruction and friendly casualties were both 
high in Grozny and Fallujah.4  
In 2008, Sadr City, Iraq, presented a different problem than either 
Grozny or Fallujah. Built in 1959 to address a severe housing shortage 
in Baghdad, the suburb was originally named al-Thawra or Saddam 
City. It would later be renamed in honor of Ayatollah Mohammad Sa-
dec al-Sadr. Sadr City was part of the larger Coalition effort to bring 
stability to greater Baghdad. The ability to shrink the problem by evac-
uating noncombatants was not an option, as there was nowhere in 
Baghdad for more than 2 million noncombatants to go. U.S. forces 
could face similar issues in large urban areas in the future.
2 Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, trans. and ed. Hans W. Gatzke (Harrisburg, PA: 
Military Service Publishing Company, 1942); reprint (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 
2003), 45–46.
3 Clausewitz, Principles of War, 46.
4 On Grozny, see David E. Johnson et al., In the Middle of the Fight: An Assessment of 
Medium-Armored Forces in Past Military Operations (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2008), 
114–22. On Fallujah, see Matt M. Matthews, Operation Al Fajr: A Study in Army and 
Marine Corps Joint Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 
2006). The Russians were much less discriminate in their use of fires in Grozny than Co-
alition forces in Fallujah. See Timothy L. Thomas, “Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons 
Learned,” Military Review (July–August 2000). Thomas notes that Grozny was essentially a 
free-fire zone and that the Russians led with massive fires and followed up with maneuver.
CHAPTER THREE
77
A new approach to urban combat grew out of the challenges the 
U.S. brigade commander faced in the 2008 Battle of Sadr City. The de-
feat of the relatively small number of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia was 
the objective in Sadr City, just as it had been with the Chechen militia 
in Grozny and the al-Qaeda terrorists in Fallujah. What evolved from it, 
however, parallels Julian S. Corbett’s classic treatise Some Principles 
of Maritime Strategy more so than lessons from Grozny or Fallujah, 
much less Stalingrad or Berlin: “That seeing that the defensive is a 
stronger form of war than the offensive, it is prima facie better strategy 
to make the enemy come to you than to go to him and seek a decision 
on his own ground.”5
BACKGROUND AND METHOD OLO GY
In late March 2008, a key battle took place in Sadr City, a Shia area of 
Baghdad with an estimated 2.4 million residents. This battle solidified 
the authority of Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki and enabled him 
to extend government control to the whole of Baghdad. Thus, the bat-
tle created some of the conditions that eventually allowed the United 
States to realize its objectives in Iraq.6 
The authors used after action reports, briefings, and other pri-
mary and secondary sources to support their research. The most 
valuable sources, however, came from interviews conducted be-
tween August 2009 and April 2011 with a broad range of military 
participants from the units involved in the following phases: the 
prebattle surge in the vicinity of Sadr City, the Battle of Sadr City, 
and the post-battle stabilization and reconstruction efforts. These 
participants ranged from lieutenants to the commanding general 
of the U.S. Army’s 4th Infantry Division. Interviews were conducted 
primarily with Army officers but also included a U.S. Air Force offi-
5 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green, 
1918); reprint, with introduction and notes by Eric J. Grove (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1988), 324–25.
6 This chapter summarizes the analysis from David E. Johnson et al., The 2008 Battle of 
Sadr City: Reimagining Urban Combat (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2013). The monograph 
provided an operational analysis of the battle, explained how the tactics developed and 
employed contributed to the outcome, and derived implications for the future conduct of 
military operations. To that point, little had been written about the battle. 
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cer, a former Iraqi intelligence official, and U.S. government officials. 
These interviews provided critical information about not only what 
happened but also why it happened. 
SET TING CONDITIONS
The 2008 Battle of Sadr City took place nearly 15 months after the be-
ginning of the U.S. surge in Iraq. When President George W. Bush an-
nounced the surge in a 10 January 2007 speech, he stated the mission 
of U.S. forces was “to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to 
help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the 
Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Bagh-
dad needs.”7 The Operation Enforcing the Law, or Baghdad Security 
Plan, was a key element of the surge.8 Its purpose was announced 
by Major General Joseph F. Fil Jr., commander of the Multinational 
Division–Baghdad (MND-B), on 16 February 2007:
This new plan involves three basic parts: clear, control and 
retain. The first objective within each of the security districts 
in the Iraqi capital is to clear out extremist elements neigh-
borhood by neighborhood in an effort to protect the popu-
lation. And after an area is cleared, we’re moving to what 
we call the control operation. Together with our Iraqi coun-
terparts, we’ll maintain a full-time presence on the streets, 
and we’ll do this by building and maintaining joint security 
stations throughout the city. This effort to reestablish the 
joint security stations is well under way. The number of sta-
tions in each district will be determined by the command-
ers on the ground who control that area. An area moves into 
the retain phase when the Iraqi security forces are fully re-
sponsible for the day-to-day security mission. At this point, 
Coalition Forces begin to move out of the neighborhood 
and into locations where they can respond to requests for 
assistance as needed. During these three phases, efforts 
will be ongoing to stimulate local economies by creating 
7 President George W. Bush, as quoted in Kimberly Kagan, Enforcing the Law: The 
Baghdad Security Plan Begins (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2007), 2.
8 Kagan, Enforcing the Law.
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employment opportunities, initiating reconstruction proj-
ects and improving the infrastructure. These efforts will be 
spearheaded by neighborhood advisory councils, district 
advisory councils and the government of Iraq.9
By March 2008, implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan 
had achieved several results that set conditions for a battle in Sadr 
City. First, al-Qaeda in Iraq had been badly hurt, and its ability to cre-
ate mass-casualty events was significantly reduced. This allowed Co-
alition forces to turn their attention to other destabilizing elements, 
such as the movement led by and identified with Moqtada al-Sadr.10 
Second, the plan had strengthened the position of the government 
led by Prime Minister al-Maliki, enabling it to survive a rupture with 
the Sadrist Movement.11 Indeed, al-Maliki was moving to confront the 
Sadrist militias in al-Basrah, and preparations were well under way by 
March 2008. Third, Coalition forces had largely contained JAM, the Sa-
drists’ armed militia, to Sadr City, a circumstance that would severely 
constrain JAM’s capabilities in the coming battle.
Moving U.S. troops from their forward operating bases into 
smaller outposts throughout Baghdad was fundamental to the execu-
tion of the Baghdad Security Plan. Key components of the unfolding 
operations included: 
 • Directly confront insurgent elements in Baghdad, thereby 
leading to better local security, cooperation, and human in-
telligence.
 • Use concrete barriers and checkpoints to:
 ¤  Limit the ability of insurgents to create mass-casualty 
events with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), partic-
ularly large, vehicle-borne IEDs.
9 Kagan, Enforcing the Law, 3.
10 MajGen Jeffery W. Hammond, USA, interview with David E. Johnson and M. Wade 
Markel, Fort McPherson, GA, 25 February 2010.
11 In 2003, al-Sadr headed a Shiite political movement known as the Sadrist Movement 
that attracted millions of Shiite followers from across Iraq, though primarily the youth, 
poor, and downtrodden, to whom he offered social, educational, and health services. 
Al-Sadr also maintained tight security over the areas he controlled and established a 
court system based on Sharia (Islamic law).
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 ¤  Disrupt the enemy’s ability to move freely and resupply 
its forces.
 • Integrate special operations forces (SOF), conventional 
forces, and all means of intelligence to locate and kill or 
capture insurgent leaders.
 • Improve the capability and capacity of Iraqi security forces, 
including the Iraqi Army and police.12
One notable exception remained, however, to the trend of de-
creasing levels of violence in Baghdad: Sadr City. The U.S. Army’s 
4th Infantry Division, which by then was serving as MND-B and com-
manded by Major General Jeffery W. Hammond, had isolated Sadr 
City to some degree. Within Sadr City’s boundaries, however, the mil-
itantly anti-American JAM firmly controlled the population. Although 
SOF and conventional force raids against JAM leadership had result-
ed in the capture, death, or flight out of Iraq of much of its senior 
leadership, the raids also caused significant tension between the 
government of Iraq and JAM. Most notably, U.S. activity in Sadr City 
had largely ceased by October 2007 in the aftermath of an air strike 
that killed a number of Iraqi civilians.13 Prime Minister al-Maliki de-
clared Sadr City off-limits to U.S. ground operations. JAM’s firm con-
trol of the population already had severely limited U.S. awareness of 
what was going on inside Sadr City. Following the repercussions of 
the October 2007 incident, U.S. forces remained largely blind when it 
came to the JAM stronghold.14 
It seems likely that al-Maliki’s government offensive against mi-
litias in al-Basrah, especially JAM, precipitated JAM’s own offensive 
in Baghdad. The al-Maliki government had been making obvious 
preparations for the al-Basrah offensive since January 2008. Few U.S. 
12 BGen Billy Don Farris II, USA, interview with David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, and 
Brian Shannon, Pentagon, 18 March 2010; and Billy Don Farris II, “Warfighter Observa-
tions during the Surge: 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, ‘Task Force 
Falcon’,” briefing, 2008. 
13 Steven R. Hurst, “US: Raid of Baghdad’s Sadr City Kills 49,” Washington Post, 21 October 
2007.
14 Col John H. Hort, USA, interview with David E. Johnson and M. Wade Markel, Carlisle 
Barracks, PA, 5 November 2010.
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officers seemed convinced that Prime Minister al-Maliki was serious 
about the attack, much less that it would begin as soon as 25 March.15 
JAM apparently believed that attacks in the capital would force the 
government to return its focus and forces to Baghdad, thus discredit-
ing the al-Maliki government. Besides the apparent logic of the situa-
tion, militia members told Washington Post reporters at the time that 
this was in fact their objective.16
On 23 March 2008, a barrage of rockets fired from Sadr City hit 
targets in Baghdad, including the International Zone (a.k.a. the Green 
Zone), which houses Iraqi government offices and foreign embassies. 
The 23 March rocket fire appears to have been JAM’s initial response 
to the movement of Iraqi forces into al-Basrah. Between 23 and 25 
March, JAM overran Iraqi checkpoints in and around Sadr City. Other 
checkpoints were simply occupied by JAM fighters in collusion with 
their nominal adversaries in the Iraqi police.17 
The scale of JAM’s Sadr City offensive emerged slowly. JAM had 
fired rockets before. Indeed, it had launched several just a few days 
earlier on 21–22 March, according to a company commander in the 
Army’s 1st Squadron, 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment. Taking check-
points and intimidating government forces was something JAM forces 
did more or less continuously during this period. The magnitude of the 
March offensive became apparent after several days.18
15 Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor describe how U.S. officials viewed Prime 
Minister Maliki’s focus on al-Basrah as a diversion from higher priority efforts against 
al-Qaeda remnants in Nineveh Province, northern Iraq, and their skepticism of Iraqi prepa-
rations for the battle. See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The 
Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 2012), 464–83. For more contemporary accounts of Iraqi preparations, 
see “Iraq’s Basra Police Chief Says Plan Drawn Up to Eliminate Militias,” British Broadcast-
ing Service, 15 March 2008; and Kim Sengupta, “The Final Battle for Basra Is Near, Says 
Iraqi General,” Independent, 20 March 2008. 
16 Sudarsan Raghavan, “19 Tense Hours in Sadr City Alongside the Mahdi Army; After 
Calm Year, Fighting Engulfs Shiite Enclave,” Washington Post, 29 March 2008, A1.
17 LtCol Michael Pemrick, USA, interview with M. Wade Markel, Fort Belvoir, VA, 26 Febru-
ary 2010; Maj Brian North, USA, interview with M. Wade Markel and Brian Shannon, Fort 
Carson, CO, 12 January 2010; LtCol Christopher J. Keller, USA, interview with M. Wade 
Markel, Arlington, VA, 4 August 2010; and LtCol Robert S. Ballagh, USA, interview with M. 
Wade Markel, Pentagon, 8 February 2011.
18 Maj Jason Northrop, USA, interview with David E. Johnson and M. Wade Markel, Arling-
ton, VA, 16 March 2011.
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By 25 March, however, a major battle was clearly underway. 
That day, the government of Iraq launched its offensive in al-Basrah. 
Al-Sadr therefore publicly ended a self-imposed cease-fire that had 
been in place since August 2007, and JAM forces throughout Bagh-
dad attacked Coalition and government targets with rocket and mor-
tar fire. By the day’s end, JAM had overrun about one-half of the Iraqi 
security force’s checkpoints in and around Sadr City. It also stepped 
up rocket and mortar attacks against the International Zone. In re-
sponse, Prime Minister al-Maliki directed Coalition forces to stop the 
rocket attacks and defeat the criminal militias in Sadr City. The Battle 
of Sadr City was on.
THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
The battle centered on the Baghdad district of Thawra, which con-
tains the neighborhoods of Sadr City, Ishbiliyah, and Habbibiyah 
(figure 3.1). Sadr City’s area spans approximately 35 square kilome-
ters, roughly half the size of the island of Manhattan at 59 square 
kilometers. At the time of the battle, Sadr City had, by U.S. military 
estimates, approximately 2.4 million residents. From the Ishbiliyah 
and Habbibiyah neighborhoods below Route Gold (al-Quds Street), 
JAM forces were firing 107mm rockets and mortars into the Inter-
national Zone.19 The Ishbiliyah neighborhood also contained the 
Jamiliyah Market, Baghdad’s largest market east of the Tigris Riv-
er. Protection money from merchants in this market supplied JAM 
with much of its resources. Coalition forces also had to combat and 
contain the Sadrist uprising in the adjacent areas east and north of 
Sadr City.20
The International Zone sat at the maximum range of the 107mm 
rockets and mortars that JAM was firing from its positions below Route 
Gold. Taking these firing points and pushing JAM above Route Gold 
19 Throughout the text, we refer to the same terrain feature, al-Quds Street, by its Iraqi 
name and the name it took on U.S. graphic control measures as Route Gold.  
20 Hort interview; Farris interview; Hammond interview; Graham interview; Maj Bryan R. 
Gibby, USA, telephone interview with M. Wade Markel, 27 January 2010; and LtCol Barry 
F. Graham, USA, interview with M. Wade Markel, Pentagon, 19 January 2010.
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would therefore significantly limit JAM’s ability to conduct effective in-
direct fire attacks against the International Zone.21 
MISSION: STOP THE RO CKETS 
AND DEFEAT CRIMINAL MILITIAS 
IN SADR CITY 
As noted earlier, on 25 March, Prime Minister al-Maliki directed the 
Iraqi Army and Coalition forces to stop the rocket attacks and defeat 
the criminal militias in Sadr City. The task fell to Army Colonel John H. 
Hort, commander of the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Divi-
sion, within whose area of operations Sadr City fell.
General Hammond focused on going after JAM leaders and 
keeping a lid on the rest of Baghdad. Within Sadr City, operations un-
folded in four phases as MND-B responded to developments. During 
the first phase, U.S. forces seized control of rocket points of origin 
21 Hammond interview; Hort interview; and Maj William Downing, USA, interview with 
M. Wade Markel and Brian Shannon, Fort Carson, CO, 12 January 2010.
Figure 3.1 The Baghdad International Zone and Sadr City.
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
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south of Route Gold while Iraqi forces attempted to secure the Ishbili-
yah and Habbibiyah neighborhoods. During the second phase, when 
it became clear that maneuver forces alone could not control JAM’s 
infiltration without a barrier, U.S. forces isolated Ishbiliyah and Hab-
bibiyah from the rest of Sadr City by building a wall 12 feet tall along 
Route Gold. JAM more or less exhausted itself contesting the wall’s 
construction. During these first two phases, 3d Brigade Combat 
Team, 4th Infantry Division, and MND-B employed aerial intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike assets to neutralize 
JAM’s remaining rocket capability. In the third phase, MND-B exploit-
ed the success of its security operations by orchestrating an inten-
sive reconstruction effort. In the fourth and final phase, Iraqi security 
forces, hardened by their earlier fight, occupied the remainder of 
Sadr City.
The Ground Fight in Sadr City: Armor Matters
The fight in Sadr City involved two phases: Operation Striker Denial 
(26 March–14 April) and Operation Gold Wall (15 April–15 May). In 
the first phase, 1st Squadron, 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment, attacked 
and seized JAM rocket-firing positions in Ishbiliyah and Habbibiyah, 
while Task Force, 1st Combined Arms Battalion, 68th Armored Reg-
iment, quelled the Sadrist uprising in areas west and north of Sadr 
City proper.22 
When Operation Striker Denial began, U.S. forces immediate-
ly encountered JAM forces in prepared positions who were ready 
and willing to fight. According to U.S. commanders, however, these 
JAM forces did not fight particularly well.23 Nevertheless, resistance 
proved tougher than expected. Within a week, 1st Squadron, 2d 
22 Hammond interview; Hort interview; and Col James E. Rainey, USA, interview with 
M. Wade Markel and Brian Shannon, Fort Carson, CO, 11 January 2010.
23 U.S. soldiers to whom we spoke were more or less in complete agreement on this 
subject, particularly those operating at the tactical level. Col Michael F. Pappal, USA, 
commanding the task force in 2008, fought in Sadr City in 2004 as major in the 1st Cav-
alry Division; he felt that the enemy’s proficiency had declined significantly since then. 
Col Pappal, telephone interview with David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, and Brian Shan-
non, 2 July 2010; SgtMaj Steven Lewis, USA, telephone interview with M. Wade Markel, 
28 July 2010; Capt Kyle Morse, USA, telephone interview with M. Wade Markel, 6 July 
2010; and Northrop interview.
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Stryker Cavalry Regiment, lost six of its Stryker vehicles to IEDs and 
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Colonel Hort decided to reinforce 
the fight with armor (M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehi-
cles) and General Hammond surged five additional companies to 3d 
Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division.24 Armor proved import-
ant in the fight, providing firepower and an ability to withstand hits 
from IEDs and RPGs. Iraqi security forces joined the fight on 5 April, 
and by 6 April, had fought their way to positions near Route Gold. In 
that fight, conducted more or less independently from U.S. forces, 
the Iraqi security forces held their positions against incessant JAM 
attacks, gaining confidence that proved critical in subsequent phases 
of the battle.
Unfortunately, occupying key terrain below Route Gold did not 
confer control of those areas to U.S. and Iraqi forces. Unimpeded 
movement north of Route Gold allowed JAM to assemble and attack 
U.S. and Iraqi forces at will. The warren of alleyways and small build-
ings provided routes for JAM fighters to infiltrate the area below Route 
Gold. Thus, to hold what they had taken, U.S. and Iraqi forces had to 
deny JAM the ability to attack south of Route Gold. Access to the area 
below Route Gold was vital to JAM, so it represented key terrain for 
Colonel Hort. Operation Gold Wall, the effort to construct a barrier 
along the length of Route Gold, was intended to deny JAM the ability 
to operate in the Jamiliyah Market area.25 
During the 30 days of Operation Gold Wall, Colonel Hort’s sol-
diers emplaced approximately 3,000 12-foot-tall and 5-foot-wide rein-
forced concrete T-wall sections to create a 4.6-kilometer barrier. JAM 
fought hard to prevent the establishment of the wall. According to Col-
onel Hort, the wall in effect “became a magnet for every bad guy in 
Sadr City.” As JAM fighters attacked to stop completion of the wall, the 
surrounding area became a killing ground. JAM had few good options. 
24 Hammond interview; Hort interview; Lewis interview; Morse interview; and Northrop 
interview.
25 It was never clear with whom the idea to isolate the area of operations using T-walls 
along Route Gold originated. Most of those interviewed credited either Col Hort or Col 
Farris. Hort credits Farris with the idea, as does Col Daniel R. Barnett, the commander 
of 1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry Regiment, during the battle.
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A completed wall would curtail JAM’s access to the population and 
the market. JAM leaders depended on that access.26 
Operations Striker Denial and Gold Wall were tough fights, in-
volving three U.S. battalions and Iraqi security forces in continuous 
operations for six weeks. During this period, Abrams tanks and Brad-
ley fighting vehicles were heavily engaged, firing 818 120mm tank 
rounds and 12,091 25mm rounds against JAM fighters and to detonate 
IEDs. Additionally, U.S. forces had to constantly adapt to JAM tactics; 
for example, JAM snipers used .50-caliber sniper rifles to attempt to 
knock out the crane that lifted the T-wall sections into place. U.S. forc-
es responded by employing organic U.S. Army and SOF snipers in a 
countersniper campaign.27 As the battle wore on, JAM fighters showed 
up in ever-decreasing numbers as U.S. and Iraqi forces steadily wore 
them down. The efforts of other U.S. government agencies and SOF 
complemented the conventional fight to hunt and keep the pressure 
on JAM leaders in Sadr City. Ultimately, six U.S. soldiers died in these 
operations, while JAM lost an estimated 700 fighters, and much of its 
leadership fled for Iran or Syria.28 On 11 May 2008, al-Sadr asked for 
another cease-fire.29
The Counter-Rocket Fight
As ground maneuver elements fought to isolate Sadr City with the 
Gold Route wall, Colonel Hort and General Hammond worked to end 
JAM’s indirect-fire attacks on the International Zone. By this point 
in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Multinational Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) and 
26 Hort interview; Gibby interview; and Col John P. DiGiambattista, interview with M. Wade 
Markel and Brian Shannon, Fort Carson, CO, 12 January 2010.
27 Hort interview. 
28 The official estimate from the interviews was 700. According to the British medical 
journal The Lancet, municipal officials in Baghdad estimate that the fighting killed 925 
people and wounded 2,605; however, this estimate does not distinguish combatants from 
noncombatants. See Paul Webster, “Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq Failing Health Care,” 
Lancet 373, no. 9664 (2009): 617–20, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(09)60382-2. 
For the exfiltration of JAM’s leadership to Iran, we relied on Maj Bryan Gibby, email to M. 
Wade Markel, “Further Inquiries,” 14 January 2011.
29 Michael Gordon, “In Spite of Truce, War of Attrition over Wall Persists in Sadr City,” New 
York Times, 15 May 2008, A6.
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MND-B were employing a broad range of U.S. ISR and strike assets 
in Baghdad. 
Colonel Hort had resources directly allocated to him that were 
unprecedented for a brigade commander, including two U.S. Air Force 
General Atomics MQ-1 Predator unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) 
armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, two U.S. Army AAI Corporation 
RQ-7B Shadow UASs, three aerial weapons teams (or six Boeing AH-
64 Apache attack helicopters), fixed-wing close air support, and the 
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System—all available 24 hours a day. 
Unlike previous operations, Colonel Hort controlled the assets with-
out having to go through intervening headquarters. Although most of 
these systems were used to engage JAM fighters or rockets, on occa-
sion, large weapons (e.g., 500-pound guided bombs) were used to de-
stroy buildings sheltering snipers. While other fights were taking place 
in Iraq and Baghdad, Colonel Hort’s fight in Sadr City represented the 
main effort, and he had priority.30
The brigade executed a plan, developed in collaboration with 
MND-B, in which 3d Brigade Combat Team focused on JAM fighter 
and rocket teams, while the division continued key leader attacks of 
strategic importance to the government of Iraq, MND-B, and MNC-I. 
As was the case in other parts of the battle, the counter-rocket fight 
was a learning process. In his tactical operations center, Colonel Hort 
received continuous feeds from U.S. Air Force Predators (both armed 
and unarmed) and U.S. Army Shadow UASs. He also received infor-
mation from Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) sensors, coun-
terfire radars, and other ISR assets.31 His battle staff integrated this 
information and communicated it to operational units down to the 
company level via a number of relatively new technologies. For exam-
ple, they used Raytheon’s Persistent Surveillance and Dissemination 
System of Systems (PSDS2) to integrate the various sensors. Addition-
30 Hort interview; and David H. Petraeus, “CENTCOM Update, Center for a New American 
Security,” briefing, 11 June 2009.
31 See “The USA’s RAID Program: Small Systems, Big Surveillance Time,” Defense Indus-
try Daily, 24 August 2011. The article states: “The RAID [rapid aerostat initial deployment] 
program is a combination of cameras and surveillance equipment positioned on high tow-
ers and aerostats, in order to monitor a wide area around important locations and bases.”
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ally, Colonel Hort was able to communicate in a secure chatroom en-
vironment via a secure Microsoft Internet Relay Chat (mIRC) client and 
to pass classified information via the Secret Internet Protocol Router 
Network (SIPR Net) down to the company level.32 
All of these integrated sensors, communications systems, and 
strike assets gave 3d Brigade Combat Team the ability to find and kill 
JAM rocket teams and destroy other targets (e.g., mortars). Engage-
ments happened in several ways. First, a radar or other sensor detect-
ed a rocket launch; a Shadow UAS was then vectored to the location 
of the launch and followed the target; and then finally, a Predator or 
Apache killed the target. Predators were particularly useful because 
JAM was expected to have SA-7 Grail MANPADS (man-portable air- 
defense systems) and the UASs enabled attacks on JAM without put-
ting Apache crews at risk. Second, skilled intelligence personnel in 3d 
Brigade Combat Team headquarters were tasked with watching the 
ISR feeds on large screens in the tactical operations center. These 
individuals were dedicated scouts who observed the area under sur-
veillance for enemy activity; when such activity was identified, the pro-
cess of bringing assets to bear was initiated. Third, ground maneuver 
forces that detected JAM activity commenced the acquisition and 
attack processes. It is important here to note that the brigade com-
mander and his battle staff had these resources pushed down to them— 
without intervening levels of command and authority—and could ex-
ecute mission command. Higher echelons resourced the fight and 
managed the deeper operations beyond the brigade.33
Like the countersniper fight, the counter-rocket fight evolved 
over time. At first, rocket launch teams were attacked immediately af-
ter they had fired. However, the brigade battle staff soon developed 
tactical patience, realizing that it was likely hitting only low-level op-
eratives with vehicles and launch rails. Eventually, the staff adopted a 
best practice of using an ISR platform to “watch the rail” and follow it. 
When the operatives returned to a supply point or a command loca-
tion to get additional rockets and instructions, the staff saw the oppor-
32 Hort interview; and Downing interview.
33 Hort interview.
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tunity to strike, hitting not only the operatives but higher elements of 
the network as well.34
Exploitation
MND-B exploited its success in neutralizing JAM with stability oper-
ations to secure Ishbiliyah and Habbibiya. These efforts intensified 
after al-Sadr declared a cease-fire on 12 May. Focused reconstruc-
tion efforts and information operations in those neighborhoods were 
intended to influence popular perceptions north of Route Gold as well. 
Even before fighting subsided completely, U.S. forces resumed apply-
ing relentless pressure against JAM’s organization. As the reality of 
JAM’s defeat became clearer, the area’s inhabitants provided a flood 
of reliable intelligence that greatly facilitated this effort.35
As the battle subsided, two key realities became apparent to 
Iraqis living south of the wall along Route Gold. First, Iraqi Army and 
national police forces were in place and providing security. For res-
idents, this hearkened back to pre–Operation Iraqi Freedom days, 
where Iraqis were in charge and not the Coalition forces who would 
eventually leave Iraq. Second, as security was restored to the area 
south of Route Gold, General Hammond, his subordinate command-
ers, and the reserve engineer brigade commander working for Gen-
eral Hammond, Brigadier General Jeffrey W. Talley, began an intense 
effort to improve conditions below the wall. Much of this effort was 
accomplished by enabling Iraqi small businesses, which gave Sadr 
City’s population a stake in the new order. Thus, the population saw 
more permanent progress, and as conditions improved, the local citi-
zenry became invested in maintaining their security and providing in-
telligence to Iraqi and U.S. forces.36
When, on 12 May, al-Sadr declared a unilateral cease-fire, it is 
likely that he was simply putting the best face possible on the existing 
situation. His forces had suffered huge losses, and key leaders had 
either fled or been killed. The population was growing restive, not only 
34 Hort interview; DiGiambattista interview; and Downing interview.
35 Hammond interview; BGen Jeffrey W. Talley, interview with M. Wade Markel, Dallas, TX, 
2 June 2010; and Gibby interview; 
36 Hammond interview; Talley interview; and Hort interview.
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because JAM was perceived as provoking confrontations that resulted 
in civilian casualties but also because of JAM’s depredations. On 20 
May, unopposed elements of the Iraqi Army’s 44th Brigade occupied 
the remainder of Sadr City.37
KEY INSIGHTS FROM THE FIGHT
The defeat of JAM in Sadr City during the six weeks of high-intensity 
operations yields several insights that bear highlighting:
 • Protecting the population requires a balance between of-
fensive, defensive, and stability operations.
 • Persistent ISR, technical intelligence, and precision-strike 
capabilities enable the attacker to seize the initiative.
 • Technical capabilities must enable decentralized decision 
making and small unit initiative.
 • Isolating the enemy enables the counterinsurgent to seize 
the initiative.
 • Ground maneuver remains indispensable for shaping the 
battle and achieving decision.
 • Heavy armored forces have enduring utility in counterinsur-
gency and urban operations.
 • Integrating SOF into conventional operations achieves syn-
ergy.
 • Snipers remain an important enabler in urban operations. 
 • Enduring success depends on capable indigenous securi-
ty forces.
 • Urban counterinsurgency requires forces to transition rap-
idly between offensive, defensive, and stability operations.
REIMAGINING URBAN OPERATIONS 
AS WIDE-AREA SECURITY MISSIONS
Two general models for dealing with insurgent control of urban areas 
have become apparent in recent years. The first approach was taken 
by the Russian Federation in the Chechen city of Grozny in December 
1999–February 2000 and the second by U.S. forces in the Iraqi city of 
37 Hammond interview; and Hort interview.
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Fallujah in November 2004. Insurgents in these cities were viewed as 
cancers that had to be excised. In both of these cases, the cities were 
essentially besieged and then stormed, a course of action made pos-
sible by their geographic isolation. Noncombatants were told to leave 
before military operations within the cities commenced. Anyone who 
remained was, in general, viewed as a combatant in what became a 
block-by-block clearing operation supported by massive amounts of 
firepower.
Not surprisingly, both cities suffered significant damage. Addi- 
tionally, casualties among Russian and U.S. forces were high. Al-
though reliable figures are difficult to ascertain, the Russian Feder-
ation suffered at least 600 dead (mostly in Grozny) and likely many 
more wounded in Chechnya between December and early January. 
In Fallujah, U.S. forces suffered 70 dead and more than 600 wounded. 
Thus, this model of urban warfare anticipates and accepts extensive 
collateral damage and relatively high numbers of friendly casualties. 
The 2008 Battle of Sadr City offers a second model for wresting 
control of a city from insurgents: treating an urban area as a wide-area 
security mission. In Sadr City, unlike in Grozny and Fallujah, telling the 
civilians to leave what was about to become a high-intensity battle-
field simply was not feasible. Sadr City held 2.4 million residents, and 
there was nowhere for them to go. Sadr City is a suburb of Baghdad 
and, unlike Grozny and Fallujah, is not geographically isolated. These 
conditions in Sadr City may be representative of the future challenges 
of urban operations, and they will likely worsen as urban areas around 
the globe become more densely populated. The objective was not to 
take and clear Sadr City, but to create conditions that would make it 
both impossible for the insurgents to operate effectively and possible 
to restore security to the broader population. 
Thus, in the Battle of Sadr City, the focus was on enemy fight-
ers and their capabilities. U.S. forces deprived the enemy of the ability 
to affect events at the operational and strategic levels of war. JAM’s 
control of Sadr City represents a perennial problem, but what made 
its March 2008 offensive problematic was JAM’s ability to strike the 
Green Zone with indirect fires (mainly via rockets). Attacks on the 
Green Zone threatened to derail the al-Basrah offensive and thereby 
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reveal that the al-Maliki government was fatally ineffective. However, 
3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, took JAM’s offensive 
capability away by employing determined ground maneuver, which 
combined infantry and armored vehicles, with support from pervasive 
ISR and precision-strike capabilities provided by UASs, attack helicop-
ters, artillery, and close air support. Without its indirect-fire capability, 
JAM could only react locally as Coalition forces exploited human and 
technical intelligence to hunt down its remaining leaders under ex-
tremely one-sided conditions.
Finally, Sadr City demonstrates that one of the keys to fighting 
an urban adversary is to create a situation that forces the enemy to 
surrender the advantages of the city. This is the art of reimagining ur-
ban warfare, and it clearly has doctrinal, organizational, materiel, and 
training implications both for the U.S. Services and the Joint force. In 
the Battle of Sadr City, building the wall along Route Gold threatened 
to deny JAM access to key terrain and, as Colonel Hort related during 
an interview with the authors, “agitated the enemy.” Quite simply, JAM 
had to contest the wall or face isolation. In the words of one U.S. of-
ficer, the wall was the equivalent of a Roman siege engine about to 
breach a city’s defenses. It created a situation that was intolerable to 
JAM, and JAM had to come out and fight. In so doing, the enemy at-
tacked U.S. forces that now had the initiative and were in a position of 
enormous advantage. JAM lost, and the Coalition victory in the Battle 
of Sadr City offers important lessons for the prosecution of future ur-
ban operations.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ISIL’s Territorial Logic of Urban 
Control in Mosul and ar-Raqqah
City as a System Analytical Framework
Erin M. Simpson, PhD
In March 2013, ar-Raqqah was the first Syrian provincial 
capital to fall to opposition forces in the rebellion against 
President Bashar al-Assad. By April 2013, the Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was in direct competition with 
other opposition forces for control. The city’s economy was 
badly affected by ISIL’s actions to control the city. Following 
weeks of violent infighting, the city’s infrastructure was par-
alyzed, with key economic infrastructure inoperative and no 
power, water, or health services available at the beginning 
of 2014. Unlike other insurgent groups, ISIL moved quick-
ly to rebuild the city, seeing the value of the infrastructure 
in its ability to control ar-Raqqah’s population. Within three 
months, water, electricity, and bread were readily available; 
schools and universities were reopened; and the private 
sector was functioning. 
Understanding the relationship between armed groups and territory is 
one of the most critical and vexing aspects of any conflict. To analyze a 
group’s military strategy, its systems of control, or its approach to polit-
ical legitimization requires understanding the complex ways in which 
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it influences particular areas of human and physical terrain. Since 
ISIL’s seizure of Mosul, Iraq, in June 2014, and its full takeover of ar-
Raqqah by August 2014, international observers have grappled with 
how to understand the extent and importance of the territory it admin-
isters, denies to opponents, and infiltrates to attack.1 Understanding 
how ISIL exists within its environment, both as it exists physically and 
as part of a system constituted through the interaction of other state 
and nonstate actors, is key to understanding both ISIL’s continued mil-
itary endurance against a multiplicity of foes and its evolving systems 
of political control emerging behind its front lines.
In contrast to models of classic Maoist insurgencies rooted in 
the study of remote rural areas, ISIL’s military operations and politi-
cal administration have focused on cities and the densely populated 
river valleys connecting them. For this reason, Caerus Associates’ 
analysis of ISIL-held Mosul and ar-Raqqah applied the City as a 
System Analytical Framework to understand ISIL’s relationship to 
the major urban centers under their control. The study, conducted 
roughly one year after ISIL’s conquest of regime military facilities 
in ar-Raqqah, analyzed the interplay between local actors and their 
environment, compared the systems operating within Mosul and 
ar-Raqqah, and examined the broader regional “system of cities.”2
Caerus’s application of the framework revealed three environ-
mental centers of gravity (E-COGs) that enabled ISIL to seize and hold 
1 Shortly after events unfolded in Iraq, news agencies and government leaders debated 
the proper use of ISIL versus ISIS. The Associated Press argued that “in Arabic, the group 
is known as Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham, or the Islamic State of Iraq and 
al-Sham. The term ‘al-Sham’ refers to a region stretching from southern Turkey through 
Syria to Egypt (also including Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Jordan). . . . 
The standard English term for this broad territory is ‘the Levant.’ Therefore, AP’s trans-
lation of the group’s name is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL.” However, 
many consider the term Levant dated: “If . . . ‘al-Sham’ means not only Syria, then there is 
a name for that: Greater Syria. When we use the older term ‘Levant,’ that should be used 
alongside the older name ‘Mesopotamia’ for Iraq. When you use modern ‘Iraq,’ use the 
modern term ‘Greater Syria’—in that case, it’s the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria 
(still ISIS).” See Ishaan Tharoor, “ISIS or ISIL?: The Debate over What to Call Iraq’s Terror 
Group,” Washington Post, 18 June 2014. For the purposes of our discussion, we will be 
using the term ISIL.
2 Mark Lomedico and Elizabeth M. Bartels, “City as a System Analytical Framework: A 
Structured Analytical Approach to Understanding and Acting in an Urban Environments,” 
Small Wars Journal (2015).
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the cities. First, ISIL’s military forces’ interior lines of communication 
allowed the organization to seize and move supplies from opponent 
stockpiles to evolving battlefronts to support new offenses in a rein-
forcing loop. Second, ISIL’s trade activities through economic lines of 
communication that connect Mosul and ar-Raqqah together and to 
other ISIL-held areas weakened ties to the rest of Iraq and Syria, while 
funneling taxes to ISIL’s coffers. The full study also assessed a third 
E-COG: ISIL’s degradation of social and political E-COGs decreased 
opportunities for counter-ISIL mobilization, though this topic will not 
be addressed here.3
ISIL’s military and political success in Mosul and ar-Raqqah is 
likely due as much to its approach to governance that focuses on the 
routes that connect urban nodes as to the nodes themselves. Enemy 
positions and civilian economies are seen as accumulators of goods 
that can be converted to logistical support to ISIL. As a result, the 
group designs campaigns to defend those routes and integrate those 
cities into the caliphate’s military network and international economy. 
While the loss of a particular city, town, or village may diminish the 
volume of economic activity ISIL can tax, or prevent access to partic-
ular bases, few cities possess unique economic or military resources 
ISIL cannot access in its remaining territories. Though Mosul and ar-
Raqqah each have unique symbolic importance, they are ultimately 
important as nodes between flows of personnel and military and eco-
nomic materials. Consequently, this study does not focus on intracity 
issues, since the connections between cities were found to be more 
influential in shaping individual urban environments and the general 
environment in ISIL-held territory in Iraq and Syria.
Because ISIL’s E-COGs are based on flows rather than particular 
urban nodes, ISIL can trade space for time, slowing down adversaries 
in major operations to encircle and clear population centers with little 
value to the organization. Meanwhile, ISIL has freedom of movement, 
which enables it to continue military operations and allow populations 
under ISIL control to continue most of their economic activities. So 
3 Dan Trombly and Yasir Abbas, “The Case for a ‘Raqqa First’ Strategy against the Islamic 
State,” War on the Rocks (blog), 10 September 2015.
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long as military approaches to ISIL center on the denial of specific 
nodes rather than the disruption of the interior lines (and the forces 
exploiting them) that allow ISIL to fluidly seize, lose, and regain them, 
ISIL’s system of cities may not remain static, but it may prove durable.
CITY AS A SYSTEM STUDY APPROACH
This study was conducted using the City as a System Analytical 
Framework to guide analysis and assessment of the major urban cen-
ters under ISIL control. The framework consists of three primary steps: 
1) define the urban operational environment, 2) frame and map urban 
problem systems, and 3) develop and analyze courses of action (COAs). 
Step one produces an understanding of the current and his-
torical state of the operational environment by defining significant 
characteristics of the urban environment using an ontology, then ex-
tending research to fill identified intelligence gaps using the urban 
triad framework of population, infrastructure, and terrain.4 Step two 
of the framework focuses on identifying the elements of the problem 
system posed by ISIL’s control over major urban centers. This involves 
the framework’s FASCOPE (flows plus the civil affairs ASCOPE—or ar-
eas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events) tool to 
identify problem system elements as different types of flows, nodes, 
and accumulators.5 Finally, step three calls for the identification of 
E-COGs—that is the critical elements that enable or buttress the 
system as a whole, expanding the enemy-centric concept of a COG 
analysis to a multipolar system for a holistic systems analysis of the 
environment. This chapter focuses on three E-COGs—military lines 
4 For the purposes of this discussion, the term ontology can refer to an explicit specifica-
tion of a conceptualization, although another definition points to a distinction between 
an ontology and a conceptualization, where an ontology is a logical theory accounting 
for the intended meaning of a formal vocabulary. The urban triad framework is based 
on concepts from Joint Urban Operations and defines the unique features of urban envi-
ronments: population (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure 
[PMESII]), infrastructure (sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, 
and other considerations [SWEAT-MSO]), and physical environment and time (a subset 
of PMESII-PT). See Joint Urban Operations, Joint Publication 3-06 (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2013).
5 Civil Affairs: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Field Manual 3-05.401 (Washington, 
DC: Department of the Army, 2007), chapter 3.
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of communication, economic lines of communication, and the degra-
dation of centers of political resistance—revealed by consideration of 
the system as a whole to be critical to ISIL’s success. 
LINES OF COMMUNICATION 
AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER 
OF GRAVITY
Freely traversable lines of communication, the flows that allow military 
personnel and equipment to travel between critical points, whether 
they are strategic nodes such as cities or accumulators such as lo-
gistical hubs, are an E-COG critical to ISIL’s military strategy. While 
flows of government and other insurgent forces also use these path-
ways, ISIL’s logistics and tactics make them particularly dependent 
on the infrastructure that supports the flow of military personnel and 
resources. ISIL depends on raiding hostile units, checkpoints, bases, 
and stockpiles to gain critical military supplies. They also rely on the 
ability to move forces between fronts as part of their campaign of in-
terior lines. Hence, pathways that allow military supplies and forces to 
flow between locations support a reinforcing loop in which ISIL relies 
on the capture of equipment and supplies to sustain its offensive ac-
tivity, which in turn enables ISIL to seize more equipment and supplies 
(figure 4.1). As a result of this feedback loop, limiting ISIL’s military 
power will require interrupting these flows to break the reinforcing 
cycle (figure 4.2).
Freely traversable lines of communication, including major 
roads, back roads, smuggling tracks, canals, rivers, and other means 
of transportation are critical features for ISIL, other armed groups, and 
state forces alike. However, not all actors can use these features with 
equal ease. Because ISIL’s attacks rely on small units that meet most 
ISIL military
supplies
ISIL seizes
new areas
Figure 4.1 Reinforcing loop dependent on 
the flow of military supplies and fighters.
Illustration by MCUP
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of their mobility needs with commercial vehicles, it has an advantage 
in using this transportation infrastructure (or lack thereof) relative to 
conventional military units.6 Such organizations are more dependent 
on well-maintained road infrastructure. Large, mechanized formations 
of heavy vehicles are particularly vulnerable to interdiction and harass-
ment by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mobile forces. As a 
result, ISIL moves its forces faster than their opponents are able to 
mobilize defenses.
ISIL takes advantage of its relative freedom of movement in this 
environment by making maneuver across its theaters of operation a 
key element of its military approach. Rapid redeployment allows ISIL 
to meet its military needs across geographically dispersed fronts. 
Mobility also allows ISIL to compete against multiple opponents that 
cumulatively possess more raw manpower and equipment than ISIL, 
but who are often at a disadvantage locally as ISIL creates new fronts 
and extends lines of communication. Because ISIL fights so many op-
ponents, it cannot afford to mass its units in a prolonged campaign 
against one enemy without leaving a disparate front open to attack 
from another, or giving others time to patch their own defenses and 
recuperate from previous defeats. Without highly mobile units, ISIL 
could neither repel simultaneous or near-simultaneous hostile offen-
6 In this instance, we refer to FASCOPE’s arms and capabilities. 
Figure 4.2 Reinforcing loop of base raiding in ISIL’s military structure and logistics.
Illustration by MCUP
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sives, nor easily exploit temporary vulnerabilities that may appear in its 
opponents’ lines.
ISIL’s mobility stands in marked contrast to the slow-moving 
and often static approach of its opponents, especially the Iraqi and 
Syrian regimes and the paramilitaries supporting them. Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF) and Syrian regime force deployments, in the defensive, 
focus on static nodes to project security, relying on military bases, 
checkpoints, and other fixed defensive structures and positions. As 
individual nodes, these positions work somewhat effectively to con-
trol the movement of the civilian population or to suppress localized 
actions by relatively poorly armed and poorly organized hostile forces. 
State-constructed defensive positions in Iraq and Syria tend to be co-
located with major population centers, either within them or on the 
outskirts. 
While the idea of locating bases and checkpoints to ensure influ-
ence over accumulations or flows of people is logical, these positions 
are often ill-suited to repel flows of hostile forces, especially well- 
designed and well-equipped assaults by mobile forces (figure 4.3). The 
positions are not laid out to provide mutual support during heavy com-
Figure 4.3 Major movements of ISIL personnel and captured weapons in vicinity of ar-
Raqqah, 2014–15.
Department of State
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bat. When manned with forces that are unwilling or unable to move, 
to contact, or to fight outside of prepared positions, mobile forces can 
easily isolate and defeat these static forces in detail, inflicting heavy 
casualties and blows to morale that may induce collapse before all 
positions are even in contact. Location in or near concentrated flows 
or accumulations of people may prove advantageous for providing 
low-level popular security, but this strategy also colocates these po-
sitions near routes that a mobile force can exploit to isolate and seize.
ISIL’s capture of Mosul illustrates the ideal demonstration of 
their mobility-centric approach. In Mosul, ISIL did not need to system-
atically clear the city in June 2014. It overran checkpoints with rapid 
assaults and superior firepower before attacking ISF unit headquar-
ters and other positions on the city’s western bank, surrounding and 
isolating ISF units there. On the eastern side of the Tigris River, other 
ISF units were unwilling to leave their bases on the east bank for the 
heavy combat in western Mosul. As a result, efforts to fall back to the 
east and regroup proved futile and turned into a retirement by forces 
in eastern Mosul.
The defeat of Syrian regime units in ar-Raqqah in the weeks af-
ter the fall of Mosul followed a similar pattern. Although the Syrian 
government held onto multiple defensive positions, they were isolated 
and unable to effectively coordinate a defense. ISIL targeted the head-
quarters of 17th Division, immediately north of the city, and seized it 
after heavy fighting. Although some personnel from the 17th Division’s 
Army base escaped to the 93d Brigade’s base near Ayn Issa or the 
airbase at al-Tabqah to the southwest, retreating soldiers were demor-
alized and frequently unable to defend themselves from fast-moving 
ISIL raids or ambushes. ISIL seized the 93d Brigade’s base and envel-
oped the al-Tabqah airbase, subjecting it to sustained bombardment 
and infantry assaults for about two weeks before ISIL breached and 
seized the facility.
In both Mosul and ar-Raqqah, ISIL’s mobility allowed it to isolate 
static positions and mass sufficient firepower and forces to destroy 
state positions one by one. Yet, without free access to the lines of com-
munication (LOCs) linking Mosul and ar-Raqqah, these sequential vic-
tories would have been difficult. ISIL needed to move forces from Syria 
CHAPTER FOUR
101
to take Mosul, and move forces from northern Iraq to overrun regime 
bases in ar-Raqqah. Access to LOCs between and around Mosul and 
ar-Raqqah did not simply provide the possibility of sequential offen-
sives across multiple fronts—it allowed each successful seizure of a 
hostile position to reinforce rather than distract from the possibility of 
offensive operations elsewhere. Weapons captured from Mosul bol-
stered offensive operations in ar-Raqqah, and weapons captured from 
Syrian bases in ar-Raqqah bolstered the next round of ISIL actions. 
In addition to supplying military victories, ISIL’s mobility facili-
tates a raid-based logistical system, where ISIL’s offensive forces and 
the weapons they capture travel from node to node across transna-
tional LOCs. ISIL’s opponents, by accumulating static forces in nodes 
accessible through these LOCs, sustain ISIL’s logistical model by de-
ploying their forces in a manner that fails to significantly impede ISIL’s 
mobility while still offering opportunities to seize new equipment (see 
figures 4.1 and 4.2). 
As open source surveys of ISIL’s equipment demonstrate, arms 
flow is dependent on weapons seized from the stockpiles of rival fac-
tions, especially those with a conventional military posture. ISIL has a 
relative deficit in access to arms trafficking compared to other region-
al militant groups. It does not directly control major border crossings 
(beyond its interior Iraq-Syria border), and it lacks a state sponsor to 
facilitate transfers of large quantities or advanced types of weapons. 
Instead, ISIL depends on small arms, light weapons, crew-served 
vehicle-mounted systems, artillery, and armor; all of which are easi-
ly moved from newly captured locations by infantry, technicals, or in 
extreme cases, heavy equipment transporters (HETs).
ISF and Syrian regime force deployments focus on military bas-
es, checkpoints, and other fixed defensive structures and positions. 
While the Syrian and Iraqi governments see these fixed locations as 
important nodes to secure control over territory, ISIL views these loca-
tions as accumulators of arms and supplies that can be raided. While 
rival nonstate actors are less dependent on conventional military infra-
structure and thus a less attractive target for raids, ISIL’s use of tube-
launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles provided to 
Syrian rebel groups shows that ISIL does benefit from rival groups’ 
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arms as well. As a result, as long as ISIL maintains freedom of move-
ment, they will not only be able to attack but will also gain strength 
from these fixed accumulations of supplies.
In the case of cities, ISIL has shown itself willing to invest in more 
substantial defenses, but it also has been willing to retreat strategi-
cally to preserve forces for combat operations elsewhere. Although 
the core of ISIL’s combat capability consists of mobile units, ISIL will 
construct fixed defenses in its territory where it has the resources 
available. ISIL repelled two ISF offensives in Tikrit, Iraq, with the aid 
of purpose-built fighting positions and IED minefields.7 In Mosul, ISIL 
has constructed a “caliphate wall” and numerous fighting positions 
and defenses around major avenues of approach to the city.8 ISIL’s 
combat engineering frequently commandeers construction equip-
ment to build large IED fields and defensive structures. However, 
these defenses seemed designed less to ensure territory is held than 
to delay enemy forces or channel them to specific, highly defended 
routes, ensuring time for the bulk of ISIL’s forces to move out of the 
threatened area while still inflicting damage.
ISIL used this strategy to great effect in the final ISF and militia 
assault on Tikrit in spring 2014, delaying ISF forces by destroying criti-
cal bridges, laying extensive fields of IEDs, and using snipers and oth-
er harassment tactics to make ISF advances slow and bloody. Soon 
after, ISIL forces massed in Baiji District, which ISIL nearly overran, 
forcing the ISF to further delay plans for a retaking of Mosul. Baiji also 
served to distract the ISF, allowing ISIL to overrun ar-Ramadi soon af-
ter the fall of Tikrit. ISIL has used similar tactics to mitigate its loss-
es in Syria. In their fight with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units 
(YPG), for example, ISIL chose to retreat from Tell Hamis and Tell Brak 
in southern al-Hasakah Province earlier this year, only to attack areas 
near Ras al-Ayn and Tall Tamr in the northeast of the province. An-
other recent example is ISIL’s retreat from Tell Abyad in northern ar-
Raqqah Province, an important city bordering Turkey, without a fight, 
7 Bill Roggio, “Iraqi Troops, Insurgents Battle for Tikrit,” Long War Journal (2014).
8 Abdelhak Mamoun, “Urgent: ISIS Builds ‘Caliphate Wall’ around Mosul,” Iraqi News, 18 
March 2015.
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only to conduct several offensives and raids in al-Hasakah and Kobani. 
As a result, even defensive structures seem designed to enable the 
flow of fighters and equipment between fronts. 
If LOCs are open, raiding on another front can enable the de-
fense of a city by providing new military equipment to ISIL and di-
verting the attacking force. When YPG forces, backed by Coalition 
airpower, made gains in Aïn Issa, Lebanon, and other areas near ar-
Raqqah, ISIL launched an infiltration attack on Kobani that killed large 
numbers of civilians, putting pressure on the YPG to redirect more re-
sources to internal security.9 It also attacked Syrian regime positions 
in al-Hasakah city, capturing new weapons and replacing a previously 
stable front between the YPG and the regime with another front in 
danger of attack from ISIL. ISIL may prioritize preserving forces to raid 
for supplies and conduct counterattacks over holding the maximum 
possible extent of territory.
ISIL relies on freedom of movement to shift fighters and sup-
plies between disparate territories, enabling the group to raid rivals’ 
supplies and achieve military victories. By turning military success 
against well-armed opponents into a reinforcing logistical loop, ISIL’s 
enemies’ actions form part of an E-COG that allows ISIL to sustain 
its combat capabilities. Moreover, ISIL only needs to temporarily win 
territory to receive these benefits. As long as needed supplies and 
fighters continue to flow to other fronts, the loss of urban nodes can 
be seen as a temporary setback. 
TRADE FACILITATION AS AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER OF GRAVITY
Since June 2014, new economic flows, enabled and shaped by ISIL, 
emerged in ISIL-held areas, creating new economic relationships 
between ar-Raqqah and Mosul. ISIL’s facilitation of commercial mo-
bility and trade through a consistent, unobtrusive system of regula-
tions, checkpoints, and taxes generates revenue for the organization. 
9 Schams Elwazer et al., “ISIS Militants Disguised as Kurdish Fighters Infiltrate Syrian 
Town,” CNN, 25 June 2015.
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Involvement in trade also promotes ISIL’s legitimacy by benefiting lo-
cal traders while preventing the rise of trade organizations that could 
pose a threat to the organization’s rule. Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly, ISIL’s economic policies facilitate internal trade between ar-
Raqqah and Mosul, while using opponent restrictions on freedom of 
movement and regulation to discourage trade with rival actors.10 This 
has served to create a coherent internal economy between ISIL-held 
areas (figure 4.4). 
A comparative analysis of FASCOPE demonstrates that, although 
ISIL’s checkpoints are an important means of monitoring the popula-
tion under its control, they are far less elaborate than those ISF and 
other forces use. Checkpoints run by conventional state actors are 
designed to intercept small militant units or IED attacks. As a result, 
conventional checkpoints require exhaustive searches and cataloging 
of civilian movement. The length of the searches required to prevent 
the transit of bombers or other clandestine attackers results in large 
delays for civilians, exacerbating the strain checkpoints place on the 
civilian population. For example, ISF checkpoints require large units 
of police or military personnel with extensive use of concrete barriers 
10 Jessica Stern, “ISIL and the Goal of Organizational Survival,” in Beyond Convergence: 
World Without Order, ed. Hilary Matfess and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: Center 
for Complex Operations, National Defense University, 2016), 195–214. 
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designed to mitigate the possibility of a suicide vehicle-borne impro-
vised explosive device (SVBIED) or other forms of attack.11 A resident 
in Mosul said in an interview that it took him nearly one hour to drive 
less than two miles to work because of an ISF checkpoint in Mosul 
City.12 Worst of all, checkpoints could provide a mechanism for corrupt 
members of security forces to extract revenue from the population.13
In contrast, ISIL’s different security needs and its potent coun-
terintelligence capability mitigate its reliance on checkpoints. ISIL re-
moved ISF checkpoint barriers to ease civilian’s freedom of movement 
immediately following its seizure of areas in Mosul and other parts of 
Iraq. ISIL also very publicly dismantled border checkpoints that previ-
ously restricted cross-border transit between Iraq and Syria, enabling 
commerce rather than restricting it. ISIL uses a handful of fighters on 
motorcycles or small cars to man checkpoints on major highways, and 
similarly small numbers can regulate the flow of civilians within major 
cities. ISIL’s checkpoint system is far less cumbersome for civilians 
than those of other forces. As a result, ISIL has gained a reputation 
for facilitating inter- and intracity flows of goods, at the same time as 
it has reduced the number of forces needed to hold cities, allowing 
them to support other missions.
Similarly, ISIL’s commercial regulations seek to promulgate pre-
dictable patterns of commerce and to decrease the role of the black 
market in areas under its control.14 Unlike most of ISIL’s rivals, to in-
clude the Iraqi government and the Syrian regime, ISIL checkpoints 
and other bureaucrats are generally less corrupt, exacting a regular-
ized, reliable tax that facilitates commerce. The majority of ISF, regime, 
and opposition groups’ checkpoints remain corrupt, often forcing mer-
chants to pay bribes at each checkpoint they pass through. With ISIL, 
merchants pay only once: ISIL checkpoints issue payment receipts 
11 For more on security issues at the time, see Iraq Situation Report: October 23–24, 2014 
(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2014).
12 Kirk Semple, “Back and Forth, Wearily, Across the ISIS Border,” New York Times, 20 
September 2014.
13 For more on civilian security, see Protection of Civilians in Mosul: Identifying Lessons 
for Contingency Planning (Washington, DC: Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2017).
14 ISIL Finances: Future Scenarios (Washington, DC: ISIL Finance Team, Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, 2016). 
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for merchants and drivers moving through or within its territories to 
prevent tax duplication. Because merchants can anticipate the fees 
and restrictions, they see more regular and predictable profits. ISIL’s 
limited regulations, combined with their clandestine surveillance and 
harsh punishments for violations, also disincentivizes black market 
commerce. These actions further buttress their legitimacy.15  
Promotion of trade also reduces the power of local actors within 
major population centers, such as ar-Raqqah and Mosul. Consumer- 
driven demand and the ability to trade from city to city diminishes the 
leverage of individual merchants. Furthermore, low barriers to entry 
due to ready access to transportation to move goods from areas of rel-
ative high supply to relative high demand, and the decentralized nature 
of trade in consumer goods, reduces incentives for merchants to work 
together to enhance their bargaining power. Moreover, economic ac-
tors in Mosul, ar-Raqqah, and other ISIL territories generally consist of 
large classes of people from varying localities and backgrounds, with 
little history or experience of exercising political power collectively. As 
a result, few identifiable alternative centers of economic power exist 
to challenge ISIL or limit the scope of its capabilities. Taxing decentral-
ized economic activity allows ISIL to generate revenue without creat-
ing codependency with powerful actors that might use countervailing 
leverage against it.
Geospatial mapping of these trends reveals that, beyond ex-
panding ISIL’s reputation as a capable governing force, ISIL’s facili-
tation of trade, in combination with severed LOCs by its rivals, have 
shifted patterns of trade and reinforced ISIL’s claims to rule a coherent 
state. While travel restrictions are a rational response to oil smuggling, 
growing numbers of refugees, and security concerns facing the Iraqi 
and Kurdish governments, severing the LOC creates distance between 
Iraqi towns under ISIL control and their traditional trading partners.16 
15 Tim Arango, “ISIS Transforming into Functioning State that Uses Terror as Tool,” New 
York Times, 21 July 2015.
16 Dalshad Abdullah and Layal Abu Rahal, “Kurdish Security Service Takes Aim at ISIS 
Oil Smuggling,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 30 July 2014; Barbara Slavin, “U.S. Official Claims 
Gains in Curtailing IS Oil Smuggling,” Al-Monitor, 8 December 2014; and Raja Abdul-
rahim, “Sunni Arabs Feel Sting of Discrimination in Northern Iraq,” Los Angeles (CA) 
Times, 20 October 2014. 
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For example, Mosul is traditionally integrated with the Iraqi-Kurdistani 
regional economy; however, ties between the cities have been sev-
ered.17 As a result, ISIL-held towns grow increasingly dependent on 
one another. For example, al-Hawija, traditionally more integrated with 
geographically proximate Kirkuk, has increasing ties to Mosul as roads 
to Kirkuk have been blocked by government and Kurdish forces.18 As a 
result, traditional intra-Iraqi trade flows have eroded, and new connec-
tions within ISIL-held areas are being formed.
At the same time, ISIL’s economic policies have increased trade 
between Mosul and other ISIL-held areas, especially with ar-Raqqah. 
As a result, Mosul is now far more integrated with the Syrian econo-
my than it is with Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan, let alone Baghdad and cen-
tral Iraq. Residents of Mosul benefit from access to cheaper food and 
manufactured goods produced in ar-Raqqah and other Syrian cities 
at a lower cost than goods from Iraq and those imported from Tur-
key through ISIL-held Syria. For example, prices of food plunged after 
ISIL’s takeover of the city as cheap agricultural food supplies from ar-
Raqqah flooded into Mosul markets. This price disparity has endured, 
as local residents in Mosul reported lower food prices compared to 
the rest of Iraq.19 The closure or aerial targeting of government in-
dustries in Mosul has exacerbated Mosul’s dependence on Syrian 
clothing, fabric, and food.20 While access to some medications and so-
phisticated manufacturing goods have been impacted by the loss of 
trade with Baghdad and Erbil, the advantages of cheap Syrian goods 
outweigh the hardships for many residents of Mosul.
Increased trade between Syrian and Iraqi towns also benefits 
Syrian merchants. Iraqi residents have a much higher purchasing 
power than Syrians, in part due to Iraqi government payments to em-
17 See “Mosul: ISIL’s Economic Engine,” Rand.org.
18 A one-way ticket from al-Hawija to Kirkuk increased from 8,000 dinars before July 2014 
to 1 million Iraqi dinars as of June 2014, according to a resident in Kirkuk interviewed by 
Caerus.
19 Rwa Haider, “What Has ISIL Done to Mosul’s Residents Since June 2014?,” Radio Free 
Iraq, 6 April 2015.
20 Khales Joumah, “The New Masters of the Market: Syrian Traders Flock to Mosul for Iraqi 
Profits,” Niqash, 18 June 2015.
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ployees and pensioners from oil exports.21 Trade with Mosul offers 
high profits to Syrian merchants, who make the eight-hour journey 
from ar-Raqqah. This makes Iraq an attractive market for Syrian mer-
chants operating in conflict-affected areas with limited hard currency 
available. 
Similarly, ISIL exerts influence over the production and sale of 
oil through its control of LOCs between oil-producing areas and major 
population centers. As analysis of the fuel trade demonstrates, the sei-
zure of the Deir Ezzor oil fields and refineries from Jabhat al-Nusra (or 
al-Nusra Front) in mid-2014 put ISIL in command of a critical flow of 
resources. ISIL control over the roads between the Deir Ezzor oil fields 
and population centers in ar-Raqqah, Mosul, and al-Anbar solidifies 
ISIL’s influence over merchants, who now pay taxes to ISIL for access 
to the lucrative oil trade. At the same time, the destruction of the Baiji 
refinery, the loss of oil fields near Tikrit, and the disruption of the fuel 
trade between Baghdad (and Erbil) with Mosul, forces Moslawis (cit-
izens of Mosul) to depend on ISIL for petroleum products. ISIL now 
dominates the oil trade to such a degree that rival Syrian opposition 
groups, Iraqi Kurds, the Syrian regime, and civilians living in Jordan or 
Turkey are forced to engage in trade with oil merchants in ISIL-held 
territories. Inability to meet local fuel needs spurred bottom-up de-
mand from civilian buyers and top-down complicity from governing 
actors. As a result, the oil trade adds tax revenue to ISIL’s coffers, en-
sures preferential access to a critical supply to ISIL military units and 
civilians, and provides leverage over major opposition forces.22 
At the same time, ISIL also has disincentivized trade between 
ISIL-held areas and areas controlled by rivals. ISIL restricts exports 
produced in its territories to force merchants to engage in more trade 
within ISIL-held areas. In Mosul, for example, roads to the south and 
east are closed to local merchants and farmers, restricting trade to 
ISIL held areas.23 In ar-Raqqah, ISIL imposes high taxes on particu-
21 A government employee in Syria makes an average of $132, whereas an Iraqi employ-
ee’s average salary is approximately $500. Also see “Mosul: ISIL’s Economic Engine.” 
22 Nour Malas and Maria Abi-Habib, “Islamic State Economy Runs on Extortion, Oil Piracy 
in Syria, Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, 28 August 2014.
23 Semple, “Back and Forth.”
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lar goods traveling from its territories to opposition and regime areas. 
Farmers in ar-Raqqah, for example, pay an additional 25 percent tax to 
ISIL if they want to sell their products to the Syrian regime. Similarly, 
while ISIL does allow oil to be exported from its territory, it restricts 
importing fuel from the outside, forcing local merchants to only deal 
in ISIL-produced oil. Although ISIL is willing to export fuel products 
across battle lines, mainly to buyers in rival Syrian rebel groups and 
regime territory, it is more reluctant to import them. In al-Hasakah 
Province, ISIL has restricted importing oil products from YPG-held ter-
ritories, cutting off the YPG’s ability to export oil to Arab Syria, and has 
increased ISIL crude oil sales. These actions resulted in more internal 
trade and economic autonomy of ISIL-held areas.24
Taken together, ISIL’s facilitation of trade through open LOCs and 
predictable regulations are reorienting the cities under its control to 
form a more coherent, integrated economic unit. As Mosul becomes 
increasingly disconnected from Iraq both physically and economically, 
Mosul and other ISIL-held areas in Iraq have become more integrated 
with each other and with ISIL holdings in Syria. This new relationship 
gives ISIL a golden opportunity to not only legitimize its transnation-
al caliphate, but to use the new relationship between ar-Raqqah and 
Mosul to finance its governance and military operations. 
LO OKING FORWARD
Territorial size and control have been important metrics for actors 
fighting ISIL and international observers. Without understanding the 
territorial logic of ISIL strategy and governance, however, anticipat-
ing the effect and assessing the significance of territorial changes 
will prove difficult. Understandably, many assessments of ISIL terri-
tory focus on the size or population of areas under ISIL control. ISIL’s 
strength is frequently assessed through its ability to seize and hold 
major cities. This is undoubtedly of value but should not overshadow 
that the ways in which cities matter to ISIL is distinct from the way they 
matter to the governments of Iraq and Syria or rival nonstate actors.
More than any particular piece of territory, ISIL seeks to sur-
24 ISIS Financing, 2015 (Paris: Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, 2016).
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vive. Fighting against multiple opponents and dependent on a steady 
stream of post-victory looting, ISIL has sought to create a territorial 
system that allows it to sustain a multifront war but also remain resil-
ient during inevitable territorial losses. By contrast, some rival actors, 
such as the Iraqi government, orient the objectives of military cam-
paigns around major cities, methodically isolating and then assaulting 
them, with great symbolic value assigned to capturing a city proper 
even as ISIL forces remain active in the immediate environs.
By facilitating military and civilian mobility, ISIL has increased in-
terdependence and mutual support between areas under its control, 
making its territories more resilient in the face of the isolate, besiege, 
and assault playbook of its major military opponents. ISIL cannot hold 
all the population centers it takes, but it can make military operations 
to retake them costly enough for a given opponent so as to buy time to 
replenish itself through operations elsewhere and to make the spoils 
of capturing the city negligible. Although this model, based on plun-
der, scorched earth, and the facilitation of regional trade necessitated 
by dislocation and hardship may diverge from other models of state 
building, it has allowed ISIL to campaign and govern an environment 
that other actors have found difficult to stabilize and control.
1 1 1
CHAPTER FIVE
Distributed Influence
Enabling Maneuver in a Megacity
Major Jonathon T. Frerichs, U.S. Marine Corps
Long considered the fathers of sea power and maritime 
strategy, Alfred T. Mahan and Julian Corbett’s opposing the-
ories—strategy, big battles, and command—may now be 
applied to the approach to modern challenges with urban 
combat. In the 1980s and ’90s, Colombia’s second-largest 
city—Medellín—became a war zone and the center of Pab-
lo Escobar’s drug cartel. Military crackdowns in the early 
2000s ended the violence, and peace agreements in late 
2003 demobilized and offered amnesty to the illegal armed 
groups. Conversely, Russia in the mid-1990s believed that 
taking the Chechen capital of Grozny in a significant show 
of force would mean an early end to the war. Lasting sev-
eral months, the fight left the city devastated and casualty 
numbers high. Russia’s tactics may have at first succeeded, 
but they ultimately lit a fire of rebellion under the Chechen 
separatist forces, who would eventually retake the city.
DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Why Prepare for a Conflict in a Megacity?
The United States military is not prepared to fight in a megacity. The 
National Security Strategy of 2010 states that “globalization has also 
intensified the dangers we face—from international terrorism and the 
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spread of deadly technologies, to economic upheaval and a changing 
climate.”1 This globalization includes an increasing proportion of the 
population and wealth consolidating inside dense urban areas. While 
the U.S. military may not want to become embroiled in a megacity 
conflict, the U.S. president may decide that American involvement is 
required to protect national interests.2 History demonstrates that the 
United States will fight wherever necessary to secure and protect its 
enduring interests. Whether to counter a direct threat, such as a ter-
rorist cell in a megacity that threatens U.S. citizens or allies or to re-
inforce a failing megacity of an allied partner to promote peace and 
security, U.S. involvement in a megacity is a necessary scenario for 
which to plan.3
If military involvement in a megacity is likely for future conflicts, 
why are U.S. forces unprepared for a conflict in a megacity? Most 
planning processes start with understanding the problem. The U.S. 
military is not prepared for a megacity conflict, because it does not 
possess a valid operating concept to achieve unified action. From 
the military framework of joint operational planning, the process of 
operational design should drive the operational approach. The de-
sign process should answer three key questions: Where are we? (i.e., 
the current situation); What is the problem?; and Where do we want 
to go?4 
Where Are We: Defining the Operating Environment
As defined by the 2014 U.S. Army study on megacities, the term meg-
acity is defined as having a population of 10 million or more. By this 
definition in 2017, the number of megacities in the world increased to 
37, and by 2030 there will be more than 40.5 Several different frame-
1 National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), i.
2 Steven Metz, “Strategic Horizons: How the U.S. Military Might Get Involved in a Megaci-
ty,” World Politics Review, 19 March 2014, 1-1.
3 Metz, “Strategic Horizons,” 2-2.
4 Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2011).
5 Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Fu-
ture (Washington, DC: Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Department 
of the Army, 2014), 3; and Tanza Loudenbach, “Here’s How Much It Would Cost You to 
Live in the 10 Largest Megacities around the World,” Business Insider, 20 October 2017.
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works exist to facilitate understanding of an operating environment. 
PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, infor-
mation, physical environment, and time) is a common framework used 
by the military. However, the military has an inherent problem with its 
ability to define the operating environment of a megacity. The military 
does not have the expertise to fill in the blanks for the different ele-
ments of this framework because of the complexity of a megacity. For 
example, the military does not have the technical expertise to under-
stand the physical and social infrastructure for a megacity. The densi-
ty, connectedness, and ever-changing nature of a megacity preclude 
a clear understanding of these elements by a standard military staff. 
What Is the Problem?
Military staffs plan by researching their environments and defining 
problems. The U.S. Army study on megacities identifies that the tradi-
tional reductionist method of identifying the problem is not sufficient 
for the complexity of operating in a megacity.6 The interconnected-
ness and complexity of a megacity does not allow the problem to be 
reduced. The study suggests that to understand the problem, an ap-
preciation for the characteristics of a megacity (context, scale, density, 
connectedness, flow, and threat profile) must be combined with an 
appreciation for the drivers of instability and capacity.7 
Where Do We Want to Go?
National strategic objectives will drive megacity operations. These 
objectives require collaboration, synchronization, and coordination 
with interorganizational partners.8 A 2013 report on joint operations 
and best practices states, “We continually hear our operational com-
manders saying that they cannot achieve strategic objectives solely 
through military action, but must depend on the full government team 
to achieve success.”9 Maneuvering toward a desired state must inte-
6 Megacities and the United States Army, 10.
7 Megacities and the United States Army, 11.
8 Interorganizational Coordination, JP 3-08 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016).
9 Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices, 4th ed. (Suffolk, VA: Deployable Training 
Division, Joint Staff J-7, 2013), 2.
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grate and synchronize all elements of national power to achieve any 
strategic objective.
Why Is the U.S. Military Unprepared?
Current urban warfare concepts fail to set the conditions for maneu-
ver by military forces in a megacity. The Capstone Concept for Joint 
Operations: Joint Force 2020 provides a vision from the chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff of how the U.S. military will secure and pro-
tect national interests in the future. In the introduction, the chairman 
“recognizes [that the military] is only one element of national power 
. . . success will turn on our ability to operate with other allied gov-
ernments and their armed forces, and nongovernmental partners.”10 
The concept paper highlights “integrated operations” that involve a 
network of forces and partners.11 While integrated operations sound 
promising, it focuses only on interagency coordination—not interor-
ganizational coordination. 
With a nuanced difference, interagency coordination is framed 
from the Department of Defense (DOD) perspective, relegating the 
problem to a military perspective. As previously stated, the military 
does not have the capacity to independently achieve strategic objec-
tives in a megacity conflict. Interorganizational coordination frames 
problem-solving from a whole-of-government approach, including 
foreign governments and military forces, intergovernmental organiza-
tions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Unity of effort from 
a DOD perspective can be achieved through interagency coordina-
tion. However, to achieve unified action in a megacity conflict, the mil-
itary must participate in interorganizational coordination. The United 
States will only be successful in a megacity conflict through unified 
action to methodically affect the system. 
KEY DEFINITIONS
 • Expeditionary force: an armed force organized to accom-
plish a specific objective in a foreign country.
10 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 2012), 1.
11 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, 4–8.
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 • Unity of effort: coordination and cooperation toward com-
mon objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily 
part of the same command or organization—the product of 
successful unified action.
 • Unified action: the synchronization, coordination, or inte-
gration of governmental and nongovernmental activities 
with military operations to achieve unity of effort.
 • Interagency coordination: within the context of DOD in-
volvement, the coordination that exists between its ele-
ments and engaged U.S. government agencies to achieve 
an objective. The key here is “within the context of DOD.” 
Interagency coordination allows for unity of effort from 
DOD, but not unified action from all the other players who 
are critical to achieving their strategic interests.
 • Interorganizational coordination: the interaction that oc-
curs among elements of the DOD; engaged government 
agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; for-
eign military forces and their government agencies; inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs); NGOs; and the private 
sector.
 • Control: physical or psychological pressures exerted with 
the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as 
directed.12
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions below provide an initial frame for understanding the 
problem of maneuvering in a megacity. Paramount to this discussion, 
a conflict in a megacity will occur. And while conflict in a megacity is 
not desirable, this assumption is critical to initiate planning. 
 • Conflict in a megacity will occur, resulting in American en-
gagement.  
 • The drivers of instability and the root causes of the problem 
in a megacity are not apparent. If they were apparent then 
the conflict could be easily resolved or reconciled.  
12 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: DOD, 2018).
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 • Control is not possible. Joint Urban Operations states that a 
fundamental step of operations in urban terrain is to “estab-
lish and extend control and protection of urban sectors and 
subsystems.”13 The complexity and interconnectedness of 
a megacity defies control (in accordance with the joint defi-
nition), so nothing can be assured. 
 • Similar rules of engagement (ROE) under which the U.S. 
military currently operates will apply, at least until vital na-
tional interests are threatened by a force that cannot be 
managed based on the current ROEs. For the purposes of 
this discussion, the cure cannot kill the patient (i.e., prevent-
ing total destruction of a city as a course of action).  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS
Historical Perspective: 
Another Large, Complex Operating Environment
Have the U.S. government and the military experienced the problem 
of operating in a large, complex, and unknown operating environment 
before? Let us consider those operating in the open seas in the late 
1800s and early 1900s. Their similarities include an increasing glo-
balization and connectedness, size (relative), and the lack of clear 
doctrine. The two most notable theorists of the time—American naval 
officer and historian Alfred T. Mahan and British naval historian and 
geostrategist Julian S. Corbett—developed two theories applicable to 
conflict in a megacity. Mahan argued for control of the sea by mass-
ing strength at decisive points to neutralize the enemy fleet, for only 
through destruction of the enemy fleet could a country gain control of 
the sea. 
In contrast, Corbett argued that the sea was not susceptible to 
ownership. He proposed that only local superiority could be gained 
through securing lines of communication (LOCs) as required to en-
able commerce and transit. Additionally, he argued that massing 
13 Joint Urban Operations, JP 3-06 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), I-11. 
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forces only provided the enemy with an easier target.14 The megacity 
concept lends itself to similar theories where we must consider the 
United States massing and destroying the enemy at a decisive point, 
or where the scale and complexity of the megacity lends itself better 
to an operating concept that secures key LOCs to enable other action.
Complexity
Megacities are complex and no source of literature denies this claim. 
The U.S. Army study on megacities states: “The nature of each meg-
acity’s complexity makes it unique. No two cities exhibit the same 
emergent properties, or are connected (internally or externally) in 
the same way.”15 Case studies of individual megacities identify that 
each city has unique, individual complexities. Additionally, the cities 
are ever changing and adapting. In Out of the Mountains, counter-
insurgency expert David Kilcullen discusses rapid urbanization and 
increasing connectedness as key factors to the complexity of oper-
ating in urban environments.16 Joint Urban Operations points to the 
complexity and difficulty of operating in an urban environment as a 
prevailing consideration. This complexity will prevent or degrade tradi-
tional military maneuver. The U.S. military must identify an alternative 
concept to gain maneuver room and achieve operational objectives in 
this complex environment. 
Control or Influence?
Just as Corbett and Mahan failed to agree, literature fails to concur on 
whether a megacity can be controlled (Mahan) or merely influenced 
(Corbett). As discussed earlier, Joint Urban Operations states that con-
trol of an urban area is a fundamental element to success in an urban 
operation.17 Steven Metz, director of research at the Strategic Studies 
Institute, wrote a series of articles that suggest control should not be 
14 Barry M. Gough, “Maritime Strategy: The Legacies of Mahan and Corbett as Philos-
ophers of Sea Power,” RUSI Journal 133, no. 4 (1988): 55–62, https://doi.org/10.1080 
/03071848808445330.
15 Megacities and the United States Army, 10.
16 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
17 Joint Urban Operations, I-10–I-12.
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the focus—but rather influence—to obtain the strategic objectives. He 
hypothesizes two scenarios: short-term disaster relief, and reinforc-
ing the inherent resiliencies and systems of the megacity.18 The key 
component of his argument is that the U.S. military is not designed, 
or capable, of controlling the megacity without a large-scale draft to 
dramatically change the size of the military. Kilcullen reinforces the 
weakness of current task organizations with a contrasting, biological 
perspective in which he views conflicts in megacities as malignancies. 
He identifies the need for a force that is capable of a limited footprint 
that can contain or remove the source of instability without causing 
too much damage to the city itself.19 
Operational Design
Both military and U.S. government doctrine identify a gap in opera-
tional design. As previously discussed, planners must comprehend 
the environment, the problem, and the desired end state. Army gen-
eral Gary E. Luck stated in Joint Operations that “to a greater degree 
than ever, diplomatic, informational, and economic factors, as well as 
the military, (our elements of national power) affect and contribute to 
national security in this complex environment.”20 The Department of 
State places similar importance on interorganizational coordination in 
both their Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and Foreign 
Emergency Support Team doctrines. Unfortunately, while the military 
and other departments of the U.S. government agree that understand-
ing the operating environment and interorganizational coordination 
are critical elements to success in the future, current doctrine and 
task organizations do not support achieving either element. 
Implications and Conclusions
The U.S. military, in support of a whole-of-government approach, must 
reassess current doctrine with regard to gaining maneuver space in 
a megacity. Assuming that control is not possible to achieve a military 
18 Metz, “Strategic Horizons,” 1-1.
19 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains.
20 Joint Operations, 2.
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end state in a megacity conflict, we must consider how the military 
contributes to achieving success.
The United States must develop an expeditionary force capable 
of identifying and influencing established and emerging networks 
within a megacity conflict to set the conditions for follow-on govern-
ment action. The key characteristics of this force include:
 • Expeditionary: capable of deploying on short notice
 • Flexible and adaptable: task organized for conflict
 • Interorganizational: capable of leveraging the full spectrum 
of assets to appropriately influence the environment
MANEUVERING IN A MEGACITY: 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF GROZNY AND MEDELLÍN
In 2013, all of the world’s conflicts were categorized as intrastate con-
flicts.21 Approximately 27 percent of these were termed internation-
alized intrastate conflicts, or intrastate conflicts with an international 
actor involved. After reviewing trends from the Department of Peace 
and Conflict Research’s Uppsala Conflict Data Program of conflict 
types by year, we can assume that future megacity conflicts will be 
intrastate conflicts (either pure or internationalized). 
The operational design process and resulting operational ap-
proach to solving an internal conflict—with or without external sup-
port—significantly affects the role of the military in the solution. The 
Russian action during the Battle of Grozny in 1994–95 and the Colom-
bian government actions in Medellín in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
represent two different operational approaches to gaining maneuver 
space for the government to operate. The Russians applied military 
mass to systematically clear Grozny, the capital of the Chechen Re-
public, of the enemy threat, while the Colombians applied influence at 
decisive points to neutralize the enemy threat and reduce the sources 
of instability.
21 Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict, 1946–2013,” Journal of Peace 
Research 51, no. 4 (2014).
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The goal of researching these two cases is to analyze two oper-
ational approaches to gaining maneuver space by government forc-
es in an intrastate conflict that takes place, at least in part, in urban 
battlefields. The research focused on initially determining how the 
country viewed the current situation, the problem, and the end state. 
During problem framing, the theory of control versus influence was 
critical to the operational approach of the two different governments. 
The Russians cleared Grozny to control the urban terrain. In contrast, 
the Colombians used influence at decisive points to achieve success. 
Moreover, the role and task organization of the security forces were 
compared to determine their contribution to achieving the end state 
of the government. Finally, the naval theories of Mahan and Corbett 
were compared to the governments’ strategies, applying mass against 
the enemy compared to influencing LOCs. Drawing lessons learned 
from these case studies provides U.S. military planners with two oper-
ational approaches to gain maneuverability in a megacity.  
Background of the Grozny and Medellín Conflicts
Grozny is situated along a critical ground LOC from the Caspian Sea 
to Moscow that facilitates the movement of oil.22 With a current esti-
mated population of fewer than 300,000 people, it is by no means a 
megacity.23 However, Grozny has been the location of more than 10 
conflicts during the previous 100 years, and it is the origin of many 
U.S. military techniques, tactics, and procedures for conducting ur-
ban operations.24 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
Grozny became the capital of the Chechen separatist movement led 
by former Soviet military officer Dzhokhar Dudayev. The conflict be-
tween Moscow and Grozny escalated between 1991 and 1994 as the 
Chechen separatist movement consolidated political and social forc-
22 Oil and the War in Chechnya: Black Gold from the Caspian (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Education, n.d.).
23 “2010 All-Russian Population Census: Volume 1. Population and Population Distribu-
tion,” Federal Service of State Statistics, accessed 22 January 2015.
24 William G. Rosenau, “Every Room Is a New Battle: The Lessons of Modern Urban 
Warfare,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 20, no. 4 (1997): 371–94, https://doi.org/10 
.1080/10576109708436047; and Timothy L. Thomas, “Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Les-
sons Learned,” Military Review 80, no. 4 (July–August 2000): 50–58.
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es toward independence.25 During 1994, Moscow attempted multiple 
subversive operations to regain influence over Grozny. These opera-
tions all failed to achieve the Russian objectives. On New Year’s Eve 
1994, the conflict transitioned to a new phase—the Russian strategy 
matured to one of domination.26 Despite the failed offensive, Russian 
forces consolidated and systematically cleared the city, sector by sec-
tor, with heavy application of artillery and air fires.27 
Employing a total force of approximately 60,000 soldiers, the 
Russians suffered approximately 1,800 killed in action. Chechen to-
tal force estimates vary significantly from source to source but are 
estimated at 2,000–12,000, with a resulting undetermined number 
of casualties. Most striking are the civilian casualties—an estimated 
35,000 civilians were killed during this four-month period.28
Medellín is the second largest city of Colombia. Located in the 
Aburra Valley, it is situated along a critical ground LOC for the Co-
lombian government to the Caribbean Sea and the southern coun-
tries of North America. With a current population of approximately 2.5 
million, Medellín cannot be defined as a megacity, but its history of 
conflict does resemble many current fragile and feral megacities.29 
During the 1980s, the Medellín cartel, under the leadership of Pablo 
Escobar, established a social order based on the use of violence. In 
1991, Medellín earned the moniker “murder capital of the world” with 
381 homicides per 100,000 people in the city.30 While the violence 
and deterioration of the city is often attributed solely to the cartel, the 
problem was much more complicated. The power brokers of Medellín 
25 V. S. Drozdov, “Chechnya: Exit from the Labyrinth of Conflict,” Russian Social Science 
Review 37, no. 6 (1996): 28–43, https://doi.org/10.2753/RSS1061-1428370628.
26 Drozdov, “Chechnya,” 28–43.
27 Ib Faurby, “The Battle(s) of Grozny,” Baltic Defence Review, no. 2 (1999): 75–87.
28 Timothy L. Thomas, “The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed 
Forces Confront Chechnya III. The Battle for Grozny, 1–26 January 1995,” Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies 10, no. 1 (1997): 50 –108, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518049708430276. 
These civilian deaths occurred in spite of a Russian directive for civilians to depart the city 
prior to the cleaning operations. The mandate to leave was not enough to displace the 
population from the security of their homes.
29 “Medellin Population, 2018,” World Population Review, accessed 20 October 2017.
30 Kate Maclean, The ‘Medellín Miracle’: The Politics of Crisis, Elites and Coalitions (Lon-
don: Developmental Leadership Program, 2014), 5.
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in 1991 included the Medellín cartel, the economic elite (coffee and 
mining), the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), 
multiple militias and paramilitary forces working for different groups, 
and the Colombian government.31 
The state of Colombia recognized it could no longer provide for 
the safety and security of Medellín citizens. The death of Escobar in 
1993, along with international recognition of its murder rates, cata-
lyzed the Colombian government to implement social, political, and 
structural changes to the city.32 These changes, in conjunction with 
military operations to neutralize nonstate actors, assisted the govern-
ment to regain influence over the city’s population. While the process 
took decades, the result was revolutionary. Medellín recently won the 
Citi Award for Innovative City of the Year, beating out Tel Aviv and New 
York.33  
Similarities and Differences
Although oceans apart, striking similarities can be seen between the 
conflicts of Grozny and Medellín. Both conflicts represent intrastate 
conflicts and take place around a large urban population. Grozny rep-
resents an intrastate conflict.34 Medellín represents an international-
ized intrastate conflict with the United States as the primary external 
actor. In both conflicts, the problem centers on the inability of the for-
mal government to provide for the people. Specifically, formal political 
forces lacked a monopoly over the legitimate use of force.35 Further, 
the enemy of the state was a complex mix of actors. In Grozny, the sep-
aratist government of Dudayev was the face of the enemy, but on the 
ground it was a collection of different groups and organizations with 
competing agendas. In Medellín, Escobar and the cartel was the face, 
31 FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, formed as a Marxist guerrilla orga-
nization in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. Maclean, The 
‘Medellín Miracle.’
32 Maclean, The ‘Medellín Miracle.’
33 “Colombia’s Medellin Named ‘Most Innovative City,” BBC News, 1 March 2013.
34 Some Russians dispute this and suggest that external Islamic extremist actors support-
ed the Chechen rebels; however, evidence does not suggest this was decisive or even 
influential during the 1994–95 conflict.
35 Drozdov, “Chechnya,” 28–43.
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but in reality there were multiple organizations and groups competing 
for power and influence. In both cities, however, the enemy competed 
for legitimacy and influence.
Both operations saw successes and failures. In Grozny, the Rus-
sian failure appeared more evident as they were displaced from the 
city in 1996. However, the Russians once again seized and destroyed 
the city in 1999–2000, maintaining relative control of it since then. In 
Colombia, the displacement of the Medellín cartel allowed the Cali 
cartel to consolidate power and influence throughout the country. 
Despite U.S. involvement to reduce drug trafficking into America, re-
search suggests no noticeable metrics of success in this objective.36 
Finally, FARC remains an active organization in Colombia that contin-
ues to garner attention from the government. 
While the similarities are important, the differences must also 
be acknowledged. The biggest difference can be seen in the history 
of conflict between the enemy and the state. In Grozny, the Chech-
en separatist movement originated in the Caucasian War from 1817 
to 1864, during which Russia conquered and annexed the Caucasus. 
Cases of mass displacement, mass murder, and general mistreatment 
of Chechen nationals are also associated with this period and subse-
quent conflicts. The Colombian conflict with the enemy in Medellín 
can only be traced back to the 1950s when migration and economic 
policies laid the foundation for discontent against the Colombian gov-
ernment. 
Operational Design: Control versus Influence 
As previously discussed, the design process should answer three key 
questions: Where are we? (current situation); What is the problem?; 
and Where do we want to go?37 In Grozny, the Russian perspective on 
the current situation was influenced significantly by the long history 
of conflict with the Chechens and the recent collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The Russian state lacked legitimacy as a governing institution 
36 Oeindrila Dube and Suresh Naidu, Bases, Bullets and Ballots: The Effect of U.S. Military 
Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, 2014).
37 Joint Operation Planning.
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and had not monopolized the use of violence. When they backed the 
failed pro-Russian opposition in the fall of 1994, the Russian govern-
ment was embarrassed in the international arena.38 As a result, Russian 
president Boris Yeltsin viewed the problem with a narrower perspec-
tive. The problem was not that the Russian state failed to provide a 
legitimate, functioning government to the Chechens; in this instance, 
the problem was simply the existence of the Chechen separatists. The 
separatists were largely based in Grozny; therefore, it follows that Rus-
sia must clear Grozny and destroy the Chechen separatist movement. 
The Russian operational approach focused on complete control of the 
city, which would enable destruction of the Chechen separatists, or an 
enemy centric approach.39 
In Medellín, the Colombian government was more introspective 
in their approach. While Escobar and the cartel were the represen-
tatives of violence, members of the Colombian government and the 
city believed that the problem was more complex than the face of one 
man. Additionally, the consensus believed that change was needed in 
Medellín—being world-renowned for murder was not acceptable. The 
government realized that the problem was a complex web of socioeco-
nomic (inequality), governmental (security architecture, representa-
tion), and structural (physical access and opportunities) issues.40 While 
it did not have a clear end state, Colombia knew that it could not contin-
ue along its current course. The operational approach focused on influ-
ence rather than control. It employed a course of action to influence all of 
the identified problems in a comprehensive way, often anticipating the 
second- and third-order effects before deciding on a course of action. 
Role of the Military: Main Effort versus 
Supporting Effort during Phases of the Operation
The U.S. military uses a six-phase model for planning operations: 
phase 0 (shape), phase 1 (deter), phase 2 (seize initiative), phase 3 
(dominate), phase 4 (stabilize), and phase 5 (enable civil  authority) (see 
38 Faurby, “The Battle(s) of Grozny,” 75–87.
39 Thomas, “The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security.”
40 Maclean, The ‘Medellín Miracle.’
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figure 1.2).41 Typically, the military will be the main effort in a whole- 
of-government approach for phases 1–4 and assume a supporting 
role in phase 0 and phase 5. This model is applicable to Russian op-
erations in Grozny. During phases 0 and 1, the main effort came from 
Russian diplomatic engagement with the Chechen separatists. From 
November 1991, when Dudayev declared Chechnya independent, to 
the New Year’s Eve offensive in 1994, the Russian military played a 
supporting role.42 Their tasks included occupying Grozny as a deter-
rent, under the guise of a so-called peacekeeping force, and isolating 
Chechnya in support of an economic siege. However, these actions by 
the Russians culminated in the direct support of pro-Russian armed 
rebels in the fall of 1994 by Chechens. Russian diplomatic efforts failed 
and resulted in the military assuming the main effort in the winter of 
1994. Phase 2 (seize initiative) started with the attack on New Year’s 
Eve 1994, and phase 3 (dominate) lasted approximately three months. 
Unfortunately for the Russians, seizing Grozny never enabled the gov-
ernment to transition to phases 4 or 5—neither domination nor control 
of the city defeated the Chechen opposition. This chapter of the Gro-
zny conflict ended with the Russians expelled from the city in 1996.
In Medellín, the military served as a supporting effort throughout 
the entire operation, while diplomacy represented the main effort. The 
Colombian government viewed the problem holistically. Security was 
a primary concern, but the government recognized that the military 
could not solve all the problems. The military (including U.S. military 
and intelligence) played a vital role in disrupting the organizations that 
had assumed influence within Medellín, most visibly by killing Escobar 
in fall 1993.43 Applying the phasing framework to the operation would 
classify the period from 1991 to 1993 as phase 0 (shaping). Phases 
2–5 overlap, with no significant delineation from phase to phase. What 
is notable, however, is a steady progress toward reestablishing formal 
government legitimacy by reconciling social, political, and structural 
issues.   
41 Joint Operation Planning, xxiii–xxiv.
42 Drozdov, “Chechnya,” 28–43.
43 Maclean, The ‘Medellín Miracle.’
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Task Organization: 
Military Centric to Whole of Government
In Grozny, once the problem was determined to be enemy-centric, the 
Russian government employed a military-centric task organization to 
solve the problem. During the 1994 New Year’s Eve invasion of the 
city, the Russian force consisted of three army groups—Northern 
Group, Western Group, and Eastern Group—each with distinct objec-
tives in Grozny. These three groups advanced in columns on the city 
with a combination of reconnaissance and airborne troops in the lead, 
followed by a mix of armored, mechanized, and dismounted troops 
in trace.44 The Chechen leadership allowed these large formations to 
enter the city, which enabled individual small units to attack isolated 
Russian units. The result was devastating for the Russians; for exam-
ple, the Russian 131st Brigade lost 20 of its 26 tanks, and 102 of its 
120 armored personnel carriers.45 The New Year’s Eve failure caused 
the Russians to withdraw and reevaluate their tactics. During the next 
three months, Russian artillery and air power enabled maneuver of 
ground forces to systematically clear each section of the city. Fires 
applied with little discretion allowed maneuver elements to clear the 
enemy block by block with little to no resistance. While eventually suc-
cessful, the operation left the city destroyed. The techniques, tactics, 
and procedures developed during this battle continue to serve as doc-
trine for the U.S. military to clear urban areas.
Medellín never bore witness to large-scale military operations. 
Two task-organized security forces are worthy of analysis: the U.S. task 
force and the Colombian militia. U.S. military operations in Colombia 
were intelligence driven and executed in the context of the antidrug 
initiative of the 1980s and 1990s (also known as the War on Drugs).46 
Notably, the Colombian and U.S. governments restricted American 
participation to the limited objective of disrupting illegal drug opera-
tions, which relegated the military to a supporting effort. The U.S. task 
force represented an interorganizational force that successfully inte-
44 Faurby, “The Battle(s) of Grozny,” 75–87.
45 Faurby, “The Battle(s) of Grozny.” 
46 Dube and Naidu, Bases, Bullets and Ballots.
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grated the military, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Department of 
State, and other intelligence organizations to achieve unified action. 
While turf wars sprang up between the different organizations, their 
synchronized efforts enabled the Colombian government to gain ma-
neuver room in Medellín.  
The Colombian militia emerged in 1991 as a transitional security 
force in Medellín. Recognizing that security was an essential service 
the Colombian government could not provide, the city of Medellín 
(with Colombian government approval) entered into peace talks with 
local militias. These groups were one of the many power brokers al-
ready providing local security. The peace talks, however, legitimatized 
their role in providing security for the populace. It is important to note 
that there was a historical precedence for nontraditional security forc-
es. Legislation dating back to the 1960s legalized civilians’ ability to 
take up arms in their own defense. In 1994, paramilitarism was legal-
ized and provided legitimate private security forces to neighborhoods, 
businesses, and families.47 While these groups were later dismantled 
in 1997 after being declared unconstitutional and criticized by interna-
tional human rights groups, they provided an effective, local solution 
to the security problem. They temporarily secured a line of communi-
cation to enable subsequent government maneuver.  
Mahan versus Corbett: 
How Was Maneuver Space Generated?
Historically, mass has been a critical planning element for Soviet and 
Russian military doctrine. Analysis of the Soviet development of op-
erational art, or the “Deep Battle” concept, reveals the importance of 
mass at the decisive point to obtain victory.48 At the tactical level, the 
principle of mass was applied to the battle of Grozny in 1994–95. While 
the initial attack force on New Year’s Eve was approximately 30,000 
soldiers, the Russians employed close to 60,000 total military person-
nel against an enemy force no larger than 12,000.49 This approach 
47 Maclean, The ‘Medellín Miracle.’
48 Jacob W. Kipp, Mass, Mobility, and the Red Army’s Road to Operational Art, 1918–1936 
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, Combined Arms Center, 1988).
49 Faurby, “The Battle(s) of Grozny.” 
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was similar to Mahan’s theory of victory at sea—mass and attack the 
enemy force.50 The Russians determined that control of the network 
could only be achieved by destroying the enemy. At the tactical lev-
el, the Russians maneuvered with the application of combined arms. 
During the systematic clearance of Grozny, the application of artillery 
and air power generated an advantage for the Russian mechanized 
and armored forces. They exploited that advantage and cleared the 
city sector by sector. Maneuver was limited to this spatial perspective. 
In Medellín, the Colombian government focused on disrupting 
and influencing critical lines of communication (networks) throughout 
the city. These LOCs included mending the social inequality between 
the elite and the city’s poor, restructuring the political and security 
system, and enabling physical access and opportunities for social ad-
vancement within the city. This approach represents an approach sim-
ilar to Corbett’s theory of victory—disrupting and influencing specific 
LOCs to enable maneuver.51 Maneuver for the Colombian government 
was obtained by generating and exploiting advantages simultaneous-
ly and along multiple lines of operation—economic, political, and so-
cial—for a systemic effect.  
Findings 
Different approaches to operational design led to extremely different 
operational approaches for the 1994–95 Battle of Grozny and the Me-
dellín conflict. In Grozny, the Russian government viewed the enemy 
as the singular problem. With this assumption, the destruction of the 
enemy became the sole objective of the Russian government. For Me-
dellín, Pablo Escobar appeared to be the source of the problem. In-
trospective analysis by the Colombian government, however, revealed 
several social, political, and structural issues, whereby a holistic view 
led to a holistic operational approach. 
Interorganizational coordination supported unity of action. While 
the Russian military as the main effort was effective during the deci-
50 Gough, “Maritime Strategy.”
51 Gough, “Maritime Strategy.”
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sive phase of Grozny and cleared the city of Chechen separatists, the 
second- and third-order political and social effects were tremendous. 
The Russian government’s failure to transition to civil authority result-
ed in the Russians losing the city again in 1996, though only to seize 
it again in 1999–2000 and hold it continually since. The supporting 
role of the military in the interorganizational effort by the Colombian 
government in Medellín, where the state took the lead with multiple 
contributing agencies both internal and external to Colombia, was ef-
fective in achieving unity of effort and the desired end state. 
This research identifies two different operational approaches to 
enable maneuver within a megacity: mass to gain numerical superior-
ity and gaining relative superiority through securing critical LOCs. The 
Russians gained physical maneuver space through the massing of 
combined arms combined with tactical movement of ground forces. 
The Colombian government did not apply mass, but it gained relative 
superiority through the execution of a holistic operational approach 
that secured critical LOCs throughout the city. 
Conclusion of Comparative Analysis 
of Grozny and Medellín
Maneuver in a megacity is obtainable. The U.S. military is capable of 
massing and systematically clearing a city as the Russians did in Gro-
zny. Should the U.S. military do the same in a megacity conflict? Cur-
rent social and political restraints would never allow the wholesale 
destruction of a city. Therefore, to succeed in a megacity conflict, the 
American military concept of maneuver must expand from a spatial 
one focused on creating and exploiting an advantage on the enemy 
in the physical domain to creating and exploiting advantages that will 
holistically move the situation toward the desired end state. Estab-
lished and emerging networks must be disrupted and influenced; in 
this instance, an attempt to control will only lead to the destruction 
of those networks. Positive resiliencies of the megacity can be rein-
forced to gain and exploit an advantage, while negative influences 
should be disrupted until the resiliencies of the city can destroy them. 
Further research will focus on how the U.S. military can best be em-
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ployed to gain relative superiority for its efforts in a megacity conflict 
and gain critical maneuver space for the commander. Research will 
focus on techniques to integrate the U.S. military in an interorganiza-
tional effort.
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT: 
DISTRIBUTED INFLUENCE
Purpose of the Concept
This concept proposes an operational approach to gain maneuver 
space for military forces in a megacity. Maneuvering in a megacity will 
be challenging. The interconnectedness and complexity of a megaci-
ty demands an operational approach that respects these factors. Pop-
ulation density, urban terrain, and connectedness will exponentially 
increase the complexity of the environment. To overcome this issue, 
a systems approach to understanding the environment and defining 
the desired state might offer a solution. Once this is achieved, multi-
domain combined arms is applied across a distributed battlefield to 
influence the megacity toward the desired state. Before proceeding, 
several key terms must be defined.  
Key Terms and Definitions
 • Maneuver warfare: identifying or creating an advantage 
and the subsequent exploitation of the advantage to ad-
vance toward a desired state. 
 • Maneuver space: the freedom to advance (physically and/
or cognitively) toward a desired state.
 • Multidomain combined arms: the application of tradition-
al fires (e.g., aviation, artillery) combined with information 
operations (synchronize all information-related capabilities 
to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making 
of a target) across all five operational domains (sea, land, 
air, space, and information).52 
 • Nodes: a connection point or the intersection of different 
52 Information Operations, JP 3-13 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014).
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connections (e.g., a place, a person, a group, an idea) either 
physically or conceptually.  
 • Connectors: the element that establishes a relationship 
between two or more nodes.
 • Network: the structure of different nodes and connectors 
that make up a model.  
 • Influence: the capacity to have an effect on the system. 
Time Horizon, Assumptions, and Risks
In 2012, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations describes the fu-
ture security environment as “more unpredictable, complex, and poten-
tially dangerous than today.”53 Additionally, it suggests that a general 
reduction in defense accounts will lead to a smaller military force. An 
increasingly complex operating environment, coupled with a shrink-
ing military, requires a shift in operational approaches. Fortunately, 
this concept does not require any additional materiel or structure for 
the military. While developments in technology and force structure will 
enhance its effectiveness, they are not required. This operational con-
cept is viable now, and it is flexible enough to be applied in a major 
theater of war to humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief scenari-
os in large urban environments. 
Constructing this operating concept is grounded in four as-
sumptions. First, destruction of the city is not desirable, particularly as 
employment of this option inevitably results in a difficult, if not impos-
sible recovery of the city. Second, this concept assumes the United 
States is most likely engaging in an internationalized intrastate con-
flict in a megacity. While this concept is optimized for this scenario, it 
remains relevant to other scenarios. Third, this concept assumes that 
traditional “mass” is not achievable due to the size and density of a 
megacity. As discussed in the case study on Grozny, the Russians re-
quired a force of nearly 60,000 soldiers to secure Grozny, a city of less 
than 1 million people. As U.S. military spending changes over time, so 
53 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, 3.
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too does its force.54 Using Russian forces as a basis, a minimum force 
of 1.2 million would be required for a megacity. Based on this pro-
jection and recent history of U.S. force commitments to conflicts, the 
government cannot commit this large of a force to a megacity conflict. 
Finally, this concept assumes that influence encompasses a positive 
and negative connotation. As defined above, the term simply refers to 
the capacity to have an effect on the system. For example, compare 
the two tactical tasks of reinforce and disrupt. Reinforce focuses on 
increasing capacity to sustain (positive), while disrupt focuses on de-
nying the enemy the ability to employ their forces (negative). Although 
both tasks describe an influence to the system, one is positive and one 
is negative. 
Applying this concept assumes two primary risks. The first is as-
sociated with any application of economy of force: the mass to destroy 
the enemy at the decisive moment will not be available. If the means 
to exploit maneuver space is not available, the conflict is needlessly 
prolonged. The second risk associated with maneuver warfare results 
from catastrophic failure. The Marine Corps’ doctrinal publication 
Warfighting states that maneuver warfare “incompetently applied car-
ries with it a greater chance for catastrophic failure. With attrition, po-
tential losses tend to be proportionate to risks incurred.”55 Unintended 
effects can cause the system to irreversibly advance toward an unde-
sirable state. However, the better the system is defined, the more likely 
a positive solution will develop. 
Description of the Military Problem
Future conflicts will emerge in megacities that will require unified 
U.S. government action. Operations must influence established and 
emerging networks (physical and cognitive) to enable maneuver. An 
attempt to control will lead to the destruction of the network. Positive 
resiliencies of the megacity must be reinforced to create and exploit 
54 Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2019 Bud-
get Request (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 1-3.
55 Warfighting, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters 
Marine Corps, 1997), 38.
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advantages, while negative resiliencies must be disrupted until the 
city can organically neutralize or destroy them. Defining the objective 
(desired state) and employing economy of force (as traditional mass 
cannot be achieved) will be critical principles to success. No current 
operating concept within the Department of Defense (DOD) maximiz-
es the ability to gain maneuver space in a megacity conflict.
Synopsis of the Central Idea
The distributed influence operating concept proposes multiline and 
multidomain influence along critical nodes and connectors. This influ-
ence results in a systemic effect on the operating environment that en-
ables maneuver. This concept synthesizes elements from maneuver 
warfare, distributed operations, and cognitive joint force entry. While 
many interpretations of maneuver warfare exist, the concept of creat-
ing and exploiting an advantage to achieve the desired state is central 
to distributed influence. These advantages are not limited to the phys-
ical and can include the cognitive.56 The term distributed operations 
offers many definitions and interpretations. 
Colonel Vincent J. Goulding from the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Lab wrote a series of papers and articles on distributed operations 
and its applicability to the Marine Corps. He envisioned operations 
with small, highly capable units spread across a large area of opera-
tions to create an advantage over an adversary through the deliber-
ate use of separated and coordinated independent tactical actions. 
Simplified even further, distributed operations combines tenets of ma-
neuver warfare with economy of force for systemic effect.57 U.S. Army 
Special Operations Command proposed cognitive joint force entry as 
operating concept in a 2014 white paper, which describes how to ap-
ply influence and information activities to counter new challenges and 
the availability of scalable options for senior leadership to shape envi-
ronments in the earliest stages. This is an apt description of applying 
56 Warfighting, 37–38.
57 Vincent J. Goulding Jr., “Distributed Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette 91, no. 2 (2007): 
51–53.
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influence in the cognitive realm of operations to achieve the desired 
state.58 
Principles of Distributed Influence: 
Define, Identify, Influence, and Exploit
Define: a systems approach to understanding the problem and identi-
fying the desired state. The megacity is a complex system comprised 
of different nodes interconnected through interactions with one anoth-
er. These nodes include physical structures (skyscrapers, roadways), 
people (city mayor, trash collectors), and subsystems (transportation, 
economic, and security). These nodes are not limited to the physical 
world; they are also cognitive. Thoughts and ideas interact within the 
system and serve as both nodes and connectors (e.g., internet, social 
media, religion, etc.). Problems in a megacity exist within this intercon-
nectedness, though these problems are not subject to a reductionist 
approach. 
Networks are mental models of the nodes and connectors within 
a complex system. This architecture of complexity allows planners to 
understand how nodes are connected. Modeling these networks in 
a megacity demonstrates that the megacity is different than the sum 
of its parts.59 Consequently, planners cannot isolate problems in an 
interactively complex system.60 Additionally, the outcome of any oper-
ation is the product of multiple interactions with different nodes and 
is not predictable with a cause and effect approach.61 To succeed in 
this environment, planners benefit from applying systemic operational 
design.  
Systemic operational design is an approach intended to help 
planners understand the interconnectedness of nodes in a system 
and to develop an operational approach to achieve a desired state. In 
A Systemic Concept for Operational Design, John Schmitt describes 
58 Cognitive Joint Force Entry (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 
2014).
59 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), 12.
60 John F. Schmitt, A Systemic Concept for Operational Design (Montgomery, AL: Air Uni-
versity, 2006). 
61 Jervis, System Effects, 79.
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how a systemic understanding of the situation will result in a course of 
action.62 Embracing the interactive complexity of a situation enables 
simplicity. Zooming out and embracing the complexity allows one to 
focus on the nodes and connectors that matter most and to develop 
an effective operational approach.63 
Identify: while defining the problem and modeling the system, 
specific nodes and connectors will emerge as susceptible to influ-
ence. Three key considerations are: susceptibility, impact, and sus-
tainability. Once the problem and a desired state are defined, planners 
identify nodes and connectors dispersed throughout the megacity 
that are susceptible to influence and will enable maneuver. Some 
connectors and nodes are not susceptible to influence; for example, 
disrupting the drinking water supply to a megacity could be very influ-
ential, though deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure is prohibit-
ed by international law. Susceptibility is simply whether the specific 
node or connector can be influenced based on the planning limita-
tions (constraints and restraints). Impact is defined as having dispro-
portionate effects or, in this case, the ability to influence a single node 
or connector and yet have an effect across the whole system. Finally, 
sustainability relates to the temporary or long-term effect of the influ-
ence. Operations to influence occur once the nodes and connectors 
to influence are identified.
Influence: operations taken to positively and negatively affect 
the system to advance it toward a desired state. During the influence 
stage, operations must be focused to disrupt the negative and rein-
force the positive aspects of the system. With this phase, the role of 
supported and supporting units must rapidly transition relationships 
to achieve maximum influence. The relationship between supported 
and supporting units and or activities is unlimited and based on the 
susceptibility and access to key nodes and connectors. For example, 
in many conflicts, commanders direct that everything must support 
the ground-based maneuver as the main effort. During distributed 
62 Schmitt, A Systemic Concept for Operational Design, 3.
63 The language here is derived from ecologist Eric Berlow and physicist Sean Gourley 
during a TED Talk on mapping ideas. Eric Berlow and Sean Gourley, “Mapping Ideas 
Worth Spreading,” TED Talks, February 2013, 7:52. 
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influence, the main effort can rapidly change and is often not the 
physical movement of ground forces. Information operations (IO) can 
support physical movement just as easily as physical movement sup-
ports IO; intelligence supports operations, just as operations support 
intelligence. Fires can support maneuver, just as maneuver can be 
employed to support fires. The transition between supported and sup-
porting can rapidly change based on the opportunities identified or 
created. Flexibility and adaptability achieved through an understand-
ing of the system (achieved in design) are critical in enabling this rapid 
transition from supported to supporting. 
Exploit: taking advantage of the distributed influence and 
achieving quasi-homeostasis. This principle focuses on neutralizing 
the problem. While not destroying it (which is often impossible), ex-
ploitation renders the problem to a manageable state. If the focus is 
enemy-centric during an internationalized conflict, homeostasis is 
achieved when the host nation security forces are capable of main-
taining dominance over the enemy, though also applicable to other 
sources of instability. In the end, once the isolation or neutralization of 
the problem is such that U.S. forces can be removed, the system will 
reach quasi-homeostasis as the desired state.  
Application in Operational Phasing
 • Phase 0 (shaping): the actions required to define the problem 
within the operational environment. By activating the system, 
we gain a better understanding of the problem and identi-
fy critical nodes and connectors susceptible to influence.
 • Phases 1–2 (deter and seize the initiative): multiline, multi- 
domain maneuver by semi-independent, task-organized 
cells to influence critical nodes and connectors across a 
distributed area to gain maneuver space (influence across 
the spectrum). Flexibility and adaptability to rapidly change 
tasks to exploit uncovered gaps. Physical dispersion and in-
fluence across the system prevents a coordinated enemy 
response. Methods to achieve this influence include:
 - Offensive operations
  •   Raids
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  •   Limited penetration: penetration concept scaled 
down from the brigade and applied as the raid con-
cept of a planned withdrawal
  •   Military deception: coercion and confusion
 - Defensive operations
  • Secure and protect key infrastructure
  • Reinforce friendly positions
 - Stability operations
  • Foreign internal defense support to host nation 
security forces
 • Phase 3 (dominate): exploit the advantage that has been 
created, which is ideally achieved with the host nation in a 
unified action (as a whole-of-government approach). The 
enemy is effectively neutralized to the point that the host 
nation maintains the equilibrium or quasi-homeostasis. 
 • Phases 4–5 (stabilize and enable civil authority): employ-
ment of semi-independent cells continues under the 
request of host nation government as required until the in-
ternationalized aspect of the conflict can be concluded.  
The Theory of Victory Is Defined 
If distributed influence is applied at critical nodes and connectors 
across the system, then the system can be advanced to a desired state. 
The desired state must be limited to achieving quasi-homeostasis, or 
establishing and maintaining an equilibrium that is acceptable to con-
clude internationalized support to an intrastate conflict. 
Application and Integration of Military Functions
Distributed influence requires synchronized application across the 
joint warfighting functions to be effective, including command and 
control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and 
sustainment. Command and control effectively prioritizes and syn-
chronizes the application of intelligence, fires, and movement and 
maneuver as supported and supporting efforts. Moreover, movement 
and maneuver will not always be the main effort. Command and con-
trol must enable the rapid transition between supported and support-
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ing units and allow for decentralized decision making by subordinate 
commanders, which is further enabled with a complete understand-
ing of the system and the desired state. 
Intelligence must be flexible and responsive enough to enable 
an understanding of influence on the system. The faster intelligence 
aggregates information and assesses the effects on a system, the 
quicker a commander can make decisions to exploit opportunities. 
Fires must be centralized enough to rapidly exploit targets and yet re-
sponsive enough to provide effective fire support for decentralized, 
dispersed units. Additionally, IO must be prioritized and planned for 
with the same detail as traditional fires. IO should not be considered 
a subset of fires. Movement and maneuver are synchronized with in-
telligence and fires to systemically influence the megacity toward a 
desired state. 
Economy of force employment will create greater force protec-
tion concerns when conducting traditional relative combat power 
assessments, which are further mitigated through the multidomain 
influence on the system and the dispersed nature of maneuver ele-
ments. Sustainment remains one of the greatest challenges in dis-
tributed operations. Planning must enable the greatest adaptability of 
maneuver cells to prevent reliance on a traditional push/pull sustain-
ment plan. Sustainment can include foraging and host nation acquisi-
tion. However, the second- and third-order effects of these techniques 
must be assessed when considering how these actions will positively 
or negatively affect the system. 
Necessary Capabilities
As previously discussed, there are no critical shortfalls when apply-
ing this operating concept in a current conflict. However, advances in 
technology will have significant impacts on the effectiveness of this 
concept. 
CONCLUSION
While the military and the U.S. government may not desire to enter a 
conflict in a megacity, circumstances may require it. Current military 
doctrine for fighting in an urban environment, however, is not sufficient 
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for operations in a megacity. For example, the principles of control and 
isolation, central to current doctrine, are not realistic to operations in 
a megacity. If control and isolation are not obtainable to support ma-
neuver, an alternative concept must identify how a commander can 
achieve the objective. 
Distributed influence proposes an additional operational ap-
proach to gain maneuver space for military forces in a megacity, 
which exploits the interconnectedness and complexity of a megacity. 
This operational approach also takes into consideration the assump-
tion that traditional mass will not be achievable by the military force. 
Through a systems approach to understanding the environment and 
defining the desired state, influence (both positive and negative) can 
be applied to create systemic effects and to achieve the desired state. 
While control and isolation are not possible, influence is achievable. 
Advances in technology and other capabilities will enhance the ability 
of the U.S. military to apply distributed influence in future conflicts, 
but they are not required to be successful in a current operation.64 
Operational testing of this concept is recommended to evaluate the 
applicability in future megacity conflicts. 
64 Of note, the U.S. Army released The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex 
World, 2020–2040 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014). This operating con-
cept identifies and outlines changes to doctrine, manpower, and equipment that will en-
hance the Army’s ability to apply the concept of distributed influence. 
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C H A P T E R S I X
Coordinating Chaos
Integrating Capabilities in Future Urban Conflict
Major Robert D. Barbaree III, U.S. Marine Corps
Is it possible for a global power to be operationally and tac-
tically superb but strategically inept? To answer that ques-
tion in the context of militarized megacities and terrorist 
groups, we must first agree that a new definition of victory 
is necessary, even as we realize that victory is simply a mat-
ter of perspective. With reflection, would the populations of 
Mosul, Iraq, and ar-Raqqah, Syria, consider themselves the 
center of a victorious situation? They have suffered massive 
destruction and decimation, yet are considered liberated 
from a nonstate terrorist regime.
INTRODUCTION
Recent events in Mosul and ar-Raqqah have ignited a resurgence in 
the U.S. military’s critical analysis of urban warfare. The idea of de-
stroying a city to save it is not desirable when considering options 
for operations in dense urban terrain (DUT). As strategists refine the 
theory of victory, the United States will require refined operating con-
cepts as well.1 Rather than the destruction and total annihilation of 
enemy forces, the U.S. military looks for ways to surgically remove vi-
1 Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2016), 16–17.
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olent actors from otherwise benign areas. A less destructive solution 
facilitates transferring control to civil authorities without significant 
reconstruction of critical infrastructure. However, to address urban 
warfare from a purely military perspective is a mistake; the breadth of 
problems that American forces will encounter in future urban systems 
will quickly transcend conventional military capabilities. As a result, 
planners must properly analyze the system they rely on and include all 
interorganizational capabilities in a proactive review of strategic and 
operational concepts for conflict in major cities.2 Close relationships 
are paramount to influencing operational outcomes by leveraging the 
organization that has the appropriate environmental knowledge, au-
thorities, and access. Cross-talk between civil agencies and military 
commands must occur at every level by incorporating competent li-
aison officers (LNOs) and coordination cells to grow operational art 
beyond military considerations.
CITY AS A SYSTEM
Understanding a city as a system and how it responds to inputs is 
an important step to developing future techniques for combat in this 
environment. Ultimately, cities are complex systems that are as un-
predictable as war itself. Although cities can be relatively predictable 
environments during normal operations, once a city’s normal opera-
tions are disrupted by war or conflict, predictability all but disappears. 
In her literature review of urban metabolism, Elizabeth Rapoport rec-
ognizes that recent urban studies frequently apply “complex systems 
theory, which conceives of systems as open, non-linear, hierarchi-
cally organized entities consisting of a number of agents interacting 
amongst themselves and with their environment.”3 This description 
aptly represents what we encounter in an urban environment. Open 
systems fluidly exchange feedback with their external environment, 
have porous boundaries, and exhibit equifinality, or more than one 
2 David N. Farrell and Megan Ward, Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Initiative: Data 
Collection and Analysis (Hampton, VA: U.S. Army TRADOC [G-2] Mad Scientist, Mitre, 
2016).
3 Elizabeth Rapoport, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Urban Metabolism: A Review of 
the Literature (London: Development Planning Unit, University College London, 2011), 9.
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way to achieve the same or similar results.4 Next, nonlinear systems 
are “those that disobey proportionality or additivity” and become un-
predictable as a result.5 
The idea of proportionality supposes that an input to a system 
will result in a proportional output. As a linear concept, proportional-
ity provides a direct connection between input and output that does 
not exist in a complex system. Additivity reduces a system into small-
er components with the idea that solving component problems will 
eventually add to solving the entire problem.6 Warfare in urban envi-
ronments certainly disobeys both of these principles. Finally, hierar-
chical organization has multiple applications but, in this case, urban 
hierarchy refers to three levels: inhabitants, the city, and how the city 
integrates into the overall system of cities in a region.7 Interaction at 
each of these levels will produce different results that may or may not 
support overall operational objectives. The characteristics of an open, 
nonlinear, and hierarchical organization allow planners to understand 
how to interact with the city, and how to anticipate potential conse-
quences of various inputs. 
Robert Jervis explains in his study of interactions that “we are 
dealing with a system when (a) a set of units or elements is intercon-
nected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce 
changes in other parts of the system and (b) the entire system exhibits 
properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts.”8 
Jervis also discusses the cyclic nature of the interaction of an actor 
and its environment. An actor does not just change the system or the 
environment by making inputs. As the system frequently adapts, the 
change in the environment and feedback to the actor subsequently 
4 Albert J. Mills et al., eds., Encyclopedia of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage, 2010), https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412957397.n126.
5 Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International 
Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992): 62.
6 Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War.”
7 Denise Pumain, ed., Hierarchy in Natural and Social Sciences, Methodos Series 3 (Dor-
drecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2006), 3–4.
8 Robert Jervis, Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), 235.
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change the actor itself.9 This idea is relatively intuitive for the Marine 
Corps to apply since it ties directly to the single-battle concept as de-
fined in the Marine Corps Planning Process: “Operations or events in 
one part of the battlespace often have profound and consequent ef-
fects on other areas and events; therefore, a commander must always 
view the battlespace as an indivisible entity.”10 In recognizing a city as 
a system, Karl Marx’s urban metabolism idea has resurfaced in the 
last 50 years to understand how it actually functions. Marx supposes 
that cities, just like an ecosystem or a human body, consume inputs 
and create waste concurrent with the activity of the entire system.11 If 
the city is unable to metabolize all of the inputs, it can quickly become 
overwhelmed and increased toxicity in the system will result in a de-
stabilized environment. A significant analysis of the way an urban sys-
tem metabolizes inputs from its environment is imperative for future 
combat operations in these environments to be successful.
When considering this complex environment, studies in scien-
tific revolutions and systems theory consider similar properties that 
the United States will encounter in addressing the future of warfare, 
especially in urban environments. In The Structure of Scientific Revo-
lutions, Thomas S. Kuhn highlights the difference between “normal” 
and “revolutionary” phases of science. A normal phase occurs when 
the scientific research adheres to a status quo and largely follows 
the paradigmatic model with few anomalies. A revolutionary phase 
emerges when the anomalies or outliers increase, and the existing 
paradigm can no longer solve problems, forcing scientists to develop 
a new model. In the struggle to find solutions, the revolutionary model 
does not necessarily maintain all of the tenets of the previous para-
digm but must maintain an equal or greater problem-solving power 
to be relevant.12 Also, especially when considering military doctrine, 
9 Jervis, Systems Effects, 125–75.
10 Marine Corps Planning Process, MCWP 5-10 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine 
Corps, 2016), 1–6.
11 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 41–45; and Rapoport, Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
on Urban Metabolism, 6–8.
12 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2012), 62–65, 144–58, 169.
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development trends toward punctuated equilibrium of long periods of 
consistency, which are marked by short periods of dynamic change.13 
In response to a revolutionary period driven by increased urbaniza-
tion, progress in urban operational art will require understanding the 
nature of the system in which we operate. War is a nonlinear, or com-
plex, system that is unpredictable because repeated actions infre-
quently lead to repeated results as human psychology and conflicting 
problem-solving cycles compete. This discussion of scientific theories 
assists the development of future operational art, particularly when 
considering the urban environment, and will allow the United States 
to proactively impose a revolutionary approach to operations in DUT 
before the normal period is punctuated by our adversaries and we are 
forced to react in a complex system.
MODERN CASES
Events of 11 September 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) marked an end to equilibrium in 
a normal period of military science. The world was catapulted into a 
punctuated and revolutionary period as global terrorism and warfare 
in Iraq and Afghanistan forced militaries to address new and differ-
ent adversaries. Not only were the enemies diverse in capability but 
also in the environment that they occupied. The U.S. military’s old 
paradigm—designed based on Cold War assumptions and success 
in Operation Desert Storm—could no longer address the anomalies 
associated with a new global threat. This was particularly true with re-
gard to counterinsurgency and urban operations. The U.S. military had 
seemingly forgotten the lessons of the Vietnam War and revisited the 
past in the search for similarities to develop capabilities and doctrine 
to meet this new threat. With regard to urban operations, fighting in 
Fallujah, Sadr City, and Mosul, Iraq, during OIF provided a laboratory 
for experimentation with novel solutions to the new realities of urban 
warfare. Concluding OIF, it would appear that the United States revert-
ed back to a normal period of equilibrium. But urbanization is growing 
13 Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated Equilibrium (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, an imprint 
of Harvard University Press, 2007), 39–40, 295.
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rapidly and future operations in DUT will present new challenges for 
the U.S. military. 
In April 2004, four American Blackwater contractors in Fallujah, 
Iraq, were killed and hung from a bridge crossing the Euphrates River, 
after which Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) ordered I Marine 
Expeditionary Force (I MEF) to attack the city. Despite initial protests, 
I MEF initiated Operation Vigilant Resolve (First Battle of Fallujah).14 
The operation was quickly organized around only two Marine Corps 
infantry battalions, with two more joining the fight later. Marine com-
manders were not clear about what their objectives were, facing stiff 
resistance from embedded insurgents in the city, and the initial fight 
lasted five days during 4–9 April. As the insurgency exploited nega-
tive press that impacted the United States and the government of Iraq, 
operations were ended on 1 May before the Coalition could realize 
tangible results. Unfortunately, Vigilant Resolve did attract additional 
insurgent fighters and illicit activity to the area. As enemy activity in-
creased, CJTF-7 leadership attempted to form an ISF Fallujah Brigade 
to keep order while U.S. forces remained on the outskirts of the city 
in support. As the Fallujah brigade disintegrated and many defected 
to the insurgency, it became increasingly clear that American forces 
would have to reenter the city and gain control. The Islamic insurgents 
were brutal in their control of the city and executed several Western 
hostages in highly publicized murders. The Coalition response was 
a much more deliberate planning effort for Operation Phantom Fury 
(Second Battle of Fallujah).15
I MEF learned from Vigilant Resolve and took significant steps 
to ensure that conditions were set for Phantom Fury to succeed. As 
planning began, so did information operations (IO) to influence the 
civilian population of Fallujah to leave the city. As a recurring theme in 
urban combat, the threat of civilian casualties informed by the recent 
experience of Vigilant Resolve made the Coalition wary of reentering 
Fallujah with a significant civilian presence at risk. In conjunction with 
limited raids and coordinated air strikes, U.S. forces used the IO cam-
14 Gian P. Gentile, “Listen to the Airman,” Military Review 88, no. 2 (2008): 69.
15 Gentile, “Listen to the Airman,” 69–71.
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paign to encourage civilians to depart. On the eve of the battle, few 
civilians remained, and the Coalition had a good understanding of the 
enemy disposition in the city.16 This time, the clearing force would in-
clude four Marine infantry battalions, an Army armored brigade, and 
nine Iraqi battalions for a coordinated, mutually supporting clearance 
operation from north to south, while supporting elements blocked the 
south and east. The overall concept was to coordinate the employ-
ment of armor and infantry; in this instance, armored Army units would 
rapidly push through the city to secure key objectives, while Marine 
light infantry would clear the city in detail.17 It would be hard fighting, 
but overwhelming mass would ensure no sanctuary for the enemy.
On 7 November 2004, Coalition forces secured the initial objec-
tives of Phantom Fury and set the stage for the main assault to be-
gin the next day. Difficulty breaching the berm north of Fallujah, and 
fierce resistance in the city, made progress slow for the Marine light 
infantry units, but they aggressively progressed nonetheless. The ar-
mored forces, however, were able to rapidly advance and seize their 
objectives. As events stabilized in the northern half of the city, Co-
alition forces continued south to insurgent defensive positions that 
were much more developed due to the belief that the Coalition attack 
would come from the south. By 12 November, all Coalition forces had 
reached their objectives, however, not all were secured. In the pro-
cess, they discovered house-borne IEDs, a significant tunnel network, 
and heavily fortified positions that showed the enemy’s preparedness. 
The continued clearance of all of the city blocks represented a 
significant challenge due to the enemy’s resolve to stand and fight, 
their support from foreign fighter networks, and drug use to boost 
courage and endurance. It was clear that the insurgents were deter-
mined to fight and take as many American lives as possible. There-
fore, clearing the city house by house and room by room became a 
particularly difficult option. The success of the IO campaign in re-
moving the vast majority of civilians offered Coalition forces another 
option. Rather than go into a heavily fortified house and suffer ca-
16 Gentile, “Listen to the Airman,” 72.
17 Gentile, “Listen to the Airman,” 75.
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sualties, Coalition forces could now confirm enemy locations, back 
away, and then use fire support to catastrophically destroy the build-
ing—a return to the idea of destroying a city to save it. Coalition forc-
es still had to clear every building, but this adapted tactic made the 
effort much safer by killing most of the remaining fighters or scaring 
them off of the battlefield.
By mid-November, Coalition forces had transitioned to recon-
struction, while fighting continued throughout the city.18 Clearly, a 
shift in mind-set had occurred on how best to conduct operations 
in this type of urban environment. With the relatively small size of 
the city, it seemed realistic to run a campaign to get civilians to 
leave before the battle. As the fight progressed during three days, 
the shift to using “firepower, and not primarily muscle power to 
clear buildings of enemy fighters” became ever more pervasive.19 
The excessive casualties experienced by Coalition forces, espe-
cially Marines, while clearing buildings was unacceptable relative 
to the mission gain. Not only did Marines rely on fire support from 
artillery and aviation, but they quickly adapted to coordinate closer 
with their armor counterparts to have direct fire support available 
at a moment’s notice. This infantry-armor coordination was critical 
to ensure the safety of both. If an attack was led by armor, it typi-
cally reduced the enemy threat before exposing light infantry. If the 
infantry initiated the next attack, insurgents were lured into compla-
cency or overaggression due to the distant sound of armor. In this 
situation, they would expose themselves to get a shot at the tanks, 
but light infantry would already be in a position to attack. This mutu-
al support, coupled with the overwhelming use of supporting fires, 
directly reduced the human toll required to clear the rest of Fallu-
jah. Even though armor was not always available to the Marines, 
and many still had to fight house by house with only light infantry, 
the adaptation to closely integrate armor and overwhelming fire-
18 Gentile, “Listen to the Airman,” 76–83.
19 Gentile, “Listen to the Airman,” 93.
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power to destroy versus clear buildings is a hallmark of Fallujah II.20
In 2008, the battle for Sadr City reaffirmed the nonlinearity of ur-
ban combat and highlighted the ingenuity required to reduce an ad-
versary in this environment. Sadr City is on the northeast edge of the 
Baghdad urban sprawl and had an estimated population of 2.4 mil-
lion at the time of the battle.21 For comparison, Manhattan, which is 
twice the geographic size of Sadr City, had a population of 1.6 million 
in 2010.22 The population density and total control that the Coalition’s 
adversary, Muqtada al-Sadr and Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), had on the pop-
ulation presented a significant challenge to Coalition forces. However, 
their understanding of JAM’s character and the purpose of the oper-
ation were critical in identifying the best method to achieve the de-
sired end state. JAM forces had been harassing the international zone 
of Baghdad with rocket fire and preceded major Coalition operations 
in al-Basrah, Iraq, with another significant rocket attack and disrup-
tion operations throughout Baghdad. Events in Sadr City threatened 
the success of the impending al-Basrah mission, so U.S. forces were 
tasked to stop JAM activity and return control of the city to the govern-
ment of Iraq.23 Because of the size and density of the city, Coalition 
forces required an approach that did not involve clearing it in detail.
To address the threat posed by JAM, Army major general Jeffrey 
W. Hammond chose an operational approach to “isolate Sadr City, in-
fluence its population, then employ Iraqi security forces (ISF) to stabi-
lize the district.”24 Isolation seemed the only viable option since U.S. 
forces did not have the numbers necessary to clear the area without 
pulling from al-Basrah, and they were forbidden entry into the city 
proper by the Iraqi government due to negative outcomes of previous 
missions.25 The Coalition achieved isolation by using concrete T-walls 
20 For more on the coordination of infantry and armor, see Tao-Hung Chang, “The Battle 
of Fallujah: Lessons Learned on Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) in the 
21st Century,” Journal of Undergraduate Research 6, no. 1 (2007): 31–38.
21 David E. Johnson et al., The 2008 Battle of Sadr City: Reimagining Urban Combat (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand, 2013), xv.
22 “Manhattan Borough, New York County, New York,” American Fact Finder, U.S. Census 
Bureau.
23 Johnson et al., The 2008 Battle of Sadr City, 39.
24 Johnson et al., The 2008 Battle of Sadr City, 10.
25 Johnson et al., The 2008 Battle of Sadr City, 100.
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to protect marketplaces and prevent JAM access to critical economic 
resources, while simultaneously manning combined security check-
points to disrupt freedom of movement. Targeted raids destabilized 
JAM command and control and minimized extended missions that 
would result in disadvantageous and drawn-out fighting. The first 
struggle to influence the population was in developing an accurate 
understanding of the environment. As a deeply embedded and influ-
ential adversary, JAM essentially denied Coalition forces the ability to 
generate a significant human intelligence (HUMINT) network. Fur-
thermore, Special Operations Forces (SOF) were unable to operate 
effectively in this environment because of the threat of rapid isolation 
by an overwhelming enemy force.26 This difficulty was the result of 
al-Sadr’s clear control of the city to the point that residents credited 
his presence with any improvements to their quality of life.27 However, 
despite the historical reliance on al-Sadr and JAM to provide security 
and essential services, their brutality in subjugating the people creat-
ed a seam for Coalition forces to exploit and influence the residents 
by providing them a better option for governance. As the battle con-
tinued, Coalition forces and ISF initiated a significant reconstruction 
effort. 
Finally, with regard to employing ISF, the T-walls to isolate key 
markets and control JAM freedom of movement had another unin-
tended consequence. JAM fighters understood the value of the ac-
cess they lost and shifted to open battle in an attempt to maintain 
control of the area. In doing so, they exposed themselves to Coalition 
targeting, which allowed the Coalition and ISF to achieve a signifi-
cant advantage.28 As U.S. forces and ISF attrited JAM resistance, they 
gained significant access to a wealth of intelligence. U.S. forces were 
still prohibited from going into Sadr City proper, so ISF took the lead in 
developing intelligence throughout the city to weed out the remaining 
JAM leaders and operational elements.29 This role supported the over-
all effort, but it also served to legitimize ISF and show their value to the 
26 Johnson et al., The 2008 Battle of Sadr City, 12.
27 Johnson et al., The 2008 Battle of Sadr City, 26.
28 Johnson et al., The 2008 Battle of Sadr City, 74–75.
29 Johnson et al., The 2008 Battle of Sadr City, 84.
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local populace. Further, ISF’s role in the overall targeting apparatus 
grew. Some of their targets remained theirs to engage, several were 
handed off to the U.S. Army, and others were given to SOF for action. 
This ability to fully integrate the partner forces into operations is criti-
cal in areas where they have the best access and need the credibility 
gained from their involvement. It took significantly more effort for U.S. 
forces to convince the Iraqi government that conditions existed to pro-
vide security and essential services. However, once they did, condi-
tions dramatically improved. ISF welcomed Iraqi police into the area to 
assist in providing law and order, the government collected trash off of 
the streets, and citizens felt as though they had a stake in their future 
and no longer had to react to JAM brutality.
Sadr City is a good example of finding novel solutions to complex 
problems in an urban environment. Rather than destruction and anni-
hilation, U.S. forces found less devastating methods to achieve their 
objectives. This is not to say that there was not significant fighting in 
and around Sadr City. However, Coalition forces focused on denying 
JAM’s critical requirements—freedom of movement and access to 
critical resources—and forced the insurgents to come out and fight. 
In doing so, U.S. forces and ISF did not have to destroy the city to save 
it. More important, the Coalition’s main effort in al-Basrah continued 
its mission without being diverted due to problems in Sadr City. Re-
construction efforts and infrastructure that remained intact quickly 
increased the credibility of ISF and the government of Iraq. General 
Hammond’s operational approach showed the applicability of creative 
thought in urban warfare. Though Sadr City represents only a fraction 
of what future combat in DUT or a megacity will entail, its lessons pro-
vide insight into what methods might be useful to avoid protracted war 
in extremely difficult urban terrain. 
OPERATION IRAQI FREED OM 
AND MOSUL
In Operation Inherent Resolve (Iraq and Syria, 2014), the 2016 coun-
teroffensive in Mosul highlights the congestion of the battlespace in a 
DUT. During this coordinated operation, a myriad of military units and 
organizations swarmed through the area. Coalition forces were rep-
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resented by elements of the Army’s 101st Airborne Division and 82d 
Airborne Division participating in security force assistance (SFA) with 
U.S. Air Force joint terminal attack controller support, as well as Coali-
tion forces supporting SFA in a training capacity. Army Civil Affairs and 
U.S. Department of State officials were conducting interorganizational 
and intergovernmental coordination to synchronize efforts through a 
delicate interstate division between the government of Iraq and Kurd-
istan Regional Government (KRG), while simultaneously coordinating 
the conduct of the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF).30 The U.S. Agen-
cy for International Development (USAID) and other nongovernment 
organizations (NGOs) were involved in the humanitarian crisis and 
managing resumption of essential services as well as multiple camps 
of internally displaced persons. As the most engaged units in kinetic 
operations, the Coalition’s SOF from seven nations were supporting 
foreign internal defense and conducting advise, assist, accompany, 
and enable operations with Iraqi and Kurdish security forces (ISF and 
KSF) throughout Kurdistan and eventually in Mosul as part of the op-
eration. Even within American SOF, the Marine Special Operations 
teams and Naval Special Warfare task elements remained separate 
during the operation. While not nearly a comprehensive list of orga-
nizations and activities, it does highlight the complexity of the operat-
ing environment. Taken a step further, most of these agencies did not 
have formal command relationships at the tactical level that forced 
their coordination.
Coalition forces and interagency involvement complicated mat-
ters due to the number of competing equities; however, the primary 
fighters were ISF and KSF. Their interaction and coordination added 
yet another layer of difficulty and saturation. Units operating in the 
battlespace for ISF consisted of conventional Iraqi Army units, Iraqi 
SOF Counter-Terrorism Service, Iraqi Federal Police (IFP), IFP Emer-
gency Response Divisions, Iraqi Air Force, and Popular Mobilization 
30 For more on the ITEF, see “U.S. Security Operation with Iraq,” fact sheet, Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 20 January 2017.
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Forces.31 The KRG initially supported the Kurdish Peshmerga, Zere-
vani, and Asayish forces, among others, as they provided security and 
the initial thrust to begin the counteroffensive. In addition, local gov-
ernment officials and agencies became involved and empowered as 
control of areas surrounding and inside Mosul were reclaimed. The 
tension between Kurdish and Iraqi elements and leadership led to sig-
nificant friction at times and highlighted the need for an intermediary 
to manage the relationship and operations. So, once again, multiple 
units with different chains of command reporting from separate and 
sometimes antagonistic organizations found themselves working to-
ward common objectives.
The Coalition was fortunate to have experienced some earlier 
success in the region, due to several smaller-scale operations that oc-
curred throughout the Tigris River Valley since 2014, but it still took 
some compromise to ensure unity of effort. Colocation was the critical 
factor that enabled a common operating picture and rapid decision 
making. The Kurdish leadership maintained the Kurdistan Regional 
Support Center (KRSC) that worked directly with conventional forces 
and SOF LNOs to share KSF disposition and operational information. 
The KRSC also coordinated access and movement through region-
al sectors to ensure force protection and logistics. All Coalition SOF 
units provided representatives to planning cells and a combined joint 
operations center (CJOC) to rapidly process, prioritize, and coordinate 
all operations and strike requests. This SOF CJOC was also colocated 
with the Coalition’s joint operations center so that the director could 
quickly get accurate information about current battlefield conditions 
from forward SOF teams. All warfighting functions colocated to the 
maximum extent possible, and coordination meetings occurred dai-
ly or weekly, based on the key stakeholders’ availability, to discuss 
progress and shortfalls. The consulate general conducted a biweekly 
31 Michael Knights and Alex Mello, “The Best Thing America Built in Iraq: Iraq’s Counter- 
Terrorism Service and the Long War against Militancy,” War on the Rocks (blog), 19 July 
2017; Robert M. Perito, The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire (Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2011); “Iraqi Emergency Response Units Vital to Inner-city 
Security,” Army.mil, 28 September 2009; and Renad Mansour, “More than Militias: Iraq’s 
Popular Mobilization Forces Are Here to Stay,” War on the Rocks (blog), 3 April 2018.
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meeting to synchronize civil-military operations and remain aware of 
the reality of the situation. Once again, more coordination occurred 
than described here, but the critical element is that coordination at all 
levels and across all domains and functions happened continuously 
but informally. In the future, we will probably not have several small-
scale events that serve as dress rehearsals for informal relationship 
building and structural development as combat operations take place. 
These considerations need to be considered before deployment to 
the theater and incorporated as much as possible into the joint man-
ning document so that personnel requirements can correlate to actual 
line numbers.
FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
Unified action by a broad organization of dissimilar agencies with a 
varied understanding of their counterparts is challenging. James C. 
McArthur rightly addresses the need for each organization to “clear-
ly articulate its needs, resources, abilities, authorities, and, most im-
portantly, its constraints.”32 However, Interorganizational Cooperation 
recognizes that “one difficulty of coordinating operations among USG 
departments and agencies is determining appropriate counterparts.”33 
A proactive approach from mission leadership is necessary to identify 
the appropriate counterparts early and to connect these individuals at 
operational and tactical levels that are close to the problem. Brokering 
this relationship will enable honest dialogue between planners to fully 
understand the capabilities, authorities, and limitations of each con-
tributor. SOF may have the relationships, access to key leaders, and 
authority to execute specific activities. Conventional forces may have 
the preponderance of fire support, aviation, and logistics, including 
medical support. USAID may have the resources to handle infrastruc-
ture challenges while other government agencies have the necessary 
intelligence information. However, approval authority for any activity 
may reside with the host nation via the country team. In this type of 
32 James C. McArthur et al., “Interorganizational Cooperation—Part I of III: The Interagency 
Perspective,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 79 (October 2015): 110.
33 Interorganizational Cooperation, JP 3-08 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016), 
I-12.
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situation, very similar to Mosul in 2016, planners must have detailed 
knowledge of who is operating in the battlespace, how they can best 
be employed to support the operational objectives, and how inputs 
into the system may result in disproportionate results for the other 
participants. Open sharing of information and colocating will be nec-
essary to ensure data quickly makes it to the individual who it impacts 
the most or has the authority and ability to take action. Integrated plan-
ning between these organizations will add depth to problem framing 
and help identify key shortfalls across agencies before they materi-
alize on the battlefield. Currently, ad hoc relationships yield positive 
effects in the operating environment, but agencies should formalize 
relationships early enough to allow personnel to develop working rela-
tionships and a shared vision.
Formal mechanisms to coordinate this activity currently lag be-
hind the operational concepts, but Interorganizational Cooperation 
and the Army’s Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
manual provide useful insights into how to manage this integration. 
Effectively coordinating efforts in the future will require exchanging 
LNOs with adjacent organizations operating in the battlespace. The 
Army’s field manual recognizes that “LNOs are critical to a command’s 
ability to coordinate, integrate, and deconflict CF [conventional forces] 
and SOF operations.”34 Though this publication specifically address-
es military integration, these principles need to be carried over to the 
whole-of-government framework, especially when considering opera-
tions in DUT. Interorganizational Cooperation carries the idea further 
by recommending the joint staffs request LNOs and open dialogue 
with other agencies, or providing LNOs due to the limited manpower 
available to other agencies.35 These LNOs need to be carefully select-
ed individuals who have the credibility to speak and authority to act on 
their organization’s behalf during critical times of battlefield friction 
when waiting for a decision from leadership will close a window of 
opportunity. In a complicated combat environment, the difficulty be-
34 Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special 
Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability, FM 6-03.05 (Washington DC: Depart-
ment of the Army, 2010), 14.
35 Interorganizational Cooperation, 10.
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comes selecting a solid performer to leave the primary staff to serve 
as an LNO. However, selecting strong performers is critical to ensure 
operational and strategic success while encouraging interorganiza-
tional relationships based on mutual competence.
CONCLUSION
Through Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, interagen-
cy, joint SOF, joint conventional forces, Coalition forces, and NGOs 
increasingly operated in the same battlespace. As future military op-
erations continue to move into DUT, this level of concurrent activity 
is only going to increase as each agency is required to leverage their 
capabilities to support the operational objective. McArthur et al. high-
light this need as it addresses the differences in interorganizational 
purpose, process, and people. The authors note that, when this “coor-
dination is absent, DOD [Department of Defense] activities may lead 
local groups to develop unrealistic goals for future governmental inter-
actions, leading to disappointment, resentment, and possible anger to 
the United States.”36 The requirement to rapidly identify which agency 
is the most capable to solve difficult problems is growing, and lower 
echelons at the operational and tactical level must embrace this co-
ordination. Unity of effort is critical at these levels and is more difficult 
to achieve when enduring relationships between organizations do not 
exist.
36 McArthur et al., “Interorganizational Cooperation,” 108.
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C H A P T E R S E V E N
Joint Combined Arms Maneuver 
in the Megacity
Learning to Thrive in Chaos 
Major Geoffrey B. Lynch, U.S. Army
Responding to urgent pleas for support in 2013, French mil-
itary personnel carried out airstrikes in an effort to back the 
Malian government against extremists. For months, howev-
er, the Islamists remained unshaken by Western advances 
into the stronghold of a complicated urban environment. 
In the wake of significant shows of airpower, the civilian 
population paid the greatest penalty, trapped between two 
external factions fighting over the same territory with dis-
parate end goals.
INTRODUCTION
Based on global urbanization trends, military operations will occur in a 
megacity sometime in the near future.1 Megacities are defined by the 
United Nations (UN) as urban areas where the population exceeds 10 
million. Today, 23 megacities are recognized globally, though current 
1 Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future, 
Staff Study (Arlington, VA: Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, 2014), 37.
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data suggests there may be as many as 37 megacities by 2025.2 This 
number will only increase if the upward trend continues as expected.3 
More than just the immense population densities, megacities have 
many other unique characteristics that distinguish them from smaller 
urban areas. As such, Title 10 of the U.S. Code clearly defines the legal 
responsibility of the armed forces, in this case the U.S. Army, to defend 
the nation and defeat any enemy on land responsible for aggressive 
acts toward the United States.4 
Current Army doctrine, organizational structure, and training pri-
orities do not account for the specific conditions units will encounter 
in a megacity, such as scale, connectedness, flow, density, and con-
text.5 Army and Joint doctrines for Urban Operations (UO) are a good 
starting point but are based on several false assumptions; for exam-
ple, they posit that land forces can isolate an urban area or control an 
urban area externally and operate freely from the periphery.6 
These assumptions fail to account for the highly connected hu-
man networks within the landscape, access to mass media platforms, 
rapid mobilization or swarm capabilities, and the sprawling and com-
plex physical terrain.7 To win in a complex environment (a megacity) 
as described in The U.S. Army Operating Concept 2014 (AOC), the 
Army must adapt its current doctrine, training, and organizational 
structure. This concept proposes the creation of a multifunctional di-
vision that will specialize in Joint combined arms maneuver (JCAM) 
to create multiple dilemmas for future adversaries in complex urban 
environments.8 
2 For the purpose of this discussion, the terms megacity and complex urban environ-
ments are interchangeable. Some complex urban environments do not meet the 10- 
million people population criteria for a megacity as defined by the UN, but share the 
same complexities of megacities. The Gaza Strip or Mogadishu are examples of com-
plex urban environments that do not meet the criteria to be classified as a megacity. 
3 David Shunk, “Mega Cities, Ungoverned Areas, and the Challenge of Army Urban Com-
bat Operations in 2030–2040,” Small Wars Journal (January 2014): 1.
4 Armed Forces, 10 U.S.C. § 101, 112th Cong. (July 2011), 3,061–62.
5 Megacities and the United States Army, 2.
6 Urban Operations, FM 3-06 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2013), I-10.
7 Megacities and the United States Army, 2.
8 The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020–2040, TRADOC Pam-
phlet 525-3-1 (Arlington, VA: Department of the Army, 2014), 5.
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CASE STUDIES
To gain fidelity and establish the logic to make specific recommen-
dations to current Army doctrine, and ultimately contribute to a larger 
military concept, case studies were conducted on the Israel- Hezbollah 
War in 2006, French operations in Mali in 2013, and the Battle of Kis-
mayo in 2008. Although these conflicts did not occur in a megacity 
as defined by the UN, parts of each campaign were waged in com-
plex urban environments that resemble a megacity enough to quali-
fy for consideration and analysis. Each conflict was analyzed based 
on three categories: doctrine, training, and organization. They were 
investigated from the perspective of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 
the French military, and the African Union coalition forces (Somali and 
Kenyan militaries and associated militias). 
ISRAEL–HEZBOLLAH WAR 
Background
In July 2006, after Hezbollah fighters kidnapped two IDF soldiers, 
war broke out between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Israe-
lis responded to the kidnapping with an extensive air campaign to 
destroy Hezbollah’s ground-to-ground rocket capability and to force 
them into a position to release the two captured soldiers.9 Although 
initially disrupted by the destructive air strikes, Hezbollah unleashed 
its own attack within 24 hours, launching an intense rocket salvo 
from southern Lebanon into Israel. Hezbollah’s rocket campaign was 
highly effective, with more than 100 rockets falling on northern Israel 
daily. From the outset, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) had complete con-
trol of the air and conducted more than 12,000 sorties throughout 
the month-long campaign. Although they destroyed a large number 
of Hezbollah’s long-range rockets, the IAF failed to slow the rate of 
rocket attacks.10 
In the next phase of the operation, the IDF conducted a series of 
9 Spencer C. Tucker, ed., The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, 
and Military History, vol. 2 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008), 616–17.
10 Tucker, The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 626–29.
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limited-scale raids to destroy Hezbollah’s short-range rocket capability 
and to disrupt its base of operations in the border region. The original 
ground plan of limited raids was quickly altered as Hezbollah had pre-
pared a network of bunkers and defensive belts to ensure a protracted 
ground fight.11 The war concluded with IDF forces penetrating deep 
into Lebanese territory but with no significant strategic effect. 
The war with Hezbollah was considered a failure of the IDF by 
some inside and outside of Israel, based primarily on the fact that 
there had never been a clear strategy or declared definition of what 
success in the campaign entailed.12 The IDF was unprepared for a 
high-intensity conflict with Hezbollah, which required a completely 
different mentality from that of the counterinsurgency strategy the IDF 
had implemented against Palestinian terrorists in Gaza for the past 
several years. In the 2006 conflict, the IDF demonstrated they were 
unfit to conduct combined arms battles that required the infantry (and 
special forces), armor, engineers, aviation, and artillery to synchronize 
their efforts in a complex urban environment.13 
Intelligence Failures
The IDF’s failures in intelligence were not a product of bad intelligence 
or a lack of intelligence. The problems occurred because of IDF’s in-
effective organizational structure and poor methods of disseminating 
intelligence. The Israeli intelligence community had vast knowledge 
of Hezbollah’s military capabilities, disposition, composition, and 
strength. However, this information was not provided to the right com-
manders at the right times for it to be used effectively. For example, 
Israeli intelligence discovered an extensive bunker and tunnel system 
near the town of Maroun al-Ras but failed to distribute this information 
to the maneuver units on the ground. This lack of coordination was 
11 Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute Press, 
2008), 43. 
12 Gilbert Achcar and Michel Warschawski, The 33-Day War: Israel’s War on Hezbollah in 
Lebanon and Its Consequences (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2007) 37.
13 LtCol Hany T. Nakleh, “The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Impli-
cations” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 10. 
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a major factor in the high number of casualties sustained and in the 
IDF’s tactical failures on the ground.14 
Conversely, Hezbollah had a very effective intelligence prepara-
tion of the battlefield (IPB) process that included an open source intel-
ligence collection and analysis center to examine Israeli and outside 
media sources. Hezbollah established listening posts and observation 
posts to report on IDF troop movement. Hezbollah employed Iranian- 
provided signal intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities in an attempt to 
monitor IDF traffic and were highly effective in monitoring unsecured 
platforms. They were ineffective in monitoring encrypted platforms, 
but for reasons unknown, the IDF often defaulted to unsecured plat-
forms for communication.15
The IDF’s insufficient development of human intelligence 
(HUMINT) caused information gaps in the IDFs’ understanding of the 
complex human networks and the complicated relationships between 
Hezbollah, the Lebanese government, and the local population. Fur-
thermore, their lack of HUMINT in support of unmanned aerial sys-
tems (UAS) resulted in excessive civilian casualties. 16
Information Operations 
When fighting in megacities defined by mass media and global con-
nectedness, winning the information operations (IO) war is essential. 
The IDF’s failure to establish an effective IO campaign led some in 
the media and international community to report the military action as 
illegitimate. According to after action reviews, many of the senior IDF 
officers and political officials did not understand the political and per-
ceptual nature of this war. They lacked a targeted IO campaign direct-
ed toward the appropriate audiences to demonstrate that force was 
justified.17 Ultimately, the IDF failed to convert tactical successes into 
political victories through IO. 
14 Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon, 
trans. Ora Cummings and Moshe Tlamim (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 133.
15 Anthony H. Cordesman, Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 142.
16 Nakleh, “The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon,” 10.
17 Cordesman, Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, 42.
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Fires and Maneuver
The IDF struggled to fire and maneuver deliberately through the disag-
gregated but interconnected urban areas. Hezbollah’s extensive subter-
ranean network allowed for maneuvering of personnel and equipment 
as well as the penetration of IDF positions. IDF forces were constantly 
tied down in the built-up areas and could not effectively isolate Hezbol-
lah forces. The IDF was never able to synchronize its efforts to allow for 
dynamic and focused maneuver of infantry and armor units.18 Instead of 
synchronizing their combat power on multiple decisive points simulta-
neously to overwhelm the enemy, the IDF piecemealed their forces into 
the fight, and therefore achieved marginal results. 
Conversely, Hezbollah did not remain static and defend  terrain 
but combined its small arms, mortars, rockets, IO, and antitank weap-
ons to successfully maneuver against the IDF.19 Hezbollah used 
terrain to a great advantage in the conflict and built up urban areas 
as fortifications in conjunction with areas of broken and developed 
terrain.20 Hezbollah’s most successful defensive operations came 
from taking advantage of normal civilian buildings and built-up areas. 
These existing civilian structures provided the same level of cover and 
concealment as military fortifications but were much harder to detect, 
provided better exfiltration routes, allowed more mobility between po-
sitions, and favored a complex defense in-depth technique.21 
Overreliance on Technology
Prior to the conflict, the IDF developed doctrine that had a misplaced 
reliance on precision munitions, long-range strike capabilities, and in-
telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets as a substi-
tute for capable ground forces and human proficiency. The overuse 
of UAS without appropriate HUMINT support led to inaccurate strikes 
and unnecessary civilian casualties. The IDF preferred to rely on its 
standoff weapons to engage Hezbollah positions from afar, but they 
quickly realized this was not feasible in the urban areas they were op-
18 Cordesman, Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, 137–38.
19 Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared, 44. 
20 Cordesman, Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, 15.
21 Cordesman, Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, 19.
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erating. This war demonstrated to Israel that high-tech systems could 
be avoided and deceived, while ground forces, especially infantry, 
special forces, and highly trained individual soldiers and teams are 
essential for operations in complex environments. 22 
Training
In the five years prior to the war with Hezbollah, the IDF conducted no 
major training exercises on combined arms maneuver in complex ur-
ban terrain. A distraught reserve armored battalion commander con-
demned the three IDF chiefs of staff “for having neglected land forces 
in favor of the air force, for sacrificing ground mobility on the altar of 
high-tech wizardry, and for squandering tank specialists in the nooks 
and crannies of the Intifada.”23 As was the case with airpower theo-
rists prior to World War II, IAF commanders had misplaced confidence 
in the ability of strategic air power to unilaterally defeat a determined 
enemy. Therefore, most of the training repetitions and resources were 
dedicated to the Israeli Air Force. 
Organization
The issues discussed above in terms of intelligence failures and an 
inability to maneuver were partly the result of a flawed organization-
al structure. The fact that the Israeli intelligence services had exten-
sive knowledge of Hezbollah tunnel systems and defensive belts, but 
failed to distribute this information to the commanders on the ground, 
highlights a lack of integration between intelligence and operations.24 
The problems with integrating the various combat arms would be sig-
nificantly improved with a better organizational model. The various 
arms worked well in isolation, as this is how the IDF was organized 
to operate. Instead of being organized under one unified organization 
(at the brigade or division level), they were organized separately and 
operated that way. 
22 Peter W. Singer, “Mike Tyson and the Hornet’s Nest: Military Lessons of the Lebanon 
Crisis,” Brookings, 1 August 2006.
23 Intifada refers to the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation of the West Bank 
and Gaza. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared, 27.
24 Harel and Issacharoff, 34 Days, 133.
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The IDF robbed their tactical air capability to dangerous levels 
in an effort to pay the strategic air component bill. Although the IAF 
conducted a very destructive air campaign with more than 12,000 
sorties, the vast minority of these sorties were in support of ground 
maneuver. This demonstrates a major flaw with the IDF’s integration 
and organization of tactical aviation and maneuver units.25 Though the 
air campaign was labeled a success by most in the IDF, the level of 
success remains debatable if analyzed based on the strategic objec-
tives it achieved—or failed to achieve in this case. The kidnapped IDF 
soldiers were never released or rescued, Hezbollah rocket fire was 
never suppressed, the extent of the IAF attacks inspired widespread 
condemnation, and a lack of close air support (CAS) left IDF ground 
forces bogged down with limited maneuver support from the air.26 
Failure to Integrate Host Nation Partners
The IDF failed to develop a host nation partner to augment its organic 
capabilities. The IDF had an extremely valuable partner in the South 
Lebanon Army (SLA) that it worked with extensively to control the se-
curity zone in Southern Lebanon from 1985 to 1999.27 The IDF made 
the decision to unilaterally attack Hezbollah and Lebanese infrastruc-
ture, adopting a strategy that Lebanon must be held accountable for 
Hezbollah’s actions. The IDF’s failure to develop an indigenous part-
ner proved to be a catastrophic error and led to further miscalcula-
tions. However, host-nation integration was the strength of the African 
Union’s campaign against al-Shabaab in the Battle of Kismayo. 
KISMAYO 
Background 
The Second Battle of Kismayo was a combined military offensive led 
by Somali National Army forces (SNA) and African Union Mission in 
Somalia forces (AMISOM) mainly comprised of the Kenyan military 
and Ras Kamboni allies against al-Shabaab in the insurgent group’s 
25 Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared, 61.
26 William M. Arkin, Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War (Max-
well Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2007), 151.
27 Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared, 9.
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last major stronghold of Kismayo, Somalia. It began on 28 September 
2012 with SNA and AMISOM forces conducting an amphibious land-
ing approximately six kilometers north of Kismayo and then moving 
quickly inland to seize vital areas in the city.28 
SNA and AMISOM naval, air, and ground forces were success- 
ful in seizing the city with little resistance mounted by al-Shabaab. Kis-
mayo was regarded as a major stronghold for al-Shabaab based on 
the revenue the group was generating through charcoal exports and 
levying port taxes on imported goods. According to Al Jazeera, the 
offensive was a major “morale-dampening loss” for al-Shabaab, as the 
militants had few areas left from which to safely launch attacks on soft 
targets.29
Surprise
The amphibious assault conducted by SNA and AMISOM forces 
caught al-Shabaab completely by surprise. The ability to maneuver 
from the sea allowed the attacking forces to deal a decisive blow from 
a direction the rebels were not expecting. Residents, who remained 
in their homes as the battle continued, said the attack came from the 
air and sea and were shocked at how quickly it seemed to material-
ize.30 As AMISOM and SNA forces conducted clearing operations in 
Kismayo’s city center, many fighting positions and gun emplacements 
were found abandoned. This was a clear signal al-Shabaab had been 
prepared to mount a defense of the city but had anticipated the attack 
to come from a ground avenue of approach from the north.31 When 
AMISOM attacked from the sea instead, al-Shabaab forces aban-
doned their positions. 
28 “Somali Militant Base of Kismayo Attacked by Kenyan Forces,” BBC News, 28 Septem-
ber 2012.
29 “Somali Militant Base of Kismayo Attacked by Kenyan Forces”; and “Troops Lay Siege to 
Somali Rebel Bastion,” Al Jazeera, 28 September 2012. 
30 Clar Ni Chonghaile, “Kenyan Troop Launch Beach Assault on Somali City of Kismayo,” 
Guardian, 28 September 2012.
31 “Retreat of the Shabaab: Somalia’s Militant Islamists Cede Territory,” Jane’s Intelligence 
Review 24, no. 12 (December 2012): 19.
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Simultaneity 
Kismayo had been a key supply route for al-Shabaab and a source 
of taxes the group collected. Income from the port had generated as 
much as $50 million a year from illegal trading.32 In addition, the port 
represented a major conduit for smuggling weapons and other war- 
fighting materiel. With this in mind, AMISOM and SNA forces made it a 
priority to take control of the port as soon as possible.33 To alleviate the 
pressure and send a strong message, the SNA and AMISOM moved 
to simultaneously seize the port, the key road intersections, and lines 
of communication (LOCs) north of the city, while the Ras Kamboni 
militia cleared the city center. The swift and simultaneous actions on 
these points of manipulation sent a strong psychological message to 
the local population and put al-Shabaab in multiple dilemmas from 
which they could not recover.34 
Developing Nontraditional Alliances 
for Long-term Stability
An innovative technique that AMISOM used to prevent volatility in 
the wake of the takeover was to enlist support from some of the lo-
cal clans or militias who had the allegiance of the people, but who 
could be brought onto the side of the government. One such militia 
with a significant effect in Kismayo was the Ras Kamboni, a paramili-
tary group active in southern Somalia who are vehemently opposed to 
al-Shabaab.35 The Ras Kambonis were extremely effective at hunting 
down and rooting out the al-Shabaab cells that infiltrated back into 
Kismayo after the attack. The Ras Kamboni’s contribution to the coali-
tion was significant in securing a stable environment in Kismayo in the 
weeks and months after the operation.36 
32 Hamsa Omar, “Somalia Deploys Forces in Captured Former Al Qaeda Bastion,” Bloom-
berg, 1 October 2012.
33 Jeffrey Gettlemen, “Last Somali Militant Bastion Falls, Kenya Claims,” New York Times, 
28 September 2012.
34 “Retreat of the Shabaab,” 19.
35 Gettlemen, “Last Somali Militant Bastion Falls.”
36 “Retreat of the Shabaab,” 21.
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Findings
Several important themes emerged from these case studies as it 
relates to operations in complex environments: the importance of 
simultaneous and coordinated maneuver and fires; the danger of 
overreliance on technology to win wars; and the importance of organi-
zational structure to synchronize intelligence, IO, and combined arms. 
The case studies also demonstrated the importance of developing 
strong relationships with foreign partners through training and op-
erations and the importance of training, specifically for operations in 
complex urban environments with a combination of conventional and 
special forces. The lessons learned from these case studies (along 
with French operations in Mali discussed later) were applied in the 
development of the following concept.
CONCEPT
Purpose
The purpose of this concept is to generate discourse and make rec-
ommendations to encourage further debate on how the U.S. Army will 
cope with the challenges associated with Joint Combined Arms Ma-
neuver (JCAM) in complex urban environments. The U.S. military has 
proved through historical precedent in places like Fallujah, Iraq, and 
Hue City, Vietnam, that current doctrine for Joint Urban Operations is 
an appropriate source to guide commanders only in urban areas that 
can be isolated.37 While some of the principles discussed in JP 3-06 
and FM 3-06 are applicable for the megacity, this concept aims to de-
velop solutions to the many challenges that have not been specifically 
addressed in doctrine. 
Time Horizons, Assumptions, and Risks
Time Horizons
The recommended time horizon for this concept is in accordance with 
the chief of staff of the Army’s planning guidelines outlined in the AOC 
37 Joint Urban Operations, JP 3-06 (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2013), III-18.
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and nested within Force 2025 and Beyond.38 With current data from 
the UN suggesting that there could be as many as 37 megacities by 
2025, it seems logical to use 2025 as a planning factor for applica-
tion of this concept.39 While 2025 serves as a viable planning horizon, 
there are near-term requirements that would need to be implemented, 
such as short-term acquisition and technology development, imple-
mentation of the megacity as a training priority for regionally aligned 
forces (RAF), and any necessary changes to tables of organization and 
equipment (TO&E). 
Assumptions
The following assumptions underlie this concept:
 • Control and/or isolation of complex urban environments 
will be problematic if not unachievable.
 • Based on current trends, U.S. forces will be required to 
conduct a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability 
operations in a megacity (or megacity-like complex urban 
environment) in the next 20 years. 
 • As the land component with limited strategic mobility, the 
Army is dependent on and complementary to the Joint 
force. 
 • JCAM requires U.S. integration with multinational partners 
to provide the cultural, operational, and environmental ad-
vantages required for success in a megacity. 
 • The current Army force structure will not support a coun-
terinsurgency (COIN) campaign in the model of Iraq or Af-
ghanistan. 
Risks
The following risks must be considered and assessed as the develop-
ment of this concept continues:
 • Friendly force loss of control based on simultaneous and 
decentralized operations. Operations in complex urban 
38 The U.S. Army Operating Concept, i.
39 Shunk, “Mega Cities,” 1.
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environments could involve multiple small-unit actions of 
various sizes and scopes that are executed simultaneously. 
These actions will be dependent on effective mission com-
mand and fire and maneuver control. 
 • To increase disaggregation, tempo, mobility, and simulta-
neity, Army forces risk degrading their ability to effectively 
mass.
 • Additional risks may be incurred by delegating decision- 
making authority to lower echelon commanders.
 • Host nation infrastructure and technology are unable to 
bridge the logistics gap. 
 • Reduction of traditional force protection measures (e.g., 
heavy personal gear, fortified forward operating bases, etc.) 
to maximize speed, mobility, and flexibility.
Description of the Problem
While urban areas are naturally problematic for military operations, 
megacities contain unique characteristics that distinguish them from 
normal urban areas. Factors that set megacities apart from other 
urban locales include global connectedness and immense metabo-
lism rates in terms of resource intake and waste output.40 Complex 
operating environments of the future—megacities—will be defined 
by resource limitations, rampant organized and disorganized crime, 
nonexistent governance and rule of law, wealth inequalities, extreme 
poverty, degraded infrastructure, disease, and pollution.41 
In addition to its natural complexity, future adversaries will use 
the megacity’s complex terrain to conduct conventional and uncon-
ventional warfare in an attempt to neutralize the overmatch of U.S. forc-
es. State and nonstate actors will employ countermeasures to inhibit 
U.S. freedom of movement, such as integrated air defenses and urban 
defensive belts intermingled with civilian populations. Future adver-
saries will operate beyond the physical realm to avoid direct combat, 
using subversive techniques such as cyber and IO to diminish U.S. po-
40 Megacities and the United States Army, 4. 
41 Shunk, “Mega Cities,” 2. 
CHAPTER SEVEN
169
litical will.42 As was the case for the IDF in their conflict with Hezbollah 
in 2006, U.S. forces should assume future adversaries will possess the 
capabilities to degrade its technological advantages in such areas as 
long-range strike capability, UAS, and digital command and control.43 
Synopsis of the Central Idea
This concept describes how the Army (through the creation of the 
multipurpose division) will integrate with the Joint force to create mul-
tiple dilemmas for its adversaries and ultimately defeat them, gain a 
temporal advantage, or create leverage by influencing multiple points 
of manipulation simultaneously. The Army (complemented by the Joint 
force) will create a multipurpose division that will specialize in JCAM 
in complex urban environments. As discussed in the AOC, “with unity 
of effort, the joint force can achieve access across all domains, land, 
maritime, air, space, and cyberspace to strike the enemy at an un-
known time or location and create multiple dilemmas.”44 
Multiple Dilemmas
Creating multiple dilemmas involves dictating the terms of the op-
eration with high-tempo operations, attacking with multiple arms at 
several points simultaneously to render adversaries incapable of re-
sponding effectively. The actions the enemy takes to avoid one attack 
will make them more vulnerable to another. To achieve multiple dilem-
mas, forces will operate in a dispersed manner over a wide area but 
maintain the ability to quickly concentrate their efforts through intelli-
gence and operations integration. 
JCAM and Points of Manipulation
JCAM is achieved by combining the capabilities of multiple arms or 
elements from one or more of the Services, other government agen-
cies, and multinational partners to support maneuver across multiple 
domains to gain and maintain a relative advantage over adversaries. 
The Army, through the creation of the multipurpose division, will seize, 
42 The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 9.
43 Singer, “Mike Tyson and the Hornet’s Nest.”
44 The U.S. Army Operating Concept, IV.
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maintain, and exploit the initiative on land as the Joint force maneuver 
element.45 Points of manipulation are defined as any person, location, 
network, connection, entity, communications or information node, or 
logistical requirement that is essential to an adversary’s ability to op-
erate in a complex environment. By attacking, neutralizing, securing, 
influencing, or defeating these points of manipulation, the enemy will 
be thrown off-balance (physically, psychologically, or both) to the point 
they are rendered irrelevant. Some examples of points of manipulation 
in a megacity could be key leaders (e.g., uniformed, nonstate actor, 
criminal, or others), command and control nodes, ports, media or in-
formation centers, commerce centers, key LOCs, logistical hubs, or 
network intersections.
Multidomain Maneuver
Multidomain maneuver as described by Sun Tzu is: “Taking advan-
tage of the enemy’s unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and 
strike him where he has taken no precautions.”46 As our adversaries 
continue to develop antiaccess capabilities to degrade U.S. freedom 
of movement, the Joint community must maximize its expertise to cre-
ate forcible entry forces equipped to maneuver across multiple do-
mains simultaneously to strike the enemy in a manner for which they 
are unprepared.47 The multipurpose division will be reliant on the Joint 
force to achieve multidomain dominance, especially as it relates to 
strategic mobility. 
The Multipurpose Division
With a wide range of possible contingencies based on the unique-
ness of each megacity, Army units conducting JCAM will require a 
versatile force structure tailored for the specific situation. The Army 
can achieve this by creating diverse and rapidly scalable formations 
based on the capabilities required to operate in complex urban en-
vironments. This diversity can be accomplished by replacing the bri-
45 The U.S. Army Operating Concept, IV.
46 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1971), 134.
47 The U.S. Army Operating Concept, IV.
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gade combat team (BCT) with the division as the basic fighting unit of 
the Army. This simple, logical adaptation to the current force structure 
would organically provide all of the necessary capabilities including 
intelligence, aviation, engineering, IO, and cyber to the Joint task force 
(JTF) commander. 
Another adaptation of the force structure is the integration of 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) into the division. This multipurpose 
division construct would provide the commander the flexibility of 
determining the appropriate SOF/conventional force ratio based on 
the situation and negate the tension that can exist between SOF and 
conventional forces. The AOC states that “forces tailored rapidly to 
the mission will exercise mission command and integrate joint, inter-
organizational, and multi-national capabilities.”48 Adopting the multi-
purpose division construct would allow the commander to scale up or 
down appropriately to create the right formula for each situation, while 
avoiding the tedious and awkward combining of various (nonorganic) 
BCTs and outside SOF units to form an ad hoc JTF. 
The 4th Infantry Division is a perfect test unit to demonstrate this 
concept. As a hybrid organization, the 4th Infantry Division is well suit-
ed to operate as a JTF with its division headquarters, Stryker BCT, light 
infantry BCT, armor BCT, and organic aviation and engineer brigades. 
With the addition of a SOF company to the organization (hypothetically 
for the purposes of this concept), 4th Infantry Division would stand as 
the model multifunctional division. 
Persistent Air Support
The persistent aviation support (PAS) concept is an emerging theo-
ry that would naturally complement JCAM in a complex urban envi-
ronment. The PAS concept holds that helicopters, specifically attack 
helicopters and UAS, can be airborne and conducting operations 24 
hours a day, seven days a week.49 Besides the obvious advantage pro-
vided by fires and ISR, the mere presence of friendly aircraft (manned 
48 The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 15.
49 CAP (without the concept part) is a term coined by Col T. J. Jamison, former command-
er of 82d Combat Aviation Brigade in Afghanistan, who provided much of the back-
ground information found in this chapter.
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or unmanned) on the battlefield has a significant psychological impact 
on the enemy that can allow maneuver (ground) commanders to gain 
and maintain a position of relative advantage over the enemy. 
With PAS, Army Aviation should be organized under the task 
force commander. This could be done in the fashion of the previous 
armored cavalry regimental structure to improve interoperability be-
tween air and ground forces through an enduring relationship and 
multiple training repetitions and to empower the PAS concept to 
support multipurpose divisions in a megacity. Within this framework, 
a UAS component should be organized under the aviation battal-
ion. This will allow for a more complementary relationship between 
manned and unmanned systems at the unit level, as opposed to the 
current competing relationship.50
Balancing Technology and Human Investment
This concept advocates leveraging technological advancement but 
not at the cost of neglecting investment into the improvement of basic 
soldiering in both the cognitive and tactical sense. While emerging 
technologies in such areas as ISR, sustainment methods, precision 
strike capability, and digital command and control systems must be 
developed, fundamental shoot, move, communicate, and medical ca-
pabilities will continue to be the cornerstone of success in complex 
environments. 
APPLICATION OF MILITARY FUNCTIONS
Fires and Maneuver
Multipurpose divisions operating in a megacity will favor the land 
force-centric tenets of tempo, mobility, simultaneity, adaptability, and 
lethality versus the protection-centric strategy of recent wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Operations will be defined by disaggregation and 
disciplined small unit action with light infantry, SOF, and a large con-
tingent of multinational forces working the interior of the megacity 
with heavier, mobile forces (Stryker and/or armor) on the periphery to 
interdict or restrict LOCs. Units will learn to flow with the natural me-
50 Sickler, Army Aviation, 2. 
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tabolism of the area by blending in with indigenous security forces to 
reduce their signature in the interior, while maintaining a high level of 
mobility and firepower provided by organic aviation and wheeled and 
tracked platforms on the flanks to mass combat power when neces-
sary to exploit opportunities. Soldiers and leaders of the multipurpose 
division will train to thrive in austere conditions and pride themselves 
on limiting their logistical requirements by exploiting the internal infra-
structure of the megacity. 
CAS should be robust and enduring in the megacity. Due to the 
physical and human terrain of the megacity, the effectiveness of artil-
lery and mortars could be degraded in some cases. The PAS concept 
is one possible solution to the fires and ISR gap. PAS has the ability 
to restrict enemy freedom of movement and provide the means for 
ground commanders to conduct timely, informed maneuver.51
The multipurpose division, with its organic capabilities, would 
embody the core tenets of simultaneity, adaptability, tempo, mobility, 
and lethality. The division would have the unilateral ability to conduct 
simultaneous operations at a high tempo provided by the combined 
mobility and firepower of wheeled, armored, and rotary-wing capabil-
ities and enhanced by the adaptability of SOF and indigenous forces. 
A recent historical example of what this concept aims to achieve was 
demonstrated by the French military in Mali in 2013. Although this 
operation did not occur in a megacity, the conditions were complex, 
and the French military provided several valid lessons, such as staying 
ahead of your adversaries’ decision cycle through high-tempo and au-
dacious actions and partner integration. 
OPERATION SERVAL ,  MALI
French actions during Operation Serval in 2013 were defined by 
tempo, mobility, surprise, flexibility, and integration.52 The French 
achieved strategic surprise and maintained the initiative by acting 
with greater audacity and speed than the Islamists. The French used 
a combination of SOF, commando and light units, and mechanized, 
51 Sickler, Army Aviation, 2. 
52 Michael Shurkin, France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army (Santa Mon-
ica, CA: Rand, 2014), 2–3. 
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highly mobile forces with heavy fire power to attack multiple points 
of manipulation simultaneously. They moved at speeds that strained 
their logistical capabilities but maintained a high tempo that kept the 
Islamists off balance by creating multiple dilemmas. They demonstrat-
ed the importance of bold and constant movement, which retained 
the tactical initiative and prevented the enemy from targeting static 
positions.53 Future multipurpose divisions should aim to employ this 
type of tempo and dynamic action in a megacity. 
Mission Command
The mission command philosophy is ideal for conducting JCAM in a 
megacity if implemented properly. The idea of disciplined initiative at 
the lowest level is critical for leaders operating in decentralized and 
uncertain environments as in the megacity. Leaders must train re-
petitively through self-study, rigorous force-on-force exercises, simu-
lations, staff rides, and leader professional development sessions to 
gain the confidence, trust, and common understanding to operate 
with degraded communications and thrive in chaotic situations. Fur-
thermore, a training focus on cognitive ability, cross-cultural study, 
and language will provide a marked advantage to soldiers and leaders 
over potential adversaries.54 
A significant challenge in exercising mission command in com-
plex environments will be in establishing the appropriate command 
structure for specific situations and determining how mission com-
mand will translate to multinational and interagency partners. As it 
relates to the multifunctional division, it is a matter of establishing the 
right commander and headquarters depending on the level of respon-
sibility, task force size, and personal background of a particular officer 
based on the situation. An example would be to insert an SOF officer 
as the JTF commander for an unconventional (megacity) problem set, 
even if the preponderance of the forces were conventional based on 
the SOF officer’s background in urban warfare. 
53 Shurkin, France’s War in Mali, 9–10.
54 The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 18.
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Intelligence
Similar to the IDF in 2006, U.S. Army intelligence sections (S-2) at the 
BCT and battalion levels are not sufficient for operations in complex 
environments. JCAM will require a more robust SIGINT and HUMINT 
capability to provide the commander an accurate and timely picture 
of an ever-changing situation.55 Adopting the multipurpose division 
concept would alleviate many of the shortfalls based on a more robust 
intelligence section at the division level. However, new and innovative 
intelligence capabilities must be developed to counter the fast-paced 
and constantly changing conditions in a megacity; for example, a so-
cial media analyst could monitor social media traffic to maintain situ-
ational awareness and stay ahead of the enemy’s swarm efforts. The 
multipurpose division will also require enhanced cyber capabilities, 
as argued by Major Joe Farina in his cyber levée en masse concept.56 
Sustainment
Securing LOCs and supply lines in and out of a megacity will be prob-
lematic, if not impossible. However, the megacity also may offer some 
advantages in logistics. Just as the French sourced most of their fuel 
and Class I requirements from the local economy in Mali, U.S. multi-
functional divisions can limit their logistical tail by foraging from the 
urban environment.57 Regardless, the Army must develop technology 
(manned and unmanned) to minimize the ground LOCs, decrease risk 
to soldiers, increase freedom of movement, and allow for JCAM oper-
ations in the most austere conditions.58 
Force Protection
The multipurpose division will leverage tempo, simultaneity, mobility, 
55 Maneuver Center of Excellence Reconnaissance and Surveillance Working Group, 75th 
Ranger Regiment: Problem Framing (Fort Benning, GA: Department of the Army, n.d.), 16.
56 Maj Joe Farina, “Cyberspace in the Megacity: Thickening the Fog of War?” (master’s 
thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, 2015), 5; and 
Audrey Kurth Croninn, “Cyber-Mobilization: The New Levee en Masse,” U.S. Army, 10 
September 2006.
57 Class I requirements refers to rations for subsistence (food and drinking water) and 
gratuitous (free) health and comfort items. Shurkin, France’s War in Mali, 34.
58 The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 34. 
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adaptability, and lethality to provide the adequate measure of force 
protection. Operations in megacities will demand a decrease on the 
reliance of large fixed sites, such as combat outposts and forward op-
erating bases as in the model of Iraq and Afghanistan. Multipurpose 
divisions should make use of roving urban patrol bases and existing 
infrastructure of the host nation security forces for temporary basing. 
The complex terrain and population density will not support the build-
up of fixed sites based on their vulnerability to enemy attack, but ex-
isting host nation facilities provide ready-made areas to utilize as a 
base of operations in the megacity. To rapidly gain and maintain the 
initiative, units should avoid static positions, increase movement and 
situational awareness, deliver accurate fires, and develop lighter and 
more maneuverable gear. 
Necessary Capabilities
Interagency Integration
The Army should continue the positive trend created in Afghanistan 
and Iraq of synchronizing, and in some cases supporting, the efforts 
of the other instruments of national power. David Kilcullen reinforces 
this point:
There are still no purely military solutions to many of the 
challenges we will encounter, meaning that disciplines 
such as law enforcement, urban planning, city administra-
tion, systems design, public health, and international de-
velopment are likely to play a key part in future theory of 
conflict.59 
There are likely scenarios in a megacity where the multipurpose di-
vision could be the supporting effort and should be prepared to inte-
grate with our interagency partners to support those missions. 
Partner Integration
Leveraging host nation capabilities, cultural knowledge, tactics, infra-
59 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 114.
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structure, and environmental awareness will be essential in all JCAM 
operations in a megacity. As highlighted in the 2010 case study on the 
pacification program in the favelas in Complexo do Alemão in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, partnered forces could include the police, military, city 
officials, public works officials, or a combination of all.60 Another ex-
ample would be AMISOM’s partnership with the Ras Kamboni militia 
to root out the remaining al-Shabaab forces and establish security in 
Kismayo. Multipurpose divisions may be inclined to partner with non-
traditional groups in the future like the Ras Kamboni militia, who can 
contribute to creating multiple dilemmas.61 The Army’s multinational 
force partnerships will be strengthened greatly if the megacity is cod-
ified as a unit training priority. 
Training
As discussed in the AOC and the Strategic Studies Group’s analy-
sis, the Army must institutionalize the megacity into the Joint train-
ing construct.62 Furthermore, Title 10 mandates that the U.S. Army “is 
organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained 
combat incident to operations on land.”63 Megacities (and other com-
plex urban environments) fall within this jurisdiction and should be ad-
dressed in the Army’s training priorities.64 
The next step is for the Army to implement the megacity as a 
training priority for each of the regionally aligned forces (RAF). This 
priority should be aligned with security cooperation initiatives and 
phase 0 efforts in accordance with the geographical combatant com-
mander’s (GCC) campaign plan. This would allow each of the RAFs to 
train with multinational partners (in the theater of operation) to gain 
competency, increase interoperability and access, and develop expert 
knowledge on the megacities located in their area of operation (AO). 
These Joint and combined training opportunities in a megacity could 
include anything from training exercises without troops, senior leader 
60 Megacities and the United States Army, 114.
61 “Retreat of the Shabaab,” 21.
62 Megacities and the United States Army, 168.
63 Armed Forces, 3,061–62.
64 Megacities and the United States Army, 168.
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staff rides, or force-on-force training with partner nations.65 This train-
ing technique was validated by the French in Mali in 2013:
France has been working with at least two Malian Tuareg 
forces, Haji ag Gamou’s Malian Army units and the MNLA 
[National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad]. France’s 
relations with Gamou’s force and the MNLA, though not 
free from problems and controversies, suggest a high de-
gree of familiarity with northern Malian affairs as well as the 
ability and willingness to engage local forces and, in effect, 
leverage internal Tuareg factional competition. French forc-
es almost certainly knew what they were doing and with 
whom they were dealing before they arrived in Mali. They 
did not have to scramble to get up to speed.66
Home station training for multipurpose divisions (not in the RAF cycle) 
could be vastly improved by developing relationships with municipal 
agencies, police and fire departments, city planners, and public works 
officials of stateside urban areas to gain a better understanding of 
these disciplines. 
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS
Future threats in a megacity will be uniquely challenging and will be 
based on complex networks that are connected locally, regionally, 
and globally. Spatial and temporal dimensions for JCAM operations 
in the future will be defined differently at the operational and tactical 
levels. An example at the operational level is the 2008 terrorist attacks 
in Mumbai, India. Had the United States been compelled to take mil-
itary action against this threat, it would most likely have required si-
multaneous actions in both Mumbai (on the attackers) and Karachi 
(the command and control center), and other locations (the support 
efforts) spanning the boundaries of multiple GCCs.67 The geograph-
ic distance at the operational level adds a level of complexity, as the 
65 Megacities and the United States Army, 168.
66 Shurkin, France’s War in Mali, 34.
67 “Mumbai Terror Attacks,” CNN, 18 September 2013. 
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GCCs must coordinate and synchronize their actions across time, 
space, and resources.
Spatial and temporal dimensions at the tactical level will be de-
fined by a specific megacity and the outlying areas. The multipurpose 
division is well-suited to meet various scenarios that could occur in 
a megacity as a self-contained task force or with augmentation. The 
multipurpose division will maintain the capability to apply SOF, light, 
armored, and Stryker infantry, as well as organic aviation for addition-
al mobility, ISR, and CAS. The multipurpose division will maintain a 
robust staff to support the commander and will possess the required 
engineer and logistics assets to support high-tempo maneuver; for 
example, light infantry and/or SOF would work with multinational part-
ners to blend in with the environment while engaging simultaneous 
targets and armored and Stryker forces provide a mobile cordon from 
the periphery. Along with aviation support through PAS, the multipur-
pose division could mass its combat power to exploit opportunities 
or operate in a disaggregate manner to engage simultaneous targets 
and create multiple dilemmas for the enemy. 
Whether operating in a specific neighborhood in a megacity, or 
from multiple locations inside the same megacity, or across multiple 
regional boundaries as described above, Army forces must be pre-
pared to synchronize simultaneous efforts while projecting combat 
power through all domains. Ultimately, this concept aims to provide 
options to the GCCs for contingencies in extremely complex environ-
ments like the megacity. 
CONCLUSION
Based on current globalization trends, the Army will conduct a combi-
nation of offensive, defensive, and stability operations in a complex ur-
ban environment in the next 20 years. Whether the megacity consists 
of a population of 10 million or not is irrelevant. If the urban area is 
defined by population density, global connectedness, complex human 
networks, and urban sprawl, it meets the criteria of a complex urban 
environment and is a legitimate problem requiring further consider-
ation by military planners. 
Future armed conflict will continue to become more complex 
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based on the increasingly human nature of conflict, with threats 
emerging from dense and ungoverned urban areas, and the increased 
availability of lethal weapon systems. Enemies and adversaries will 
challenge U.S. forces in the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace 
domains. Advanced technologies will be transferred from state to 
nonstate actors. Because these threats tend to originate from densely 
populated urban centers, the United States cannot rely on technology 
and long-range strike capability alone to win its future wars. A capable 
and multifunctional combined-arms force will be required for opera-
tions in the chaotic and uncertain environments of the future.68
The multipurpose division is a logical and realistic adaptation of 
the current force structure that could be implemented in the near term 
to address the potential gaps in doctrine, organization, and training 
priorities. However, additional research, testing, and validation are re-
quired for future operations in megacities. As new information is ab-
sorbed, new questions will arise that need to be answered. Ultimately, 
this concept aims to grow the discourse and spark interest for further 
debate on how the Army will cope with the significant challenges as-
sociated with operations in complex urban environments. 
68 The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 34.
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C H A P T E R E I G H T
Cyberspace in the Megacity
Thickening the Fog of War?
Major Joseph I. Farina, U.S. Marine Corps
Cyber warfare in megacities flourishes because nation- 
states and nonstate actors can dig in and degrade much 
of the military’s technological advantages. Consider the 
2014 protests in Hong Kong: compact urban environment, 
tens of thousands of protestors, a volatile police force, and 
a government more concerned about its reputation as a 
safe enclave for commerce. The political cost of Beijing’s 
unyielding position increased as footage of unarmed stu-
dents in clouds of tear gas flashed around the world on a 
network that could communicate unhindered with millions 
in a moment.
In 2014, more than 40 percent of the world’s population used the in-
ternet.1 Cisco networking index predicts that the number of mobile 
network-connected devices will exceed 10 billion by 2018 and will be 
1.4 times greater than the world’s population (UN estimates 7.6 billion 
people by 2018).2 As the cost of information continues to decrease, 
the capacity of nation-states, nonstate actors, and private citizens to 
1 “Internet Users,” Internet Live Stats, 1 July 2016.
2 Cisco, “Cisco Visual Networking Index Forecast Projects Nearly 11-Fold Increase in 
Global Mobile Data Traffic from 2013 to 2018,” press release, 5 February 2014.
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communicate increases. Information-sharing electronic devices and 
platforms, such as cellphones, Xbox 360, Twitter, and Facebook, and 
their associated networks interconnect nation-states, nonstate actors, 
and private citizens through cyberspace.3
Information-sharing electronic devices use cyberspace for con-
nectivity. For a technologically advanced U.S. military, cyberspace 
provides the medium for command and control, communications, 
and weaponry employment. Conversely, cyberspace in the megacity 
provides adversarial nation-states and nonstate actors the same me-
dium for command and control, communications, and weaponry em-
ployment. The impacts from nation-states and nonstate actors using 
cyberspace in the megacity diminish the U.S. military’s technological 
advantage while increasing its level of uncertainty, the proverbial “fog 
of war,” and friction.
The utilization of cyberspace by a megacity’s citizens, with diver-
gent interests and connected to different groups, thickens the fog of 
war for the U.S. military. Cyberspace, when compared to the doctrinal 
method of defining the battlefield, requires revaluation for utility with-
in the cyberspace domain in reducing a maneuver commander’s un-
certainty. Additionally, nation-states and nonstate actors’ mobilization 
through cyberspace, the Napoleonic cyber levée en masse, exploits 
megacity telecommunications infrastructure to converge at gaps 
within the U.S. military. Pointedly, cyberspace facilitates mobilization 
through transient mass. To analyze these topics and their effects in 
an environment of increasing uncertainty, one requires common defi-
nitions for the fog of war, the megacity, and the cyberspace domain. 
After defining key terms, this chapter then analyzes how the cyber 
battlefield and the cyber levée en masse thicken the fog of war and 
create critical challenges for the U.S. military. Using comparative anal-
ysis, this chapter analyzes two case studies for further cyber fog ex-
3 Cyberspace refers to “the global domain within the information environment consist- 
ing of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident 
data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and em-
bedded processors and controllers.” Cyberspace Operations, JP 3-12 (Washington, DC: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), v; and Cyberspace Operations, Annex 3-12 (Maxwell Air Force 
Base, AL: Curtis E. Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, 2010), 1.
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amination and lessons learned. Finally, this research concludes with a 
proposed military concept that explores potential courses of action to 
counter a megacity’s transient mass. 
DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this chapter, the fog of war refers to “the uncer-
tainty in situational awareness experienced by participants in military 
operations”; this includes uncertainty regarding an adversary’s intent 
and capability as well as one’s own capabilities.4 This uncertainty 
leads to friction, which is what makes the easy tasks hard and the sim-
plest of movements difficult. However, the size and scope of the meg-
acity potentially compounds this effect.
A megacity, as defined by the United Nations and New Scientist 
Magazine, is a metropolitan area with a total population in excess of 
10 million people.5 Additionally, a megacity can be a single or multiple 
converging metropolitan areas.6 Inherent to a megacity is transient 
mass. Transient mass refers to the ability of a city system to block, 
contain, or canalize friendly maneuver forces with organic people or 
devices on short notice.7 However, coupling a basic understanding of 
the megacity with an understanding of the cyberspace domain further 
thickens the fog of war.
The global domains consist of land, air, sea, space, and cyber-
space.8 Considering the connectivity cyberspace offers, defining an area 
of interest and influence within a megacity becomes challenging. For 
example, consider a cyberattack originating from the Asia- Pacific, 
4 “Clausewitz’s Fog and Friction and the Military Transformation Friction,” Conflict and 
Security (blog), University of Nottingham, 2 December 2013; and Carl von Clausewitz, On 
War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1976, 1984).
5 World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision (New York: UN Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2006), fact sheet 7.
6 Fred Pearce, “How Big Can Cities Get?,” New Scientist, 17 June 2006, 41.
7 Dr. Benjamin M. Jensen to Maj Joseph I. Farina, Marine Corps Command and Staff Col-
lege, Marine Corps University, January 2015. The term organic refers to that which is as-
signed to and forms an essential component of a military organization.
8 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, FM 3-38 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
2014), 1-3. 
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transiting through a series of botnets in Europe, and targeting a 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) conducting humanitarian as-
sistance/disaster relief in Karachi, Pakistan.9 How would the MEB 
intelligence officer and commanding officer define the MEB’s area 
of interest and influence with regard to cyberspace? Considering the 
global connectivity and anonymity cyberspace offers, this task initially 
appears daunting.
CYBER AREAS OF INTEREST 
AND INFLUENCE: D OES UTILITY 
EXIST FOR A MANEUVER COMMANDER?
Doctrinally, the U.S. military defines the battlefield environment cate-
gorically into three areas: areas of operations, interest, and influence.10 
An area of operations (AOR) is “a geographical area, usually defined 
by lateral, forward, and rear boundaries assigned to a commander, by 
a higher commander, in which he has the responsibility and the au-
thority to conduct military operations.”11 In cybersecurity, doctrinally 
known as defensive cyberspace operations, the AOR refers to a place 
“inside the firewall, proxy or quite simply, inside the [internet protocol] 
or domain space an entity owns.”12 However, the U.S. military possess-
es the ability to conduct offensive cyberspace operations and cyber-
space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), in addition 
to defensive cyberspace operations.13 
The issue for the U.S. military is where the authorities of a com-
puter network attack and exploitation reside during operations in a 
megacity. Currently, a maneuver commander, whether in the megacity 
or a rural environment, does not possess the authority to conduct a 
9 “ ‘Bot’ is derived from the word ‘robot’ and is an automated process that interacts with 
other network services. Bots often automate tasks and provide information or services 
that would otherwise be conducted by a human being.” “What Is the Difference: Viruses, 
Worms, Trojans, and Bots?,” Cisco, 14 June 2018.
10 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, FM 34-130 (Washington, DC: Department of 
the Army, 1994).
11 Operational Terms and Graphics, FM 101-5-1 (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 1997).
12 Mathew Stern, “Applying Military Doctrine to Cyberspace: Area of Operations, Influ-
ence, and Interest,” Security Week, 12 September 2012, 1. 
13 Cyberspace Operations, II-4, GL-4.
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computer network attack, therefore eliminating a cyber AOR. Further-
more, computer network attacks and exploitation can originate from 
any location globally with an internet connection. Additionally, given 
diaspora networks and sympathy groups, the actual network targeted 
may only exist partially in physical form within the boundary of a meg-
acity. Therefore, there is limited utility in defining a cyber AOR. Even if 
a maneuver commander authorizes a computer network attack within 
the megacity, cyberspace poses additional challenges to the utility of 
a cyber area of influence.
The area of influence is “a geographical area wherein a com-
mander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or 
fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or 
control.”14 The area of influence includes both organic and “support-
ing combat power, to include joint, multinational, or interagency as-
sets.”15 When employing organic kinetic weapons, the joint definition 
is comprehensible. However, when operating in a globally connect-
ed domain such as cyberspace, a cyber area of influence appears 
irrelevant since cyberspace is global. The cyber area of influence in 
the megacity thus reaches worldwide, regardless of where the au-
thorities reside. Therefore, the utility of the cyber area of influence 
within the cyberspace domain is questionable, leaving the area of 
interest for later debate.
The area of interest “includes the area of influence, areas ad-
jacent thereto, and extends into enemy territory to the objectives of 
current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occu-
pied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of 
the mission.”16 Matthew Stern argues that the area of interest in cy-
berspace is comparably the enemy’s “cyber infrastructure such as 
botnets, crime ware and actor/group/nation states.”17 This viewpoint 
fails to include that in the globally connected domain of cyberspace, 
the enemy could operate from another country, from another conti-
14 Operational Terms and Graphics, 1-12.
15 Operational Terms and Graphics.
16 Operations, FM 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2008), 5-5.
17 Stern, “Applying Military Doctrine to Cyberspace,” 1.
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nent, or from within the United States.18 However, Stern and Johan 
Sigholm accurately explain that nation-states and nonstate actors 
will play a role in cyberspace.19 
In the megacity, nation-states and nonstate actors will impact 
whether an adversary accomplishes their mission through cyber-
space. For example, in October 2014, the hacking group Anonymous 
conducted cyberattacks against China in response to China’s crack-
down on prodemocratic protesters. Comparatively, Hong Kong’s pro-
democratic protesters used cyberspace for mobilization at the gaps 
of antiprotesting forces’ security.20 Although areas of operations, in-
fluence, and interest relate to cybersecurity, in a global domain that 
offers nation-states and nonstate actors anonymity, they are of limited 
use. However, future nation-states and nonstate actors will use mass 
communication mediums for mobilization within a megacity, similar 
to how Napoleon Bonaparte mobilized his troops during the French 
Revolution, thereby increasing their ability to muster and generate 
mass while increasing uncertainty for the U.S. military. 
FROM THE BASTILLE TO THE MEGACITY: 
THE CYBER LEVÉE EN MASSE
A political and social phenomenon undertaken during the French 
Revolution and elaborated on by Napoleon was mass conscription, 
or levée en masse. Prior to Napoleon, large armies were socially and 
politically challenging. Under France’s previous regime, the working, 
middle, and upper classes were exempt from military service. This lim-
ited and deprived mass armies since there was only a small segment 
of the population to draw from.21 
18 Sangwon Yoon, “North Korea Recruits Hackers at School,” Al Jazeera, 20 June 2011.
19 Johan Sigholm, “Non-state Actors in Cyberspace,” Journal of Military Studies 4, no. 1 
(2013): 3.
20 Menchie Mendoza, “Anonymous Supports Hong Kong Protests, Leaks Data from Chi-
nese Websites,” Tech Times, 14 October 2014.
21 Joseph I. Farina, “Evolution to Warfare to 1945” (unpublished manuscript, 17 October 
2014), 1–2; Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1983), chapter 4; and Peter Paret, “Napoleon and the Revolution in War,” 
in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Modern Age, Peter Paret, ed., 
with Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 
123–42.
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However, starting in 1800, Napoleon coupled mass  recruitment 
and nationalist passion in forming his revolutionary armies. The 
vast increase in the production of citizen soldiers facilitated not just 
France’s foreign policy but the French commander’s ability to fight 
more aggressive and costly campaigns.22 Dr. Audrey Kurth Cronin and 
David Kilcullen argue that “it is no accident that the rise of mass war-
fare coincided with a huge explosion in the means of communication, 
particularly a dramatic growth in the number of common publications 
such as journals, newspapers, pamphlets, and other short-lived forms 
of literature.”23 In the twenty-first century, globally connected websites, 
text messages, internet blogs, and social media replaced the Napole-
onic fervor expressed though paper-based printed documents.
There are approximately 4.2 billion internet users worldwide. In 
locations where computer access or landline phones are limited, cel-
lular conductivity likely exists. Moreover, “the number of unique mo-
bile subscribers will reach 5.9 billion by 2025, equivalent to 71% of the 
world’s population” with more than half of mobile subscriptions locat-
ed in the Asia-Pacific.24 Considering the vast amounts of telecommu-
nications systems available, coupled with the number of subscribers, 
nation-states and nonstate actors operating within the megacity will 
likely use cyberspace to mobilize within the megacity construct.
NATION- STATES AND NONSTATE 
ACTORS’  CYBERMOBILIZATION
Timothy L. Thomas, Cronin, and National Gang Intelligence Center’s 
National Gang Report for 2011 and 2013 elaborate on the ability, ubiq-
uity, and mobilization cyberspace offers nonstate actors. Nonstate 
actors use cyberspace for motivation, recruitment, collaboration and 
coordination, expansion of social networks, training, and dissemi-
22 Farina, “Evolution to Warfare to 1945,” 2.
23 Audry Kurth Cronin, “Cyber-Mobilization: The New Levee en Masse,” Parameters (Sum-
mer 2006): 1; and Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains.
24 The Mobile Economy, 2018 (London: GSMA, 2018), 2.
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nating propaganda.25 Additionally, cyberspace provides nonstate ac-
tors a low-cost menu that includes social networks, mass texts, chat 
rooms, and websites, among many others, to communicate. As the 
cost of information decreases, the capacity of actors to spread their 
messages radically increases. In Out of the Mountains, Kilcullen sup-
ports Cronin’s argument that a “democratization of communications, 
an increase in public access, a sharp reduction in cost, a growth in 
frequency, and an exploitation of images to construct a mobilizing 
narrative” are critical elements in the proliferation of information.26 In 
the megacity, cyberspace offers nation-state and nonstate actors an 
opportunity to rapidly mobilize and converge that was created by the 
“democratization of communications.”27 
In December 1999, the internet facilitated maneuver for World 
Trade Organization protestors by allowing “net-recruited protestors 
to converge on Seattle in all directions.”28 Additionally, as Kilcullen 
explains, when “infesting the megacity,” the Mumbai terrorists used 
Skype, cellular, and satellite telephones to communicate with their 
handlers, who used Twitter, news blogs, satellite news, and cable tele-
vision to control the attacks.29 Kilcullen and Thomas identify “flat” hi-
erarchal structures and control operations conducted through remote 
control as key factors facilitating mobilization and convergence.30
BACK TO THE FUTURE: 
PAST CYBER ACTIVITIES DEPICT 
AN INCREASE IN UNCERTAINTY
When considering the size and scope of the megacity, coupled with 
the proliferation of globally connected telecommunication devices, 
the utilization of cyberspace by citizens of a megacity thickens the 
25 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, 2011); Timothy L. Thomas, Cyber Mobilization: A Growing Counterinsurgency 
Campaign (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Joint Information Operations Center, 2006); and 
Cronin, “Cyber-Mobilization.”
26 Cronin, quoted in Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 207.
27 Cronin, “Cyber-Mobilization.”
28 Thomas, Cyber Mobilization, 23.
29 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 62.
30 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 62; and Thomas, Cyber Mobilization, 23.
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fog of war for the U.S. military. Cyberspace facilitates mobilization and 
convergence on U.S. military gaps while increasing maneuver forces’ 
uncertainty. However, as Kilcullen, Thomas, Cronin, and Stern identify, 
the use of cyberspace is not limited to citizens, but rather utilized cat-
egorically by nation-states and nonstate actors. 
Once refined, cyberspace within the megacity allows nation- 
states and nonstate actors to use transient mass for mobilization and 
convergence on a technologically superior adversary, thereby creating 
a denser fog of war and adding friction to an adversary’s operations. 
To mitigate the effects of transient mass and to reduce uncertainty 
and diminish the fog of war, the U.S. military must create operational- 
and tactical-level capabilities to effectively process and synthesize the 
vast amounts of disaggregated information within cyberspace. To fully 
appreciate the use of cyberspace to create transient mass to thicken 
the fog of war, one does not need to look far into the distant past for 
examples of nation-states and nonstate actors using cyberspace with-
in a megacity construct.
Examples worth further research include the 2008 Mumbai at-
tacks and the cyber operations by North Korea targeting Seoul, South 
Korea. Additionally, researching nation-states and nonstate actors’ 
use of cyberspace outside the megacity construct, such as the 2007 
cyberattacks on Estonia, the 2007 cyberattacks on South Ossetia, and 
the 2014 Hong Kong protests are worthy of exploration. Only further 
research, and its associated findings applicable to military operations 
within a megacity, will promote visibility through the cyber fog.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: 
CASE STUDIES OF MUMBAI 
AND HONG KONG 
A megacity, given its high population density and connectivity, allows 
the temporary horde of people and swarm of devices, or amalgama-
tion of the two, to mobilize and converge at preplanned locations to 
impact operations and further escalate the fog of war. To best analyze 
the potential effects of transient mass on American forces, one must 
first study current examples of transient mass against host-nation se-
curity forces.
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Apropos examples used for comparative analysis were the 26 
November 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2014 Hong Kong protests. 
These events were selected due to their notoriety for using modern 
technologies and information-sharing devices, particularly those that 
connect to and interact through cyberspace. The research included 
Google search queries consisting of “Mumbai+attacks+technolo-
gy” and “Pakistan+terrorist+VOIP” to retrieve relevant news stories 
and analysis on the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks.31 For relevant 
news stories and analysis on the 2014 Hong Kong protests, analy-
sis included Google queries of “Hong Kong+protests” and “Hong 
Kong+protest+technology.” Note that the preponderance of Hong 
Kong protest articles referenced the use of modern technologies for 
communications and mobilization throughout.
Research for this chapter relies on analysis of more than 40 pub-
lished reports and articles, including press releases and India’s inves-
tigative report to Pakistan. Although additional published reports and 
articles are available, these publications corroborate those already 
under analysis. Additionally, research on the 2008 Mumbai terrorist 
attacks includes documents held at the U.S. Marine Corps Alfred M. 
Gray Research Center: Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy’s The Siege: 
68 Hours Inside the Taj Hotel, David Kilcullen’s Out of the Mountains, 
and Pauline C. Reich and Eduardo Gelbstein’s Law, Policy, and Tech-
nology: Cyberterrorism, Information Warfare, and Internet Immobiliza-
tion.32
The goal of the research is to identify the emergent character-
istics of modern cyberconflict by analyzing similar forms of modern 
technologies connected through cyberspace by both the 2008 Mum-
bai terrorists and the 2014 Hong Kong protesters. Furthermore, this 
research analyzes how both groups’ use of modern technologies 
enables mobilization and convergence at preplanned locations. We 
will examine an actor’s use of modern technologies with the intent to 
31 VOIP refers to voice over internet protocol.
32 Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, The Siege: 68 Hours Inside the Taj Hotel (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2013); Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains; and Pauline C. Reich and Eduardo 
Gelbstein, Law, Policy, and Technology: Cyberterrorism, Information Warfare, and Internet 
Mobilization (Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, an imprint of IGI Global, 2012).
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look beyond simply identifying the specific type. Finally, were there 
host-nation security forces’ reactions that occurred through cyber-
space? If so, how did the Mumbai terrorists and Hong Kong protestors 
counteract the host-nation’s reactions? Answering these questions 
and drawing lessons learned from each event potentially discerns an 
adversary’s most likely course of cyber action. Prior to moving forward 
with the analysis, we will offer some context on each event and their 
cyber similarities.
Background and Similarities
Mumbai is a megacity in the state of Maharashtra, India. Mumbai is 
the fourth largest city in the world with a population of 22 million and 
is India’s most populous city.33 In the evening hours of 26 November 
2008, 10 Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists attacked multiple locations within 
Mumbai, including the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, the Oberoi Hotel, the 
Nariman House, the Chhatrapati Shivaja Terminus railway station, and 
the Leopold Café.34 The attacks resulted in the deaths of 183 people, 
including 14 police and security forces, and left more than 300 peo-
ple injured.35 A unique facet of the Mumbai attacks was the use of 
information-sharing devices by the terrorists and their handlers. Fred 
Burton and Scott Stewart pointedly state that “perhaps the most rev-
olutionary aspect of the Mumbai attacks was the assailants’ use of 
modern technology to assist them with planning the attack and with 
their command, control and communications during the execution of 
their operation.”36 Modern technologies, such as information-sharing 
devices interconnected through cyberspace in Mumbai, also charac-
terize command, control, and communication during the 2014 Hong 
Kong protests.
Hong Kong is a city at the southeastern tip of mainland China. As 
one of the most densely populated cities in the world, Hong Kong has 
33 “Mumbai Population 2018,” World Population Review, 13 February 2018.
34 Founded in the early 1990s, Lashkar-e-Taiba represents one of the largest, most ac-
tive Islamic terrorist organizations that operates primarily out of Pakistan. Rama Lakshmi, 
“Indian Investigators Reveal Details Culled from Arrested Gunman,” Washington Post, 3 
December 2008, 2.
35 Reich and Gelbstein, Law, Policy, and Technology, 378.
36 Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, “Mitigating Mumbai,” Stratfor, 14 January 2009, 2.
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a population of more than 7.43 million people with a density of 6,650 
people per square kilometer.37 The September 2014 protests began 
when the National People’s Congress’s Standing Committee for the 
People’s Republic of China released its framework for Hong Kong’s 
2017 chief executive election. At the core of the issue is the Stand-
ing Committee’s “[expectation] to endorse a model under which only 
two or three candidates may run for office once they have secured the 
support of at least half of a 1,200 nominating committee.”38 Hong Kong 
citizens could only cast their votes on the committee’s approved can-
didates. This decision was unacceptable to Hong Kong residents; as 
a result, demonstrations and protests commenced on 22 September 
2014. Equipped with “top-of-the-line phones on some of the world’s 
fastest mobile networks,” Hong Kong protesters mobilized at a pace 
that “older generations of activists could have only dreamed of.”39
By analyzing both the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks and the 
2014 Hong Kong protests, similarities between the two events shed 
light onto the use of cyberspace for mobilization and convergence, in-
creasing uncertainty and friction for host-nation security forces. First, 
the Hong Kong protestors’ use of cyberspace facilitated the creation 
of a transient mass assembling at preplanned locations, similar to the 
Mumbai terrorists’ use of modern technologies to converge on the 
selected target locations. Handheld cellphones were the primary me-
dium used in each incident. This implies that the decreasing cost of 
information enables an adversary to generate mass locally faster than 
the counterforce, whether expeditionary unit or local police, can gen-
erate combat power. 
Second, the Hong Kong cyber-enabled protesters surprised 
Hong Kong security forces by coordinating the masses through cy-
berspace. This was not just a mob but coordinated action. Although 
characterizing this action as decentralized planning and execution, it 
is still coordinated. Similarly, the Mumbai terrorists’ use of cyberspace 
37 “Hong Kong Population 2018,” World Population Review, 12 June 2018.
38 Tony Cheung, “Hong Kong’s Candidate Nominating System Out of Balance, Says Beijing 
Scholar,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 31 August 2014, 1. 
39 Wilfred Chan, “Cellphones and Umbrellas: Protesting Hong Kong-style,” CNN, 29 Sep-
tember 2014.
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for planning surprised Mumbai security forces. The terrorists’ ability 
to mobilize and converge by using cyberspace to command, control, 
and communicate overwhelmed Indian security forces.
Third, not only did both parties use the already established 
host-nation cyber infrastructure, but both the Mumbai terrorists and 
the Hong Kong protesters counteracted host-nation reactions to the 
incidents through the use of that host-nation’s cyber infrastructure. 
Most notably, the attack planners and the protesters’ counteractions 
occurred by monitoring social media and news outlets reporting law 
enforcement and security forces’ locations. 
Similar Modern Technologies 
for Mobilization and Convergence
The 2008 Mumbai attack planners made use of India’s already estab-
lished cellular network and Thuraya’s mobile satellite network. The 
terrorists’ use of cellular phones, specifically voice communications 
and text messages, for command and control permitted convergence 
at their preplanned targets.40 Additionally, issuing additional subscrib-
er identity module (SIM) cards of Indian and U.S. origin to three of the 
terrorists facilitated initial anonymity.41 The terrorists’ handlers, locat-
ed in the Kashmir area under Pakistani control, solely used voice over 
internet protocol (VOIP) phone services.
To achieve initial anonymity, Zarrar Shah, the Mumbai terrorists’ 
computer expert, purchased these VOIP services through Callphon-
ex, a New Jersey company, to ensure the majority of his calls would 
bear the 201 area code when intercepted.42 The types and methods 
of communications employed by the Mumbai terrorists were “clear-
ly a few steps if not a generation ahead of what the [Indian] police 
had,” thus compounding the levels of uncertainty and friction of the 
host-nation.43 As Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy depict in The Siege, “the 
40 Indian Government Dossier, “Mumbai Terrorist Attacks, Nov. 26–29, 2008,” The Hindu, 
January 2009, 9, 52.
41 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 53–54.
42 “26/11 Mumbai Terrorist Attack: LeT Tech Chief Posed as Indian Businessman to Buy 
VoIP,” First Post (Mumbai), 22 December 2014.
43 Reich and Gelbstein, Law, Policy, and Technology, 396.
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gunmen in Mumbai appeared to be dialing Austria, and receiving calls 
from a number in the United States.”44 Consequently, Indian security 
forces encountered “an internet telephone network, with gunmen in 
India dialing a remote hub that re-routed the calls to their handlers, and 
vice versa.”45 Additionally, the Mumbai terrorists used Garmin global 
positioning systems (GPS), with preloaded waypoints, to navigate from 
the shores of Pakistan and through their amphibious landing near the 
fishing villages of South Mumbai for mobilization and convergence on 
their respective targets in downtown Mumbai.
Similar to the Mumbai terrorists, the Hong Kong protesters mo-
bilized and converged their forces, the masses of protestors, at pre-
planned locations through the use of existing cyber infrastructure, 
relying mostly on cellphones and social media for planning, com-
mand, control, and communications. Hong Kong averages more than 
two cellphones per user, with an overall mobile subscription rate of 
237 percent; therefore, a common communications medium for the 
masses already existed.46 In addition to cellphones, Hong Kong pro-
testers took advantage of Twitter (#OccupyCentral and #UmbrellaRev-
olution), Facebook, and Weibo, China’s version of Twitter, to direct and 
navigate the masses as well as to report Hong Kong security forces’ 
actions.47 Therefore, Hong Kong’s dense connectivity allowed for bet-
ter coordination (and generation) of transient mass.
Through the use of modern technologies, primarily cellphones 
and internet-connected, information-sharing devices, the Mumbai 
terrorists and the Hong Kong protesters rapidly mobilized and con-
verged on their respective locations. In Hong Kong, protestors “clutch-
ing glowing smartphones, used group chats apps like WhatsApp and 
Firechat” to establish hasty protests. Roughly 1,000 protestors, most 
who had just viewed the social media posts, suddenly “flooded the 
main road in Hong Kong’s Mong Kok shopping district, leaving police 
44 Scott-Clark and Levy, The Siege, 166.
45 Scott-Clark and Levy, The Siege, 166.
46 Andrew Lih, “In Hong Kong’s Protests, Technology Is a Battlefield,” Quartz, 2 October 
2014.
47 Douglas Yeung and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, “The Mountain Is High and the Emperor Is 
Far Away,” Foreign Policy, 11 November 2014, 2.
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surprised and outnumbered.”48 Comparatively, as assessed by former 
Indian special secretary Vappala Balachandran, a member of the two-
man high level committee appointed to investigate the incident, the 
2008 Mumbai attacks marked “the first time terrorist handlers active-
ly guided attacks from Pakistan through cell phones.”49 Akin to Hong 
Kong protestors’ use of social media, the Mumbai terrorists viewed 
news and social media, primarily Twitter, for up-to-the-minute infor-
mation on Indian security forces’ locations, international reactions, 
and locational information, such as Taj Mahal Hotel floor and room 
numbers, from trapped guests and civilians.50 Therefore, considering 
that the Hong Kong protestors and the Mumbai terrorists successfully 
employed modern technologies to mobilize and converge, what were 
the host-nation and security forces’ reactions?
How Did Host-Nation’s Security Forces React?
The Indian security forces’ reaction to Lashkar-e-Taiba’s actions fo-
cused primarily on halting the attacks occurring throughout Mumbai. 
However, Indian security forces also commenced communications 
intelligence collection, particularly targeting Global System for Mo-
bile communications (GSM) cellphone numbers, such as the GSM 
phone number +91 9910 710 424 used between the Pakistan-based 
handlers and the attackers in the Taj Mahal Hotel. Through collec-
tion, exploitation, and analysis, Indian security forces determined the 
terrorists’ locations through the terrorists’ own reporting to their 
Pakistan-based handlers. Due to the handlers’ use of satellite and 
VOIP communications, Indian security forces were incapable of as-
certaining the handlers’ location, thereby increasing friction to securi-
ty operations.51 A former Indian naval commander and retired director 
of the Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses states, “the se-
48 Chan, “Cellphones and Umbrellas.”
49 Vappala Balachandran, “Dealing with Aftermath of Attacks: Lessons from Mumbai and 
Elsewhere on What to Do and What Not to Do” (presentation, Pluscarden Programme 
Conference: The Future of International Cooperation in Countering Violent Extremism, 
Oxford University, October 2010), 3–4.
50 Balachandran, “Dealing with Aftermath of Attacks,” 2.
51 Jeremy Kahn, “Mumbai Terrorists Relied on New Technology for Attacks,” New York 
Times, 8 December 2008, 1.
CHAPTER E IGHT
196
curity forces in India, a country renowned for its huge supply of world 
class computer programmers, are especially weak in cybersecurity,” 
and can only intellectually and theoretically track satellite communi-
cations, emails, and phone calls over the internet.52 However, would it 
not better serve Indian security forces to deny the terrorists’ use of the 
cyber infrastructure?
This research did not find any reference to Indian security forc-
es attempting to disable the cyber infrastructure, bar cellular access, 
shut off power to cellular towers, or interfere/jam cellphones. Addi-
tionally, access to the cyber infrastructure remained available due to 
the plethora of intelligence gained from the terrorists’ communica-
tions, reports from civilians through Twitter to Indian security forces, 
and the Indian security forces’ use of the cyber infrastructure for their 
own communications. As internet security expert Bruce Schneier ex-
plains, “[communications] infrastructure is especially valuable during 
a terrorist attack. Twitter was the best way for people to get real-time 
information about the attacks in Mumbai. If the Indian government 
shut Twitter down . . . during a terrorist attack, the lack of communica-
tions for everyone, not just the terrorists, would increase the level of 
terror and could even increase the body count.”53 Therefore, maintain-
ing open access to the cyber infrastructure, according to Schneier, 
may actually decrease situational uncertainty and the level of friction 
encountered. While Indian security forces’ approach to collection, ex-
ploitation, and analysis were simplistic, Hong Kong’s approaches were 
complex.
While Indian security forces were severely limited in their cy-
ber collection, exploitation, and analysis abilities, Hong Kong secu-
rity forces exhibited state-of-the-art cyber responses to protesters. 
Protesters using the social media website WhatsApp for planning, 
command, control, and communications received an advertisement 
offering to better coordinate protests. However, protesters had actu-
ally installed malicious software (malware) onto their smartphones. 
Of Chinese government origin, the malware exploits the phone’s con-
52 Reich and Gelbstein, Law, Policy, and Technology, 396.
53 Reich and Gelbstein, Law, Policy, and Technology, 385.
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tent and delivers its stored information to suspicious websites whose 
servers are in mainland China. For iPhones, the malware has the so-
phistication to overcome the Apple default applications, a technique 
referred to as “jailbreak.”54 The culprits of the malware then collected 
the voice conversations of their targets. Beyond the technical abilities 
of the Indian security forces, the malware originators captured sound, 
tracked locations, and analyzed contacts, messages, and photos in an 
effort to thwart future protests and disrupt coordination efforts. How-
ever, the sheer number of protesters, a transient mass approaching 
several thousand to half a million people, converging with precision 
at preplanned locations though cyberspace, were no match for the 
30,000-strong Hong Kong security forces regardless of the cyber 
techniques used.55 Similar to the Indian security forces’ dilemma, why 
did Hong Kong security forces allow continued access to its cyber in-
frastructure?
Hong Kong is “connected to the outside world through a com-
mercially competitive and decentralized communications infrastruc-
ture.”56 Although civilian rumors circulated of censorship and Hong 
Kong forces threatened to shut down cellular towers, the cyber infra-
structure remained operational. Research determined that the deci-
sion to allow the Hong Kong cyber infrastructure to remain operational 
was to not further exacerbate the protests, considering the previously 
discussed figures of Hong Kong civilians’ devices connected to the 
cellular infrastructure; additionally, the cyber infrastructure provided 
Hong Kong security forces a method for exploiting the protesters. 
Therefore, a similarity exists between the coordinators, on an open 
cyber infrastructure, broadcasting their planned locations for protests 
to the masses and the Pakistani handlers transmitting, on an open 
cyber infrastructure, their orders of terror to the Mumbai terrorists. 
While those in Mumbai used cyberspace communications to disperse 
information internationally, so did those in Hong Kong use cyberspace 
for dissemination of information globally. However, mainland China, 
54 Lih, “In Hong Kong’s Protests.”
55 Emily Parker, “Social Media and the Hong Kong Protests,” New Yorker, 1 October 
2014, 1.
56 Lih, “In Hong Kong’s Protests.” 
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unlike India, incorporated a form of cyber defense to prevent the dis-
semination of Hong Kong protesters’ messages.
Unlike Hong Kong and India’s open cyber infrastructure, main-
land China operates the Golden Shield Project, better known as the 
“Great Firewall.”57 Operated by the Ministry of Public Security, the 
Great Firewall provides the Chinese government with the ability to 
censor and survey civilian internet activity, including social media sites 
such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Additionally, China blocked 
Instagram to prevent Hong Kong protesters from sharing images with 
those on the mainland. Finally, Chinese officials were aggressively 
censoring Weibo accounts for images and messages related to the 
Hong Kong protests.58 However, censorship through the Great Firewall 
is not the only potential Chinese reaction to the Hong Kong protests.
Since the beginning of the protests, independent media sites in 
Hong Kong were the victims of the largest cyberattack in history. Co-
incidentally, the cyberattacks “[increased] in their intensity each time 
pro-democracy activists announced new activities or developments.”59 
Although the Chinese government seemed the primary suspect, a 
“lone wolf” attack by a single individual operating through a botnet is 
also plausible.60 Considering the anonymity cyberspace offers, identi-
fying those responsible for the cyberattack is difficult. It seems more 
important to focus on how protest sympathizers in China observed 
censored social media websites, messages, and images through cy-
berspace. What lessons can we learn from the Mumbai attackers and 
Hong Kong protesters’ cyber counteractions to host-nation reactions?
Cyber Counteractions and Host-Nation Reactions
Considering the lack of cyber reaction to terrorist activities during the 
Mumbai attacks, additional research did not identify a cyber counter-
action by Indian security forces. Of equal importance, the Mumbai 
57 Xiao Qiang, “How China’s Internet Police Control Speech on the Internet,” Radio Free 
Asia, 24 November 2008.
58 Parker, “Social Media and the Hong Kong Protests,” 1.
59 Parmy Olson, “The Largest Cyber Attack in History Has Been Hitting Hong Kong Sites,” 
Forbes, 11 November 2014.
60 Olson, “The Largest Cyber Attack in History.”
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terrorists had identified known gaps in Indian security forces’ cyber 
capabilities prior to the attack, essentially exposing an Indian gap 
during mission planning. Those involved in the Mumbai attacks “were 
well aware of the technology available and also [knew] the police are 
several steps behind.”61 Again, the use of multiple SIM cards and cell-
phones, coupled with VOIP services, provided initial anonymity and 
increased the level of uncertainty and fog of war in Mumbai. Addition-
ally, the Mumbai attackers countered Indian security forces’ actions 
through Pakistani handlers reporting feeds from Twitter and media 
outlets. The Pakistan-based handlers and Mumbai terrorists’ use of 
the Indian cyber infrastructure facilitated an intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) enterprise, enabling collection, reporting 
the actions of Indian security forces, and disseminating information 
to one another. For example, the terrorist Abu Qahafa used his infor-
mation-sharing device to access Google to conduct on-the-objective 
“open source” collection of a hostage, accessing his image on the 
internet and his posted biography.62 Similar to the Mumbai terrorists 
exploiting gaps in Indian cyber capabilities, the Hong Kong protesters 
exploited capabilities of cyberspace to counter Hong Kong security 
forces’ actions. This may suggest the employment of “cyber intelli-
gence preparation of the battlefield” or “cyber recon” during preoper-
ational planning.
Expecting the cyber infrastructure to shut down, specifically cel-
lular and internet access, Hong Kong protesters incorporated mesh 
networks for planning, command, control, and communications. A de-
centralized design, a mesh network, also referred to as off-grid com-
munications, consists of a series of interconnected nodes that talk 
directly to one another through a cellphone’s radio and Bluetooth con-
nection.63 Provided that users are within a 70-meter radius, the mesh 
network application FireChat gives access to public chat rooms creat-
ed by other FireChat users. The Hong Kong protesters, in anticipation 
61 Reich and Gelbstein, Law, Policy, and Technology, 396.
62 Scott-Clark and Levy, The Siege, 163.
63 Suhauna Hussain, “FireChat and Activism,” Berkeley Technology Review, 23 November 
2013.
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of a cellular network shutdown and to overcome the strain on the cel-
lular network, created more than 100,000 new FireChat accounts in 
less than 24 hours for a total of 460,000 in two weeks.64 Moreover, the 
protesters developed numerous social media applications to enable 
the continuation of command and control. For example, these applica-
tions claim to leave no user details, such as traceable internet protocol 
addresses.65 Hong Kong authorities never censored FireChat or com-
parable obstreperous web applications, as the main protest-related 
cyber threat came not from the protesters but from Anonymous.66 
In support of the Hong Kong protestors, Anonymous, an interna-
tional hacking syndicate, conducted computer network attacks and 
exploitation operations against Hong Kong government websites in 
response to the host-nation security forces’ use of tear gas on protest-
ers.67 As a result of its cyber operations, Anonymous released individ-
ual internet protocol addresses (IP addresses) and 50,000 user names 
and email addresses.68 This act symbolizes how the globally connect-
ed domain of cyberspace interconnects nation-states (Hong Kong), 
nonstate actors (Anonymous), and civilians (protesters). But how did 
protesters overcome the Great Firewall?
Despite nation-states’ efforts in cyber defense, those capable of 
identifying and developing techniques will “leap over the firewall” or 
intrude where desired. In defiance of Chinese censorship, software 
allows users to access the World Wide Web to “jump the Great Fire-
wall [and check] the BBC News website to scan the top story on Hong 
Kong protest.”69 For as long as a requirement exists, software, mobile 
64 Sam Judah, “#BBCtrending: Hong Kong’s ‘Off-grid’ Protesters,” BBC, 29 September 
2014, 2; and Margaret Rouse, “Mesh Network Typology (Mesh Network),” Internet of 
Things Agenda (blog), TechTarget, December 2015. 
65 Michael Sainsbury, “Hong Kong Protesters at Cyberwarfare’s Bleeding Edge,” Nikkei 
Asian Review, 10 October 2014.
66 Sainsbury, “Hong Kong Protesters at Cyberwarfare’s Bleeding Edge.”
67 Chris Luo, “Anonymous Group of Hackers Release Data from Chinese Government 
Sites,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 12 October 2004.
68 “Anonymous Leaks Chinese Government Website Date over Hong Kong Protests,” 
Press Trust of India, 13 October 2014.
69 Christina Larson, “Not Even China’s Great Firewall Can Shut out News about Hong 
Kong’s Democracy Protests,” Bloomberg, 29 September 2014.
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applications, and innovative methods for internet conductivity will 
continue developing and proliferating.
Findings
The main findings of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks and the 2014 
Hong Kong protests identified cyber areas of operations and influence 
as containing limited value during the conflict. Whether Pakistan- 
based handlers employing VOIP services routing through the United 
States and Austria or internationally based nonstate actors conduct-
ing computer network attacks and exploitation operations, such as 
Anonymous, the globally connected domain of cyberspace affords 
anonymity to the tech savvy. Additionally, the amalgamation of cyber-
space’s anonymity and global dispersion, coupled with the decreas-
ing cost of information and the increasing capacity to communicate, 
compounds uncertainty and friction when operating within a megac-
ity environment.
Cellphones are changing the idea of “place.” The associated 
phone numbers in the Mumbai attacks had New Jersey area codes, 
contributing to the friction. Area codes previously corresponded to a 
user’s general location; now, at best, area codes depict where one 
purchased a phone or where one’s call routed through.70
This research and analysis extracted the potential impacts of 
mobilization and convergence through cyberspace. Protesters and 
terrorists alike prepared, organized, and concentrated on preplanned 
locations and targets through the use and benefit of cyberspace. Tran-
sient mass connected and mobilized through information-sharing 
devices, such as the protesters in Hong Kong, swelled from several 
thousand to 500,000 people, overwhelmed a security force of 30,000, 
and rapidly focalized on preplanned locations.
The Mumbai attacks and the Hong Kong protests demonstrated 
nation-states, nonstate actors, and civilians’ innovative and simulta-
neous interaction with one another through cyberspace. In the 2014 
70 Analysis provided by Dr. Eric Shibuya, Marine Corps Command and Staff, Marine Corps 
University, Quantico, VA, hereafter Shibuya analysis.
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Hong Kong protests, the action-reaction-counteraction cycle pitted 
tech-savvy cyberwarriors in battles on a digital battlefield. This includ-
ed the introduction, development, and adaptation of new technolo-
gies to augment cyber attack protesters’ information-sharing devices 
or to counter potential host-nations’ actions.
The cyber actions against Hong Kong and Chinese security forc-
es by Anonymous demonstrate that third-party actors, to include non-
state actors, can support a nation-state’s adversary. Third-party actors, 
potentially operating globally from unknown locations, can conduct 
computer network attacks and exploitation operations against either 
side participating in conflict.71
A megacity, with its densely connected population, allows for 
better coordination and generation of transient mass. As the Hong 
Kong protests indicate, one social media post or text message can 
quickly assemble a massive “army” on an unsuspecting security 
force.
It is unlikely that host-nations will terminate the conductivity 
between the population of a megacity and cyberspace since doing 
so potentially increases host-nation uncertainty. This was evident in 
Hong Kong and Indian security forces’ decision to maintain the avail-
ability of cyberspace. Additionally, terminating access to cyberspace 
to limit the formation of transient mass appears futile, considering 
the availability of technologies (e.g., satellite communications and 
WhatsApp) to connect information-sharing devices without internet 
or cellular network access.
CASE STUDY CONCLUSION
Modern technologies provided both the Hong Kong protesters and 
Mumbai terrorists a low-cost, effective medium to mobilize and con-
verge preplanned locations and targets. As a result, host-nation se-
curity forces encountered unprecedented levels of uncertainty and 
friction, including an initial unknown number of attackers, an inability 
to thwart protests, and an inability to coordinate an immediate, effec-
tive security response. Although the cyberfog blinded Indian security 
71 Shibuya analysis.
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forces’ ability to locate the Pakistan-based handlers, cyberspace did 
yield immediate tactical and operational-level intelligence. Likewise, 
the Hong Kong protesters’ cyber-enabled levée en masse caught an 
unsuspecting security force off-guard, thereby increasing uncertainty 
and operational friction. Yet, cyberspace provided Hong Kong securi-
ty forces a medium to gain situational awareness. As challenging as 
these events were to Indian and Hong Kong security forces, potential 
concepts emerged that could benefit the U.S. military. 
American forces must conceptualize exploiting transient mass’s 
inherent electromagnetic energy. In doing so, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures will overcome mobilization and convergence through cy-
berspace in the megacity. Finally, any concept exploiting transient 
mass’s electromagnetic energy must consider any associated author-
ities to assist a maneuver commander in seeing through the cyberfog.
Purpose of the Military Concept
Within the megacity, transient mass uses information-sharing de-
vices to command, control, and communicate. Consequently, the 
electromagnetic energy emanating from a transient mass’s information- 
sharing devices is exploitable. The purpose of this concept is to pro-
vide a maneuver commander the ability to capitalize on the megacity’s 
inherent electromagnetic energy in support of military operations.72 
In Iraq and Afghanistan, adversaries effectively utilized the electro-
magnetic spectrum to conduct command, control, computer, com-
munication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) as 
well as detonate explosive devices. Hard lessons learned from these 
wars resulted in the rapid development of electronic warfare systems, 
such as the U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command’s Thor III system, to 
counter an adversary’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum.73 These 
systems, intended for defensive and reactive employment, seek to jam 
versus exploit electromagnetic space for maneuver and ISR. As the 
72 Christopher A. Kennedy et al., “Energy and Material Flows of Megacities,” Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences 112, no. 19 (April 2015): https://doi.org/10.1073 
/pnas.1504315112.
73 Concepts and Programs 2011 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2012), 
286.
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U.S. military retrogrades out of the mountains and valleys of Afghani-
stan and potentially into the skyscrapers and alleys of a megacity, an 
adversary’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum not only continues, 
but also compounds. Within the megacity, characterized by its infor-
mation-sharing device, network-connected population, the adversary 
adds the ability to organize transient mass to their arsenal, facilitating 
mobilization and convergence onto military friendly locations. This 
concept proposes using a transient mass’s organic electromagnetic 
energy and information-sharing devices to increase a maneuver com-
mander’s situational awareness and an adversary’s cognitive load 
through cluster logic and misinformation, respectively. Cluster logic 
refers to the use of a transient mass’s electromagnetic signature to 
ascertain its size, direction, and speed. Accordingly, cluster logic and 
misinformation arm a maneuver commander with the ability to disrupt 
transient mass’s capacity to mobilize and converge, decrease the un-
certainty caused by the transient mass, and allow an increase in situa-
tional awareness. Cluster logic and misinformation allow a maneuver 
commander to see through the fog. 
Time Horizon, Assumptions, and Risks
In The Megacity: Operational Challenges for Force 2025 and  Beyond, 
the Army Chief of Staff examines how “military forces might conduct 
operations in and around a megacity and approaches to achieve mili-
tary success in urban environment in 2030–2040.”74 As one of the na-
tion’s 911 forces in readiness, the 3d Marine Division staff frames the 
complexities of a megacity in anticipation of future contingencies.75 
The amalgamation of the U.S. military’s anticipated megacity opera-
tions and examples of other nations’ security forces operating within 
a megacity demonstrate the near-term requirement for capabilities 
that take advantage of a megacity’s inherent electromagnetic energy. 
However, this concept implies two assumptions for its utilization.
74 The Megacity: Operational Challenges for Force 2025 and Beyond (Washington, DC: 
Army Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, 2014), 1. 
75 3d Marine Expeditionary Force email to Marine Corps Command and Staff, 14 October 
2014.
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First, this concept assumes the replication of policies, proce-
dures, and authorities similar to that of the electronic warfare systems 
employed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The concept is a force multiplier to 
a maneuver force commander, regardless of the military occupation-
al specialties of subordinate units. The second assumption signifies 
that transient mass is dependent on information-sharing devices for 
command, control, and communication. Although the proliferation of 
information-sharing devices is evident within a megacity, there are as-
sociated risks that will prevent employing this concept. 
One associated risk is that transient mass within a megacity is 
not dependent on information-sharing devices or nonelectromagnetic 
energy for command and control, but paper-based communication. 
Using newspapers and leaflets, similar to the Napoleonic fervor ex-
pressed though paper-based printed documents, requires a less tech-
nological response. Arguably, a host-nation terminating the use of the 
telecommunications infrastructure to its citizens posits additional risk; 
however, not only does this seem unlikely, but applications exist to allow 
information-sharing devices to work despite the lack of infrastructure.
Description of the Military Problem
Modern technologies provide transient mass a low-cost, effective me-
dium to rapidly mobilize and converge at preplanned locations and 
targets. As a result, the U.S. military will encounter unprecedented lev-
els of uncertainty and friction, including an unknown number of adver-
saries; an inability to disrupt, defeat, or deny an adversary the ability 
to mobilize and converge; and an inability to coordinate an immediate, 
effective response. This concept provides a maneuver commander 
with the ability to turn transient mass’s command and control mecha-
nism on itself and to use transient mass’s electromagnetic signature 
as a radar. Flooding an adversary’s command and control mechanism 
with misinformation makes ascertaining the correct orders and direc-
tions from a transient mass’s leadership challenging while increasing 
an adversary’s uncertainty and friction. Additionally, by sensing and 
graphically presenting the transient mass’s energy, a maneuver com-
mander generates situational awareness; yet, to best understand this 
concept requires context of potential security environments.
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A potential security environment is 3d Marine Expeditionary Bri-
gade or a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–Crisis Re-
sponse (SPMAGTF-CR) supporting either humanitarian assistance/
disaster relief or embassy reinforcement operations in a megacity 
encountering civil unrest or unstable peace.76 Exacerbating each 
scenario is the use of low-cost, effective information-sharing devices 
to mobilize and converge at American military locations, such as aid 
relief stations, staging locations, and the U.S. embassies. To prevent 
further escalating the internal unrest, the host-nation ostensibly de-
cides not to power down its communication infrastructure, such as 
internet connectivity. Commonly organic to each Marine Air-Ground 
Task Force (MAGTF), the maneuver commander’s intelligence section 
provides threat assessments and conducts force protection and in-
dication and warning operations. Nonetheless, the intelligence sec-
tion’s ability to accurately report the formation, location, and direction 
of transient mass is limited due to placement and access of organic 
collection assets. Consequently, the servicemember on post requires 
the most current information to prevent the mobilization and conver-
gence of transient mass on that position. Furthermore, the maneu-
ver commander requires a capability to affect transient mass through 
nonlethal fires.
Synopsis of Central Ideas
This concept has two subcomponents. The first subcomponent 
provides for the ability to turn the transient mass’s command and 
control on itself by exponentially increasing the amount of misinfor-
mation the adversary must siphon, similar to increasing the noise 
in signal-to-noise ratio. The desired end state with transient mass 
is to cause disorganization within the transient mass. By increasing 
the interference (the volume of misinformation that transient mass 
76 Unstable peace refers to “a situation in which tension and suspicion among parties 
run high, but violence is either absent or only sporadic.” Education and Training Cen-
ter, Certificate Course in Conflict Analysis (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace. 2015); and Joseph I. Farina, “Challenges to Yemen’s Sovereignty” (unpublished 
paper, Marine Corps University, 9 February 2015), 6.
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must filter), the desired signal (relevant information, such as loca-
tions of U.S. forces or planned protest sites) becomes difficult to dis-
cern. This subcomponent is comparable to cognitive load theory.77
Cognitive load theory literature determines “that subjects under 
a larger cognitive load tend to be more impulsive and less analytical” 
and are “less able to devote cognitive resources to reflect on their 
decision,” leading to impulsiveness, being more risk averse, exhibit-
ing a higher degree of impatience, and failing to process all available 
information.78 Cognitive load “manipulation is effective because it 
occupies a portion of the working memory of a subject” and is sim-
ilar to the diminished ability to reason.79 Accordingly, presenting vast 
amounts of misinformation (interference), or increasing the cognitive 
load, increases uncertainty and friction on transient mass. This sub-
component increases the “noise” by flooding command and control 
mediums with misinformation, including false locations and directives 
from organizers.
The second subcomponent is cluster logic. Akin to the local news 
providing a layered geospatial presentation warning about a thunder-
storm 10 miles in diameter and moving at 35 miles per hour, cluster 
logic reports the size, location, direction, and speed of transient mass 
to maneuver commanders and subordinate units. Cluster logic in this 
situation uses transient mass’s electromagnetic signature as radar by 
graphically representing the information on the user’s graphic user 
interface (e.g., Google Earth’s KML feeds or overlays), comparable to 
the “hot spots” of thunderstorms.80 Note that users can employ each 
concept individually or in a mutually supporting fashion. The net result 
77 Cognitive load refers to an instructional theory that starts from the idea that working 
memory is limited by the amount of information it can hold and the number of opera-
tions it can perform on that information. See John Sweller et al., Cognitive Load Theory 
(New York: Springer, 2011).
78 Sean Duffy and John Smith, “Cognitive Load in the Multi-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Game: Are There Brains in Games?,” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Econom-
ics, no. 51 (August 2014): 48, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2014.01.006.
79 Duffy and Smith, “Cognitive Load in the Multi-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma Game,” 48.
80 KML refers to Google Keyhole Markup Language or “a file format used to display 
geographic data in an Earth browser such as Google Earth, Google Maps, and Google 
Maps for mobile.” See “KML Tutorial,” Developers Google, 16 November 2017.
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of collapsing transient mass through cognitive load and cluster logic 
is the ability for a maneuver commander to deny, degrade, and defeat 
transient mass.
Application and Integration of Military Functions
The Marine Corps’ view of command and control accounts for “the 
implications of the ongoing information explosion that is a conse-
quence of modern technology” as factors when forming an under-
standing of the nature of war and the Marine Corps’ philosophy on 
warfare.81 Although not war necessarily, megacity operations operate 
under this philosophy regardless. The proposed concept supports 
command and control by identifying a transient mass’s location, di-
rection, and speed, thereby facilitating the U.S. military forces’ perse-
verance in spite of uncertainty. This concept aids a commander in not 
only seeing the problem through cluster logic, but also by synthesiz-
ing this information with intelligence reporting. They can then com-
municate the synthesized information to subordinate and host-nation 
forces for force protection and directing maneuvering units to dis-
rupt, defeat, or deny the adversary or reinforce already employed 
forces. Additionally, this concept may force the adversary to another 
medium, potentially exposing additional nodes in the network or pre-
viously unknown methods of command and control, contributing to 
situational awareness and the targeting cycle. Finally, cluster logic 
users, through the MAGTF Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Co-
ordination Cell (CEWCC), can identify targets where nonlethal fires, 
such as electronic warfare and cyberspace operations, are required 
to increase the noise (cognitive load) on transient mass.82 Pointedly, 
this concept enables the warfighting functions to increase a transient 
mass’s friction and uncertainty and to facilitate friendly command 
81 Command and Control, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 6 (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters Marine Corps, 1996), 2–3.
82 The CEWCC “coordinates the integrated planning, execution, and assessment of cy-
berspace and EMS actions across the MAGTF’s operational environment in order to 
increase operational tempo and achieve military advantage.” See “MAGTF Cyberspace 
and Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell (CEWCC) Concept,” Marines.mil, 24 July 2014.
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and control, maneuver, force protection, intelligence fusion, and non-
lethal fires. However, there are fundamental capabilities required to 
implement this concept.
Necessary Capabilities
This concept should not fixate on ground employment only. Consider-
ing that the MAGTF is task organized, rotary- and fixed-wing employ-
ment should be explored. Not only does this offer flexibility but also 
line-of-sight, placement, and access considerations. Aviation exam-
ples include roll-on/roll-off capabilities for MAGTF rotary-wing assets, 
the Navy’s EP-3E ARIES II fixed wing assets, and small tactical un-
manned aircraft systems.83 Additionally, considering force “footprint,” 
where high-demand/low-density military occupational specialties are 
limited or not authorized for in-country clearance, maneuver units 
must have access to this capability. 
Spatial and Temporal Dimensions
Obtaining this level of electromagnetic situational awareness through 
cluster logic potentially provides users a faster rate of information 
compared to traditional indications and warning reporting. Eliminating 
the broadcast and dissemination of traditional reporting and replacing 
it with near real-time capability, as this concept proposes, increases 
the user’s observe-orient-decide-act (OODA loop) cycle, leading to 
a faster operational tempo. Coupling both concepts, similar to com-
bined arms, further expedites a maneuver commander’s operational 
tempo by increasing the adversary’s uncertainty and friction, there-
by decreasing the adversary’s OODA loop cycle.84 There are no pre-
scriptive actions or methods for the employment of these concepts. 
However, information reconnaissance and preparation of the envi-
ronment, occurring during phase 0 (shape environment) operations, 
provides users an advanced understanding of their electromagnetic 
environment, including potential locations for operational “stand-off” 
83 ARIES refers to airborne reconnaissance integrated electronic system.
84 Warfighting, MCDP 1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1997), 40, 102.
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and optimization of equipment. This provides users time and space to 
conduct operations and maneuver to deny, disrupt, or defeat transient 
mass. As a general scheme of maneuver, operations should consist 
of surveying, synthesizing survey information with maneuver concept 
of operations, determining operational site (e.g., checkpoint, staging 
area, aid station, host-nation facility) locations, and running conductiv-
ity checks. On employment of the operational element, the command-
er’s tactical operations center would not only graphically display team 
locations but cluster logic system data feeds as well.
CONCLUSION
Applying the military lexicon of areas of responsibility, influence, and 
interest to cyberspace are of limited utility due to the anonymity and 
global reach cyberspace offers its users. As U.S. military planners fore-
cast megacity operations, cyberspace only compounds the uncer-
tainty and friction a maneuver commander encounters. Cyberspace 
within the megacity allows nation-states and nonstate actors to use 
transient mass for mobilization and convergence on a technologically 
superior adversary, thereby creating a denser fog of war and adding 
friction to an adversary’s operations. Additionally, within the megacity 
characterized by its information-sharing device network-connected 
population, the adversary adds the ability to organize transient mass 
to their arsenal, facilitating mobilization and convergence onto military 
friendly locations. However, this does not mean U.S. military forces are 
helpless. 
The cluster logic and cognitive load concept proposes using a 
transient mass’s organic electromagnetic energy and information- 
sharing devices to increase a maneuver commander’s situational 
awareness and an adversary’s cognitive load through misinforma-
tion. The ancient Chinese military general, Sun Tzu, reinforces the 
concept of using an enemy’s inherent capabilities in The Art of War. 
He states that “the opportunity to secure ourselves against defeat 
lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy 
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is provided by the enemy himself.”85 Therefore, an adversary oper-
ating within the megacity, interconnecting through cyberspace and 
using transient mass to mobilize and converge on preplanned loca-
tions, may actually provide a maneuver commander the ability to see 
through the cyber fog. 
85 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1963), chapter 4.
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C H A P T E R N I N E
Take It, Don’t Break It
A Megacity Concept of Operations
Colleen Borley
Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
Even though siege warfare predates medieval times, exam-
ples can be seen today in the actions of dictatorial lead-
ers in such countries as Syria or the American military’s 
attempts to take Mosul. Syrian president Bashar al-Assad 
has retaken more than 75 percent of Aleppo with the pass-
ing of time and a great deal of support from his close ally, 
Russia. Even against heavy artillery and indiscriminate air 
strikes, under-equipped rebels have been able to hold large 
swaths of compact urban cities. Today, sieges are more so-
phisticated and involve strangling a population of available 
resources and information, which causes tremendous loss 
and crisis in the enemy nation-state.
MEGACITY MOJO
Any parent entering the china section of Macy’s with a three-year-old 
understands the concept of “you break it, you buy it.” All but the stout-
of-heart parent would steer the toddler clear of the china section al-
together. Today, the United States has learned that the world expects 
America to fix what it broke in the aftermath of a conflict. As a result, 
the megacity has become a “steer clear” zone in U.S. Army doctrine. 
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Just as with the complexities of keeping a toddler out of trouble in Ma-
cy’s, the Army grasps the difficulties of tackling war in the megacity. 
Former secretary of state and Army general Colin L. Powell acknowl-
edged the expectation in deliberations over the war in Iraq in 2002 
with President George W. Bush, according to the Washington Post’s 
Bob Woodward, who called it the “Pottery Barn Rule.”1 The expecta-
tion that the United States will fix what it broke makes preparations for 
the end of a conflict essential throughout the prosecution of the con-
flict. Fortunately, war is less likely to occur within a megacity given the 
urban environment’s economic dynamism. However, if external forces 
thrust war upon the megacity, victory will require the preservation of 
its dynamic and intricate networks. A look at the megacity’s intrica-
cies shows its economic power. A case study on sieges indicates that 
the best way to preserve the economy and the megacity’s networks is 
to win without fighting, or a broader concept for victory in a megaci-
ty without substantially breaking it. Victory without butchery means 
employing deception, gaining support from inside, and preventing the 
enemy from using tunnels.
The megacity is not one of the “nine terrains” Sun Tzu envi-
sioned, but if he were alive today, Sun Tzu would have to revise his 
terrains to include the megacity. The world’s population is growing 
increasingly urbanized and more megacities are emerging. Megaci-
ties present a multidimensional battlespace inhabited increasingly by 
netizens linked through complex digital relationships.2 Megacities fre-
quently stretch high into the sky, dense with towers, while containing 
depths of an almost equal size below ground in a warren of tunnels. 
Slums and periurban areas are also a characteristic of megacities.3 
How do you fight and win in this complex territory? Given the amount 
of wealth generated in megacities and their importance to the global 
1 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 150.
2 For the purposes of this discussion, netizen refers to an active participant in the online 
community of the internet.
3 Periurban refers to areas that are largely defined as those surrounding metropolitan ar-
eas and cities, though neither urban nor rural in the conventional sense. They are often 
contested spaces and largely regarded as being in transition.
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economy, the challenge to success in a megacity is to take it without 
substantially breaking it. Key terrain becomes network nodes for food, 
water, communications, and electricity. Seizing key terrain generally 
means laying siege to the city. 
The growth of urban poverty associated with a megacity seems 
to drive doom and gloom analysis about the future of warfare. Eco-
nomic data suggests a different view, however, and there is room for 
optimism. Megacities cluster cheap labor, deliver public goods and 
services efficiently, generate significant portions of national wealth, 
and provide opportunity for advancement. The data shows the eco-
nomic power of the megacity and explains why people migrate to 
them. The megacity’s economic power and resiliency will likely insu-
late the megacity from warfare in the future.4 
Pessimism seems to dominate literature on urbanization and 
megacities. A leading figure in this camp seems to be Australian 
writer David Kilcullen. In Out of the Mountains, Kilcullen argues that 
population growth, urbanization, littoralization, and connectedness 
are factors that will play a role in the causes of wars of the future. He 
deduces that population growth and concentration in urban centers 
such as megacities will cause wars, because war is a fundamental hu-
man endeavor. Where humans are, Kilcullen predicts, war will follow. 
He reaches a logical conclusion, but data does not seem to support 
the conclusion, and his conclusion falls short on understanding ur-
banization and the growth of megacities.5
Jonathan Kalan, Janice Perlman, and Edward Glaeser have 
studied megacities and identified causes for optimism. Kalan, a pho-
tojournalist who writes for the BBC and Foreign Policy, takes on the 
traditional notions of the megacity’s ills. Where some see slums, Ka-
lan argues there is dynamic economic activity and upward mobility. 
Where some see environmental catastrophe, Kalan suggests that the 
average megacity dweller uses less energy and emits less than their 
4 Jeff Desjardins, “The Megacity Economy: How Seven Types of Global Cities Stack Up,” 
Visual Capitalist, 7 February 2017.
5 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013).
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rural counterpart.6 Janice Perlman is a sociologist, who spent 40 years 
studying the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Her research documents 
the upward mobility of the megacity’s slums and demonstrates why 
people continue to migrate toward megacities.7 Harvard economist 
Edward Glaeser proposes that slums are a sign of a healthy city, be-
cause they are the first step on the urban ladder to prosperity. He 
notes that cities do not make people poor, but poor people flock to 
cities because of the economic opportunity they provide.8 Looking at 
Detroit, the inverse seems true. When a city can no longer provide 
prosperity, people abandon it.
Three key assumptions underlie the analysis of probable warfare 
in a megacity. The first is that a fundamental cause of war is economic. 
The second is that the most important difference between a city and 
a megacity is their scale. The third is that the phrase “war in a meg-
acity” refers to urban combat, such as the conditions the U.S. military 
experienced in Fallujah, Iraq. A single violent act or terrorist attack do 
not constitute war but could be the precursors to war. Graham Brown 
and Arnim Langer, scholars of hybrid inequalities, note that “empirical 
evidence suggests that the progress of a country’s economy and the 
likelihood of violent conflict tend to be inversely related . . . [since] vi-
olent group mobilization frequently occurs in situations characterized 
by a sharp economic decline or lower-than-expected economic prog-
ress.”9 Indermit Gill of the World Bank’s Development Economics unit 
emphasized scale in differentiating megacities from cities.10 If megac-
ities are prosperity generators on a massive scale, then it would seem 
that war would be less likely.
Megacities attract millions each month and aggregate their 
6 Jonathan Kalan, “Think Again: Megacities,” Foreign Policy, no. 206 (May–June 2014): 69. 
7 Janice Perlman, Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro, Kindle ed. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
8 Edward Glaeser, Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, 
Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier, Kindle ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2011). 
9 Graham K. Brown and Arnim Langer, “Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: A Critical 
Review and Research Agenda,” Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 1 (2010): 27, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800903553837.
10 Kalan, “Think Again,” 70.
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cheap labor into economic success. Nearly 1.4 million individuals per 
week migrate to cities globally.11 If people are rational actors making 
choices about their future, then clearly they see taking a chance on 
the cities as beneficial, even if it means trading the countryside for the 
slum. Mega-naysayers such as Kilcullen predict a “human tidal wave” 
as a coming catastrophe, but since 1950, the cities of the globe have 
absorbed the equivalent of New York City’s population every other 
month.12 Despite this huge influx, the city continues to deliver on its 
economic promise to many. Not only do people migrate to cities and 
eventually improve their economic situation, they generate enough 
wealth to send it back to their relatives. According to the World Bank, 
“In 2013, remittances were more than three times larger than [official 
development assistance] ODA and, excluding China, significantly ex-
ceeded foreign direct investment flows to developing countries.”13 The 
human migration toward the megacities and the remittances demon-
strate the economic success of the megacities. Additionally, the mi-
gration and remittance flows link megacities and rural regions closely 
together, so it is possible that an economic shock in one could be felt 
in another. The megacity’s economic success and increasing global 
ties are two factors that will insulate the megacity from the prospect 
of warfare. 
Upward mobility for the urban poor and migrants of a megacity 
is another key factor in the diminished likelihood of war in a megac-
ity. Janice Perlman, who experienced Rio’s favelas firsthand, makes 
an important distinction about urban migrants. She observed that 
these newcomers were the “most far sighted, capable, and coura-
geous members of their communities. They were the ones with the 
motivation and willingness to work in the least desirable jobs for the 
longest hours . . . to provide their children with the opportunities they 
11 Karen C. Seto and Shobhakar Dhakal, “Human Settlements, Infrastructure, and Spatial 
Planning,” in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change, ed. Ottmar Edenhofer 
et al. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
12 Perlman, Favela.
13 Dilip Ratha et al., Migration and Development Brief, no. 23 (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2014), 1. 
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never had.”14 The United Nations’ Population Fund reports that cities 
concentrate poverty, but they also provide opportunities to escape 
poverty.15 Perlman followed residents of the favelas for many years 
and found that 67 percent of her original subjects, as well as 65 per-
cent of their progeny, had left the slums. Those subjects who stayed 
in the favelas noted they had better access to public services and im-
proved household comforts.16 As long as the megacity continues to 
churn economically and maintain the prospect of upward mobility for 
many of its residents, it seems unlikely that war will germinate amid 
the trickle-down prosperity.
Research suggests that megacities perform more efficiently and 
with less environmental impact in the delivery of goods and services 
than rural areas. A 2012 McKinsey Global Institute study found that 
it was 30–50 percent cheaper to provide housing, water, and edu-
cation in populated urban areas than in rural areas. The study also 
found that 90 percent of urban households had electricity as opposed 
to 63 percent of rural households.17 Edward Glaeser argues that the 
average city dweller uses less energy than their country or suburban 
counterpart.18 In Glaeser’s view, “The combination of public transpor-
tation, smaller homes, higher population density and neighborhoods 
designed for walking makes cities the most environmentally friend-
ly places for living.”19 Similar to the argument about upward mobility, 
as long as the megacity continues to deliver the “public goods,” war 
seems less likely to loom in future. 
The flow of more than a million people per week, and the sub-
sequent upward mobility, seems to confirm what the financial data 
shows. The megacity is a powerhouse of wealth generation. The 
McKinsey study found the 600 cities making the largest contribu-
14 Perlman, Favela, 216–21.
15 Population, Environment and Poverty Linkages: Operational Challenges (New York: 
United Nations Population Fund, 2014).
16 Kalan, “Think Again,” 71.
17 Richard Dobbs et al., Urban World: Cities and the Rise of the Consuming Class, Kindle 
ed. (New York: McKinsey Global Institute, 2012). 
18 Ethan Wagner, “Review: Two Tales of a City,” Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 2 
(Spring/Summer 2012): 189–91. 
19 Wagner, “Review: Two Tales of a City.” 
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tion to global gross domestic product (GDP) would have created 65 
percent of global economic growth by 2025. Of those 600, 440 cities 
are in emerging economies. By 2025, those 440 cities will have gen-
erated close to half of global GDP growth.20 The Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) found that cities in Asia produce more than 80 percent of 
GDP in many Asian countries. According to ADB, almost 80 percent 
of metropolitan areas in the world have average incomes that exceed 
those for their nations, particularly in Asia.21 The other ramification of 
megacity wealth generation is that the destruction of or disruption to 
the megacity is not in anyone’s best interest. For countries depending 
on the megacities to drive their national economy, violence in the city 
disrupting the economy and the flow of goods and services assures a 
destructive situation.
War is not likely to take place in megacities, because they are 
efficient and dynamic aggregators of economic wealth, distributors of 
goods and services, and mechanisms for upward mobility. That does 
not mean that the megacity will be able to provide everything to all its 
inhabitants. Nor does it mean that violence, crime, and slums will not 
exist in megacities or that megacities are invincible. Possible causes 
for disrupting the success of megacities may come instead from state 
failure or interstate conflict. Yet, it seems the megacity contains suffi-
cient resilience and economic capacity to prevent such shocks from 
completely disrupting the megacity. 
In the event that state failure or interstate conflict bring war to 
the megacity, it seems logical that the conflict could take shape as a 
siege. In the past, warring parties could bypass, occupy, besiege, or 
destroy enemy-held cities. Of the four options for dealing with such a 
city, one of the most complex military options is the siege. The density 
and territorial expanse of a megacity magnify the military challenge 
the megacity poses. Examining methods of ending sieges offers many 
lessons, which could apply to the megacity. Several ways to end a 
siege appear common: treachery, deception, tunnels, surrender, and 
20 Dobbs et al., Urban World, 25. 
21 “ADB’s Focus on Urban Development,” Asian Development Bank, accessed 13 Novem-
ber 2014.
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negotiated settlement. For our purposes, we will leave surrender and 
negotiated settlements to the diplomats and politicians. Treachery, 
deception, and tunnels seem the most applicable to the military prac-
titioner because opposing forces have used them all in sieges to com-
pel an enemy to surrender or to resist an enemy’s blockade.
Siege Case Studies
A case study of 19 sieges on four continents across 2,000 years of 
history does not chronicle siege technology, but rather the people on 
both sides of the walls (table 1). The case study shows how they over-
came their respective impasses using deception, treachery, and tun-
nels. Case selection included geographic considerations to observe 
global siege conditions. Methodology for siege breaking also factored 
into the case selection as well as the availability of sufficient informa-
tion documenting the use of deception, treachery, or tunnels. The 
most common conclusion for a siege is that one of the parties simply 
capitulates once reaching the end of its ability to resist. The cases 
where resistance succeeded or deception brought swift victory are 
of greatest interest to this study. The significance today of sieges is 
that, as the number of megacities grows, twenty-first-century conflict 
is likely to take place in or around a megacity. The key to victory in a 
megacity may lie beyond the Trojans and the trebuchet in understand-
ing the siege as a complex military option for approaching conflict in 
a megacity. 
Medieval walled cities and megacities bear some comparisons 
worth exploring. A megacity is an urban population center contain-
ing more than 10 million inhabitants characterized by vast geographic 
area and dense concentrations of people and infrastructure.22 Mega-
cities draw strength from generating enormous amounts of econom-
ic activity and the resiliency derived from the interconnectivity of the 
cities’ inhabitants.23 At the same time, megacities remain vulnerable 
because the inhabitants depend on water and produce grown outside 
22 Kalan, “Think Again,” 69.
23 David J. Kilcullen, “The City as a System: Future Conflict and Urban Resilience,” Fletcher 
Forum of World Affairs 36, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 20.
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Table 1. Case study of historical sieges
Treachery Deception Tunnels Negotiate Key to success
Damascus, 
634 X
Insider threat; traitor told 
of opportune time to con-
duct attack on the walls
Rome, 408 X
Senators bought their way 
to the end of the siege
Masada, 73
Brute force; Romans took 
the city
Damascus, 
1148 X
Insider threat; traitor 
informed of weakness 
to city
Detroit, 1812 X
Psychological operations; 
size of attacking force 
and Native American 
contingent
Mafeking, 
1899–1900 X
Psychological operations; 
conditions within the 
walls and commitment 
to resist
Smolensk 
1609–10 X
Insider threat; traitor re-
vealed weakness in walls 
that attackers exploited. 
The siege ended that 
same day
Batavia, 
1629 X
Dutch burned rice barns 
and logistics through 
spies
Peters-
burg, VA, 
1864–65 X
Tunnel built under Con-
federate lines
Ypres (Pass-
chendaele), 
1917 X
Tunnel under Hill 60 hit 
with largest explosion of 
its kind
Alamo, TX, 
1836
Caused the Texans to 
sleep then killed the 
sentinels
Turin, 1706 X
Tunnels allowed for 
efficient use of military 
equipment; defenders 
could hold out until help 
arrived
Gaza, 332 X X
Used for life support, 
weapons caches, troop 
movements
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of the city for sustenance. Not unlike the walled cities of the past, the 
density of the megacity makes visibility into the heart of the city diffi-
cult for an enemy. In addition, megacities must import the elements of 
sustainment, food, and water just as their medieval urban forebearers 
did. The need to sustain life through resources brought into the city 
makes both a walled city and a megacity vulnerable to sieges. 
For the purposes of our discussion, a siege refers to a “military 
operation in which enemy forces surround a town or building, cut-
ting off essential supplies, with the aim of compelling the surrender 
of those inside.”24 The term siege is different from the term blockade 
in that the purpose of a siege is to compel surrender by denying the 
enemy life-sustaining materials. In contrast, a blockade by definition 
does not have a stated purpose other than denying the import of 
sustainment. According to Merriam-Webster, a blockade serves “to 
stop people or supplies from entering or leaving (a port or country) 
especially during a war.”25 The Army’s Operational Terms and Graph-
ics omits a definition of both words, but both remain viable military 
means to achieve objectives today. The task to isolate is listed as “a 
tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both physical-
ly and psychologically—an enemy from his sources of support, deny 
him freedom of movement, and prevent him from having contact with 
24 “Siege,” Oxford Dictionaries. 
25 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed. (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 
2003). 
Metz, 1870 X
Insider threat; traitor 
provided time to attack 
Shimabara, 
1672 X
Ninjas obtained uniforms, 
snuck in, and broke the 
siege 
Smolensk, 
1706 X X
Insider threat; traitor pro-
vided information on wall 
weakness and invaders 
breached the wall with 
explosives 
Source: Compiled by author
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other enemy forces.”26 None of these definitions includes walls as a 
requirement. The key element in sieges is compelling the enemy to 
act and the enemy’s resistance to that compulsion. For nearly 2,000 
years, both the attackers and defenders in sieges have used treachery, 
deception, and tunnels to compel enemy action and achieve victory.
For the purposes of the case study, treachery refers to the pro-
vision of privileged information provided from inside sources, which 
allows an opposing force to achieve foreknowledge in support of vic-
tory. Information derived from treachery can either provide insight into 
enemy centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, or preconceptions. 
According to Abram Shulsky, the former director of the Office of Spe-
cial Plans at the Department of Defense, “deception refers to the effort 
to cause an adversary to believe something that is not true . . . with 
the goal of leading him to react in a way that serves one’s own inter-
ests, rather than his.” A 1980 study from the Office of Research and 
Development at the Central Intelligence Agency divides deception 
into two types. A-deception involves increasing the enemy’s ambigu-
ity by diluting the truth’s signal strength and increasing the possible 
number of alternate explanations.27 M-deception uses misdirection 
where alternate explanations are limited to those false conclusions 
the enemy is intended to draw in accordance with a plan. 28 Whether 
A-deception or M-deception, feedback that the enemy is interpreting 
signals as intended improves the overall success of any deception op-
eration.29 Privileged information from the inside is one key feedback 
mechanism.
In some cases, betrayal from an insider represents an efficient 
path to victory. In 634 CE, General Khalid ibn al-Walid laid siege to 
Roman-controlled Damascus. A resident of Damascus seeking refuge 
for his bride informed al-Walid that the city planned to mark the birth of 
26 Operational Terms and Graphics, FM 101-5-1 (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 1997), 1–105.
27 Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore (Washington, DC: Office of Research and Devel-
opment, Central Intelligence Agency, 1981), 22.
28 Deception Maxims, 22.
29 Abram Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” Trends in Organized 
Crime 6, no. 1 (September 2000): 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-000-1003-1.
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the Roman governor’s son with a celebration. Additionally, the Roman 
informant told the general that the inhabitants of the city would be 
drunk and the walls lightly defended. Al-Walid selected a few men to 
scale the walls, open a gate, and allow the army to enter.30 Privileged 
information provided visibility into the activities within the walls, and 
allowed General al-Walid to take advantage of an operational oppor-
tunity. Operations in a megacity will similarly require insider informa-
tion to overcome the density of the megacity and inform operational 
decisions. 
As with Damascus, insider information proved decisive in the 
siege of Smolensk. Lithuanian forces besieged Russian-controlled 
Smolensk from 1609 to 1611. Lithuanian forces finally broke through 
when an informant, Andrei Dedishin, told Lithuanian forces the loca-
tion of the city wall’s vulnerability.31 Lithuanian forces dug under the 
wall and placed a powder charge underneath the wall to punch a hole 
and provide an avenue for attack. The city fell by the next day following 
the wall’s breach.32 Once again, an insider provided critical informa-
tion to the enemy’s understanding of critical vulnerabilities and played 
a decisive role in ending the siege.  
In Metz, France, during the Franco-Prussian War, Wilhelm Stie-
ber, Otto von Bismark’s head of the Feldgendarmerie, employed an ex-
tensive network of sources.33 Stieber had a source in French marshal 
Patrice de MacMahon’s staff who reported the French plans to relieve 
its forces under siege at Metz.34 Prussian general Helmuth von Moltke 
used the source’s report to outmaneuver the French relief force and 
trap them in the fortress of Sedan, including Emperor Napoleon Bona-
parte III. Not only did the source’s information compel the surrender 
30 Terry Crowdy, The Enemy Within: A History of Spies, Spymasters, and Espionage, Kindle 
edition (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2006), 794–97.
31 Daniel H. Shubin, Tsars and Imposters: Russia’s Time of Troubles (New York: Algora 
Publishing, 2009), 200.
32 Anna FiIipczak-Kocur, “The Regaining of Smolensk in 1611 and Its Defence in 1634 
in the Eyes of Contemporary Lithuanian Prints,” Cross-Cultural Communication 10, no. 3 
(2014): 2. 
33 Crowdy, The Enemy Within, 3,414–17.
34 Crowdy, The Enemy Within.
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of Metz and Sedan, it ended the war by crushing the French Army’s 
ability to resist. 
Deception changes risk gain calculations, often allowing one 
side to persist until reinforcements arrive or convincing a side that 
continued resistance is futile. In 1899, British colonel Robert Baden- 
Powell and a garrison of 1,500 men withstood a siege by 8,000 Boers 
for 217 days at Mafeking, South Africa.35 Colonel Baden-Powell and 
his men employed a variety of deceptive tactics to buy time until re-
inforcements could break the siege.36 For example, Colonel Baden- 
Powell’s men placed dummies on the fortifications to draw fire from 
Boer positions, offering British snipers a chance to attrite the Boer 
force. When Boers grew skeptical of the dummies, the British played 
accordion music as the dummies made their appearance on the for-
tifications.37 Colonel Baden-Powell also cobbled together improvised 
dummy forts, guns, and armored trains to draw enemy fire.38 The Brit-
ish would also “fatten-up” any emissaries sent to consider terms with 
the Boers during the siege to give the appearance that conditions in 
the fort remained tenable for a significant period.39 The colonel also 
arranged Sunday cricket matches to aid the impression that all was 
well within the walls and the British could hold out indefinitely.40 Col-
onel Baden-Powell’s ruses bought sufficient time for British reinforce-
ments to raise the siege. In the case of Mafeking, deception served as 
a force multiplier and allowed the British sufficient time to reinforce 
their position and lift the siege. 
The British success at Mafeking illustrates not only how de-
ception can change the risk gain calculation but also how deception 
conditions the enemy through repeated actions and small changes. 
The British representative’s appearance and attitude conditioned the 
35 Christopher Dawson, “The Celebrated Siege,” Daily Telegraph (Sydney, Australia), 17 
May 2000.
36 John Fox, “Lord Robert Baden-Powell (1857–1941),” Prospects 43, no. 2 (2013): 255, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11125-013-9265-y.
37 Reginald Hargreaves, “For to Deceive,” Marine Corps Gazette 43, no. 1 (January 1959).
38 Dawson, “The Celebrated Siege.”
39 Hargreaves, “For to Deceive.”
40 Dawson, “The Celebrated Siege.”
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Boers with whom he treated to believe that the men within Mafeking’s 
walls had sufficient stores. The cricket matches also supported the 
deception by making the besieged seem more able to resist.
In Detroit during the War of 1812, the British employed “Magrud-
er’s principles” of deception offensively to even the odds of victory. 
Magruder’s principles state that “it is generally easier to induce an 
opponent to maintain a preexisting belief than to present notional 
evidence to change that belief.”41 In Detroit, British major general Sir 
Isaac Brock played upon the fears and beliefs of the American com-
mander, Brigadier General William Hull, that the British force exceed-
ed the American force significantly, coupled with his fear of Native 
Americans. In a letter to Major Thomas Evans, General Brock credited 
Thomas with the idea to clothe the British militia in discarded uniforms 
from the 41st Regiment of regulars. Brock told Thomas he thought the 
ruse doubled the size of his force in the Americans’ eyes. Additionally, 
to increase the apparent size of the British force, Brock ordered that 
soldiers walk through the chow line in a loop such that they surrepti-
tiously dumped the contents of their mess kit in a pot and returned to 
the end of the line.42 Brock received an intercepted letter from General 
Hull indicating his fear of attack from Native Americans to the Amer-
ican secretary of war, William Eustis. Brock used the knowledge of 
Hull’s fear to draft a message to Hull playing on Brock’s alliance with 
Tecumseh and the Shawnee. Brock noted that he would be responsi-
ble for the good conduct of his men; however, he could not control the 
actions of the Native American forces under his command. The letter 
clearly influenced Hull’s decision to surrender Fort Detroit with barely 
a shot fired on 18 August 1812.43 
Used offensively in this case, deception served as a force mul-
tiplier and played an important role in ending the siege swiftly. Brock 
disrupted Hull’s ability to command and control because he thorough-
41 Deception Maxims, 6.
42 Maj Ernest A. Cruikshank, The Documentary History of the Campaign upon the Niagara 
Frontier in the Year 1812, Part 3 (Welland, ON: Lundy’s Lane Historical Society, 1899).
43 Donald R. Hickey, War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2012), 83.
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ly skewed his perception of reality. Rand’s Scott Gerwehr and Russell 
W. Glenn suggest that “deception is used to adversely affect an op-
ponent’s decision-making processes, most often to influence or de-
grade enemy command and control (C2).”44 Gerwehr and Glenn saw 
the effects of deception as applicable even down to the individual en-
emy soldier in a “low intensity urban insurgency.”45 The isolation of the 
American troops defending the walls of the fort in part allowed Brock’s 
deception to work because the defenders could not verify Brock’s 
claims regarding the Shawnee and could not properly assess the size 
of the opposing force. The density of a megacity also will likely make 
deception a tool, which both sides could then use to their advantage.
Tunnels are ancient weapons that remain in the repertoire 
of modern warfare. They provide life support or efficient means of 
employing limited resources to attack enemy forces.46 Historically, 
armies and insurgents have used tunnels to gain advantage over nu-
merically superior opponents. They tend to prolong sieges, as op-
posing forces tend to use tunnels when they have sufficient time and 
expertise to construct them. Although tunnels can prolong conflict, 
they can also end sieges when used as a weapon, such as in the 
siege of Smolensk, where they offered a psychological advantage.47 
Just as the leviathan lurks beneath the sea’s surface, a tunnel can 
deliver an unseen threat to an enemy without warning. At the same 
time, tunnels are symbols of resistance, such as in Gaza. The tunnels 
provided a morale boost to the Palestinians as both a symbol and a 
means of their resistance.48 
In Turin, during the siege of 1706, tunnels extended the ability of 
the city’s Austrian/Savoyard defenders to withstand the French Army 
until reinforcements arrived to lift the siege. Both Turin’s Austrian/Sa-
44 Scott Gerwehr and Russell W. Glenn, The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Oper-
ations (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000), 20. 
45 Gerwehr and Glenn, The Art of Darkness.
46 Arthur Herman, “Notes from the Underground: The Long History of Tunnel Warfare,” 
Foreign Affairs, 26 August 2014. 
47 Herman, “Notes from the Underground.”
48 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Perfume, Viagra, Lions and Fuel: Smuggling Is Gaza’s Growth 
Industry,” Jerusalem Post, 14 November 2008.
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voyard defenders and their French opponents used tunnels to try to 
break the four-month siege. The French, under the command of Gen-
eral Louis Francois Aubusson, duc de la Feuillade, even tried to build 
a trench around the city. By late August 1706, Austrian forces feared 
they would run out of powder and ammunition to sustain the fight and 
knew they had to develop a strategy to break the siege. The Austrian 
commander, Weirich Philip Lorenz, count von Daun, focused Austrian 
efforts on mining and countermining operations as the most efficient 
means of opposing the French with limited resources.49 The Savoyard 
sappers constructed tunnels nearly reaching the French lines. In one 
case, French forces located a tunnel into the city and a Savoyard sap-
per had to blow up the tunnel to prevent their entry into the city but 
lost his life in the process.50 Rather than dueling artillery, the main ef-
fort in the siege of Turin appears to have taken place underground. 
The tunnels did not deal the final blow to the French forces; the sub-
terranean cat and mouse game engaged the French for months until 
the armies of Prince Eugene of Savoy and Victor Amadeus II, Duke of 
Savoy, could relieve the siege.
The battles of Petersburg, Virginia (1864), and Somme, France 
(1916), took place nearly 50 years apart yet followed similar patterns. 
In both cases, the attacking force opposing a well defended, fortified 
position used tunnels to shock their enemies in the hope of breaking a 
stalemate. In the case of Petersburg, Union troops secretly dug a tun-
nel under the Confederate lines, filled the tunnel with barrels of black 
powder, and detonated the powder.51 Unfortunately, due to errors in 
executing the plan for after the explosion, the blast trapped advancing 
Union soldiers in a crater measuring 170 feet long, 60 to 80 feet wide, 
and 30 feet deep.52 Unable to scale the crater walls, Union soldiers be-
came easy marks for the stunned Confederates.53 At Somme, British 
49 Kenneth P. Czech, “Breaking the Siege of Turin,” Military History 14, no. 6 (1998): 42.
50 Czech, “Breaking the Siege of Turin.”
51 Alfred P. James, “The Battle of the Crater,” Journal of the American Military History Foun-
dation 2, no. 1 (Spring 1938), 2–25.
52 Herman, “Notes from the Underground.”
53 Bryce A. Suderow, “The Battle of the Crater: The Civil War’s Worst Massacre,” Civil War 
History 43, no. 3 (1997): 221, https://doi.org/10.1353/cwh.1997.0023. 
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soldiers detonated 450,000 kilograms of explosives underneath Hill 
60 on Messines ridge creating an 800-meter crater.54 The explosion 
killed or entombed 10,000 German soldiers and eventually the British 
took the ridge.55
The Palestinian tunnels at Gaza demonstrate the asymmetric 
use of tunnels in warfare. In 2014, Israel Defense Forces destroyed 31 
military crossings into Israel.56 These sophisticated tunnels 60 feet be-
low the surface contained weapons caches and provided avenues to 
move Hamas fighters, equipment, and kidnap victims. Some tunnels 
were large enough to drive trucks through.57 For more than a decade, 
the tunnels also provided vital support to the inhabitants of Gaza as 
the means for smugglers to move in goods for resale. Smugglers have 
moved everything from food and small household items to cars and 
building materials through the tunnels.58 When Israel cut off fuel deliv-
eries to Gaza in 2008, smugglers even established a pipeline for fuel 
and the price of fuel fell by nearly 50 percent. The longer the siege 
persists, the more sophisticated the tunnels become.59 
Treachery, deception, and tunnels are likely to remain important 
tools in modern sieges, particularly in a megacity. Today’s sieges may 
take place without encircling walls, as in Gaza, but the key principle of 
compelling an enemy to surrender its position remains. In the sieges 
examined, opposing forces tried to use treachery, deception, and tun-
nels to gain an advantage and break a stalemated situation. Sources 
of privileged information regarding the enemy situation and center 
of gravity serve to hasten victory without significant loss to friendly 
forces. Deception changes risk gain calculations and can act as a 
force multiplier in uneven contests. Tunnels can offer sustainment or 
a means of delivering a knockout punch from below to attack enemy 
54 Mark Day, “Miners of Messines,” Weekend Australian, 11 August 2007.
55 Herman, “Notes from the Underground.”
56 Herman, “Notes from the Underground.”
57 Herman, “Notes from the Underground.”
58 Tamer Qarmout and Daniel Béland, “The Politics of International Aid to the Gaza 
Strip,” Journal of Palestine Studies 41, no. 4 (Summer 2012): 34, https://doi.org/10.1525 
/jps.2012.XLI.4.32.
59 Khaled, “Perfume, Viagra, Lions and Fuel.” 
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forces. Tunnels also bring a psychological advantage to the fight. They 
can carry with them the terror of the unknown or act as a symbol of 
resistance. When combating the density of the megacity and the meg-
acity’s complex networks, understanding how treachery, deception, 
and tunnels have contributed to victory in siege warfare will be critical 
to success.
CONCEPT OF OPERATION
With the Pottery Barn Rule in effect, or its Macy’s corollary, it seems 
clear that a military operation aimed at gaining control of a megacity 
or its inhabitants must have a different approach to the problem. Gain-
ing control of a megacity will likely involve depriving certain sectors, 
or even the entire city, of at least some sustainment to compel them 
to conform to the attacking force’s plan. This siege without walls will 
require a new approach, which preserves the megacity and its power 
and can harness that power to achieve victory. The new approach will 
require foreknowledge, deception, and misdirection to change the en-
emy’s reality and bend the enemy to conform to the will of the attack-
ing force without unduly damaging the features making the megacity 
so valuable. 
Sun Tzu stressed the importance of “foreknowledge.”60 Fore-
knowledge gained through intelligence collection is the central 
element in battlespace preparation. It requires using all sources of in-
formation effectively to understand the center of gravity of the enemy 
city. While all forms of intelligence are important, gaining insights from 
human sources within the city with access to key network nodes is the 
most important. Not only can these human sources inform as to how 
the network works, they can also highlight critical vulnerabilities or ex-
ploitable enemy preconceptions and, in some cases, assist in the ex-
ploitation of those vulnerabilities. For example, the right source at the 
public water company could provide information about how to control 
the flow of water to certain sectors remotely. Access to major telecom-
munications companies offers similar benefits. Treachery from within 
60 Sun Tzu said the key to enabling “the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve 
things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.” Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 163.
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leads to foreknowledge for the attacking force and increases the op-
portunity for surprise.
Surprise is frequently an important by-product of deception. Ger-
wehr and Glenn note that surprise attacks can significantly diminish 
the cost of attacking in an urban environment. Their research indicates 
that “surprise changed the ratio of casualties in favor of an attacker 
from 1:1 to 5:1.”61 U.S. Army general William E. DePuy agreed that 
surprise changed the combat calculus, although he disagreed with 
Gerwehr on the magnitude. DePuy assessed that surprise doubled 
combat power for either side. Regardless of the precise magnitude, it 
seems clear that surprise lends an increase to combat power. Dr. Bar-
ton Whaley, a noted scholar in deception from the Naval Postgraduate 
School, observed that of the 68 major battles fought between 1914 
and 1967, combatants increasingly relied on deception to achieve sur-
prise.62 
Foreknowledge can feed a successful deception or influence 
campaign because deception campaigns rely on an accurate under-
standing of the motivations and desires of the deceived. Noted politi-
cal scientist Robert Jervis wrote an essay on misperceptions in which 
he hypothesized that decision makers tend to force new information 
to fit their existing analysis of a given situation.63 Foreknowledge is 
essential to understanding an opponent’s preconceived notions to 
lead an opponent to misperceive the threat and make tactical errors. 
General Brock in the siege of Detroit is a classic example of this tech-
nique. Brock used Hull’s belief about the size of the British forces and 
Hull’s fear of a violent attack from Native Americans to achieve victory. 
Each megacity will differ in terms of what motivates the leadership 
and its inhabitants. However, shaping the beliefs of the inhabitants of 
the megacity at all levels of society to achieve desired outcomes for 
the attacking force seems to be as essential to battlefield success as 
artillery rounds. Some examples of possible ways to lead the enemy 
61 Gerwehr and Glenn, The Art of Darkness, 37.
62 Gerwehr and Glenn, The Art of Darkness.
63 Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics 20, no. 3 (April 1968): 459, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2009777.
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to misperceptions could be using deception to increase the apparent 
size and capability of the attacking force. Deception shaping could 
include planted stories in local news and social media outlets about 
a new capability, which could radically alter the conflict. In addition, 
include news stories about the benevolence of U.S. forces to civilian 
populations, especially those who cooperate with instructions and do 
not pose a threat to U.S. forces. 
Another important use for deception is to misdirect the location 
of your attack. Misdirection is particularly effective when paired with 
an enemy’s preconception.64 The Allies were very successful using 
this tactic at Normandy. Adolf Hitler remained convinced that the Al-
lies planned to invade at Pas-de-Calais. The Allies had foreknowledge 
based on Ultra intercepts of Hilter’s conviction and used it to craft the 
Allied deception plan associated with Operation Overlord.65 Data from 
a 1980 study completed for the Central Intelligence Agency’s Office 
of Research and Development indicated that deceptions that played 
to enemy perceptions succeeded more frequently than those that did 
not.66 An attacking force could use control over the network nodes, 
particularly communications, to create the appearance of an impend-
ing attack far away from the intended target. The operational plan 
should include a psychological campaign to undermine the enemy’s 
will to fight. The psychological campaign could incorporate the de-
ception plan, but it could simply use information gained from sources 
to attack the enemy’s morale.
As seen in the siege at Gaza, tunnels have served as a lifeline for 
the inhabitants. They became both symbols of resistance as well as a 
means to circumvent the blockade. Given how many megacities have 
miles of underground tunnels already constructed to accommodate 
public transportation, denying the enemy the use of these tunnels is 
critical lest the tunnels protract the siege. A ruse suggesting that a 
contagion dwells in the tunnels or that the attacking force has rigged 
the tunnels with explosives and traps would keep people voluntarily 
64 Deception Maxims, 7.
65 Deception Maxims, 6.
66 Deception Maxims, 9.
CHAPTER NINE
232
out of the tunnels. The ruse could serve as a force multiplier so that 
U.S. forces would be needed to guard the tunnel access points. The 
ruse is not likely to be durable as a stand-alone effort. The ruse has 
a long military tradition because, according to Vietnam veteran Army 
lieutenant colonel Richard E. Mack, “the commander who can suc-
cessfully outwit the enemy doesn’t need fire superiority, nor neces-
sarily the advantage of a larger force.”67 In the age of social media, it 
becomes easy for residents to spread truth about situations on the 
ground and therefore the ruse execution must be thorough and nest-
ed within a larger plan to gain control swiftly. 
CONCLUSION
The ultimate goal should be, as Sun Tzu recommends, to win without 
fighting.68 The megacities worldwide continue to grow and drive pros-
perity; however, megacities are not without their weaknesses. Similar 
to ancient walled cities, megacities seem particularly sensitive to the 
continuous flow of food, water, and supplies from outside the area. 
The case study on sieges shows how opposing forces used treachery, 
deception, and tunnels to gain an advantage in sieges. The case study 
also demonstrated that foreknowledge gained through the treachery 
of an insider and a deception represents an excellent means for end-
ing sieges to the deceiver’s advantage. Tunnels present a mixed bag. 
When forces on either side used tunnels to breach the walls, the tun-
nels succeeded most often when combined with deception or treach-
ery. Tunnels also served as symbols of resistance and often prolonged 
conflict. Therefore, in the interest of taking a megacity with numerous 
subterranean tunnels, it seems best to render the tunnels useless to 
the opposing side. Foreknowledge, deception, and treachery will at-
tack the enemy’s power and sap his will to resist. Capitulation with 
minimal destruction of the megacity is vital to prevent a massive hu-
manitarian assistance problem and to preserve the megacity’s eco-
nomic power. Keeping the Pottery Barn Rule in mind, foreknowledge 
67 Richard E. Mack, “A Case for the Ruse,” Marine Corps Gazette 52, no. 4 (April 1968): 
24–27.
68 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 109.
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will highlight ways to apply force most efficiently to achieve victory. At 
the same time, foreknowledge could reveal vulnerability in the ene-
my’s perceptions of the situation, which could allow the use of a ruse 
or a misdirecting deception. Foreknowledge is the key to unlocking 
the siege and bringing a victory without fighting.
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C H A P T E R T E N
Symbiotic Warfare
Resource Competition and Conflict
Major Christina L. Manning, U.S. Air Force
In a country dominated by significant population density 
and resource scarcity, China is looking at a future of dras-
tic competition for services and resources most take for 
granted. For example, China holds 7 percent of the world’s 
fresh water but currently sustains 20 percent of the human 
population. China also urbanizes at a much faster rate, 
pushing toward 250 million more urban residents in the 
next decade, who will be competing with the agricultural 
and industrial sectors for water. In the face of a shrinking 
resource base and increasing pollution, how does a meg-
acity sustain all of that? But, more important, how would the 
population react should conflict break out in the middle of 
these resource-constrained megacities?
CONSTRAINT PERPETUATES VIOLENCE
Introduction
Most research on future war analyzes conflict at the macro level using 
empirical evidence of recent conflicts to suggest that future war will 
continue between states against nonstate actors.1 While macro-level 
1 Monika Heupel and Bernhard Zangl, “On the Transformation of Warfare: A Plausibility 
Probe of the New War Thesis,” Journal of International Relations and Development 13, 
no. 1 (2010): 26–58, https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2009.31.
CHAPTER TEN
235
analysis may be useful in trending patterns of conflict over time, the 
research fails to address the obvious and overwhelming demographic 
trends that will change the landscape of future battlefields. 
Megacities and their congested environments present new 
challenges for the military. Densely populated and congested envi-
ronments rely on robust resource allocation networks and distribution 
pathways in order to meet the resource demands of the megacity pop-
ulation. Thus, military planners cannot ignore the delicate balance that 
exists between the population and resources within a megacity. Only 
through a micro-analytical approach can military and civilian planners 
adequately determine intervention points to neutralize external pre-
dation threats. Thus, whether future threats manifest themselves by 
nonstate or state actors becomes entirely irrelevant, as the battlefield 
on which actors will conduct operations will be the megacity.
Problem/Puzzle
While most research proposes concepts and frameworks that char-
acterize the social and environmental aspects of cities, this literature 
review explores the marriage between ecology and sociology to de-
scribe the interdependencies that exist between city populations and 
their urban ecosystems.2 Researching how populations behave when 
adversaries (state or nonstate actors who disrupt a community’s eco-
system to exploit resources) appear affords military planners the ability 
to identify and exploit intervention points for tactical or strategic gain. 
Literature Review
According to William R. Catton Jr., “natural systems have limits of 
tolerance that produce an ensemble of interacting constraints on 
human action.”3 In his essay, Catton argues that collective behavior 
theory, when coupled with an understanding of ecosystems, explains 
how people and societies respond (behave) when faced with urban 
2 William R. Catton Jr., “Probable Collective Responses to Ecological Scarcity: How Vi-
olent?,” Sociological Perspectives 27, no. 1 (January 1984): 3, https://doi.org/10.2307 
/1389234. See also David J. Kilcullen, “The City as a System: Future Conflict and Urban 
Resilience,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 36, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 19–39.
3 Catton, “Probable Collective Responses to Ecological Scarcity,” 3.
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resource deficits. For Catton, the potential for conflict increases in 
conjunction with a state’s increase in the use of legal governance as 
a means to regulate competitive consumption of natural resources. 
Thus, scarcity of resources will drive individuals and entire societies 
(beyond states) to engage in networked exchanges as a method of 
adapting to anticipated competitive encounters.4 According to Cat-
ton, as urbanization increases the demands on natural resources, ur-
ban societies will confront an eventual scarcity of resources derived 
from indispensable biological systems (e.g., forests, cropland, grazing 
lands, and fisheries).5 Acting collectively, states and individuals within 
a society will seek to justify their actions to control and harvest re-
sources. Such preemptive aggression manifests itself as competition 
grows because of resource capacity deficits. 
Violence may arise at the state or city level if panic occurs. For 
clarification, social science defines panic as “the aggregation of how 
groups behave when demoralization occurs due to events departing 
radically from culturally instilled expectations.”6 Panic ensues due to 
either perceived or actual resource deficiencies.7 If panic occurs, indi-
vidual actions cease to be concerned with group interests and individ-
uals become preoccupied with self-preservation.8 The normal mode 
of panic manifests itself in the form of crowds, which occur when indi-
viduals congregate collectively to express individual interests.
Depending on which social science theory one subscribes to, 
crowds behave either rationally or irrationally. For the sake of argu-
ment, sociologist Neil J. Smelser’s “value-added process” theory of 
collective behavior promotes a sound argument that not all crowds 
act irrationally.9 According to Smelser, and complemented by Cat-
ton, crowds (even rational crowds) may resort to violence due to an 
4 Catton, “Probable Collective Responses to Ecological Scarcity,” 7. See also William H. 
McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
5 Catton, “Probable Collective Responses to Ecological Scarcity,” 3.
6 Catton, “Probable Collective Responses to Ecological Scarcity,” 8.
7 Catton, “Probable Collective Responses to Ecological Scarcity,” 8.
8 Catton, “Probable Collective Responses to Ecological Scarcity,” 8.
9 Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1965).
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increase in panic that manifests when strain increases. Strain, in an 
urban setting, arises when commercial and governance mechanisms 
do not aggregate enough resources to sufficiently relieve strain. Thus, 
strain, whether actual or perceived, can lead to violence if the strain 
on a particular system (i.e., resource system) is not relieved. Accord-
ing to Smelser, and promoted by Catton, a containing entity can only 
relieve panic by ensuring routes of escape from threat are identified, 
left completely open, or are perceived to remain open to the public. 
A perceived or actual strain on an urban ecosystem will cause panic, 
which may manifest violence if a controlling entity or governance sys-
tem cannot alleviate or contain the strain on resources. In a megacity, 
strain is typically the result of resource scarcity. In an urban context, 
scarcity includes strains on the commodities essential to daily living 
(e.g., money, groceries, and fuel).10 Therefore, strain on resources from 
an actual or perceived threat may lead a population to resort to vi-
olence as a matter of self-preservation. Violence will disrupt the re-
source allocation networks and distribution pathways controlled by 
the city and state. If the networks and pathways become vulnerable to 
attack, primary and opportunistic predation of resources may occur. 
Predation of resources in a densely populated environment may 
increase the propensity of violence against civilians. The increase in 
civilian violence may continue. For example, social scientists, such 
as Monika Heupel and Bernhard Zangl, offer macro-level analysis of 
how warring parties have increasingly propagated violence against 
civilians during the last few decades.11 Heupel and Zangl explore the 
hypothesis that fragmentation of warring parties and the economiza-
tion of their war motives facilitate the application of brutal violence 
against civilians.12 As such, new wars are different from old wars in 
that agglomerated populations act as warring parties and wage wars 
against states. In contrast, old wars are characterized by a state wag-
ing war against another state—even if done by proxy. Still seeking an 
overall political objective, Heupel and Zangl categorize agglomerated 
10 Catton, “Probable Collective Responses to Ecological Scarcity,” 8.
11 Heupel and Zangl, “On the Transformation of Warfare,” 26–58.
12 Heupel and Zangl, “On the Transformation of Warfare,” 26–58.
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populations by their economy, motives, and strategy. Their research 
uses case studies from Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Somalia, and 
Sierra Leone to characterize how warring parties conduct violence. 
Heupel and Zangl’s conclusions suggest that ideological and identity- 
based motives of warring parties generally did not disappear but in-
creasingly merged with economic motives. Furthermore, their study 
reveals a troubling trend. Drawn from empirical and case study evi-
dence using several of the aforementioned case studies, agglomer-
ated populations operating in dense environments have increasingly 
relied on strategies that entail brutal violence against civilians. 
Drawing parallels between densely populated societies and 
megacities makes for an easy transition. Under the megacity sce-
nario, warring parties would commit an intentional disruption of the 
ecosystem to acquire or control resources and related commodities. 
Regardless of their motives or claims of legitimacy, warring parties in 
a megacity will operate within the population in an effort to disrupt the 
balance of the ecosystem and to manipulate the resource allocation 
networks and distribution pathways that supply a city. Based on this 
analysis, the term predation refers to an act committed by agglomer-
ated populations (a.k.a. predators), which seek to control or exploit a 
community’s resources.
In a predation scenario, predators will increase violence targeted 
at civilians. Referring back to the aforementioned empirical study, the 
propensity toward civilian violence occurs for three reasons. First, ag-
glomerated populations that either maintain criminal war economies 
or heavily rely on other criminals are more likely to employ brutal war-
fare strategies because these activities (e.g., looting and blackmailing) 
normally entail violence against the local population.13 Second, with 
the shift toward economic (resource) motives, agglomerated popula-
tions will no longer fight for the interests of the local population, low-
ering the agglomerated population’s inhibitions to commit violence. 
Third, as an agglomerated population loses the ability to control in-
dividual factions, brutal violence against the local population is likely 
13 For a thorough discussion of war economies and shadow economy networks, see 
Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper, with Jonathan Goodhand, War Economies in a Regional 
Context: Challenges of Transformation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004). 
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caused by the fragmentation of the agglomeration population itself.14 
Other scenarios that threaten urban ecosystems beyond preda-
tion require analysis and mention. For example, natural disasters ellicit 
a different social network response when a community is threatened. 
Interestingly, research illustrates that people and nations that expe-
rience imposed (intentionally manipulated) resource constraints are 
likely to react as a “disaster community.”15 For example, in times of 
resource instability caused by natural disasters, initial behaviors can 
be characterized by reacting in a brief stage of “immobility,” where 
people “under react to the event, failing to comprehend its magni-
tude” followed by an emphasis of “activity for activity’s own sake.”16 In 
such a situation, cities, communities, groups, and nations that suffer 
consequences resulting from the natural disaster may become easy 
targets for outside predators seeking to exploit resources.17 Wheth-
er through direct predation or caused by natural disaster, ecosystem 
analysis when coupled with collective behavior theories affords civil 
and military planners the ability to predict behaviors of megacity pop-
ulations when an internal or external threat disrupts a community’s 
access to resources. 
Understanding predation in a megacity context requires military 
and civilian planners to understand the megacity conflict environment 
that, according to David Kilcullen, is the result of three main drivers: 
urbanization, littoralization, and connectedness. Kilcullen describes 
connectedness by characterizing coastal cities as networked, con-
nected, and linked.18 Using demographics and incidents in Somalia to 
reinforce his claims, Kilcullen suggests that networks are neither licit 
14 Heupel and Zangl, “On the Transformation of Warfare,” 34.
15 For a detailed discussion of disaster communities and the behavior of social networks 
established by communities in response to natural (and imposed) disasters, see Alan 
Kirschenbaum, “Generic Sources of Disaster Communities: A Social Network Approach,” 
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 24, no. 10/11, (2004): 95–129, https://
doi.org/10.1108/01443330410791073.
16 Catton, “Probable Collective Responses to Ecological Scarcity,” 14.
17 For further discussion, see Catton, “Probable Collective Responses to Ecological Scar-
city,” 14.
18 According to Kilcullen, urbanization is clustered in littoral (coastal) areas. “Coastal cities 
are networked internally, connected to the rural hinterland, and linked with ethnic diaspo-
ra populations and global networks.” Kilcullen, “The City as a System,” 19–39.
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nor illicit and that “people self-organize in networks and engage in a 
complex hybrid of illicit and licit behavior that rides the connected-
ness of coastal urban areas.”19 
Zoning in on connectedness, Kilcullen’s essay brings up several 
interesting points. First, he offers a conceptual framework model to vi-
sualize the interdependencies of and connectedness between a city’s 
periurban areas and key transportation nodes. In his concept, Kilcul-
len defines periurban areas as “the slums and townships around the 
margins of growing cities that account for a high proportion of new 
immigrants from the countryside.”20 Kilcullen also defines transporta-
tion nodes as “airports, intermodal logistics hubs, container terminals, 
free trade zones, and seaports.”21 Transportation nodes are usually 
located in periurban areas. Transportation network workers also live 
in periurban areas. Furthermore, periurban areas experience weaker 
governance; increased crime, poverty, and unemployment; and often 
suffer greater shortages of food, fuel, electricity, and water.22 Fusing 
Kilcullen’s argument with Catton, Smelser, Huepel, and Zangl’s theo-
ries, conflict could spark violence if panic or resource capacity deficits 
grow or predators exploit transportation nodes.23 
Categorizing future threats, Kilcullen comes to the same conclu-
sion as Catton and Smelser, suggesting that future predation threats 
will manifest from both irregular actors and methods. The gravest 
future threats will come from irregular actors (agglomerated popula-
tions) who avoid direct confrontation with military and police forces. 
These nonstate armed groups (predators) will employ stealth, operate 
19 Kilcullen, “The City as a System,” 25.
20 Kilcullen, “The City as a System,” 24.
21 Kilcullen, “The City as a System,” 24.
22 Kilcullen, “The City as a System,” 28.
23 For an additional definition of nodes beyond tangible assets, see Jacob Apkarian et al., 
“Hierarchy in Mixed Relation Networks: Warfare Advantage and Resource Distribution in 
Simulated World-Systems,” Journal of Social Structure 14, no. 1 (2013): 1–17. The article 
provides a mathematical framework for validating the theory that societal evolution is 
really coevolution and that the exigencies that confront a single society will push that 
society to adapt to the problems it faces. Therefore, low power actors benefit by being 
excluded from coercive relations, while high power actors inevitably suffer. Furthermore, 
regardless of whether an actor is high or low power, exclusion from exchange is always 
detrimental. 
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in small teams, and combine tactical initiative with local knowledge.24 
In this type of scenario, the population becomes the maneuver space.
Furthermore, manipulation of networks (social, transportation, 
or economic) will be the source of hybrid threats.25 While all of these 
threats require some level of manipulation of activities within a meg-
acity, governments (e.g., the United States) must clarify legal distinc-
tions between warfare and law enforcement to promote enhanced 
cooperation. Kilcullen suggests capabilities that combine policing, 
administration, and emergency services with sufficient military ca-
pability to deal with well-armed nonstate adversaries are likely to be 
more effective than military or constabulary efforts alone.26 Of note, 
Kilcullen also claims networks will be “nested” in the complex urban 
littoral environment, avoiding detection “by remaining beneath the 
clutter of urban development and overpopulation.”27 Thus, in addition 
to redefining roles and relationships of the military and constabulary, 
the military must adopt an operating concept that accounts for the 
symbiotic nature of the megacity population in relation to its resourc-
es. Only by holistic analysis can military and civilian planners deter-
mine intervention points available to assist a community effort aimed 
at neutralizing predation. 
Kilcullen proposes three types of intervention points in his es-
say. First, he identifies and classifies supply-side interventions as 
those that ameliorate drivers of rabid urbanization and ease pressure 
on infrastructure. Second, he suggests demand-side interventions, 
or those that improve a city’s resiliency to cope with pressures on 
24 Kilcullen, “The City as a System,” 29. Kilcullen suggests using Mumbai as a case study 
to analyze the networks and study irregular actors and their methods. China, where more 
than 51 percent is urbanized, also makes a good case study to understand how greater 
connectedness affords civilian populations greater access to advanced technologies, en-
hancing the civilian population’s military potential. 
25 Kilcullen, “The City as a System,” 19–39.
26 Kilcullen, “The City as a System,” 32.
27 Kilcullen, “The City as a System,” 33. Note that the recent example of operations in Au-
gust 2009 to extradite Christopher Coke, Jamaica’s former prime minister, to the United 
States exemplifies how nested networks complicate operations in a megacity environ-
ment. Overall, the operation led to 500 arrests and 73 lives lost in the efforts to extract a 
single crime boss from one urbanized, networked, and littoral environment. For more on 
this event, see Mattathias Schwartz, “Jamaica’s Former P.M. Opens Up about Coke Arrest 
and Extradition,” New Yorker, 3 August 2012.
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its systems. Third, he categorizes framing-system interventions, or 
those that alter the context of how the city develops, changing its in-
teraction with national and transnational systems.28 Operations and 
efforts targeted toward intervention points provide planners with a 
proactive versus reactive response. This method supports  Catton’s 
claims and other social science research that illustrates how a 
resource-controlling entity can manipulate a population’s behavior 
by controlling resource-allocation networks or distribution pathways. 
For military planners, intervention points are synonymous with re-
sources that are critical vulnerabilities. As in nature, predation and the 
predation process are synonymous with invasion processes. Military 
planners must map the invasion process to determine resource-inter-
vention points to assist communities in neutralizing predation.
Conclusion
Ecology and sociology research suggest that violence will erupt when 
resource constraints motivate a collective population (e.g., group, 
crowd, or warring party) to mobilize to manipulate control of networks 
directly related to resource allocation and distribution. Understand-
ing how populations behave when internal or external threats disturb 
their ecosystems (intentionally or unintentionally) affords planners 
the ability to identify critical vulnerabilities in resource-allocation net-
works and distribution pathways. These critical vulnerabilities serve 
as intervention points for military planners to use when attempting to 
neutralize a resource-predation threat.
Redefined Problem Statement
Whether military planners generate operations to quell violence or 
strive to prevent it, planners must identify vulnerabilities in resource- 
allocation networks and distribution pathways to ensure densely 
populated and congested communities have access to essential re-
sources. Observing the invasion process via the use of agent-based 
modeling allows planners to draw conclusions about predation and 
the invasion process as it naturally occurs.
28 Kilcullen, “The City as a System,” 37.
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WHEN PREDATORS BECOME PREY: 
OBSERVING CHARACTERISTICS 
OF INVASION
The purpose of this case study is to use invasion biology agent-based 
models to observe the effects invasive species have on a community’s 
(ecosystem) resources, infrastructure, and native population. Doing 
so allows researchers to draw parallels between biology and military 
science to conceptualize how the invasion of a megacity might oc-
cur. Invasion biology, which explores densely populated, congested 
environments, affords researchers numerous examples of how inva-
sion affects a community.29 Whether caused by invasive pathogens or 
intraspecific predation, invasion biology affords researchers the ability 
to study how populations in congested environments react to preda-
tors in the hope that a pattern of the invasion process will reveal itself. 
Building on the previously conducted literature review, which 
concluded that megacity warfare will occur due to a competition for 
limited resources, this case study uses the biological understanding 
of intraspecific competition (competition for resources between the 
same species) to draw conclusions about how adventive species 
(predators) may invade a megacity for the control or manipulation of 
resources. This case study then summarizes the observations drawn 
from both empirical studies of invasion ecology as well as agent-
based modeling to illustrate how a community (a function of native 
population and habitat) responds to an invasion. Such conclusions 
may prove useful to military planners seeking to identify intervention 
points to assist a community in neutralizing predation threats.
Introduction to Empirical Study Review
Invasion biology expands beyond the study of the natural distribution 
patterns of living organisms to examine how nonnative (adventive) 
species are introduced, spread, and interact with native species in an 
29 For further justification of modeling ecological systems, see S. T. A. Pickett et al., “Ur-
ban Ecological Systems: Linking Terrestrial Ecological, Physical, and Socioeconomic 
Components of Metropolitan Areas,” Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, no. 32 
(2001): 127–57, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ecolsys.32.081501.114012.
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ecosystem.30 In the study of invasion biology, most adventive organ-
isms are introduced to a receiving ecosystem as a result of human 
action.31 Furthermore, the native population of an ecosystem histor-
ically maintains a competitive advantage over ecosystem resources, 
resulting in the failure of an adventive species to establish occupan-
cy.32 The success of an invasive species is directly dependent on the 
ability of the native population (community) to control resources or 
prevent the adventive species from acquiring resources. Translating 
this into a megacity concept, this case study affords researchers the 
ability to test the hypothesis that the ability of the native population 
(community) to retain access to resources and deny those resources 
to predators directly correlates to a megacity community’s ability to 
resist invasion from agglomerated populations (predators) that seek 
to exploit resources. 
General Observations of Invasion Behavior
Biology affords numerous examples of why invasion, or the ability of 
predators to extort resources, succeeds or fails.33 Scientists have prov-
en that the vulnerability of a community’s ecosystem is more crucial 
in determining whether invasion succeeds or fails than the biological 
characteristics of the predators themselves.34 For example, studies 
illustrate that geographically and historically isolated environments 
contain a low diversity of native species, exhibit high levels of natural 
disturbance or human activities, and illustrate an absence of coad-
apted enemies (e.g., competitors, predators, parasites, and disease), 
which makes them more susceptible to invasion.35 
Ironically, the vulnerability of the adventive organism in relation 
to the ecosystem’s native population explains why most invasions fail. 
30 Jannike Falk-Peterson et al., “On the Numerous Concepts in Invasion Biology,” Biological 
Invasions 8, no. 6 (September 2006): 1,409, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10530-005-0710-6.
31 Falk-Peterson et al., “On the Numerous Concepts in Invasion Biology,” 1,411.
32 Thomas E. Miller et al., “Effect of Community Structure on Invasion Success and Rate,” 
Ecology 83, no. 4 (2002): 898, https://doi.org/10.2307/3071899.
33 For the analysis and summary of more than 45 conducted studies, see Dov F. Sax and 
James H. Brown, “The Paradox of Invasion,” Global Ecology and Biogeography 9, no. 5 
(2000): 363–71, https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2699.2000.00217.x.
34 Miller et al., “Effect of Community Structure on Invasion Success and Rate,” 898.
35 Sax and Brown, “The Paradox of Invasion,” 363.
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For example, “established species with a substantial geographical 
range are sustained in part by the positive feedback effects of dis-
persal on local population dynamics.”36 Unless the local population 
permits an adventive organism (predator) to disperse, the adventive 
species is subject to extinction.37 As with islands, which are the most 
vulnerable ecosystem to invasion, an adventive, invasive species will 
“exploit the entire range of resources and habitats.”38 For invasion to 
be successful, an adaptive, invasive species must determine its capac-
ity to exploit a particular resource against the spectrum of resources 
obtainable in the new habitat.39
Most observation and theoretical studies regarding the process 
of invasion emphasize the traits of the invaded community or habitat 
versus focusing on traits of the invasive species, with good reason.40 
An invasive, adventive organism is only successful if it can “displace 
the native species or use empty or underused niches to establish oc-
cupancy.”41 Resource availability (ability to control or gain access to re-
sources) is the main limiting factor in the ability of a predator to invade. 
In a megacity scenario—as illustrated by invasion pathology, microbi-
ology, and ecology—invaders target both vulnerable populations and 
pathways. Where the local population and resources are most vulner-
able is where invasion is likely to occur.42
Scientists also have studied the effects of resource levels on in-
vasion. Studies conducted by scientists, such as I. C. Burke, J. P. Grime, 
and L. F. Hueneke, illustrate that as the native population’s dependence 
on resources increases, the threat of successful predation actually 
36 Sax and Brown, “The Paradox of Invasion,” 365.
37 Sax and Brown, “The Paradox of Invasion,” 364.
38 Sax and Brown, “The Paradox of Invasion,” 367.
39 Sax and Brown, “The Paradox of Invasion,” 366–67.
40 Miller et al., “Effect of Community Structure on Invasion Success and Rate.” 898.
41 Miller et al., “Effect of Community Structure on Invasion Success and Rate,” 898.
42 James H. Brown, “On the Relationship between Abundance and Distribution of Spe-
cies,” American Naturalist 124, no. 2 (1984): 255–79.
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decreases.43 Notably, a community’s codependency on and proximi-
ty to resources significantly impeded an adventive species’ ability to 
invade.44 In a megacity with a high density of population and a high 
codependence of resources, the determining factor for a predator’s 
success relies on the predator’s ability to control and desegregate 
the population from resources. Therefore, it is more advantageous to 
explore a community’s vulnerabilities in resource-allocation networks 
and distribution pathways than to analyze the characteristics of a 
predator or to target the predators. 
Interestingly, research has shown that natural or introduced (ma-
nipulated) predators have the potential to serve as a deterrent against 
an invading species. For example, one study proved that lizard pred-
ators impeded the establishment of spiders on islands and thereby 
deterred an adventive, invasive species from acquiring the resources 
necessary to establish a habitat.45 In this study, the invasive species 
(predator) became the prey and the probability of invasion success 
was limited.46 Translating this to a megacity concept, a third party or 
introduced natural enemy of the predator may prove successful if the 
local population embraces the third party and the introduction of the 
third party does not result in disruptive effects on the megacity’s natu-
ral functioning (access to resources). 
Figure 10.1 illustrates the differences between natural and in-
troduced predators into an ecosystem. Note that this case study is 
limited to exploring intraspecific competition between natural and 
introduced predators that migrate to a habitat. This study does not 
attempt to analyze secondary, opportunistic predators that may come 
from within or introduce themselves to a habitat to capitalize on an 
adventive species invasion already underway.
43 Miller et al., “Effect of Community Structure on Invasion Success and Rate,” 899. See 
also, Charles S. Elton, The Ecology of Invasions by Animals and Plants (London: Methuen, 
1958); and Ted J. Case, “Invasion Resistance Arises in Strongly Interacting Species-Rich 
Model Competition Communities,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 87, 
no. 24 (1990): 9,610–14, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.87.24.9610.
44 Case, “Invasion Resistance Arises in Strongly Interacting Species-Rich Model Compe-
tition Communities,” 9,610–14.
45 Miller et al., “Effect of Community Structure on Invasion Success and Rate,” 899.
46 Miller et al., “Effect of Community Structure on Invasion Success and Rate,” 899.
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Introducing more variables into invasion research, Thomas E. 
Miller et al. discovered that a variety of factors (migration, predation, 
and resource availability) influenced invasion capability of similar pro-
tozoans.47 They manipulated the resources available, accounted for 
the natural predators within a given ecosystem in relation to the in-
vasive species, and introduced additional nonnative predators to the 
ecosystem.48 Their results validated the hypothesis that the probability 
of successful invasion is dependent on an ecosystem’s resource avail-
ability, species interactions, ease of invasive species dispersal, and the 
invasive species’ ability to react in the new habitat when third parties 
are introduced to counter the predation threat.49 Drawing on parallels 
for a megacity scenario, the probability of successful invasion by ex-
ternal predation correlates directly with a megacity’s ability to provide 
resource control, target invaders through the use of native predators 
(e.g., law enforcement), as well as use introduced, welcomed preda-
tors (e.g., third party intervention) to limit predator dispersal.
47 Miller et al., “Effect of Community Structure on Invasion Success and Rate,” 899.
48 Miller et al., “Effect of Community Structure on Invasion Success and Rate,” 899.
49 Miller et al., “Effect of Community Structure on Invasion Success and Rate,” 904.
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Figure 10.1 Intraspecific competition with opportunity and risk.
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Predator/Prey Population and Models
If researchers regard the megacity as a complex ecosystem and con-
clude that this ecosystem is susceptible to invasion by adaptive pred-
ators that possess the capacity to exploit resources, then researchers 
can further explore predator/prey interactions. By modifying both pred-
ator and prey variables and coefficients using NetLogo software and 
applications, researchers can model predator/prey interactions with 
multiple variables. Predator/prey models, such as the Lotka-Volterra 
model of predator/prey interaction (logistics growth equation), allow 
biologists to analyze how two interacting populations either grow or 
decline over time in the same habitat.50 In most predator/prey models, 
researchers observe a native population in a given habitat and then 
introduce a natural predator of that population to observe effects. Re-
searchers commonly use a sheep (prey) versus wolf (predator) model 
to study predator/prey interactions. Using NetLogo, researchers ma-
nipulate the population of both predator and prey as well as observe 
the effects of predation when the amount of resources (grass) is in-
creased and decreased. 
One notable study extrapolated data from the wolf/sheep pred-
ator/prey model to foster a better understanding of guerrilla warfare. 
Specifically, Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito analyzed 
intraspecific competition of predators by adapting the Lotka-Volterra 
logistics growth model.51 By using a system of differential equations 
to account for population variables—the number of predators “x” at 
time “t,” the number of natural predators to combat “x” at time “t,” and 
the size of the prey population controlled by “x” at time “t”—they effec-
tively adapted the predator/prey model into a guerrilla warfare model. 
In their study, they reassigned some of the native sheep populations 
to assume the role of a predator competitor against the wolf predator. 
Additionally, they set up a control that neither the reassigned sheep 
(predator population) nor wolf (secondary, invasive predator) would 
“feed” directly on the other but would grow in relation to its own popu-
50 Alfred J. Lotka, Elements of Mathematical Biology (New York: Dover Publications, 1956).
51 Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, “A Predator-Prey Model of Guerrilla War-
fare,” Synthese 76, no. 2 (August 1998): 235–44, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869590.
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lation. In their model, they attributed fluctuations in wolf (invasive pred-
ator) populations to both manipulated recruitment and loss rates.52 
The model effectively illustrated that the ratio of soldiers to guer-
rilla forces as criterion for controlling predation success was flawed.53 
According to results, the ratio of natural predators (predator sheep) to 
the native sheep (prey) population controlled by the wolves (invasive 
predators) must be higher than a certain value. This implied that the 
targeted variable for manipulation was not the population of the in-
vaders or the natural predators designed to target the invaders, but 
that of the native population.54 The ability of the predators (guerrilla 
forces) to segregate the population from resources and limit soldiers’ 
ability to secure resources for the population proved instrumental to 
the guerrilla forces’ success. Ultimately, their study illustrated the im-
portant role both the native population and resource access plays in 
predation. 
Using NetLogo to observe the dependency of resources as a 
variable of predator/prey populations, this researcher extrapolated 
the predator/prey wolf/sheep model to observe how those interac-
tions would take place in a resource-constrained environment.55 In 
this model, the population of both predator and prey fluctuated dra-
matically in proportion to the amount of grass available for sheep con-
sumption. Under stable conditions within the ecosystem, predator/
prey populations fluctuated at a predictable rate; however, the intro-
duction of resource depletion (e.g., burning the grass in the model) 
resulted in a rapid growth of predator to prey populations. Observing 
interactions, this researcher concluded that increased competition for 
resources between the predator and prey populations directly influ-
enced the ability of the predator to disperse and increase its popula-
tion size. Translating this to a megacity scenario, the research proves 
that a native population’s drive to maintain control over resources di-
rectly limits the ability of predators to successfully invade.
52 Intriligator and Brito, “A Predator-Prey Model of Guerrilla Warfare.” 
53 Intriligator and Brito, “A Predator-Prey Model of Guerrilla Warfare.” 
54 Intriligator and Brito, “A Predator-Prey Model of Guerrilla Warfare.” 
55 U. Wilensky, “Wolf Sheep Predation,” Center for Connected Learning and Computer 
Based Modeling, Northwestern University, 1997.
CHAPTER TEN
250
To observe the behavior of predator/prey ecosystems when 
secondary (third party) predators introduce themselves into an eco-
system, this researcher explored a different NetLogo model.56 In this 
study, birds (predator) and bugs (native population) wander randomly 
around a landscape. Each step costs both species energy and both 
birds and bugs must consume resources (bugs must eat grass and 
birds must eat bugs and other introduced invaders) to replenish their 
energy. Grass grows at a fixed rate, and when eaten, this researcher 
deducted a fixed amount of resources from the resource patch. This 
researcher introduced mice (secondary predators) as invasive species 
to represent indirect competitors of the bugs. This researcher also in-
troduced other disruptions, such as simulating a disease to remove 
a portion of the bug population or burning down grass to remove the 
food source for bugs and invasive species. Overall, this researcher ob-
served the natural population and the third-party predators were suc-
cessful in neutralizing the invasive threat of the unwanted predators as 
long as the third-party predators did not disrupt resources necessary 
for the native population. The conclusions derived from this modeling 
event support general, empirical observations as well as other pred-
ator/prey and intraspecific competition results previously mentioned.
 A summary of the conclusions drawn from previous research, as 
well as this researcher’s own studies, regarding both predation and 
invasion include:
 • The ability of the native population (community) to control 
resources directly correlates to the megacity’s ability to re-
sist invasion by an adventive species (predator). 
 • Environments that are geographically and historically iso-
lated, contain a low diversity of native species, exhibit high 
levels of natural disturbance or human activities, and illus-
trate an absence of coadapted enemies (i.e., competitors, 
predators, parasites, and disease) are more susceptible to 
invasion.
 • Invaders target both vulnerable populations and pathways. 
56 M. Novak and U. Wilensky, “Bug Hunt Predators and Invasive Species,” Center for Con-
nected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling, Northwestern University, 2011.
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Where the local population and resources are most vulner-
able is where invasion is likely to occur.
 • It is more advantageous to explore a community’s vulnera-
bilities than to analyze the characteristics of the predators. 
 • A third party or introduced natural predator to counter an 
invasive species may prove successful if the host commu-
nity embraces the third party. 
 • The probability of successful invasion by external preda-
tors correlates directly with the megacity’s ability to pro-
vide resource control; target invaders by the use of native 
predators (law enforcement); as well as use introduced, 
welcomed predators (third-party intervention) to limit pred-
ator dispersal.
 • An opposing force should consider targeting and vying for 
control over the natural population versus seeking to cap-
ture or destroy invasive predators. 
 • The ability of the native population to maintain control over 
resources is directly dependent on the ability to mitigate 
the dispersal of predators.
Interdependency of Three Key Variables 
All three models suggest a direct relationship between the ecosys-
tem resources (proximity dependent), prey populations, and predator 
populations. Manipulating one variable proves to have dramatic con-
sequences on the others. Therefore, researchers must take a holistic 
approach to understanding invasion. 
When analyzing invasion, researchers must consider all three 
components: the predator, native population, and resources as de-
pendent variables. The native population and resources, as well as the 
infrastructure essential to ensure the delivery of resources, combine 
to form a community. Researchers should think of the community as 
a habitat. A community resilient to predation is a community that en-
sures the natural population remains in control and in direct proximity 
to the resources essential to sustaining it. 
In a megacity, where resource proximity and infrastructure are 
critical to ensuring the stability of a population, the determining factor 
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for invasion is the community population. Therefore, military forces and 
law enforcement should focus efforts on securing the local population 
and protecting resources versus solely targeting or hunting predators. 
Participation of the local population and reducing vulnerabilities that 
exist in resource-allocation networks and distribution pathways ulti-
mately affects predation success.57 As invasion studies and modeling 
illustrate, predators ultimately become the natural prey of the commu-
nity in resource-constrained environments. The more densely populat-
ed the community, the harder it is for an adventive species to survive.
SYMBIOTIC WARFARE 
OPERATING CONCEPT
The Concept of Predation in Relation to Future Warfare
Future conflict is likely to erupt as the result of a competition for re-
sources between actors.58 Relating back to the basics of supply and 
demand, those without sufficient abundance of supply will target 
and exploit the supply of others. If worldwide demographic trends 
continue, actors struggling for resource demands are likely to find 
themselves doing so in a megacity environment. The congested and 
densely populated environment of the megacity requires more than 
just analysis of infrastructure and urbanization if the military plans to 
conduct effective operations. Actors on the losing side of the supply 
scale can be state or nonstate actors, but ultimately these agglomer-
ated populations have one strategy objective in mind: use the popula-
tion as maneuver space to gain access to resources.
Defined for our purposes as predators, agglomerated popula-
tions use violence and disruptive means to acquire resources. These 
predators, which have no political motivation, seek only to control and 
manipulate resource-allocation networks and distribution pathways to 
57 Note that the effects of damage to ecosystem infrastructure were not modeled in this 
case study. Models that illustrate how damage to resource infrastructure may lead to 
crowed pathways, resulting in the ultimate breakdown of ecosystem function, should be 
considered by future analysts who seek to elaborate on these concepts.
58 For more information on the environment and security, see Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 
“Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International Secu-
rity 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 5–40. 
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achieve their ends. The population is just maneuver space. However, 
predators that seek to exploit or harvest resources within a megaci-
ty face an enormous challenge. Concepts extrapolated from invasion 
biology and ecology prove that the best means for neutralizing preda-
tion threats in densely populated environments is by leveraging the 
local population. If predators aim to use the population as maneuver 
space, then leveraging the population to destabilize a predator’s ma-
neuver becomes the objective. A secondary objective to support neu-
tralization is the ability of the military to provide the population access 
to resources. Studies prove that any disruption to resource-allocation 
networks or distribution pathways will destabilize the community and 
afford predators the opportunity to disperse, scatter, and ultimately in-
vade. 
Overview
The symbiotic warfare operating concept (SWOC) describes how the 
future Joint force will shape the megacity operating environment and 
neutralize threats acting as a complementary extension to an already 
existing, networked community infrastructure. The SWOC guides fu-
ture force development by identifying capabilities the Services will 
need to conduct operations in a megacity. To conduct operations in 
such an environment, the SWOC requires platforms and capabilities 
that must: 1) facilitate military maneuver in congested and potentially 
contested environments to secure resource networks and distribution 
pathways vital to the population, and 2) minimize disruption to those 
resource networks and distribution pathways. Therefore, the SWOC 
vision of future warfare explores how the military will work in parallel 
with the local population and public service networks to ensure the 
uninterrupted flow of resources and services to the population. As a 
result, SWOC serves as both the ways and means of securing resourc-
es and neutralizing predation threats that seek to disrupt flow.
Symbiosis and the Character of Megacity Conflict
SWOC emphasizes the importance of maintaining a holistic view when 
conducting operations in a congested environment, such as a megac-
ity. Densely populated environments and the complex networks that 
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support resource allocation and distribution to the population exist 
in a delicate, symbiotic balance. Thus, SWOC affords community and 
military planners the ability to identify and exploit intervention points 
for tactical or strategic gain. The primary objective of SWOC is to neu-
tralize external threats by ensuring resource-allocation networks and 
distribution pathways remain secure and open to the population. The 
neutralization of predators is a secondary effect of the military’s ef-
forts to keep resource-distribution networks and pathways open to 
the community. In such a scenario, the community, not the military, 
targets and neutralizes the predator(s).
The SWOC also serves to describe the interdependence and 
connectedness that must exist between the military, public services, 
and local population. Similar to military operations on urbanized ter-
rain (MOUT) doctrine and counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, sym-
biotic warfare considers geography, population, and the adversary as 
interdependent variables. However, the military is only successful in 
achieving the main objective in the SWOC by effectively using the lo-
cal population and infrastructure as maneuver space. For the military, 
the objective in the SWOC is not the neutralization of predators, but 
to keep the resource pathways open to the population in order for the 
population, working with law enforcement, to neutralize predators. 
The SWOC Is Not Siege Warfare
The SWOC attempts to stabilize and minimize disruption in the megac-
ity by differentiating itself from siege warfare. The DOD defines siege 
warfare as the employment of combat forces to physically occupy and 
control a designated area.59 As a tactical mission, the Army and Marine 
Corps define seize as a military force taking possession of a designat-
ed area using overwhelming force or clearing a designated area to ob-
tain control of it.60 The SWOC is geographically agnostic in the sense 
that the military objective is to control resources within the terrain and 
minimize infrastructure damage to avoid disruptions in the daily oper-
ations of the community. Furthermore, the use of overwhelming force 
59 Operational Terms and Graphics, FM 101-5-1 (Washington, DC; Department of the 
Army, 1997), 1–168.
60 Operational Terms and Graphics, 1–168.
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or the dispersal of the population because of military operations will 
disrupt distribution pathways and networks and stress the capacity of 
civil services to provide sustenance for personnel. Therefore, symbiotic 
warfare operations require the military to act as an augmentation force 
to the local community with the military’s primary objective to ensure 
resource-allocation networks and distribution pathways remain open. 
The SWOC Is a Synthesis 
of Urban Warfare, COIN, and Irregular Warfare 
Symbiotic warfare encompasses urban warfare and military tactics 
associated with military operations on urbanized terrain doctrine and 
COIN doctrine.61 By definition, Military Operations on Urbanized Ter-
rain and Joint Urban Operations outline the tactical and capability op-
tions available to a commander in an urban environment.62 Explicit in 
describing the street, subterranean, and air battlespace, urban doc-
trine takes into consideration that “the basic principles of combat in 
built-up areas have essentially remained unchanged in this century.”63 
Where the SWOC and urban operations doctrine agree are on the 
importance of maneuver warfare and combined arms philosophies in 
the urban environment.64 Where they disagree are on the factors that 
will have an impact on the manner in which military forces, including 
the Marine Corps, conduct urban warfare. For example, Military Op-
erations on Urbanized Terrain uses historical examples of warfare to 
suggest the critical factors that contribute to effectiveness are intelli-
gence, surprise, and combined arms. Combined arms, according to 
this doctrine, require essential categories of weapons in association 
with: 1) infantry, 2) armor, 3) artillery, 4) mortars, 5) antiaircraft artillery, 
and 6) aviation.65 While these types of weapons and capabilities were 
essential in 1998, technological advancements of the U.S. military 
61 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), MCWP 3-53.3 (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters Marine Corps, 1998); Joint Urban Operations, JP 3-06 (Washington, DC: 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013); and Counterinsurgency, JP 3-24 (Washington, 
DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013).
62 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, 1-2; and Joint Urban Operations, I-2–I-7.
63 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, 1-8; and Joint Urban Operations.
64 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, 1-12; and Joint Urban Operations.
65 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, 1-13–15; and Joint Urban Operations.
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and our adversaries require the United States to update doctrine to 
account for operational concepts, tactics, and new types of tactical 
lethal and nonlethal weapons required to conduct operations. 
Additionally, Joint Urban Operations’s discussion of the urban 
operating environment does not account for the interconnectedness 
between densely populated environments and access to resourc-
es. As the previous literature review illustrated, panic ensues when 
populations become segregated from resources they view as vital 
(e.g., food, water, power, fuel, cyber, money). If the future of conflict 
manifests out of a competition for resources, then the military must 
consider the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) by defin-
ing the populations’ critical resource requirements, mapping out the 
resource-allocation networks and distribution pathways that provide 
those critical resources, and assessing those networks and pathways 
for vulnerability. Securing and ensuring the integrity of resource net-
works and pathways becomes the military’s primary responsibility.
Proposed Model 
for Mapping Predation Intervention Points
Although the SWOC is geographically agnostic in the sense the mili-
tary’s objective is to control resources within the terrain and minimize 
infrastructure damage to avoid disruptions in the daily operations of 
the community. IPB requires military and civilian planners to identi-
fy critical vulnerabilities that exist in resource-allocation and network 
distribution pathways as a preventive measure against predation. Us-
ing biological science and studies to map predator invasion process, 
a proposed model to identify military intervention points may prove 
useful. Table 1 illustrates how physical and biological sciences adapt 
to complement the SWOC to provide military and civilian planners a 
proactive method of analyzing the symbiotic and delicate balance be-
tween a community’s population and resources.
While each predator and community is unique, the qualities of 
neither the predator nor the population actually serve as the center 
of gravity in symbiotic warfare. Predators exploit resources and the 
vulnerabilities that exist in resource allocation and distribution net-
works and pathways. Neutralizing the threat requires cohesive ef-
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forts between the civilian community, metropolitan police forces, and 
the military. In the SWOC, the military only takes direct action when 
metropolitan police forces require augmentation or when defending 
resource-allocation networks and distribution pathways. Thus, the 
identification of intervention points proves useful for military planners 
who seek to commit military assets and capabilities to assist in preda-
tion neutralization.
Differences between Symbiotic Warfare and Insurgency
Counterinsurgency defines an insurgency as “the organized use of 
subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political con-
trol of a region.”66 The SWOC adopts a similar definition for its use 
of the term predator, delineating insurgents from predators primarily 
by their objective. For example, in an insurgency, the insurgent uses 
“a mixture of subversion, sabotage, political, economic, psychological 
actions, and armed conflict to achieve its political aims.”67 Predators, 
which also use a mixture of subversion, sabotage, political, economic, 
psychological, and armed conflict, seek to control or exploit resourc-
es. The predator’s objective is not political by nature. Furthermore, the 
hearts and minds of the population is not an objective for predators 
or for a military, which is charged with assisting a community in neu-
tralizing a predation threat. Predators use the population as maneuver 
space to gain access to resources. Military planners must determine 
where populations are most vulnerable to help the community deter-
mine where predators may temporary nest.
The SWOC also adopts several concepts from COIN doctrine. 
For example, similar to COIN, symbiotic warfare is a comprehensive 
civilian and military effort designed to neutralize predators and ad-
dress the root causes of resource instability that led to predation.68 
Similarly, symbiotic warfare is population centric. The development 
of proper symbiotic warfare tactics starts with the acceptance of the 
66 Counterinsurgency, I-1.
67 Counterinsurgency, I-1.
68 By definition, “COIN is a comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simul-
taneously defeat and contain insurgency and addresses its root causes.” Counterinsur-
gency, I-1.
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Table 1. Mapping predation intervention points
Invasion 
process
Mitigation 
strategy
Resources Native 
population
Predator
Species in 
vector/path-
way
Prevention 
and intercep-
tion
Identify alloca-
tion networks 
and distribution 
pathways
Identify 
vulnerable 
population
Identify 
resource 
requirement
Insertion Early detection Monitor alloca-
tion networks 
and distribution 
pathways
Monitor 
vulnerable 
population
Identify 
resource 
exploitation 
networks
Population 
established*
Rapid re-
sponse
Secure alloca-
tion networks 
and distribution 
pathways
Monitor for 
sign of preda-
tion; segregate 
population 
from broken 
networks and 
pathways
Eradicate 
predator’s 
resources
Spread/
dispersal*
Containment 
and neutral-
ization
Monitor alloca-
tion networks 
and distribution 
pathways
Monitor for 
signs of preda-
tion; segregate 
population 
from broken 
networks and 
pathways
Segregate
Ecosystem 
infrastructure 
and competing 
population 
damage*
Restabilization 
and resto-
ration
Repair damage 
to infrastruc-
ture; strength-
en vulnerability
Reintegration Eliminate
* Dependent on the ecosystem community’s adaptive capacity and the robustness of its 
resources.
Source: Adapted from George Marbuah et al., “Economies of Harmful Invasive Species: A 
Review,” Diversity 6 (July 2014): 503, https:doi.org/10.3390/d6030500.
population’s role in identifying and neutralizing the threat. A metropol-
itan police force may prove fully capable of securing the population; 
thus, the military will assume only an enabling and complementary 
role with capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance (ISR) and counter electromagnetic warfare. 
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Critical Factors in Urban Operations
The factors the SWOC determines critical to urban operations are in-
telligence, combined arms, and civil military operations. Combined 
arms break down essential categories of weapons to: 1) offensive and 
defensive air, sea, and cyber forces; 2) security forces (infantry and 
SOF); 3) electromagnetic weapons; and 4) nonlethal fires. The SWOC 
uses the existing infrastructure and resources within the megacity to 
target and neutralize the threat to the greatest extent possible. Military 
operations in the support of the SWOC are to fill infrastructure capa-
bility and capacity gaps and strengthen the vulnerabilities of networks 
and pathways that provide resource allocation and distribution.
Offensive and defensive air, sea, and cyber forces require the 
U.S. military to reassess its current platforms for viability in a megacity 
environment. For air and cyber assets, the Services could consider us-
ing ISR micro air vehicles (MAVs) to swarm and scatter the megacity. 
Low cost ISR MAVs, using a Lockheed C-130 Hercules as a delivery 
mechanism, can deploy in an uncontested air space and transfer via 
flutter, hover, or loiter in a contested air space for up to 10 days.69 Their 
less than 1.5-inch profile and light weight allows a C-130 to deploy up 
to 10,000 MAVs during one air delivery. The uses of ISR MAVs prove 
critical to monitoring resource-allocation networks and distribution 
pathways.
Furthermore, the military could also use MAVs to set up virtual 
command and control (C2) nodes. MAVs equipped with dual transmit 
capability, similar to ISR MAVs, can also carry a unique IP address. De-
ploying 10,000 components during one launch not only allows for net-
work and transmit capability for military forces but also reestablishes 
connectivity after a cyber or electromagnetic attack. To assist in neu-
tralizing predation threats, the military and civilian law enforcement 
can use network mirror imaging to set up a network noose to track 
predator movements and transmissions. This also opens the virtual 
C2 environment to facilitate robust information operations campaigns 
69 Maj David J. Blair, USAF, and Capt Nick Helms, USAF, “The Swarm, the Cloud, and the 
Importance of Getting There First: What’s at Stake in the Remote Aviation Culture De-
bate,” Air & Space Power Journal 27, no. 4 (2013): 14–38.
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to include those launched by intelligence planners who seek to em-
ploy deception tactics. 
Fires, while important, play a minor role with IPB planning, MAV 
ISR, and virtual C2 nodes. While small diameter bombs may prove pre-
cise, it is important to remember that the concept of symbiotic warfare 
is to minimize disruption to infrastructure within a megacity, especial-
ly to resource-allocation networks and distribution pathways that the 
predators themselves will seek to exploit.
Capability Assessment
Today’s Joint Force cannot meet the challenges of megacity warfare. 
While Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain and Joint Urban Op-
erations are starting points for doctrine reassessment, capabilities 
require a technology refresh if the Joint Force wants to remain imper-
vious and invulnerable while defending, securing, and protecting a 
megacity’s resource-allocation networks and distribution pathways. 
The purpose of the capability assessment is not to seduce the Joint 
Force with technology but to counter twenty-first century technologi-
cal threats that leave megacity resources and communities vulnerable 
to predation. 
Regarding potential threats that leave resource-allocation net-
works and distribution pathways vulnerable, the SWOC recommends 
developing the following capabilities and tactics. Rethinking how the 
Joint Force uses its current capabilities and tactics could not come at 
a more relevant time. The lag time in acquisition and proper research, 
testing, development, and evaluation places 2019 as the right time to 
consider 2025’s future needs. The following is a list of current capabil-
ity, platform, and concept shortfalls: 
 • Capabilities
 - Terrain and subterranean loiter, hover, and flutter ISR
 - Terrain and subterranean counterelectromagnetic warfare
 • Platforms
 - ISR and network-capable MAVs and drones that provide loiter 
capabilities and those that can flutter, scatter, and swarm to 
counter an electromagnetic threat, reopen networked lines of 
communication, provide network noose capabilities to mon-
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itor predator activity, and exploit information exchanges for 
intelligence gathering 
 • Concepts
 - Virtual “Cloud” C2 to 1) minimize military footprint on a com-
munity’s resources and 2) remain elusive to predators
 - Scatter, swarm, and disperse tactics to counter an electro-
magnetic attack and track a predator’s capability to use the 
population as maneuver space 70 
Conclusion
Densely populated and congested environments rely on robust re-
source-allocation networks and distribution pathways that future ag-
glomerated populations (predators) will attempt to disrupt to exploit 
resources. The military’s future role in megacity warfare is to provide 
an undisrupted flow of resources to the population to neutralize preda-
tion threats. Symbiotic warfare is nothing more than a hybrid of urban 
warfare, insurgency, and irregular warfare. Based on scientific re-
search and adaptive modeling of how densely populated species be-
have when predators attempt to exploit resources, symbiotic warfare 
provides the intelligence community a map of the predation invasion 
process, affording the military intelligence community the ability to 
identify points of intervention useful in neutralizing predation threats. 
Furthermore, symbiotic warfare, and the follow-on symbiotic 
warfare operating concept, focuses on the interdependencies that 
exist between resources, population, and the predators that seek to 
disrupt the integrity of resource-allocation networks and distribu-
tion pathways. Doctrine analysis reveals obvious oversights in these 
considerations and still relies on fires as a primary means of threat 
neutralization. If megacity warfare becomes a reality, then the military 
needs to prepare for it. Current platforms and capabilities, which they 
deliver, fall short in meeting heavy ISR demands and networking capa-
bilities. Furthermore, the ability of platforms to maneuver freely within 
70 For detailed explanation of “swarm” and “scatter” as tactics to counterelectromagnet-
ic threats, see Blair and Helms, “The Swarm, the Cloud, and the Importance of Getting 
There First,” 14–38. 
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the megacity do not currently exist. If nothing more, this research pro-
vides the military with a sobering reality that future warfare may not 
require direct action and fires as much as it will require the military to 
deliver and secure essential services for a population.
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C H A P T E R E L E V E N
Air Domain Dominance in a Megacity
Major Nathan J. Storm, U.S. Marine Corps
The Japanese landings came on 8 December 1941 in north- 
ern Malaya and southern Thailand. By the morning of 10 
December, they had penetrated well into the Malayan fron-
tier and advanced to Kedah, Malaysia. Japanese aircraft 
dealt swiftly with any resistance and eased their progress 
down the peninsula to threaten Singapore. The Japanese 
had advanced nearly 1,000 kilometers to capture Malaya in 
only 54 days. On the night of 8 February, two divisions of 
the Japanese invasion force crossed the straits and land-
ed on Singapore Island. At the end of the day, more than 
30,000 Japanese troops occupied Singapore, establishing 
a stronghold on the northwestern part of the island. The 
Japanese advance continued until Allied forces had been 
driven back to the suburbs of Singapore city. Food and wa-
ter supplies were low, and that evening British lieutenant 
general Arthur E. Percival surrendered to the Japanese.
MARINE CORPS AVIATION D O CTRINE 
AND CAPABILITIES IN A MEGACITY
The future of urban warfare is bleak. The possibility, or probability, of 
conducting any of the range of military operations inside a dense ur-
ban environment is incredibly high. A national security professor at 
the U.S. Naval War College, Richard J. Norton, certainly expects it, stat-
ing that “if three quarters of the world will live in cities, and we still fight 
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wars, then wars are going to be fought in this environment.”1 With that 
concept in mind, the Marine Corps must research, develop, and prac-
tice new concepts for the conduct of war in a dense urban environ-
ment. Current Marine Corps air doctrine and maneuver capabilities 
are poorly suited for operations within this dense urban environment. 
For purposes of this project, we will discuss the dense urban envi-
ronment as a megacity. To understand how to fight in a megacity, we 
must have a broad definition from which to work. We also must justify 
our reason for studying war in a megacity environment and determine 
if current doctrine and tactics suitably account for the vast human net-
work the military will encounter while operating there. 
The generally accepted size of a megacity is an urban area with 
a population greater than 10 million people. The United Nations 2018 
Revision of World Urbanization Prospects (WUP) reports 37 current 
megacities and predicts 43 by 2030.2 The WUP continues:
Today, 55% of the world’s population lives in urban areas, 
a proportion that is expected to increase to 68% by 2050. 
Projections show that urbanization, the gradual shift in res-
idence of the human population from rural to urban areas, 
combined with the overall growth of the world’s popula-
tion could add another 2.5 billion people to urban areas by 
2050, with close to 90% of this increase taking place in Asia 
and Africa.3
The World Health Organization (WHO) further explains the an-
nual increase in urban population: “The global urban population is ex-
pected to grow approximately 1.84% per year between 2015 and 2020, 
1.63% per year between 2020 and 2025, and 1.44% per year between 
2025 and 2030.”4 Expanding urban populations place more humans at 
closer proximity to each other than ever before. Close physical prox-
1 Flavia Krause-Jackson and Nicole Gaouette, “Homemade Tank Powered by Game Boy 
Fights Wars of Future,” Bloomberg, 9 September 2014.
2 2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects (New York: United Nations, 2018).
3 2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects.
4 “Urban Population Growth,” World Health Organization, accessed 17 December, 2014.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
265
imity coupled with increased electronic connectivity yields drastically 
increased global interconnectedness. During the course of this study, 
the size of a megacity became irrelevant to our purposes. The key 
feature became instead population density over absolute size. Gaza 
is more densely populated than Los Angeles, even with a total pop-
ulation of about 1.8 million people. If our major concern is the inter-
connectedness of major urban centers, we need not worry about an 
arbitrarily defined population requirement but that there exists ample 
opportunity for connections to form within the population.
Mavens and connectors or programmers and switches—no mat-
ter what you call them—the people who establish, recruit, train, and 
run human networks are a major threat. The pool from which recruits 
are drawn continues to increase as the local, interconnected popu-
lation size grows. In a networked megacity, the ability to control or 
regulate those human networks is key. In The Tipping Point, Malcolm 
Gladwell discusses two types of human network facilitators he calls 
“mavens” and “connectors.” Mavens collect information; they have 
knowledge and want to distribute that knowledge to as wide an au-
dience as possible. To distribute knowledge, mavens enlist help from 
connectors. According to Gladwell, connectors are important not only 
for the number of people with whom they are connected but also for 
the quality of those connections.5 Noted sociologist Manuel Castells 
discusses a similar concept in his 2011 article, “A Network Theory 
of Power.” Castells’s concepts of “programmers” and “switches” hold 
similar meaning to Gladwell’s mavens and connectors. Castells de-
fines programmers as a person or group with “the ability to constitute 
network(s) and to program/reprogram the network(s) in terms of the 
goals assigned to the network,” and connectors have “the ability to 
connect and ensure the cooperation of different networks by shap-
ing common goals and combining resources while fending off com-
petition from other networks by setting up strategic cooperation.”6 
Mavens and programmers control the knowledge base. They trans-
5 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference 
(New York: Little, Brown, 2000), 30–86.
6 Manuel Castells, “A Network Theory of Power,” International Journal of Communication, 
no. 5 (2011): 776.
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fer their knowledge to a close group of followers but need another 
means to translate that knowledge to a wider audience. Connectors 
and switches are that means; during a future war in a megacity, the 
people or groups who facilitate these roles are a key to success in 
defeating any adversarial group.
Physical and electronic interconnectedness, increasing popula-
tion density and size, and the power to form, program, and spread net-
works creates a distinct problem for the Marine Corps with regard to war 
in a megacity. From an aviation point of view, how does the Marine Corps 
respond to military operations within a megacity, assuming that control 
and regulation of physical and electronic network connections are key? 
One current military doctrinal publication “recommends isolat-
ing and bypassing urban terrain when possible due to the costs in-
volved.”7 Obviously when discussing the future of war in a megacity, 
bypass and isolation is neither possible nor the best means by which 
to prosecute the war. To effectively fight in a megacity, the U.S. Ma-
rine Corps must be capable of controlling individual networks. Current 
Marine Corps aviation doctrine seems ill-equipped to function against 
the interconnected complexities of war in a megacity. 
The Marine Corps maintains six aviation functions: electronic 
warfare (EW), air reconnaissance, offensive air support (OAS), assault 
support, command of aircraft and missiles, and antiair warfare (AAW).8 
Initial problem framing assessment within the megacity describes 
problems of aviation maneuver. Problem framing also leads to a cur-
sory list of questions the Marine Corps must parse through. How does 
the Corps adapt these six functions to operate within a dense urban 
environment? Similar to ground urban operations, aviation urban oper-
ations are fraught with myriad challenges. How does Marine Aviation 
maneuver safely and effectively within this type of environment? Will 
the megacity’s concentration of electromagnetic radiation affect the 
capability and effectiveness of EW? How will urban canalization affect 
the assault support aircraft’s mission of airborne movement of equip-
7 MTTP for Aviation Urban Operations, MCRP 3-35.3A (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Com-
bat Development Command, 2001), I-1.
8 Aviation Operations, MCWP 3-2 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command, 2000), 2-1–2-6.
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ment and personnel? Will the vertical nature of most megacities inter-
fere with OAS and air reconnaissance’s ability to locate, target, and 
prosecute the enemy without high collateral damage risk? Without 
adaptation of procedures and capabilities, limited line of sight affects 
positive command and control of aircraft within a megacity. How will 
the megacity affect the Marine Corps’ ability to conduct AAW? The 
asymmetric nature of urban combat affects every aspect of Marine 
Aviation.
MTTP for Aviation Urban Operations speaks in very broad terms 
about considerations for military aviation operations in an urban envi-
ronment, but notably does not discuss the interconnected nature of 
urban warfare. Joint Urban Operations more appropriately discusses 
the interconnectedness of a megacity “as a complex and dynamic 
system, with unique political, military, economic, social, information, 
and infrastructure (PMESII) and other components. Each element 
impacts, constrains, and influences military operations.”9 Joint Urban 
Operations continues to discuss “complex social and political interac-
tions by compressing large numbers of people into a small geograph-
ic area. Critical infrastructures (physical, economic, governmental, 
social, etc.) are in such close proximity and, in most areas, so inter-
twined that even minor disruptions by military operations can cause 
significant repercussions.”10 It also covers aviation operations, stat-
ing that “air operations must adapt to the unique urban environment 
. . . although [command and control] C2 does not change in the urban 
environment, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) may be vastly 
different from those employed on the open battlefield.”11 The Marine 
Corps must cooperate with the joint community to research and de-
ploy new techniques and technology suitable to a megacity.
One key to success in megacity warfare is creating and adapting 
TTPs to the megacity environment. The Marine Corps also must de-
velop new means of conducting urban aviation operations to include 
airborne, nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
9 Joint Urban Operations, JP 3-06 (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2013), I-2.
10 Joint Urban Operations, I-2–I-3.
11 Joint Urban Operations, I-9.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
268
sance (NTISR); and assault support and offensive air support (OAS). 
With regard to NTISR and OAS, the traditional top-down approach will 
likely not be as effective in an urban environment because of the ver-
tical characteristics of a modern megacity. Assault support TTPs also 
may need to be adjusted, especially in light of the probability of aircraft 
operating below the building horizon and limitations on current air-
craft survivability equipment (ASE).
Additional aviation considerations include impacts to aircraft 
systems, such as forward-looking infrared (FLIR) radar and night 
vision devices (NVD). For example, thermal reflectivity precludes 
FLIR systems from being able to see through glass. Glass has high 
thermal reflectivity and will reflect the thermal energy of the back-
ground.12 The Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 
(MAWTS-1) Night Vision Device (NVD) Manual continues: “Certain 
smooth, glossy surfaces, such as . . . windshields and glossy painted 
fenders can reflect [infrared] IR radiation images incident on them 
from other sources.”13 Glass-fronted buildings dominate the modern 
cityscape, thereby making them opaque to modern aviation thermal 
imaging devices.
The nighttime urban environment has similarly negative effects 
on NVDs. Current advances in the Marine Corps night vision goggle 
device, the AN/AVS-9 with OMNI-VI image intensifier tubes, have re-
duced halo effect around non-NVD compatible lights (typical white, 
yellow, red city lights are non-NVD compatible).14 Improved image in-
tensifier tubes cannot account for the increased visual clutter and re-
flected light that negatively affect the devices. Decreased visual acuity 
increases the risk associated with flying in the urban environment and 
creates significant difficulty with locating, tracking, and operating 
against individuals who control urban networks. 
To effectively operate in the megacity environment, the Marine 
Corps must research, study, and experiment with new and existing 
12 MAWTS-1 Night Vision Device (NVD) Manual, 9th ed. (Yuma, AZ: Marine Aviation Weap-
ons and Tactics Squadron 1, Marine Corps, 2011), 26, hereafter MAWTS-1 NVD Manual.
13 MAWTS-1 NVD Manual, 28.
14 LCdr Heath Clifford, USN, “NVD Technology Update” (presentation, MAWTS-1, Yuma, 
AZ, 10 November 2014).
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concepts to develop appropriate TTPs and equipment. Current capa-
bilities are more well suited to warfare in the open environments in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Current satellites and unmanned aircraft sys-
tems are poorly equipped to gather intelligence in the narrow streets 
of a megacity. To facilitate future success, the Marine Corps must rec-
ognize these limitations and develop new methods of locating, track-
ing, and controlling megacity network programmers and switches.
Before developing a concept for the future of Marine Corps Avi-
ation in a megacity, this chapter will discuss how to develop a more 
thorough understanding of the problems related to war in megacities. 
The following case study of the Japanese invasion of the Malay Penin-
sula and Singapore during WWII develops one perspective of appar-
ent issues of megacity war.
CASE STUDY: JAPANESE INVASION 
OF SINGAPORE DURING WWII
Japan’s first offensive in the Pacific war against the West actually was 
not the attack on Pearl Harbor. About 20 hours before the Japanese 
attack on Oahu, Hawaii, five Imperial Japanese Army fighters took off 
from Thailand to support a convoy in the Gulf of Siam. During their 
flight, the fighters happened upon a British Royal Air Force (RAF) Con-
solidated PBY Catalina patrol flying boat. The amphibious aircraft, 
based out of Singapore, was searching for the convoy those Japanese 
fighters were meant to support. The Japanese fighters vastly out-
matched the sluggish boat-plane and destroyed the Catalina before it 
could radio back to its headquarters in Singapore.15 And so began the 
war in the Pacific, Japan’s conquest of the Malay Peninsula, and their 
eventual seizure of Singapore.
Initially, one might look to a 76-year-old battle in the Pacific and 
think it of little significance to a discussion of twenty-first-century 
warfare or, more specifically, to war in a megacity. The Marine Corps 
Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) Warfighting extols the “two concepts 
of universal significance in generating combat power: speed and fo-
15 Stanley L. Falk, Seventy Days to Singapore: Malayan Campaign, 1941–42 (New York: 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1975), 16.
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cus.”16 It is this speed and focus that led the Japanese to dominance 
during their multimodal and multidomain assault on the Malay Penin-
sula and Singapore. Japan’s air and sea power dominated in the face 
of a numerically superior British occupation and established defense. 
Through the next few pages, we will briefly frame a discussion of the 
battle and the operational planning for both the Japanese and British. 
Finally, we will discuss overall findings from the case study and how 
we can relate this operation to war in a megacity and the concepts to 
come.
The method of research for this case study was through internet 
searches, online research databases, written histories, and theoretical 
works. The intent of this work is to develop a link between the military 
necessity of gaining and maintaining rapid domain dominance within 
an urban environment, such as Singapore in 1941, and the capacity to 
gain the same dominance in a modern megacity environment. To this 
end, the research for this chapter was primarily concerned with the 
historical narrative regarding Japan’s domination of the Malay Penin-
sula, followed by the seizure of the island and city of Singapore. The 
modern commander may find the best way to gain control of a megac-
ity is through the valuable lesson of the rapid multimodal dominance 
the Japanese achieved in Singapore. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To continue their offensive in China, the Japanese needed access to 
natural resources they could not otherwise procure in the open mar-
kets. The economic sanctions placed on Japan worked to strangle 
the nascent Japanese empire.17 Forced to look for war materials else-
where, Japan looked to the south for relief to “seize for herself the min-
eral-rich resources of South-east Asia.”18 At approximately 0215 on 8 
December 1941, a little more than an hour before the attack on Pearl 
16 Warfighting, 40.
17 Falk, Seventy Days to Singapore, 19.
18 Falk, Seventy Days to Singapore, 19.
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Harbor, the initial Japanese invasion force in Malaysia landed.19 During 
the next few hours, the Japanese brought three divisions ashore in 
Thailand while holding another division in reserve.20 Using what one 
must assume to be deceptive tactics, the Japanese leadership in Thai-
land “completed [formalities] allowing us to pass through Thailand.”21
The British forces in Singapore and throughout the Malay Pen-
insula had accurate intelligence regarding the impending Japanese 
assault. However, the general understanding and analysis of that in-
telligence was that the Japanese Army was attacking Thailand and 
not the British in Singapore.22 The British also recognized the difficulty 
of defending against a Japanese assault into neutral Thailand’s sover-
eign borders. British forces crossing Thailand’s border to defend Ma-
laysia and Singapore against the Japanese offense would likely paint 
the British as the aggressor.23 
In the introduction to Arthur Swinson’s book Defeat in Malaya: 
The Fall of Singapore, Sir Basil Liddell Hart describes the defending 
British force as having “more than sufficient strength in the island to 
repel the invasion, particularly as it came in the sector where it was 
most expected.”24 Under Lieutenant General Arthur Percival, Malaya 
Command, the British command in Singapore totaled approximately 
88,600 troops. Troop breakdown in Malaya Command included 37,000 
Indian troops, 19,600 British, 15,200 Australians, and 16,800 Malayan 
and Chinese troops. The Indians were broken down into two divisional 
commands and the Australians had one. The British troops had no 
division command but were broken into six battalion commands. Per-
cival commanded a weak air force of 158 operational aircraft made up 
primarily of obsolete models operated by underprepared pilots who 
19 Yap Siang Yong et al., Fortress Singapore: The Battlefield Guide (Singapore: Times 
Books International, 1992), 10.
20 Falk, Seventy Days to Singapore, 31.
21 Arthur Swinson, Defeat in Malaya: The Fall of Singapore (New York: Ballantine, 
1970), 51.
22 Swinson, Defeat in Malaya, 51.
23 Brian P. Farrell, “High Command, Irregular Forces, and Defending Malaya, 1941–1942,” 
Global War Studies 8, no. 2 (December 2011): 46–47, https://doi.org/10.5893/19498489 
.08.02.02.
24 Swinson, Defeat in Malaya, 7.
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had not seen combat. Finally, the Royal Navy in Singapore included 
aircraft carrier HMS Hermes (95), battlecruiser HMS Repulse (1916), 
battleship HMS Prince of Wales (53), and a few smaller ships.25
The approximate total Japanese force brought to bear against 
the Malay Peninsula and Singapore was roughly matched with the 
British forces in the area. Japanese forces included approximately 
50,000 infantry, 80 medium and 100 light tanks, a strong artillery pres-
ence, and various support elements (engineers to support bridging 
operations) totaling an additional 30,000 troops. The Japanese force 
came in with more than 450 aircraft and a strong naval presence of 
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.26 
ANALYSIS
So how did a numerically inferior force (~80,000 Japanese to ~88,600 
Allied) push one of the world’s great powers south along the length of 
the Malay Peninsula and eventually rout them in Singapore? Herein 
lies the heart of what this chapter looks to discover. The superior Jap-
anese planning, strategy, and execution kept the British forces contin-
uously off balance and in an almost constant state of withdrawal.
Similar to the numbered war plans the United States maintains, 
Japan built a specific war plan against the strategically important is-
land of Singapore. To use the parlance of our times, the operational 
planning team (OPT) leader was Lieutenant Colonel Masanobu Tsu-
ji.27 Though not specifically trained in amphibious operations or jun-
gle warfare, the Japanese embarked on a crash course. The Japanese 
planners sought information regarding the tropics from any source 
they could imagine, including “pestering sea captains, mining engi-
neers, bankers, university professors, diplomats, Buddhist priests—in 
short, anyone and everyone in Japan and Formosa who knew anything 
at all about the tropics.”28 For the Japanese troops to prepare for the 
assault through Malaysia, they conducted regional exercises through-
25 Falk, Seventy Days to Singapore, 53–57.
26 Falk, Seventy Days to Singapore, 28.
27 Falk, Seventy Days to Singapore, 24.
28 Falk, Seventy Days to Singapore, 25.
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out the spring of 1941, allowing the army and navy to build interoper-
ability and amphibious experience.29 Tsuji and his planners personally 
conducted ground and aerial reconnaissance of the Malay Peninsula 
and potential landing beaches.30 With detailed planning, reconnais-
sance, and multiple rehearsals, the OPT ensured every opportunity 
for Japanese success in Singapore. Japanese leadership recognized 
the strategic importance of Singapore and the necessity for Japanese 
control over Singapore while conducting the Pacific campaign. With 
this recognition came long-term and deliberate planning that ultimate-
ly led to their success.
Political forces at home in London hampered British defenses in 
Singapore with poor local tactical decisions. In his book Operation Mat-
ador, Ong Chit Chung argues that much of the fault for Singapore’s fall 
to the Japanese lay with Winston Churchill. Churchill’s attention was 
with the more immediate war on the European continent than with the 
much farther afield defense of Singapore. The thinking in London was 
that Japan might invade Thailand, but certainly would not risk war with 
the Western powers.31 Furthermore, Churchill generally believed that 
Japan was not on the verge of war with the West—given their preoccu-
pation in China—and that the best defense of Singapore was through 
“strong local garrison and the general potentialities of sea-power. The 
idea of trying to defend the Malay Peninsula and of holding the whole 
of Malaya . . . cannot be entertained.”32 Churchill’s views delayed ar-
rival of the capital ships Repulse and Prince of Wales (ill-fated as their 
arrival may have been). Theorists often quote Clausewitz’s definition 
“that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, 
29 Henry Frei, Guns of February: Ordinary Japanese Soldier’s Views of the Malayan Cam-
paign & the Fall of Singapore, 1941–42 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004), 31.
30 Falk, Seventy Days to Singapore, 26–27.
31 Operation Matador was the plan by the British Malaya Command to move forces into 
place to counter a Japanese assault. Ong Chit Chung, Operation Matador: Britain’s War 
Plans against the Japanese, 1918–1941 (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1997), 
222–23.
32 Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, vol. II, The Second World War (Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin, 1949), 667–68.
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a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”33 
However, in this case, the converse is true. The politicians in Britain, 
far from pursuing war in Singapore, found a war in Southeast Asia at 
least partially because of their political inaction. British unwillingness 
to initiate Operation Matador, because they feared being seen as the 
aggressor in Thailand, did not help the defense of Singapore.34 Nor did 
the quick demise of the Repulse and Prince of Wales or the modest 
(at best) northern defense in Singapore assist in the ultimate success 
of the British.
The Japanese fought south quickly. Upon the initial assault, 
their priority was air supremacy. Japanese air forces destroyed Brit-
ish aviation units and, upon seizure of British-held airfields, extended 
the range of Japanese aircraft farther south. Once satisfied they had 
attained air supremacy, the Japanese would speed their southward 
advance toward Singapore.35 Speed was of the utmost importance 
to the Japanese. Brian P. Farrell, head of the history department at 
the National University of Singapore, writes that “the British expect-
ed the Japanese to consolidate a beachhead, build up their strength, 
advance only when their main force was concentrated, then advance 
methodically.”36 Farrell points to the success of their strategy: 
Within 100 hours they shattered all British defensive plans, 
seized the initiative, and advanced boldly into northern Ma-
laya. Force Z sortied, but was caught at sea by Japanese 
land-based naval air forces and destroyed on the morning 
of 10 December. This, plus the Japanese success at Pearl 
Harbor, gave the [Imperial Japanese Navy] IJN command of 
the sea. That allowed it to threaten the whole east coast. 
This forced Malaya Command to keep much of its strength 
in southern Malaya and on Singapore Island. [Royal Air 
Force] RAF Far East gave battle, but was outmatched in ev-
ery respect. Losing nearly half its strength in three days, the 
33 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 1984), 87.
34 Chung, Operation Matador, 232–33.
35 Falk, Seventy Days to Singapore, 31.
36 Farrell, “High Command, Irregular Forces, and Defending Malaya,” 47.
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air force drew back to regroup and try to protect reinforce-
ment convoys approaching Singapore; this left the army 
vulnerable.37
Contrary to British expectations, the majority of Japanese land 
forces flowed like water to the western coast of the Malay Peninsula 
then south to arrive at the Johor Strait by the first week of February 
1942. Sun Tzu describes the necessity of speed as “the essence of 
war. Take advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness; travel by unex-
pected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions.”38 
Japanese forces succeeded in that paradigm. As mentioned above, 
the Japanese land-based naval air forces destroyed the British “Force 
Z” (the capital ships Repulse and Prince of Wales), leaving the pen-
insula unguarded at sea. Japanese air forces also destroyed virtual-
ly all of the British aviation capability on the Malay Peninsula and in 
Singapore. The rapidity of the attack by the Japanese kept the British 
defense off balance and negated the numerical superiority the British 
enjoyed.
The battle raged the length of the peninsula and, by the end of 
January, the British forces had retreated back across the causeway 
onto Singapore Island. On the morning of 31 January 1942 at approxi-
mately 0815, the British forces destroyed the causeway and prepared 
for a final defensive stand in Singapore.39 On 8 February 1942, the Jap-
anese arrived at the Johor Strait, began an amphibious assault on Sin-
gapore, and by the morning of 9 February had two divisions of infantry 
and portions of their heavy machinery across the strait. The Japanese 
continued to push the British forces back toward Singapore and, by 
12 February, the Japanese controlled the reservoirs that fed water to 
the city. The British forces surrendered in the early afternoon of 15 
February 1942.40
37 Farrell, “High Command, Irregular Forces, and Defending Malaya,” 49.
38 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1971), 134.
39 Louis Allen, Singapore, 1941–1942 (Oxford: Frank Cass, 2005), 160.
40 Allen, Singapore, 169–74.
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The question now is how to correlate these lessons learned from Ja-
pan’s successful assault of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore to the 
future of warfare in a megacity. We will condense the above pages to a 
few findings that provide a glance at a theory of victory. First, we want 
to look at the importance of intelligence gathering, analysis, and plan-
ning processes, then discuss the influence of speed, surprise, maneu-
ver, and multidomain dominance as these subjects relate to military 
operations in a megacity.
Military theorist Sun Tzu describes the need to conduct plan-
ning so that one may “know the enemy and know yourself; in a hun-
dred battles you will never be in peril.”41 The Japanese forces were 
well prepared for the operation to capture Singapore. They gathered 
intelligence, built their plan based solidly on intelligence estimates, 
and rehearsed their concept. To be victorious in a future megacity 
war, the United States military must be equally prepared. Preparation 
must entail detailed studies of how conflict in a megacity would pres-
ent. War in an urban environment is exceedingly complex, even more 
so because each megacity has a unique character, culture, and en-
vironment. A one-size-fits-all approach cannot work (at least not effi-
ciently). To be successful, the U.S. military must fully understand the 
requirements and the environment to develop tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) by which to gather operable intelligence in the net-
worked environment of a megacity and subsequently attack targets 
that support those networks. 
Clausewitz describes the value of speed and surprise in his trea-
tise On War as “the means to gain superiority.”42 The Japanese did 
not have numerical superiority so they maximized their use of speed 
and surprise. Conversely, the British forces on the Malay Peninsula 
had neither surprise nor initiative. Though Operation Matador could 
have influenced the outcome of the 70 days between the invasion and 
the surrounding of Singapore, the authorization to initiate Matador did 
41 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 84.
42 Clausewitz, On War, 198.
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not arrive until 5 December 1941.43 The Japanese rapid ingress across 
the beach and south through the peninsula evidenced no sacrifice of 
speed and initiative. As such, the Japanese had little requirement to 
build up forces in the traditional sense. Similar to Sir Julian S. Corbett’s 
sea power theory, Japanese speed and surprise without loss of initia-
tive created a sort of mass in being.44 This is not to say that they did 
not mass their forces—they certainly did. The speed with which the 
Japanese moved gave a semblance of mass that provided maneuver 
space while their forces continued to flow ashore.
The Japanese forces quickly captured and controlled critical in-
frastructure on the island of Singapore that contributed to the British 
surrender. As mentioned, on 12 February, Japanese forces controlled 
the water reservoirs that supplied Singapore. Though the Japanese 
did not halt water service to the city, they certainly had the capability. 
Controlling this key infrastructure and service must have had some 
influence on the British surrender. 
The most important finding of this case study is the speed with 
which Japan gained multidomain dominance across the length of the 
peninsula and the surrounding waters. Though the British ineffective 
defense was partially due to political decision making in London, the 
reality was that the Japanese quickly marched south along the penin-
sula and dominated nearly the entire way. Only a few hours after the 
initial amphibious landing in the north, Japanese bombers completed 
their first bombing raid on Singapore. Though there was little signifi-
cant damage, the raid set the tone for the remainder of the Japanese 
push south.45 Still, on 8 December, the Japanese air forces reduced 
British air strength in the northern parts of the peninsula from 110 
operational aircraft to 50.46 Japanese air supremacy over the entirety 
of the peninsula and Singapore soon followed. Similarly, the Japanese 
attained domination of the seas surrounding the Malay Peninsula and 
43 Allen, Singapore, 99.
44 Julian S. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 
2004).
45 Swinson, Defeat in Malaya, 52.
46 Swinson, Defeat in Malaya, 55.
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Singapore almost as soon as the British capital ships arrived. By the 
afternoon of 10 December, both British ships were lost and Japan had 
control of the sea lines of communication. On 14 February, the Japa-
nese completed repairs to the destroyed causeway across the Johor 
Strait, adding one more layer to the Japanese area of domination.47 
The Japanese now controlled air, sea, and ground access to Singa-
pore. The British subsequently surrendered on 15 February 1942. One 
can surmise that multidomain supremacy allows the freedom of ma-
neuver to be ultimately successful.
Conclusion
Though this chapter did not discuss the operation in intricate detail, 
the premise is easy to comprehend. Japan’s thorough planning allowed 
their army and navy to dominate the Malay Peninsula and Singapore. 
Nested within their theory of victory was the rapid multidomain control 
they enjoyed in both the skies above and the seas around Singapore. 
But if we return to our earlier question, how does this case study affect 
our comprehension of future war in a megacity? 
One way we can look to build and maintain speed and initiative in 
a megacity is through acquiring domain dominance. The air domain is 
of particular interest because current doctrine and capabilities do not 
lend themselves to successful operations within a megacity’s environ-
ment. Singapore was initially under total military control by the Brit-
ish, making it easy for the Japanese to gather intelligence and select 
targets. It is unlikely that a modern megacity will be completely con-
trolled by some group, therefore intelligence gathering, targeting, and 
fires become infinitely more difficult. Indiscriminate bombing (or even 
precise targeting that ends in a destroyed building) will likely further 
the enemy’s cause and enrage the local populace. The military must 
look to other means to create this domain dominance and one such 
possibility is the use of unmanned aerial systems, micro air vehicles, 
and systems and techniques that have yet to be developed. 
47 Allen, Singapore, 174.
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FUTURE CONCEPT: 
HOW UNMANNED AIRCRAF T SYSTEMS 
SUPPORT MEGACITY WARFARE
General Purpose
The United States military will fight in a megacity. The question is not 
if but when. Richard Norton, professor of national security at the U.S. 
Naval War College, states specifically that “if three quarters of the 
world will live in cities, and we still fight wars, wars are going to be 
fought in this [urban/city/megacity] environment.”48 The general pur-
pose of this concept is to describe a paradigm shift for Marine Corps 
Aviation and implementation of airpower within a megacity environ-
ment. Siege warfare is neither feasible nor appropriate for combating 
an adversary within a megacity. National resolve would likely not be 
such that the public would willingly ignore the plight of the millions of 
noncombatants within a besieged megacity. The U.S. Marine Corps 
must be able to capture the initiative through rapid multimodal, mul-
tidomain dominance of specific areas within a megacity. Multimodal 
and multidomain supremacy describes the ability of the operational 
force within a megacity to control the air, land, and potentially water 
within an area via multiple means. The multiple modes of dominance 
include ground forces, air power, sea power, and cyber capabilities. 
Major Jonathan T. Frerichs writes of the need to “gain critical maneu-
ver space for the commander.”49 To support the commander, Marine 
Corps Aviation should change its theory of victory to provide support 
within a megacity. In order to support the commander, Marine Corps 
Aviation should diversify its capabilities through greater use of un-
manned aircraft systems. These systems should be able to operate 
independently as well as in concert with traditional manned aircraft. 
This concept may offer specific means by which the Marine Corps can 
add capability within the air combat element (ACE) to better support 
the ground combat element (GCE) commander.
Based on previous problem framing and case study analysis re-
48 Krause-Jackson and Gaouette, “Homemade Tank Powered by Game Boy Fights Wars 
of Future.”
49 Jonathan Frerichs, “Maneuvering in a Megacity: Case Study of Grozny and Medellin” 
(unpublished manuscript, 17 November 2014).
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garding the question of megacity war, the following concept is offered 
as one possible solution. The concept represents a narrow view of the 
defined problems and case study findings. Earlier problem framing 
describes issues related to aviation doctrine, maneuver, and sensor 
technology. The concept references these problems in the discus-
sion. The previous case study of the Japanese invasion of Singapore 
yielded several findings regarding speed, key terrain, and multidomain 
dominance based on the air domain specifically and ways by which 
remote and autonomous technologies can assist Marine Corps Avia-
tion to become more flexible and efficient. 
Time Horizon and Risks
Imagine an increasingly bold and ambitious Boko Haram striking far 
to the southwest of their current territory in Borno, Nigeria. Imagine 
this group rapidly moving through Nigeria and establishing a foothold 
within Lagos, Nigeria. Lagos, the largest city in Africa and 19th largest 
in the world, has an urban population of about 13 million people.50 
Regardless of the likelihood, the time horizon for the requirement to 
operate within a megacity environment is, for all intents and purposes, 
now. By and large, the technology the Marine Corps needs to facilitate 
nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (NT-ISR), 
targeting, and fires within a megacity already exists. Microair vehicles 
(MAVs), unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), and remotely piloted ve-
hicles (RPVs) already exist within the military’s inventory.51 RPVs are 
what we generally think of as drones and are a subset of UASs. A true 
UAS does not require human interaction beyond the planning phase 
because the aircraft autonomously flies its mission, while a pilot or 
controller “flies” an RPV through all stages of flight. British armed forc-
es currently use similar small air vehicles in an unarmed role.52 How-
ever, the Marine Corps should develop creative doctrine for their use. 
Swarming, preprogrammed, or autonomous vehicles can add great 
flexibility with which the ACE can provide ISR and targeting capability 
50 2018 Revision of World Population Prospects, 26.
51 For purposes of this chapter, the term small air vehicles describes the multiple types of 
aircraft within the scope of MAVs, UASs, and RPVs.
52 “The UK’s Unmanned Roadmap,” Military Technology 37, no. 12 (December 2013): 76.
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that traditional rotary- and fixed-wing aviation cannot provide within a 
megacity.53 
Military Problem
To be successful in any operation, a military force must gain and main-
tain the initiative and domain dominance through speed and surprise. 
Marine Corps Aviation faces several problems within this concept 
of victory in a megacity or an extremely dense urban environment. 
With current TTPs and capabilities, none of these problems are in-
surmountable, but future adaptations and creative solutions will make 
victory easier for the Marine Corps. An easier and faster victory with 
less collateral damage is an obvious benefit. If military operations in a 
megacity affect fewer noncombatant lives and property, noncomba-
tants are less likely to be aggrieved and thus less likely to take up arms 
against friendly forces. Some major military problems facing Marine 
Corps Aviation units fighting in a megacity are:
 • Maneuverability in the confines of a megacity
 - Threat envelopes and reaction time. For instance, the 
RPG-75 has an approximate range of 200 meters against 
a moving target. The rocket fires at 189 meters per sec-
ond (m/s) (in excess of 400 mph) and flies approximate-
ly 3–6 seconds before self-destruction.54 The SA-7B 
“Grail” has a 5 kilometer range, flying at nearly 385m/s 
(in excess of 800 mph).55 The ability to see and react to a 
system like these is limited within the urban environment 
due to the canalization if flying below the top of build-
ings or from reduced identification and reaction time 
because of the distractions created within the urban en-
vironment (e.g., sun reflecting off glass, lights, etc.).
 • ISR capability
 - Viewing angle of traditional ISR and NT-ISR platforms. 
53 Joe Pappalardo, “The Drones of the Future Will Work in Flocks,” Popular Mechanics, 23 
January 2015.
54 “Infantry Weapons: RPG-75 Light Anti-Armor Weapon,” Jane’s Online, accessed 4 
March 2015. 
55 “Air-Launched: 9M32 Strela-2 (SA-7 ‘Grail’),” Jane’s Online, accessed 4 March 2015.
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For example, it is difficult to see into a building using 
traditional ISR tools such as a geosynchronous satellite 
stationed 23,000 miles above the battlespace.56 Other 
traditional ISR tools like fixed-wing aircraft and drones 
have similar limitations. Unlike traditional and nontradi-
tional ISR platforms, small air vehicles can fly level with 
the target upon which they are attempting to gather in-
formation.
 • Optical sensor capability
 - Night vision devices (NVD), such as infrared cameras.
 • Ability to attack specific targets with little or no collateral 
damage to surrounding spaces
In the next few sections, this chapter matches the above mili-
tary problems with potential solutions, new technology, and recom-
mended tactical employment changes. These solutions consider the 
findings gleaned from a recent case study of the Japanese invasion of 
Singapore in 1941. 
Concept Overview
The Japanese invasion of Singapore case study provides sever-
al pertinent findings. The Japanese were able to overwhelm the 
massed British forces by creating the semblance of a mass of their 
own, though the Japanese traded consolidated mass for the ability 
to maneuver quickly. The Japanese also maintained dominance in 
multiple domains—land, air, and sea. By dominating these areas and 
controlling key infrastructure, the Japanese were able to overwhelm 
the British defenses on Singapore and capture the island. This con-
cept seeks to answer the question of how the Marine Corps can take 
those lessons of multiple domain supremacy, speed, and mass to im-
pact the future of warfare in the modern, dense urban environment. 
The concept specifically focuses on the air domain in and above the 
city. 
56 Loren B. Thompson, U.S. Air Dominance in a Fiscally Constrained Environment: Defin-
ing Paths to the Future (Arlington, VA: Lexington Institute, 2013).
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The Marine Corps set out a vision of distributed operations in 
the Expeditionary Force 21.57 To support the operational intent found 
there, the Marine Corps should entertain creative solutions for oper-
ations within a megacity. This concept entails use of UAS, MAV, and 
RPV systems to augment traditionally piloted aircraft. This concept’s 
operating theme requires the coordinated operation of traditional air-
craft and small air vehicles. To support this concept, small air vehicles 
can assist the commander in three distinct ways: 1) flying in concert/
close proximity to traditional aircraft in support of the mission; 2) pro-
viding real-time NT-ISR capability; and 3) supporting attack and as-
sault support aircraft by providing close air support or NT-ISR support 
to close air support aircraft. 
The Marine Corps creates opportunity for the ground command-
er by exploring the collection of capabilities created by development of 
modern technologies such as small air vehicles. As explained below, 
small air vehicles provide an opportunity for the ground commander 
to increase his ISR collection, to expand assault support missions, and 
to reduce collateral damage while destroying point targets.
Application and Integration of Military Functions
Maneuverability
As previously discussed, the dense urban terrain of a megacity re-
stricts maneuverability for traditional UAS and aircraft systems. To 
maintain sufficient reaction time to enemy threat systems, aircraft must 
fly above the urban horizon. Ensuring traditional aircraft fly above the 
cityscape allows additional time for aircraft survivability systems (ASE) 
and aircrew to react to enemy weapons systems. The ubiquitous RPG 
supports this argument. With a 200–400m range, traveling at approx-
imately 400mph, aircraft have about 2.1 seconds to react. Reaction 
time within an urban environment is complicated further by build-
ings (if flying in or near an urban center) and the ability to identify the 
threat against the background clutter. Though they likely would not 
have substantial ASE, smaller air vehicles are less expensive in both 
57 Expeditionary Force 21: Forward and Ready—Now and in the Future (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters Marine Corps, 2014), 11.
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monetary and human capital, thus their loss is more easily accepted. 
Small air vehicles are not limited by ASE requirements, therefore they 
can maneuver in an urban environment in unprecedented ways. The 
flexibility small air vehicles provide to aviation maneuver yields better 
information to the commander and opportunities for manned aircraft 
to perform tasks to which they are better suited.
The Marine Corps describes both need and method for dis-
tributed operations using the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II 
program (or Joint Strike Fighter) and other elements of the Marine 
Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The 2015 “Marine Corps Aviation 
Plan” defines distributed short take-off, vertical landing (STOVL) op-
erations (DSO) as:
A threat-based limited objective operation which occurs 
primarily when the entire MAGTF cannot be brought to 
bear against the enemy. DSO asymmetrically moves inside 
of the enemy targeting cycle by using multiple mobile for-
ward arming and refueling points (M-FARPs). Using existing 
infrastructure (multi-lane roads, small airfields, damaged 
main bases), DSO provides strategic depth and operational 
resiliency to the joint force.58
Using small air vehicles in addition to current traditional platforms will 
allow the MAGTF greater flexibility in conducting DSOs. Small air vehi-
cles support DSO from a logistical perspective and a close air support 
perspective. 
Logistical Support of DSO
Platforms such as the Lockheed Martin/Kaman K-MAX power lift he-
licopter could provide the MAGTF greater flexibility while reducing 
requirements for traditional aircraft conducting logistics missions. 
The Marine Corps used two K-MAX aircraft in Afghanistan in 2011 
to great acclaim.59 The K-MAX could increase ability to conduct DSO 
58 “Marine Corps Aviation Plan, 2015” (presentation, Headquarters Marine Corps, 2015), 
2.3.
59 Mike McCarthy, “Post Afghanistan: What’s Next for Marines’ K-MAX and Unmanned 
Cargo Supply?,” Defense Daily 258, no. 24 (May 2013): 10. 
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with fewer logistical requirements on other MAGTF aircraft that may 
be needed for more sensitive missions. By July 2014, however, the 
Marine Corps decided they were no longer necessary to operations 
in Afghanistan and the K-MAX program ended.60 K-MAX, or a similar 
system, can easily conduct logistical support to DSO by ferrying fuel 
or armament to specified M-FARP locations. Using K-MAX in addition 
to Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallions and Bell Boeing MV-22B Osprey 
assault support aircraft supports greater flexibility by allowing aviation 
assets to spread the load across the battlespace without increasing 
manned mission requirements. 
Close Air Support of DSO
A traditional Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deploys with four Bell 
AH-1 Cobras, two Bell UH-1N Hueys, and six McDonnell Douglas AV-
8B Harrier IIs. The F-35B Joint Strike Fighter will replace the Harrier 
IIs within the next several years. Small air vehicles could provide ad-
ditional close air support (CAS) capability and flexibility in the con-
duct of DSO. By conducting the DSO mission with both manned and 
unmanned CAS systems, the MEU can spread its capabilities more 
widely.
Integration
Instead of these tools being separated by time, space, and altitude, 
they fly together to conduct their mission. Small air vehicles flying in 
close proximity to traditional aircraft creates problems. For instance, 
no helicopter pilot wants a small air vehicle (regardless of size) flying 
into the helicopter’s rotor systems. A solution to this problem is a prox-
imity signal that prohibits the small air vehicle from coming within a 
certain distance of the aircraft. If the small air vehicle is “slaved” to the 
traditional aircraft (“master”) and mirrors its flight, all while maintain-
ing a safe distance, the likelihood of a collision should be significant-
ly reduced. Without modifying existing airframes, small air vehicles 
can be used in the manner they are used today, where the aircraft 
60 Marina Malenic, “K-MAX Ends Afghanistan Deployment, USMC Studies Data,” IHS 
Jane’s 360, 24 July 2014.
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are programmed for the mission at a certain airspeed, altitude, and 
route. The traditional aircraft simply separate from the unmanned sys-
tems by time, space, or altitude. For logistical missions, the traditional 
means of separation supports the concept but the same method of 
separation would not realize the same results in conduct of a CAS 
mission. For the CAS mission, a slave/master relationship between 
the traditional platform and the small air vehicle would likely provide 
the best support.
Small air vehicles capable of swarming benefit ground and air 
commanders. The new requirement will be for additional analysts or 
information managers for the information swarming air vehicles pro-
duce. To translate information produced by swarming drones into ac-
tionable intelligence, the intelligence structure within the MAGTF will 
require modification. Swarming air vehicles also serve to overwhelm 
enemy defenses.61 The ultimate goal might be for individual maneuver 
units as small as squads or fireteams to deploy multiple small air vehi-
cles in support of fire and maneuver.
In August 1997, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory con-
ducted a 12-day experiment at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat 
Center in Twentynine Palms, California. The Hunter Warrior Advanced 
Warfighting Experiment “took a look at enhancing Marine units’ ef-
fectiveness by utilizing a combination of experimental equipment and 
new warfighting tactics and techniques.” The experiment showed that 
by mixing traditional capabilities with new technologies a small Ma-
rine Corps unit could “provide a forward afloat force with the capability 
to have an operational effect on a larger, capable foe. Hunter Warrior 
proved that it can be done, but not by using new technology alone.”62 
ISR and Targeting
Flying above the city restricts a pilot’s viewing angle to a relatively ver-
tical line of sight. Top-down angles create a dilemma within the meg-
acity, especially where high-rise buildings dominate the cityscape. 
61 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments: A Vulnerability Analy-
sis (Kalkar, Germany: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, 2014), 101.
62 U.S. Marine Corps, “Findings Released on Hunter Warrior Advanced Warfighting Ex-
periment,” press release, 22 August 1997.
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Vertical visibility angles limit ISR, targeting, and fires to top-down 
approaches. In a megacity, top-down ISR allows the analyst access 
only to what is not obscured by various structures. Similarly, top-down 
angles limit targeting and fires to rooftops, entire buildings, or open 
spaces. Destroying entire buildings is unacceptable in a megacity 
where limiting collateral damage should be a priority. Smaller air ve-
hicles level the visibility angle, allowing greater visual access to pre-
viously obscure places. Additionally, small air vehicles can augment 
current platforms in the megacity environment. Imagine the following 
scenario: attack helicopters conducting an escort mission deploy a 
number of swarming MAVs that provide the aircrew with ISR of spe-
cific terrain, a route, or objective area. Those MAVs could increase 
the situational awareness of the escort helicopters by expanding the 
visual range of the aircrew.63 
Optical Sensor Capability
As mentioned previously, operations in a dense urban environment 
have detrimental effects on optical sensors.64 One possible solution is 
removing the limitations to these sensors by mounting them on small 
air vehicles. By mounting a low-light video camera on a small air vehi-
cle, limitations such as thermal reflectivity and the detrimental effects 
of environmental lighting can be eliminated. Imagine a small air ve-
hicle affixing itself to the outside of a building, allowing a camera to 
be placed immediately against the outside surface of a window. This 
theory requires continued advancement of optical sensors and tech-
nology. The research does not address battery capacity, but technol-
ogy exists to allow small drones and MAVs to recharge via prestaged 
inductive charging stations.65 Given the accessibility of existing tech-
63 Norway’s Prox Dynamics developed and manufactured a production-quality helicopter 
“nano air vehicle” called the PD-100 Black Hornet Personal Reconnaissance System. The 
entire system, including two air vehicles, weighs 1.3 kilograms (km) for a 1.5km video da-
talink and 25 minutes of flight. “The $40,000 Nano Drone Used by British, German, and 
Norwegian Army,” Droning On, 1 June 2017.
64 Nathan Storm, “Megacities I: Megacities vs. Aviation Doctrine” (unpublished manu-
script, 17 November 2014). 
65 “The New Skysense Indoor and Outdoor Charging Pads Available Now,” Skysense, 16 
November 2017.
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nologies, the Marine Corps should be willing to use them creatively 
and develop operating concepts with these tools in mind.
Minimizing Collateral Damage
Minimizing collateral damage in a megacity is not only a moral obliga-
tion, but it may also be a military imperative. Innocent civilian and non-
combatant deaths may encourage noncombatants to take up arms 
with enemy combatant forces. Reducing collateral damage may re-
duce the future strength of enemy combatants. One method by which 
to provide precise fires is through the use of small air vehicles instead 
of traditional weaponry. One such concept under development by the 
U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory (USAFRL) and General Dynamics 
are weaponized small air vehicles capable of attacking a specific per-
son with little or no additional collateral damage.66 Another technology 
pursued by the USAFRL is biologically inspired small air vehicles ca-
pable of adaptive flight.67 Using similar technology, local commanders 
can target or reconnoiter key infrastructure, named areas of interest 
(NAIs), or numbered targets. These small air vehicles have the ability 
to enter specific buildings and find the requisite rooms once inside. 
These small air vehicles can discretely prosecute targets without un-
necessary destruction.
These advanced capabilities will not be without a certain level 
of risk and cost. Any small air vehicle that does not autonomously fly 
its mission would certainly be at risk of being hacked by an adversary. 
The informed public likely would not accept a completely autonomous 
version of a micro air vehicle capable of targeting specific people. 
Therefore, these vehicles would require authorization from some re-
sponsible actor leaving open a window of opportunity in which those 
vehicles could be hijacked. The financial cost of developing such a 
product is likely to be relatively high given the current fiscally con-
strained reality. Militarized micro air vehicles also impart moral, ethical, 
and public relations costs on the country that uses such technology. It 
66 “US Air Force Flapping Wing Micro Air Vehicle,” YouTube, video, 4:32, 16 July 2009.
67 Team AFRL, “WOW Technologies, BIO Inspired Flight for Micro Air Vehicles,” YouTube, 
video, 1:38, 28 February 2013.
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is difficult to distinguish between the controversial drone strikes seen 
in the Middle East during the last few years and the potential use of 
militarized MAVs.68 
Necessary Capabilities
The capabilities required for these small air systems are as varied as 
the six functions of Marine Corps Aviation. The full realization of this 
concept requires continued technological development and creative 
application of current technologies. Small air vehicles promise flexi-
bility in their use; developers (civilian and military alike) must also be 
flexible in imagining a future of unmanned air vehicle use. Likewise, 
future leaders should see use of small, unmanned air vehicles as aug-
menting traditional manned aircraft. These systems should operate 
in concert, not independently of each other. The paradigm by which 
manned and unmanned vehicles do not mix should change; to that 
end, the future of Marine Corps Aviation is best maximized by team-
work between both systems. 
CONCLUSION
This concept is a creative solution to an exceedingly difficult problem. 
One can only accept an attempt to distill warfare in a dense urban 
environment such as a megacity to a short document for what it is: a 
possible option to solve one perspective of war fighting within a meg-
acity. Using small air vehicles to augment, support, and extend current 
aviation capabilities will take time, experimentation, and patience. The 
majority of technologies mentioned in this concept already exist, and 
their potential uses are limited only by our own ambitions. The British 
Army bought 160 Black Hornet MAVs for $20 million.69 Likewise, for a 
relatively small sum, the Marine Corps might invest in similar technol-
ogy that could greatly expand Marine Corps Aviation capabilities.
This concept is not merely a collection of current and future ca-
68 Larry Lewis and Diane Vavrichek, Rethinking the Drone War: National Security, Legit-
imacy, and Civilian Casualties in U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations (Quantico, VA: Ma-
rine Corps University Press, 2016).
69 “Spy Master 2013,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 2013, 7, 175.
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pabilities but shows a possible future in which the Marine Corps can 
be better prepared for warfare in a dense urban environment like a 
megacity. Current Marine Corps capabilities prove the force as ca-
pable of dominating the ground and rooftops. The concept offers a 
means by which the Marine Corps can also dominate the space in 
between—in a megacity—this space is within the individual buildings. 
The capabilities offered herein create an opportunity for the ground 
combat element to better perform its mission.
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C H A P T E R T W E LV E
Virtual Resistance Networks
Enabling and Protecting Electronic 
Information Flows in the Megacity
By Colin R. Relihan
Under current Chinese law, Hong Kong residents can 
only vote for preapproved political candidates, making it 
impossible for opponents of Beijing to get on the ballot. 
By September 2014, the situation had frustrated attempts 
by grassroots groups, such as Occupy Central, to achieve 
greater democracy in Hong Kong, leading to a weeklong 
boycott of classes led by Scholarism, a student group.  
Approximately 13,000 students campaigned against Chi-
na’s encroachment on Hong Kong’s governance. The pro-
tests expanded when the Occupy Central movement and 
Scholarism-led campaign combined. Riot police advanced 
on the protesters in Hong Kong’s Admiralty district in the 
territory’s worst incident of civil unrest in decades, leaving 
38 people injured and hospitalized and 78 arrested.
The development of megacities and the rapidly evolving information 
and communications technology environment likely will overwhelm 
traditional approaches to intelligence and information operations (IO). 
Megacities are the focal point for a vast array of electronic and physi-
cal networks with highly globalized social and economic connections. 
Rapid demographic change can stymie any military force’s attempt 
CHAPTER TWELVE
292
to gain an understanding of the battlespace. Information and com-
munications innovations such as big data analytical techniques and 
social media offer new opportunities to understand human terrain. 
These same technologies create new ways for IO planners to push 
narratives to target audiences on a massive scale. More people are 
now able to register their reactions to political change in an accessi-
ble, open-source environment such as the internet than ever before. 
Crowd-sourced intelligence has proven useful for military operations 
without a human adversary, such as foreign humanitarian assistance 
and disaster response (HADR). The explosion of social media and oth-
er communications platforms can simplify the task of building a “so-
cial radar” for monitoring sociopolitical developments in electronically 
connected megacities.1 But for military intelligence and IO officers, op-
timism about the ability of Web 2.0 user-generated content to deliver 
endless streams of useful social media information may be premature. 
In the rapidly expanding megacities of the developing world, nonstate 
armed groups—drug cartels, terrorist groups, and ethnic militias—are 
likely to attack and subvert electronic social networks that challenge 
their influence over the operational environment. To prevent the shut-
down of these virtual resistance networks (VRNs) by violence and 
subversion, U.S. military and interagency actors will need to encour-
age higher volume online information flows from local civilians.2 And 
if the American military seeks to use this open-source data to weaken 
militant groups, it must devise engagement, counterintelligence, and 
force protection strategies that safeguard local civilians providing this 
intelligence. 
This chapter recommends that the U.S. military develop ways to 
work with VRNs. While civil society has taken the lead in providing 
technical support to online actors suffering from government cen-
sorship or repression, only the military or other security forces can 
1 Michael T. Flynn et al., “ ‘Left of Bang’: The Value of Sociocultural Analysis in Today’s 
Environment,” Prism 3, no. 4 (September 2012): 17.
2 See Howard Caygill, On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance (New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2015); Bruce Sterling, “War Is Virtual Hell,” Wired, 1 January 1993; and Siobhan 
McEvoy-Levy, Peace and Resistance in Youth Cultures: Reading the Politics of Peace-
building from Harry Potter to the Hunger Games (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
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provide the physical protection necessary to protect VRN participants 
from real-world reprisal. Criminals and militants have long been able 
to deter civilians from sharing information with governments and civil 
society through traditional media, and these groups will likely improve 
their capability to track unwanted information flows in cyberspace as 
well. Because of the decentralized nature of online social networks, 
the military-VRN link will necessarily be an indirect quid pro quo part-
nership. The network provides open-source intelligence and the mili-
tary provides protection. Such a relationship will blur the line between 
intelligence collection, information operations, and civilian security. 
A joint interagency task force can take advantage of the megacity’s 
connectivity, global links, and density to support layered defenses for 
VRNs in the face of armed group coercion. If secured, the VRN can 
provide the basis for an electronic counterinsurgency, particularly 
in environments where local host-nation governance is too weak or 
corrupt to be the focus for resistance. A VRN with thousands of par-
ticipants willing to provide information online can produce massive 
amounts of sociocultural data, security atmospherics, and other in-
telligence for the military commander. These participants can come 
from the local urban area or involve global allies, such as diaspora 
members, activists, and connected commercial actors. 
The development of an open VRN also can serve as an IO objec-
tive in and of itself, as militants will be less able to deter local civilian 
involvement in online information sharing if they see that resistance is 
possible. Effective collective action by the megacity public is only pos-
sible if there is sufficient security. But the solution to physical threats 
to virtual networks may not be found by exerting more direct control—
increased classification of intelligence sources and centralization of 
IO messaging—but by accepting the information decentralization of 
the evolving urban environment. Indirect influence over massive, pri-
vate social networks creates security and IO risks, but open-source 
electronic media provides speed and volume advantages to the mili-
tary planner not available through military and government resources 
alone. 
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NEW INFORMATION NETWORKS 
IN THE MEGACITY: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
Traditional U.S. military doctrine recommends isolating urban areas to 
retain initiative and ability to maneuver, as the high density of people 
and infrastructure can complicate operations.3 Even if physical isola-
tion were achievable, growing electronic connectivity and globalized 
socioeconomic networks makes cutting off the megacity’s informa-
tion links to the outside world next to impossible and generally unde-
sirable. Vital sections of the population rely on internet connectivity 
more and more, particularly youth who form the bulk of mass protest 
movements and criminal/militant groups alike.4 A Pew Research Cen-
ter 2014 study shows that the 18- to 29-year-old generation across the 
developing world is rapidly adopting internet, social networking, and 
smartphone technology far ahead of their older counterparts.5 
This rapid change can be destabilizing. David Kilcullen claims 
that the largely uncontrolled expansion of megacities clustered along 
the world’s coasts, and deeply connected with the rest of the globe, 
will drive future conflict.6 Modern information technologies, connect-
ed youth social movements, and global online activism have already 
helped feed disruptive change throughout the Middle East during the 
2009 Iranian “Green” movement protests and the 2011 Arab Spring, 
as well as the 2014 pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong.7 
Turning off virtual access, whether done by local militant groups, cen-
soring governments, or a U.S. military seeking to exercise control, may 
precipitate a broader regional crisis. Megacities serve as the nodes 
3 Joint Urban Operations, JP 3-06 (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2013), I-2-3. 
4 Yvonne Jewkes and Majid Yar, ed., Handbook of Internet Crime (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 230–55.
5 Emerging Nations Embrace Internet, Mobile Technology: Cell Phones Nearly Ubiquitous 
in Many Countries (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2014), 12–13.
6 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 25, 66.
7 Hooman Majd, “Think Again: Iran Green Movement,” Foreign Policy, 6 January 2010; Jes-
si Hempel, “Social Media Made the Arab Spring, But Couldn’t Save It,” Wired, 26 January 
2016; and Emily Rauhala, “Hong Kong’s Student Leaders Jailed for 2014 pro-Democracy 
Protest,” Washington Post, 17 August 2017.
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for crucial regional and even global social, economic, and electronic 
networks. It is more likely that the U.S. military will find itself trying to 
preserve these linkages to safeguard regional stability than seeking to 
shut them down. 
But if megacity growth, economic globalization, and commu-
nications innovations have made old military solutions to the urban 
battlespace obsolete, they also offer opportunities. Growing pene-
tration of cellular phones, internet, and social media use in develop-
ing world cities provides new opportunities to gather information on 
dense, rapidly changing urban environments.8 Populations that previ-
ously existed in the city’s shadows, living in slums, and participating 
primarily in gray or black markets can now connect to the rest of the 
world through new modes of informational, social, and economic ex-
change. Manuel Castells expresses an optimistic viewpoint, claiming 
that “the emergence of mass self-communication offers an extraordi-
nary medium for social movements and rebellious individuals to build 
their autonomy and confront the institutions of society in their own 
terms and around their own projects.”9 According to Castells, these 
tools later allowed Middle Eastern nonstate groups to coordinate ac-
tivity and disseminate large amounts of information through massive 
many-to-many online networks.10 This information “counter-power” al-
lowed well-organized but largely unarmed groups to challenge state 
repression and censorship during the Arab Spring.11
So new technologies have created new ways for disadvantaged 
populations to coordinate and to participate in urban governance, and 
8 The concepts behind terms such as developed and developing worlds are beyond the 
scope of this chapter. However, additional information on how their complexities may 
impact urban warfare can be found at Tariq Khokhar and Umar Serajuddin, “Should We 
Continue to Use the Term ‘Developing World’?,” Data Blog (blog), World Bank, 16 Novem-
ber 2015.
9 Manuel Castells, “Communication, Power, and Counter-Power in Network Society,” In-
ternational Journal of Communication, no. 1 (2007): 249.
10 The term many-to-many networks refers to information generated and received by mul-
tiple sources, such as social media and other internet-based forms of communication. 
See “1 to Many, Many to Many, and Many to 1—for PR and Inbound,” IMRE (blog), 11 
January 2018.
11 Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012), 42.
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they have done so by increasing the ability of online networks to share 
information publicly. In Nairobi, Kenya, the Map Kibera project allows 
local populations to provide “volunteered geographic information” to 
map previously uncharted sections of the city.12 In New York, the Oc-
cupy Sandy movement used social media–driven crowdsourcing to 
improve distribution of humanitarian aid in the immediate wake of a 
natural disaster.13 Both systems rely on decentralized methods to col-
lect and disseminate information, gaining in speed and volume what 
they lose in direct control. Civil society has taken advantage of these 
techniques, but the military also is capable of leveraging crowdsourced 
information to improve situational awareness. Michael T. Flynn, James 
Sisco, and David C. Ellis rightly caution that geospatial visualization of 
social media “big data” is insufficient on its own for good sociocultural 
analysis of the potential battlespace.14 But social media’s utility as an 
intelligence source will likely improve, as future urban environments 
will be more saturated with open-source electronic data than in the 
past. Past network analytical products may have focused on nondig-
ital links, such as tribal affiliation or black-market economic ties, but 
urban populations of the future—particularly youth—are more likely 
to organize and communicate online. This shift makes mass collec-
tion and analysis of publicly available online social network informa-
tion more vital than before. If the battlespace’s population lives online, 
then that is where the U.S. military must go to find intelligence.
OPEN SOURCE UNDER AT TACK
Crowd-sourced intelligence has proven useful for missions without 
a clear adversary, such as foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster 
12 Jiri Panek, “The Commercialisation of Public Data—How Does Participatory Data- 
mining Look on a Global Scale?,” South African Journal of Geomatics 2, no. 3 (June 2013): 
234; and Douglas E. Batson, “Black Spots Are No Treasure Island: Land Tenure and Prop-
erty Rights in Megacities,” in Understanding Megacities with the Reconnaissance, Sur-
veillance, and Intelligence Paradigm, ed. Charles R. Ehlschlaeger (Vicksburg, MS: Topical 
Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment and U.S. Army Engineer Research Development Cen-
ter, 2014), 41.
13 Eric Ambinder et al., The Resilient Social Network: @OccupySandy #SuperstormSandy 
(Falls Church, VA: Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, 2013).
14 Flynn et al., “‘Left of Bang’,” 17.
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relief, but harnessing social media analysis in a conflict environment 
raises new problems. Criminals, terrorists, and insurgents have always 
targeted local nationals who report on their activities to state or for-
eign authorities. They will likely continue to do so against perceived 
internet or social media informants, attacking and subverting elec-
tronic networks that challenge their influence over the operational en-
vironment. States such as Iran, Egypt, China, and others have clamped 
down on online dissent with varying levels of success, but nonstate 
armed groups will increasingly target civilian electronic networks as 
well. 
Many militant groups and criminal organizations will likely emerge 
as a hybrid electronic-physical threat, integrating electronic warfare 
strategies with their traditional ability to use violence to deter civilians 
from participating in open-source resistance networks. They will often 
better understand local environments, complicating security force re-
sponse by nesting themselves among the most dispossessed groups 
in the city and developing difficult-to-target transnational links. Some 
of their strategies are simple information denial, such as with the Is-
lamic State’s 2014 shutdown of Mosul’s cell towers ahead of an ex-
pected Iraqi counteroffensive.15 Others are more sophisticated, such 
as Mexican drug cartel Los Zetas’ communications arm, La Direccion. 
It reportedly collects electronic intelligence to prevent law enforce-
ment, rival cartels, and the public from interfering in its drug and other 
illicit businesses.16 In some cases, state/nonstate armed group online 
collusion will emerge, possibly as seen during the 2007 and 2008 Es-
tonia and Georgia cyberattacks. There is widespread suspicion that 
Russian organized crime used its hacking capabilities to support a 
state’s political aims.17 Groups that mix criminal entrepreneurs and 
political motivations are especially likely to have the resources and 
willingness to pursue this hybrid strategy against VRNs.
15 “Communications Shut Down: Why Extremists in Mosul Have Blocked All Telecommu-
nications,” Niqash, 4 December 2014.
16 George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2010), 188.
17 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Cyber Warfare: A “Nuclear Option”? (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2012), 22–23.
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In a 2010 speech on internet freedom, then U.S. secretary of 
state Hillary Clinton claimed that “information has never been so free,” 
recognizing that state censorship posed one major threat to internet 
freedom.18 But nonstate armed groups pose a different threat, us-
ing coercion to prevent VRNs from developing, imposing what John 
P. Sullivan called “zones of silence” when he described the cartel- 
dominated information environment in northern Mexico.19 If the U.S. 
military operates in a future megacity conflict and does not protect 
these VRNs from militant intimidation, it will have little social radar to 
monitor. 
Events in the Middle East—primarily the 2011 Arab Spring but 
also the 2009 Iranian Green Revolution—are among the most com-
monly cited examples of the future role played by social media net-
works in fostering resistance networks.20 Twitter, Facebook, and 
cellular phones all allowed antigovernment activists to organize pro-
tests and share information with the outside world. During the Arab 
Spring, government countermeasures to limit protester access to the 
internet largely failed. Local activists and their international support-
ers developed innovative workarounds for continued access, such as 
a program that evaded an Egyptian internet ban by converting voice-
mail messages into online text “tweets.”21 Cyberspace-only repres-
sion strategies failed, but elsewhere hybrid physical-digital strategies 
met with greater success. Also in 2011, but across the Atlantic, the 
hacker network Anonymous launched Op Cartel, threatening to reveal 
information on Los Zetas members and Mexican government asso-
ciates to the public. Los Zetas did reportedly release an Anonymous- 
associated Mexican hacker, but countered the larger threat to reveal 
information by claiming it would kill 10 random citizens for every name 
18 Hillary Clinton, “Internet Freedom” (speech, Washington, DC, 21 January 2010).
19 John P. Sullivan, “Attacks on Journalists and ‘New Media’ in Mexico’s Drug War: A Power 
and Counter Power Assessment,” Small Wars Journal, 9 April 2011. 
20 Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope, 53–66, 94–105; and James Jay Carafano, Wiki 
at War: Conflict in a Socially Networked World (College Station: Texas A&M University 
Press, 2012), 57–62.
21 Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope, 61–66.
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released.22 States may feel constrained from using extreme violence 
against online informants and activists, but many gangs, terrorist or-
ganizations, and other nonstate threats that proliferate in developing 
world megacities will feel no such restraint. 
In this contested environment, enabling and protecting online 
information networks is difficult because their source of strength also 
makes them fragile. According to James Jay Carafano’s study of elec-
tronic social networks and conflict, only a few actors in any online 
information network—broadcasters—are responsible for the vast ma-
jority of activity linking different network segments.23 Nonstate armed 
groups can quiet whole networks just by intimidating or killing the 
most active broadcasters. Potential social network participants face a 
collective action problem as broadcasters create value for all network 
members who want to resist militant influence. However, in the face of 
widespread intimidation, few or none are willing to take on these cru-
cial, but vulnerable, nodal positions in an online information network. 
Violence deters anyone from exercising the crucial “network-making” 
power that creates links between subnetworks and ensures sufficient 
information flow among the members.24 Without these key actors, lo-
cal civilians are likely to act rationally and rely on “self-help” strate-
gies that increase their personal security without providing broader 
resistance.25 But without coordinated action, thousands of individual 
rational decisions to avoid attracting any reaction from a violent cartel 
or militant group—gated neighborhoods, shuttered newspapers, and 
mass migration to safer areas outside the urban area—destroy the 
city’s resilience. 
Stephen Graham called this tendency urbicide when describing 
wartime Baghdad, where walls, security guards, and other security 
measures broke down the vital economic and social activity that gave 
22 Damien Cave and Ravi Somaiya, “Facts Blur as Online Feud Ends in a Draw,” New York 
Times, 4 November 2011; and Scott Stewart, “Anonymous vs. Zetas Amid Mexico’s Cartel 
Violence,” Security Weekly, Stratfor, 2 November 2011.
23 Carafano, Wiki at War, 8–9.
24 Manuel Castells, “A Network Theory of Power,” International Journal of Communica-
tions, no. 5 (2011): 776.
25 John Bailey, The Politics of Crime in Mexico: Democratic Governance in a Security Trap 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014), 75.
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the city life.26 Preventing urbicide and zones of silence is particularly 
relevant for megacities of the future, which will serve as the center of 
regional and even global economies. Graham admonishes that turn-
ing off informational, economic, and other flows in an attempt to man-
age the security situation is a form of “suicide.”27 Conventional military 
operations commonly disrupt and destroy, but information-centric 
megacity warfare seeks to protect civilian open-source networks and 
create resilience. To prevent urbicide and restart the city’s circulation, 
intervening military forces will need to address two broad categories 
of action: countering zones of silence and protecting VRNs. These ef-
forts will require intervention strategies based in both cyberspace and 
the physical world. 
COUNTERING ZONES OF SILENCE
A healthy, active online information environment will provide analysts 
sufficient data to exploit methods, such as sentiment analysis and 
social network mapping, to build up an intelligence picture of the 
urban battlespace. But this may not initially be possible for many 
neighborhoods where zones of silence have developed. Combining 
geotagged tweets, other social media posts, and telecommunications 
infrastructure in a common visualization will allow the joint task force 
commander to identify the areas of the city that produce little secu-
rity or sociocultural atmospheric information. There may be multiple 
reasons for a lack of information emerging from a neighborhood. Mili-
tant groups may be intimidating the local population, who are deterred 
from providing online resistance or information. The next section will 
look at U.S. military options when nonstate armed groups are creat-
ing these data black holes by targeting online information networks. 
These techniques also may prove useful if the reasons for silence are 
rooted in a neighborhood’s lack of economic development or political 
apathy resulting from being ignored by the host-nation government. 
There are several measures U.S. military elements can take to 
raise the “volume” of online networks. Communications and engineer-
26 Stephen Graham, Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism (London: Verso, 
2010), 241.
27 Graham, Cities Under Siege, 264.
CHAPTER TWELVE
301
ing detachments can increase the local population’s ability to access 
online networks, especially if militant groups respond to civilian re-
porting by attacking or subverting existing internet or cellular infra-
structure. Instead, the task force can crowd seed internet connections 
by sowing Wi-Fi hubs or cheap internet-accessible mobile phones 
throughout the megacity. This can help ensure free online connec-
tions available to civilians interested in reporting on security issues. 
Partnerships with local businesses and civil society can build further 
sources of resilience and a positive local-centric IO message. Engi-
neering elements can partner with local information technology (IT) 
firms to provide a broadband backbone for the megacity. Increased 
bandwidth will allow local civilians to not only post text on social me-
dia, but better enable use of camera phone and video capabilities to 
improve the quality and impact of their messages. The Arab Spring 
and Iranian Green Revolution experiences showed that the more op-
tions for online resistance, the better. Multimodal systems reliant on 
no single transmission conduit and using multiple available technolo-
gies offers flexibility to local populations if militants threaten one com-
munication platform or another.28 
Besides direct involvement in building information infrastructure, 
engagement with local business and IT communities can help reduce 
zones of silence. Even in developing countries, megacities may be 
centers for a nation’s telecommunications investment and IT elite. 
Developing world urban centers as diverse as Bangalore, India; Mon-
terrey, Mexico; and Cairo, Egypt, are regional IT and media centers. 
The city’s IT business sector and universities are likely sources of 
computer-savvy individuals for the host nation, civil society, or adver-
sary, so the U.S. military should treat them as key human terrain. 
Engagement with these groups provides three potential advan-
tages. First, they provide local knowledge of the operational environ-
ment, which can be vital in developing strategies to encourage local 
participation in online networks. Second, they provide credibility. U.S. 
military efforts to build Wi-Fi networks or develop social media plat-
forms may raise suspicion from many urban populations worldwide, 
28 Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope, 61–66. 
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but locally developed initiatives will likely be more acceptable. For ex-
ample, in cartel–plagued Monterrey, Mexico, local businesses helped 
develop Tehuan, a social network focused on public safety reporting.29 
Because of its potential role as a force multiplier and IO conduit, U.S. 
military outreach to a megacity’s business/IT sector is crucial in cre-
ating information advantage in a social media–saturated environment. 
Finally, the adversary also can attempt to take advantage of this ele-
ment of the human terrain to boost their information operations. For 
example, some IT workers in Bangalore, India, have created greater 
instability by providing logistic support to Islamist terror groups.30 En-
gagement that not only fosters communication but economic devel-
opment keeps these key cyberspace actors employed and less likely 
to provide services to nonstate armed groups.
Information dispersal is another option to combat zones of si-
lence. The military can leverage transnational partners, such as dias-
pora organizations or multinational corporations with interests in the 
target megacity. Civil affairs or Department of State personnel can 
engage local civil society through these transnational actors. Local 
actors are more apt to provide intelligence if it is passed through a 
trusted intermediary via more secure, but still private, means such as 
virtual private networks (VPNs), financial remittance systems, and cor-
porate reporting mechanisms. Having multiple information conduits 
inside and outside the megacity for local actors to push security re-
porting provides the layered, resilient defense necessary to protect 
online information networks participants from discovery, while still 
maintaining the volume and IO advantages of an open-source net-
work. Other mission sets will address the civilian network’s security 
concerns more directly.
PROTECTING VIRTUAL 
RESISTANCE NETWORKS
If the U.S. military and interagency can help local actors connect to 
online networks to ensure mass security reporting, it is vital that the 
29 “Acerca del CIC” [About the CIC], Centro de Integración Ciudadana.
30 Shiva Kumar, “Bangalore Hub of Techie-terror Network,” Times of India, 28 February 
2008.
CHAPTER TWELVE
303
United States develop methods to protect networks threatened by 
nonstate armed groups. The VRN protection mission is critical for two 
closely related reasons. First, civilian open-source networks are frag-
ile, large, and potentially influential, but they often rely on a limited 
number of vulnerable nodes. Broadcasters and network managers 
allow social media systems to produce massive quantities of data by 
linking large numbers to the network. The same quality makes these 
networks fragile if key nodes are targeted. However, this vulnerability 
can simplify the military’s job. If the military can identify and protect 
those key nodes—a popular blogger, a public-minded software devel-
oper, or a locally trusted nongovernmental organization (NGO)—it can 
safeguard the whole information-producing system. 
In a related concept, physical protection—not just cybersecurity 
and network expansion measures—is crucial because it is a mission 
that civil society actors often cannot replicate. During the Arab Spring 
and the 2009 Iranian Green Revolution, outside IT-savvy actors used 
many of the techniques described in the previous section to counter 
zones of silence without outside government assistance. In the face 
of government attempts to restrict protesters’ network access, outsid-
ers—diaspora populations and online activists—enabled local groups 
to maintain access to social media and other communications tools. 
But hackers and diasporas could not provide the physical protection 
local protesters needed. In the case of Cairo and Tahrir Square, local 
soccer fan networks provided necessary muscle to keep government 
security forces away, while in Mexico, bloggers died as host-nation 
security forces were often outgunned and subverted by cartel enforc-
ers.31 Both the U.S. government and private actors have multiple op-
tions to expand opportunities for high-volume social media reporting 
and big data open-source analysis. The U.S. military will often have 
advantages over private actors in terms of resources and access to 
transnational partners, but protecting VRN participants from physical 
reprisal is a task that only government security forces can truly do. And 
31 Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope, 55; Shaun Waterman, “Mexican Anti-Cartel 
Blogger Is Murdered, Decapitated,” Washington Times, 10 November 2011; and “Admin-
istrador de ‘Valor de Tamaulipas’ Anuncia Cierre Definitivo de la Página” [Administrator 
for “Value of Tamaulipas” Announces Final Closure of the Page], El Proceso, 7 April 2013.
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if host-nation security forces are overwhelmed, corrupt, or not locally 
trusted, the U.S. military and its interagency partners may own that net-
work protection mission, both in the physical and cyberspace realms. 
The VRN protection mission consists of two parts: identify and 
protect. The joint task force needs to identify what nodes are most 
critical to the network’s survival and success and which ones are 
most threatened by violent actors. Open-source analysts could identi-
fy key actors within the megacity already at the center of information- 
centric resistance. Traditional counterintelligence capabilities could 
also help identify the reprisal and extortion networks of nonstate 
armed groups. Analysis should move beyond reactive measures to as-
sess preemptively which network nodes are most likely to be targeted 
in the future. Open-source intelligence officers can perform social net-
work analysis to assess which online actors are central to information 
flows. Integrating open-source social media and counterintelligence 
analysis should help assess current threats. The intelligence cell’s ul-
timate goal should be to develop protection measures for civilian net-
work participants even before the militants’ reprisal architecture has 
identified the target. The ability for preemptive protection measures 
is necessary because, once a nonstate armed group has decided to 
intimidate an online informant, it is often too late to reassure network 
members that their activity is safe.
How we reassure key civilian network participants that they can 
continue their organizing activity is crucial. Online activists, journal-
ists, NGOs, and other groups may not trust the U.S. military. Building 
trusted relationships is more important than traditional command and 
control mechanisms. The joint force commander cannot give orders 
to a civilian information network. Attempts to overtly influence the on-
line network would likely backfire by undermining the IO message that 
the local population is creating its own forms of resistance. Interagen-
cy partners may have more credibility in this area, with military intelli-
gence, communications, maneuver, and civil affairs elements prepared 
to support the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and other civilian agencies. Network influence 
and protection boards (NIPBs), consisting of military, intelligence, and 
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other interagency elements active in the megacity would allow for a 
coordinated U.S. government civilian protection effort. Intelligence 
and military members would be responsible for identifying which on-
line activists and groups need protection. NIPB members would de-
conflict which agency will be responsible for each target and decide 
who receives what kind of protection. Intelligence analysts also can 
identify potential sources of support outside the megacity, such as 
diaspora organizations, multinational corporations, or NGO networks. 
NIPB members can then arrange for other U.S. government elements 
to engage those out-of-theater organizations. 
The military component is well-suited to address physical protec-
tion concerns. Civil affairs and security assistance teams can engage 
with civil society and business organizations to improve physical se-
curity measures. Training can be offered through secure online means 
so as to avoid associating the network node too closely with the U.S. 
government. Military patrols in commercial areas can increase civilian 
confidence and reduce opportunities for militant extortion teams to 
operate. Finally, countersurveillance and close protection teams can 
respond to immediate threats or cover particularly critical information 
nodes. Special operations forces can focus direct action operations 
against a nonstate armed group’s reprisal and cyberspace teams. 
As nonstate armed groups increase their options for identifying on-
line informants, U.S. military and interagency elements will need to 
prepare for multiple avenues of subversion from the militants’ repri-
sal architecture. Los Zetas operations in northern Mexico during the 
past several years suggest that future nonstate armed groups may 
exploit three broad capabilities to identify online VRN participants.32 
They can use traditional informant networks to identify online activists 
with insufficient offline operations security measures. Nonstate armed 
groups (NSAG) can develop organic computer network exploitation 
capabilities to identify VRN participants, possibly by recruiting local 
IT professionals. Finally, they can bribe law enforcement and security 
32 Krepinevich, Cyber Warfare, 22–23; Grayson, Mexico, 188; and Stewart, “Anonymous vs. 
Zetas Amid Mexico’s Cartel Violence.” 
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personnel into providing them access into a country’s telecommuni-
cation infrastructure. 
Improving nonstate cyberspace capabilities highlights the need 
of the joint task force or interagency to support virtual protection mea-
sures through programs to improve network participants’ cyberse-
curity. It may be impossible to prevent a determined militant reprisal 
team from identifying some online activists, but cybersecurity experts 
inside and outside the U.S. government can provide training and tools 
to increase the likelihood of remaining anonymous. Cyber protection 
teams provided by U.S. Cyber Command, USAID contractors, or part-
nered NGOs may be most effective in improving civilian online security 
practices, with local threat and trust levels driving the NIPB’s decision. 
Outside diaspora and civil society are another avenue of cybersecu-
rity support, as local actors are more likely to provide intelligence if 
it is passed through a trusted intermediary. Having multiple security 
programs inside and outside the megacity helps provide the layered, 
resilient defense necessary to protect the VRN while still maintaining 
its open-source advantages. Encouraging and protecting sources of 
crowd-sourced intelligence online can address all elements of this lay-
ered defense—focused on anonymity, dispersal, and mass. This may 
increase overall civilian security if it even partially replaces nondigital 
institutions, such as analog media like newspapers and radio stations 
with targetable physical addresses. 
The military’s final contribution to protect online information net-
works is to prevent catastrophic subversion of the network. Besides 
the node-specific NIPB effort, the intelligence cell also needs to mon-
itor the “commanding heights” of the electronic domain in the urban 
battlespace, including the city’s telecommunications infrastructure, 
host-nation law enforcement, and the IT sector (both businesses and 
universities). Extorted telecom executives, unemployed computer sci-
ence graduates, and corrupt police wiretap officers may provide mili-
tants with access to subvert online information networks on a massive 
scale. Joint task force counterintelligence activity, commercial and 
academic liaisons, and patrols of key IT-related terrain all reduce the 
chances of a catastrophic subversion of the whole information net-
work. Focusing interagency anticorruption efforts on government ac-
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tors with greatest access to telecommunications networks may also 
mitigate risk. In the end, protecting online information networks is 
similar to other aspects of military operations in the megacity. It favors 
resilient systems and open information flows over disruption, destruc-
tion, and urbicide. 
THE ELECTRONIC COUNTERINSURGENCY: 
TRANSFERRING VRN PROTECTION 
TO THE HOST NATION
Effective collective action by the megacity public is only possible if 
they can organize and share information, but only with sufficient se-
curity. The U.S. military helps create security and local resilience by 
expanding information access, creating electronic safe havens, and 
creating positive feedback loops between the U.S. government and 
the local population. U.S. forces may develop an indirect information- 
for-security quid pro quo relationship with these networks, but this is 
an indirect connection. Indirect influence over massive, private social 
networks creates security and IO risks. The military cannot control the 
VRN’s message, and the intelligence cell will need to verify the most 
critical elements of VRN-provided intelligence to provide a safeguard 
of militant subversion of the network. But open-source electronic me-
dia provides speed and volume advantages to the military planner not 
available through military and government resources alone. The fact 
that the military commander cannot control these online information 
networks reinforces their power as information source and change 
agent. 
If protected and access is assured, online information networks 
are likely to grow. A large enough network could provide sufficient 
quantities of intelligence that would allow government forces to coun-
teract nonstate armed threats. The large network itself could also 
serve an IO purpose by its continued public existence in the face of 
militant disapproval, rallying others to see resistance as possible. This 
is another advantage of an open-source network over a clandestine 
one. If adversaries attempt to break it but fail, the network becomes 
stronger. 
As time passed, continued reporting from the online information 
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network could allow the U.S. government to shift responsibility back to 
host-nation security forces. As seen in locations as diverse as Mexico, 
Egypt, and Hong Kong, online civilian networks will commonly push 
anticorruption messages and other campaigns designed to compel 
improvements in host-nation government and security force perfor-
mance. As the online information network matures, the immediate 
militant threat recedes, and the activists’ ability to monitor corruption 
improves. This may enable the military to work with DOD or Justice 
Department-vetted host-nation security or law enforcement units. The 
joint task force could transfer its network protection duties, including 
the NIPB, to these trusted host-nation elements, creating intermediate 
structures that would survive the U.S. military’s departure. This could 
support the long-term U.S. end state of enabling host-nation security 
structures to manage the militant threat after the U.S. military’s with-
drawal. In Castells’s words, the information networks shift from a “net-
work of outrage” focused on militant coercion to a “network of hope,” 
a change agent that provides grassroots pressure for longer-term im-
provements in civilian security.33 
CONCLUSION
Current military doctrine focuses on avoiding a fight in urban areas, 
isolating them whenever possible. But megacities are too vital to cede 
to insurgents, drug cartels, and terrorists, as they serve as economic, 
social, and political hubs on a regional and global scale. While meg-
acities create many problems, growing so quickly multiplies security 
and governance issues for U.S. partner countries, and these countries 
require the economic vitality these urban areas produce. As a result, 
warfighting doctrines that disrupt or isolate those crucial flows threat-
en a country’s overall health. Physical barriers, such as those built in 
Baghdad or Belfast, are isolating, as are barriers in the information-
al environment. NSAG can threaten the megacity’s electronic flows, 
threatening the local population, corrupting host-nation institutions, 
and preventing local reporting of security threats. Information flows 
33 Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope. 
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such as these are the urban area’s central nervous system, sending 
messages that drive change within private and public-sector institu-
tions to counter threats to the megacity’s well-being.
Enabling online information flows and the VRN protection mis-
sion allows U.S. military forces to help restart those flows where vio-
lent and subversive actors have been able to impose zones of silence, 
leaving the host-nation government incapable or too compromised to 
respond. Civil society may exist but remains incapable of coordinated 
resistance in the face of NSAG threats. But a U.S. military/interagency 
task force can take advantage of emerging trends in the megacity to 
boost the local population’s own ability to report and resist. Increasing 
electronic connectivity globally provides new options to develop forms 
of online “counterpower” to militant and criminal influence, in the form 
of the VRN. Globalization creates new communities of interest outside 
the megacity that can support the VRN’s development. The megacity’s 
own vitality, in the form of dense commercial and social networks, can 
become a mechanism to jump-start reporting. The VRN can support a 
public intelligence cycle whereby increased reporting by network par-
ticipants on security threats improves the military’s ability to protect 
the VRN. Traditional military capabilities, such as counterintelligence 
and special operations direct action, buttress the VRN in areas where 
the public does not have the will or capacity to act. 
But the end-state goal of enabling and protecting VRNs is to 
make U.S. military intervention unnecessary. The U.S. military and in-
teragency enable the VRN to grow in its early stages, helping it over 
the threshold of the collective action problem. Over time, it should 
acquire its own momentum, building its own links to the global com-
munity and developing its own tools for online security. In the long 
run, the VRN supports real-world civil society mechanisms, such as 
NGOs and media organizations, previously weakened by militant co-
ercion. Ultimately, the VRN may challenge the host nation’s own poor 
security and governance performance, whether a result of corruption 
or limited capacity. VRNs based in the megacity, a likely stronghold 
of political and economic strength, are well-placed to pressure the 
host-nation government to improve its performance and provide secu-
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rity. VRNs thus protected and shepherded are able to reestablish the 
feedback loop between the government and the governed. This will 
enable U.S. military forces to hand responsibility back to host-nation 
forces, with politically active VRN members providing the incentive to 
counter future threats in the target megacity. 
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C H A P T E R T H I R T E E N
The City Prism
A Triangle of Urban Military Operations
Henrik Breitenbauch, Mark Winther, 
and Mikkel Broen Jakobsen1
Haiti saw a resurgence of political and economic actions 
along with a newly elected leader in 2006, which would 
prompt the United Nations to extend the mandate of the 
UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). In Port-au-
Prince, Haiti, however, the heavily armed gangs controlled 
the streets and the city’s slums. Gang leaders garnered 
support from the local population through fear and intim-
idation, but also by providing services they could not get 
from the government. The MINUSTAH actions to counter 
the gangs was implemented in a gradually escalating se-
ries of military operations attacking the gangs from multiple 
perspectives.
 
INTRODUCTION 
Cities are centers of power and resources, and power and resources 
drive political conflicts. Where there are people, there are conflicts. In-
creasing urbanization also means a rising number of political conflicts 
in urban areas. Some of these conflicts will be violent, ranging from 
1 All authors are affiliated with the Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen.
CHAPTER TH IRTEEN
312
organized crime and forceful political factions to armed resistance 
and civil war, often with international dimensions. Some of these vio-
lent conflicts and its actors will merely be criminal, a bane to the local 
population, while others will be a threat to national or internation-
al stability, including transnational terrorism. Because of population 
growth, urbanization, and poor government, the problem will there-
fore remain—and likely become further—politically, strategically, and 
militarily relevant in the decades to come.2
As has already been visible in the campaign to defeat ISIS, West-
ern political leaders will increasingly be faced with choices of whether 
to authorize the implementation of various kinds of military operations 
in urban terrain (MOUT) to influence or force an end to such conflicts. 
Western military and civilian organizations must therefore analyze and 
make plans to deal with such operations. The combination of the in-
creased share of cities in future operational environments and chang-
es in the Western approach to military operations—including broader 
political intentions regarding stability and the imperative to protect ci-
vilians—poses conceptual and practical challenges for the state and 
its military and civilian organizations.
When faced with a city as a military problem, the preferred op-
tions have traditionally been: avoid them (or lay a siege), or raze them 
to the ground. Because of the urban topography, the city represents 
a fundamental challenge for armed forces, as it complicates military 
activities, such as reconnaissance, the exchange of fire, communica-
tions, and even simple transport. This all combines to reduce consid-
erably the ability to acquire an understanding of a situation. Streets 
2 Urban military operations force us to think more holistically about what it is that the mil-
itary instrument is meant to achieve, but this thinking does not appear automatically. The 
authors would like to thank Benjamin Jensen for inspirational conversations on, among 
many other things, the 2015 megacities study with his colleagues at the U.S. Army Chief 
of Staff’s Strategic Studies Group. See Col Marc Harris, USA, et al., Megacities and the 
United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future (Arlington, VA: Office 
of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, 2014). Parts of this chapter stem 
from a report on MOUT published by the Centre for Military Studies at the University of 
Copenhagen in Danish. See Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch et al., Byens prisme: Tendenser og 
udfordringer for militære operationer i urbant terræn (Copenhagen: Centre for Military 
Studies, University of Copenhagen, 2016).
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and alleyways are transformed into gorges and gullies that limit com-
munications and provide defending forces with perfect conditions for 
carrying out ambushes. Intervening military forces have therefore tra-
ditionally sought either to avoid this theater of operations entirely or, 
if they possessed adequate firepower, to neutralize the significance 
of the theater by totally destroying the city without considering the 
civilian population.
But two factors combine to challenge the Western military orga-
nization to think differently and conceive of how to engage operation-
ally with the city. Political demand for broad counterterrorist efforts 
also include urban operations through warfighting, peace operations, 
and special forces operations, including combinations of these to pro-
vide stabilization. At the same time, Western expectations shaping the 
use of armed force dictate an increasing political requirement for fol-
lowing international humanitarian law (IHL) and other kinds of norma-
tive regulations that work against extensive use of firepower.3 
Because urban operations are notoriously difficult, they are 
at the same time prisms of a larger set of conceptual problems for 
Western military operations. Since the end of the nineteenth century, 
Western militaries have, to a large extent, turned into pure warfighting 
organizations or institutions that exist functionally, as well as at the 
level of professional self-understanding, to use lethal force to fight 
and win wars. This division of labor between warfighting and other 
security tasks has not been fully implemented for the reason that the 
state that controls the military institution occasionally (and some-
times often) also requires the military to continue carrying out securi-
ty tasks other than annihilating the enemy, as was the case in earlier 
days. The task of policing in various meanings of the word (not all of 
them civilian) thus continues to haunt Western militaries as a kind 
of professional phantom pain. Western militaries live with a tension 
between their intentional design (as lethal organizations) and their 
3 IHL refers to “a set of rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects pe-
ople who are not or are no longer participating in hostilities and restricts the means and 
methods of warfare.” See “War & Law,” International Committee of the Red Cross.
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political taskers (to not only deter and, if need be, win wars but also to 
bring conflicts to a peaceful end). Add to this situation the complex-
ities of a quickly growing population in the Global South (a.k.a. the 
Third World), much of it in megacities outside of formal government 
control and governance. 
Western military leaders are therefore faced with a triple chal-
lenge: to increase organizational self-awareness of the warfighting 
paradigm and its limits (not to destroy it, but to help supplement it 
and shift gears when necessary); to engage continuously with the 
political requirements of policing (or peace operations); and to face 
the new reality of a fast-growing world with battlefields of a size 
where Western militaries may be able to dominate locally but not 
seize or hold terrain at a broader scale, including the human ter-
rain. Urban operations challenge us to rethink our approach to con-
ventional operations, particularly regarding the ability to operate in 
the absence of territorial control and to solve or support civilian 
police work—both of which fall outside of a twentieth century self- 
understanding of the military organization.
This chapter introduces a model depicting a triangular space of 
military operations that enables us to derive and discuss some im-
portant overall dynamics of MOUT—dynamics that are typical of this 
broader set of dilemmas and tensions facing Western military opera-
tions, in particular in the Global South. 
While the model is a transparent and systematic conceptual con-
struct, it is also merely a heuristic device enabling the structured use 
of ideal types to derive a broader analysis. It is not predictive, and it 
is not meant to be an exhaustive illustration of all military operational 
activities. But what it lacks in detail it makes up for in reach: the mod-
el fundamentally challenges the implicit argument of the spectrum of 
conflict that has undergirded much of U.S. and NATO doctrine devel-
opment since the 1990s. This full spectrum approach tacitly proposes 
that the ability to conduct operations at the lower and middle level 
of the conflict spectrum is included in the ability to conduct high- 
intensity operations. The operations triangle shows how there is an 
inherent tension between the two problems sets and corresponding 
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capabilities—and that these cannot be seen, according to Thomas P. 
M. Barnett, as “lesser includeds” in overall defense planning.4 
Two main sections follow. In the first, the operations triangle is 
introduced, and in the second section, it is applied to the urban envi-
ronment to identify implications relating to each operations’ ideal type 
as well as the dynamic mix required for stabilization operations. Final-
ly, we sum up and discuss takeaways. 
THE OPERATIONS TRIANGLE 
Military operations vary with respect to their ends and means. The 
nature of the city renders the ends more complicated to realize and 
the operative means more difficult to use. Based on experiences from 
operations in Mogadishu, Somalia; Port-au-Prince, Haiti; Sarajevo, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; and other conflicts in the 1990s, General 
Charles C. Krulak, in his concept of “Three Block Warfare,” points out 
that in order to be effective, military forces must sometimes simultane-
ously carry out classic combat operations, peacekeeping operations, 
and humanitarian aid all within a three-block area.5 Krulak’s remark-
able analysis briefly summarizes a fundamental—possibly the most 
fundamental—strategic challenge to military operations; operations 
do not become successful via combat alone, but  they often consist of 
complex and not necessarily mutually helpful tasks and capabilities. 
This section introduces a new way to think holistically about 
military operational activities. First, we introduce three fundamental 
distinctions between the different attributes a military operation may 
have. Second, these systematic distinctions are then used to define 
three ideal-type military operations, logically combined in a triangle. 
The idea of the model is that while each corner of the triangle 
represents the pure ideal type, every coordinate inside the triangle 
represents a specific operation, characterized by a mix of the three 
types, in a given moment. A conflict or an operation may, over time, 
4 Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first 
Century (New York: Putnam, 2004).
5 Gen Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” 
Marines Magazine, January 1999. 
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move through the triangle as the dynamic of the conflict shifts, though 
ideally due to the effort of the military operation that is then continu-
ously recalibrated. 
We distinguish between three fundamental ideal types of military 
operations: combat operations, peace operations, and special opera-
tions. The three operation types are essentially different, regardless 
of the environment in which they are carried out. But the differences 
are accentuated in urban environments due to the dense topography. 
We define them by asking whether they: 1) seek or require territorial 
control, 2) seek or require police work, or 3) take place in a very hostile 
environment. The following section unfolds these distinctions to show 
how they are central to the military instrument. 
Territorial Control
The basic purpose of using military force has always been to defend 
one’s own territory or to take control over others’ territory. The forma-
tion of the modern European state made war a matter between states, 
as states proved superior to all other forms of political organization 
with respect to providing the capital and other resources (e.g., sol-
diers) necessary to the waging of war.6
Cities, capitals in particular, are the center of power with respect 
to providing these resources. At the same time, they are the center 
of state institutions and political power. Conquering a capital city is 
therefore to be regarded as entirely decisive for the realization of any 
strategy for obtaining control over the territory of another state.7 Civil 
wars that take place within states are usually the result of conflict be-
tween various political, social, or ethnic groups regarding the control 
of the territory and state apparatus, meaning that they also typically 
play out inside important cities.
Territorial control also can be something other than an end or a 
military objective unto itself. For example, obtaining territorial control 
also can serve as a means to realize a broader political aim than the 
6 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990 –1990 (London: Blackwell, 
1990).
7 Louis A. DiMarco, Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq (Oxford, UK: 
Osprey Publishing, 2012), 15–26.
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military operation itself. Stabilizing a conflict situation—and peace-
making and peacekeeping efforts in general—depends on whether 
there is territorial control. In that sense, territorial control constitutes a 
necessary means and the very foundation in this second type of mili-
tary operation.
However, the exercise of modern military force does not always 
require—or is it always aimed at achieving—territorial control. When 
special military units are deployed behind enemy lines to gather intel-
ligence, evacuate noncombatants, facilitate the introduction of land 
forces, or eliminate strategically important, hostile political and mili-
tary leaders, territorial control is not part of the equation. Here, typical 
for special forces, it is instead about remaining hidden when carrying 
out operations in enemy territory. Territorial control is therefore a sig-
nificant but not ubiquitous objective for military operations.
Traditional Military Operations versus Policing
The formation of the modern European state allowed for a monopoly 
of the use of military force by a government within a given territory.8 
Along with the industrialization and democratization of the Western 
European states, there was an increasing need to maintain law and 
order, and at the same time, calls for limits on the authority of military 
organizations over their own citizens.9 In the European state model, 
this resulted in the crystallization of a state police organization that 
was subject to and entrusted with enforcing the law in relation to its 
own citizens, while the military organization became (almost exclu-
sively) responsible for exercising and maintaining state sovereignty in 
relation to foreign powers. From this point in time—often relatively late 
in the nineteenth century—it makes sense to draw a distinction be-
8 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States; Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Pow-
er, vol. 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760, new edition (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012); Otto Hintze, “Military Organization and the Organization 
of the State,” in The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, ed. Gilbert Felix (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), 178–215; and Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1946), 77–128.
9 Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Re-
sults,” European Journal of Sociology 25, no. 2 (1984): 185–213; and Mann, The Sources 
of Social Power.
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tween work that is carried out by police, including fighting crime and 
maintaining law and order in connection with demonstrations, as op-
posed to work that is carried out by the military, such as the exercise 
of sovereignty in various forms and maintaining the collective defense 
of the state.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the modern West-
ern military organization has largely established its self-understanding 
in terms of foreign and combat-oriented tasks. This relatively recent 
ideal (historically speaking) has been more an aspiration than a clear 
reality. The lengthy experience of the U.S. Marine Corps with stabili-
zation missions in the broad sense in the Philippines and elsewhere 
offers examples of how this functional distinction is not always his-
torically unambiguous.10 Nevertheless, according to Samuel P. Hun-
tington, the military profession has developed into a profession for 
“the management of violence.”11 In the West—and particularly from 
the East–West perspective during the Cold War—this concept was in-
terpreted relatively narrowly as a matter of carrying out high-intensity 
combat operations. 
In connection with the North–South perspective in world poli-
tics, however, it is difficult to reduce the meaning of management of 
violence to a matter of the ability to conduct major combat operations. 
The continued existence, particularly in southern Europe, of constab-
ulary forces (i.e., security forces with a specialty overlapping the two 
extremes, such as carabinieri, policia militar, or gendarme) offers an 
example of the lengthy institutionalization of a functional, society-wide 
need. The distinction between classic military operations that are fo-
cused on combat (against a symmetrical opponent) and other types of 
security-related work involving military and other similar organizations 
is an important theme, especially when Western military forces must 
relate to security challenges outside of the West itself, including urban 
environments.
10 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power 
(New York: Basic Books, 2002).
11 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil- 
Military Relations (Cambridge, UK: Belknap Press, an imprint of Harvard University Press, 
1957), 12.
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When conceiving of the city as a security issue that can ultimate-
ly require the involvement of (foreign) military forces, it is also neces-
sary to think things through in reverse from military operation to the 
city’s problem. This means we must conceive of military operations in 
urban environments more broadly than mere combat operations with 
respect to territorial control. It is necessary to undertake security work 
before, during, and after the actual combat, which by nature is more 
policing than a classic military assignment. Similarly, many of the se-
curity issues emerging from the city itself, and those that risk creating 
instability, call for more of a police response than military action—or 
something in-between. One example could be the creation and main-
tenance of security or order in slums, or other such areas outside or 
on the edge of the territorial control of the state.
Recognizing the need to address this exact type of security is-
sue in the gray area between traditional military and traditional po-
lice work, NATO developed doctrine regarding stability policing.12 The 
need for such police work will always be greatest in cities, as the pop-
ulation and struggle for resources is most intense there, which can 
create conflicts and disrupt the established order. While police-relat-
ed issues are not part of the conventional military understanding, for 
operations in urban environments to be effective, they presuppose an 
analytical understanding of these broader security dynamics, partic-
ularly when the general objective is a gradual transition from combat 
to peace operations.
Hostile Environment 
The third and final parameter for the operation types presented be-
low is based on whether or not the military operation takes place in 
12 NATO’s definition of the tasks that fall within stability policing include, but are not 
limited to, community based policing (patrolling), restoration of public security and 
public order, crowd and riot control, traffic circulation, searches and seizures, criminal 
investigations, high-risk arrests, protection of people (vulnerable groups) and property, 
support to judicial and correction institutions, conduct of forensic activities, support 
to weapon intelligence teams (WIT), counterterrorism, counterorganized crime, crime 
scene management, counterdrug and counterhuman trafficking, war crimes investiga-
tions, and assistance to international courts. For the full list, see Allied Joint Doctrine for 
Stability Policing, AJP-3.22, ed. A, ver. 1 (Brussels, Belgium: NATO, 2016), A1.
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a clearly hostile environment, where deployed forces have a high risk 
of engaging in combat. In this case, the forces may become involved 
in major battles, as in Stalingrad, Soviet Union; Aachen, Germany; 
and Berlin, Germany, during World War II; the battle of Hue, Vietnam, 
during the Vietnam War; the Russian invasion of Grozny in Chechnya; 
or battles in Baghdad, Iraq, during the Iraq War. Here, the objective of 
the military operation is simply to win the war. 
Conversely, where there is not talk of a genuine state of war, the 
deployed forces may play a substantially different role and go about 
very different work, such as the UN presence in Somalia and Mali, 
where the operations are conducted in the tension between main-
taining a fragile peace and restoring this peace in the cases where 
it has been violated. Similarly, operations in large slum areas aimed 
at restoring law and order, such as the Brazilian Army’s efforts in Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil, can be viewed as an example of how the deployed 
forces are not in an actual state of war even if they may be subject to 
intermittent higher levels of threat. The distinction between a security 
environment defined by an actual state of war and one that may be 
merely dangerous is of central importance. 
Three Ideal-type Operations
Given the explanations presented above, figure 13.1 applies the three 
distinctions as intersecting lines. The ensuing logical operational 
space is marked with a triangle. Each corner in the triangle then illus-
trates an ideal typical military operation type.
The first type—combat operation in the lower left hand corner—
is characterized by an actual state of war. In its purest form, the com-
bat operation is characterized by an attempt to seek territorial control 
and a lack of police work. This is the operation type that can best be 
compared with the traditional understanding of “actual war” and is 
aimed at isolating, neutralizing, or ultimately destroying all or part of 
an opponent’s military apparatus to wrest control of the enemy’s mili-
tary capabilities and territories.
The second type of operation—peace operation in the top cor-
ner—is fundamentally about police work. In its purest form, the peace 
operation is marked by an attempt to seek or demand territorial control 
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in a permissive environment without an actual state of war. This type 
of operation is the least military in nature, as it is intended to support 
an already-agreed-upon peace process as opposed to creating peace 
through actual military (combat) operations.
It is important to emphasize that this conceptualization of peace-
keeping operations, as with the other two operation types, is an ideal 
type. In recent years, more robust mandates for UN peace operations 
have shifted actual operations into the area between the ideal types; 
closer to combat operations and further away from the ideal typical 
peace operation. It is precisely this tension that the model illustrates.
The third operation type—special operations in the lower right 
hand corner—is characterized by a lack of attempt at (or even in-
terest in) achieving territorial control. The special operation is also 
marked by a lack of any police work. As the name suggests, this type 
of operation is of a different nature, characterized by surgical strikes 
or pinpoint operations with a short time horizon generally aimed at 
changing the game at the strategic level, sometimes aimed at bring-
ing about the conditions for success for the other two operation 
types. 
Figure 13.1 The ideal operation.
Illustration by MCUP
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The descriptions of these three basic operation types are of a 
purely analytical character. These are neither the only types of military 
operations nor the only way of understanding the relationships be-
tween them. The model simply offers a way of systematically relating 
to the three types of operations and to clarify the relations between 
them. Similar to Carl von Clausewitz’s notion of absolute war, these 
three operation types are to be understood as ideal types and, thus, 
as abstractions.
As the triangle highlights the logical space of military operations 
as defined here, any real world operation will be found somewhere 
between the three corners of the triangle. The triangle is to be under-
stood as a logically defined space within which military operations can 
unfold in practice, with mixed forms evolving dynamically over time. 
Specific military operations include elements from all three operations 
types. The model also shows how specific military operations can be 
further understood as intermediate positions between the three cor-
ners with different characteristics and conditions.
The operations triangle is not linked specifically to MOUT, as the 
distinctions apply in principle to any operational environment. In prin-
ciple, the distinctions apply to any operational environment. They are, 
however, especially accentuated when the operational setting is a city 
due to the difficulty in establishing territorial control and carrying out 
combat operations, just as there is more police work in urban environ-
ments. Altogether, the model enables a more systematic understand-
ing of the challenges facing the military organization when the usual 
dividing lines between the civilian-military spheres are crossed and 
when the city’s dense topography challenges deep-seated military in-
tuitions. 
DIMENSIONS OF URBAN OPERATIONS
This section applies the operations triangle to the urban environment. 
The analysis provides an overview of the relationship between the 
different types of problems, conditions, and challenges in the urban 
environment.
CHAPTER TH IRTEEN
323
Combat Operations
With combat operations, we find ourselves in the part of the opera-
tions triangle corresponding best to the traditional understanding of 
actual war as illustrated by the dark gray parallelogram in figure 13.2.
In an urban environment, combat operations are often of a par-
ticularly harsh and bloody nature, which is in stark contrast to con-
temporary expectations regarding limited damages caused by military 
operations to civilians and civilian infrastructure.13 The urban opera-
tional environment favors the defender, whether they are irregular and 
poorly organized rebel forces with low-tech light firearms and anti-
tank weapons, better-organized and state supported urban guerrillas 
with access to more advanced weapons systems and military (e.g., 
13 See, for example, Neta C. Crawford, Accountability for Killing: Moral Responsibility for 
Collateral Damage in America’s Post–9/11 Wars (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2013).
Figure 13.2 Combat operations.
Illustration by MCUP
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self-seeking ground-to-air missiles, sophisticated antitank weapons, 
and access to real-time satellite imagery of the battlefield), or well- 
organized and well-equipped conventional military forces with access 
to the entire range of (more modern) military capabilities.14
The urban operational environment places extra pressure on all 
of the elements in an intervening Western military force. From a mili-
tary perspective, the multidimensional urban terrain is confusing and 
provides the defending force with almost unlimited opportunity to hide 
and appear anywhere at any time. The impact of the weapons systems 
on both sides of the conflict are reinforced—inadvertently and nega-
tively—when projectiles ricochet uncontrollably along roads and walls 
and the shock waves from detonated grenades cast deadly fragments 
of bricks and glass. Urban combat operations are therefore one of the 
(if not the) most unprofitable, loss-producing forms of military opera-
tions. Add to that the difficulty of attacking through narrow windows 
and staircases and carrying wounded personnel and supplies up and 
down stairs and along streets and alleyways that dictate movements 
and create natural ambushes or are often blocked by collapsed build-
ings, traffic accidents, or other barriers.
Finally, it is important to remember the civilian population that 
has been unwilling or unable to leave the city and that the city’s critical 
infrastructure must be maintained to the extent that, when the fighting 
is over, the city can promptly return to business as usual. This further 
limits the maneuverability of the military, just as it strains the military 
resources in the form of logistical capacity and supplies of food, water, 
medicine, and so forth. The urban environment adds extra challenges 
to the sum of what the military force must be able to handle during a 
combat operation to realize the objective of gaining territorial control. 
This means that the price of this particular kind of operation will inevi-
tably be high, both in terms of resources and human life.
Even so, actual combat operations can be necessary to establish 
14 David E. Johnson, Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 
2011), 171.
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territorial control over nonpermissive urban terrain.15 Multidimension-
al urban terrain and protecting the civilian population and infrastruc-
ture involves challenges that mean that military success requires not 
only the use of considerable resources, a very favorable balance of 
power, and access to advanced, integrated military technologies and 
networks but also extensive preliminary analysis of the city system. 
The latter is necessary to know how to isolate the enemy most effec-
tively, how to minimize losses to forces and civilians as well as col-
lateral damage, and to get an idea of how the city’s subsystems can 
be turned against the enemy. Such broad operational planning can 
render it necessary to carry out further operations, such as acquiring 
intelligence or evacuating civilians in connection with actual combat 
operations to ensure the survival of the city during and after the com-
bat. This further increases the total cost and duration of an operation. 
Few countries (primarily the United States) possess the full range of 
military capabilities required to carry out an urban combat operation 
independently. And even with the necessary resources and military 
capabilities, combat operations in urban terrain will inevitably be asso-
ciated with the massive loss of human life, and the price will therefore 
in all respects be high, including politically.
Special Operations
In contrast to combat operations—classic, ordinary military opera-
tions—special operations are avant-garde military operations that, as 
the name indicates, are of a different nature and carried out as so-
called pinpoint operations or surgical strikes in a more general military 
context. Special operations are not to be understood solely as being 
formally associated with special ops forces, just as combat and peace 
operations are not the exclusive domain of separate military forces. 
15 According to the Counterintelligence Glossary from the Office of the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, nonpermissive urban terrain refers to “an operational environment 
in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a 
unit intends to conduct, do not have effective control of the territory and population in 
the intended operational area (Uncertain Environment); or an operational environment 
in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to oppose or 
react effectively to the operations a unit intends to conduct (Hostile Environment).”
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Instead, the model shows how the operational environment will chal-
lenge conventional forces to think and act like special forces.
As illustrated in figure 13.3, the fundamental characteristic of 
special operations is that territorial control is not a factor. Instead, this 
operation type is characterized by being of smaller scale in time and 
space (hours or days), but nevertheless aimed at achieving a major 
impact on the strategic level—usually in secret—by deploying a small 
but specially trained and equipped unit with great precision.16
Special operations are typically about gathering intelligence, 
reconnaissance (behind enemy lines) for use in connection with 
the planning of future combat operations, and the actual infiltration 
and elimination or capture of capabilities and persons of major mil-
itary-strategic importance. Special operations also have come to in-
clude a broader range of operations with a specific purpose, such as 
16 Iver Johansen, “Special Operation Forces: A Weapon of Choice for Future Operations?,” 
in Military Operations in the 21st Century: Global Trends and the Future of Intervention, 
ed. Per M. Norheim-Martinsen and Tore Nyhamar (New York: Routledge, 2015), 99.
Figure 13.3 Special operations.
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antiterror operations, support to foreign governments in connection 
with, for example, fighting rebel forces (including support to another 
state, such as foreign internal defense), the evacuation of noncomba-
tants from crisis and war zones, and the liberation of hostages.
Finally, it is possible to distinguish between offensive special 
operations in which special forces are directly involved versus indi-
rect special operations in which the contribution consists of devel-
oping the military capabilities of local forces.17 Cooperation with local 
security forces can include the option to call in air support (forward 
air control), developing capabilities and embedded contributions to 
operative units (train and advise or train, advise, and assist). In that 
sense, what is unique about special operations is not that they are de-
signed to conduct one particular task but rather that they can be used 
to carry out a broad range of specialized and hazardous tasks that lie 
outside the capabilities of traditional forces.18 However, special oper-
ations will usually be planned and carried out in close cooperation 
with the various forces, as conducting operations in practice requires 
Service-specific capabilities in connection with logistics, transport, 
and air support.
As highlighted above, achieving and preserving territorial control 
are in themselves demanding challenges that become more difficult 
in an urbanized environment. As this is not the aim of special opera-
tions, they require far less equipment and fewer personnel, meaning 
that this kind of operation is far less costly. That is not to say there are 
not challenges and costs associated with conducting special opera-
tions in urbanized environments, but removing territorial control from 
the equation greatly reduces costs in relation to other operation types, 
particularly in relation to combat operations.
The increasing urbanization of vast territories outside of tradi-
tional state control and reach basically means that the security work 
that intervening forces might wish to undertake is largely pushed down 
to the right corner of the triangle to a much greater extent than was 
17 Johansen, “Special Operation Forces,” 99. The indirect variant is not treated in this sec- 
tion.
18 Johansen, “Special Operation Forces,” 98.
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previously assumed in traditional military doctrine. This is due to the 
massive amount of resources required by the combination of, on the 
one hand, the absolute growth of the urban environments and, on the 
other hand, the force sizing requirements for security operations that 
compare to the population size, not the enemy forces. Even Western 
military efforts in urban environs in the Global South that were origi-
nally conceived in conventional terms will therefore likely be pushed in 
the direction of operating without territorial control. This is not to say 
that they are supposed to operate in the same manner or based on the 
same doctrines as special forces, but rather that the conventional mil-
itary force is facing a serious conceptual challenge. Western military 
forces are challenged to reorient within the framework and conditions 
that traditional special forces are subject to. 
In addition to being characterized by the lack of any attempt at 
seeking territorial control, special operations are characterized by ex-
clusively attending to tasks of a military nature and not taking place in 
an actual state of war, even though the environment in which special 
forces operate will usually be hostile and politically sensitive. As a re-
sult, special operations do not have the same need as the other op-
eration types to coordinate military and civilian measures; compared 
to the more comprehensive combat operation, special operations do 
not typically involve the same amount of fighting. The challenges tied 
to combat activities will be relatively limited when dealing with special 
ops. It is not uncommon, however, for special operations to be carried 
out as an active part of combat activities in connection with a ma-
jor conventional combat operation, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
where special forces were deployed to eliminate the leaders of rebel 
groups and to pinpoint targets for air strikes.19
Similarly, special forces occasionally lose their cover in the 
course of an operation and are forced to engage in hard, direct com-
bat, as was the case when American special forces eliminated Osama 
bin Laden in Pakistan. In such situations, as illustrated in the lower 
19 Special Operations, JP 3-05 (Washington, DC: Joint Chief of Staff, 2014), I-6, I-10; and 
David E. Johnson et al., The 2008 Battle of Sadr City: Reimagining Urban Combat (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand, 2013).
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light-gray triangle in figure 13.3, the special operation, as it takes place 
in an actual state of war, is confronted by a number of the same chal-
lenges described above in connection with major combat operations. 
Similarly, traditional special operations involve training and the devel-
opment of capabilities, which can take place within the entire trian-
gle. For example, special operations can contribute to policing-related 
efforts to stabilize a situation in the upper light-gray triangle in figure 
13.3. Here, special operations face some of the same challenges men-
tioned above in connection with peace operations.
While there can be great variation in the kind of work carried 
out within the many types of special operations, there are common 
features that give rise to a number of general challenges when a spe-
cial operation is confronted by an urban system.20 For most special 
operations, the clandestine nature of the operation is crucial so that 
the enemy is caught off guard on their home turf. It is more difficult, 
ceteris paribus, to keep such an operation secret if it is to take place 
in the middle of a city with 500,000 residents as opposed to open 
terrain, because it is more difficult logistically to transport and deploy 
forces close to the objective without being detected and because—
even if the forces are successfully deployed—there will subsequent-
ly be a significantly greater risk of detection due to the population 
density. The multidimensional physical terrain of the city complicates 
the practical deployment of special forces, while the population den-
sity poses constant risk of being exposed. If special forces manage 
to go undetected, the operation will nevertheless still be challenged 
by having to operate in the complex physical terrain of the city, which 
therefore requires thorough previous knowledge. In contrast to both 
combat and peace operations, special ops do not have to grant the 
same considerations to the other systemic elements of the city—to 
protect the city’s infrastructure and living conditions—as the opera-
tion has a narrow objective, limited in time and space without seeking 
to influence the city’s systems in the longer term. Conversely, having 
an impact on infrastructure (protection, contribution to rebuilding or 
20 For a more comprehensive list, see Special Operations, 10–11.
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construction, or destruction) can be a significant element in nonter-
ritorial involvement with the local political network as a step toward 
establishing political control. Comprehensive, robust intelligence, 
including on the political situation and history, is just as essential a 
condition for success for special operations as for the other opera-
tions.
Should a special operation be exposed, the special forces typi-
cally find themselves in a combat-like scenario and might well have to 
nevertheless deal with some of the challenges tied to the city system, 
including limiting civilian losses and minimizing the damage to criti-
cal infrastructure. This consideration, together with a possible lack of 
familiarity with the physical terrain, can limit the capacity to provide 
effective support to the operation, such as air support. Moreover, even 
if the special operation is carried out with support from other Services, 
the special forces—unless the operation is part of a conventional 
combat operation—will often find themselves alone on the ground 
and heavily outnumbered in direct combat. This can necessitate an 
evacuation that, like the deployment itself, is more complicated and 
involves more risks in cities than elsewhere due to the complex physi-
cal terrain; for example, it might not be possible to land aircraft or even 
a helicopter. The potential for disaster was demonstrated in the failed 
1993 special operation in Mogadishu in support of UN humanitarian 
efforts, where two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down, American 
elite soldiers were cut off from their base, and a large-scale evacuation 
became necessary, ultimately resulting in 84 wounded and 19 dead 
American soldiers.21
Special operations are usually conducted as surgical strikes over 
a short period of time with small, specially trained units. The costs 
associated with such operations are therefore relatively limited com-
pared to other ideal typical operations. The objectives that special 
operations are used to complete vary significantly, and special force 
members must therefore possess extremely varied skillsets from the 
acquisition of information and reconnaissance to the elimination and 
21 Johansen, “Special Operation Forces,” 102–3.
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capture of persons and capabilities to the liberation of hostages and 
evacuation of noncombatants. The challenges involved when con-
ducting special operations in cities primarily relate to the complex ur-
ban terrain, which complicates deployment, the operation itself, and 
subsequent evacuation. Moreover, the high population density entails 
increased risks of being discovered and exposed to the enemy.
The challenges related to maintaining the city as system, includ-
ing the standard of living for local residents and urban infrastructure, 
are basically nonexistent due to the limited nature and scope of most 
special operations. When planning such operations, it is therefore cru-
cial to map the geographical position of the target, the surrounding 
physical terrain, and enemy positions, which is achieved most effi-
ciently using live-streaming technology, typically drones or satellites. 
This information is usually provided to the special forces in real time 
during the operation. Similarly, it is necessary to possess modern 
communications technology that enables the forces to communicate 
covertly, intercept enemy communications, and maintain ongoing 
contact with the unit that is coordinating the support capabilities. Fi-
nally, special operations require access to the full range of support 
capabilities (from Army, Navy, and Air Force), and to be able to use 
such support in an effective and coordinated manner in connection 
with deployment and evacuation, and air support demands close col-
laboration between the Services.
Finally, the special operations corner of the triangle is also relevant 
because it challenges us to consider whether it is possible to have the 
same ambitions as in the two other corners about achieving long-term 
security policy objectives when one’s presence is significantly smaller.
Peace Operations
Peace operations represent the least military type of operation and, as 
illustrated in figure 13.4 in the top of the operations triangle, are char-
acterized by full emphasis on policing (rather than fighting) and main-
taining territorial control over a permissive environment. In situations 
where Western military involvement can be considered, the territorial 
control will typically be fragile, possibly based on a peace agreement 
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between formerly warring parties, and the aim of the peacekeeping 
operation is therefore to ensure the implementation and maintenance 
of the negotiated peace.
Just as with the two others, this position is naturally an abstrac-
tion. Both parts can exist momentarily in time and space, but only in-
termittently and locally. Because the peace operation is furthest from 
the two other corners in the triangle—furthest away on the scale from 
traditional military operations to policing—this is also where we are 
furthest from the traditional military self-understanding, which is de-
fined by combat.22 Even so, this is still a type of military operation. In 
general, there is a need for military capabilities to deliver security on 
the level immediately below an actual state of war. The UN’s role in 
peace operations since World War II is an example.
With the UN as the representative of the international community, 
22 Antulio J. Echevarria II, Reconsidering the American Way of War: U.S. Military Practice 
from the Revolution to Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014).
Figure 13.4 Peace operations.
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a need emerged for independent mediation, including peacekeeping 
efforts. Peacekeeping operations are defined in Chapter VI in the UN 
Charter, which deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes in which 
formerly warring parties can opt for a peacekeeping operation to en-
sure that already signed agreements regarding peace agreements 
and truces are respected and implemented.23 Here, the fundamen-
tal principle is, generally, that the parties in the conflict agree to the 
operation. This kind of traditional peacekeeping operation is usually 
carried out as a UN operation or under the leadership of regional orga-
nizations with a mandate from the UN (e.g., the African Union, NATO, 
or the EU). A peace operation typically includes both military and civil-
ian instruments, such as military units, police, and civilian specialists 
and advisors. In this context, the military instrument typically consists 
of lightly armed, clearly marked units that are as visible as possible 
with respect to toning down the military profile while simultaneously 
acting as a neutral go-between in relation to the formerly warring par-
ties. In connection with a peace operation, the military instrument is 
usually subject to extremely strict rules of engagement. Military per-
sonnel will therefore usually only use armed force in self-defense or to 
maintain the operation mandate.
In the course of the 1990s, the growth in the number of peace-
keeping operations and increasing involvement of the global communi-
ty in conflicts between and within states increased the political pressure 
to be able to intervene earlier in conflict cycles to change and end them. 
Accordingly, the use of more robust mandates under Chapter VII from 
the UN Charter, which allows for the use of lethal force, has become 
much more widespread.24 Former UN General Secretary Kofi A. Annan’s 
involvement and the Brahimi Report in 2000 pushed the general debate 
in the UN system concerning formal sovereignty in the direction of that 
which has since assumed the form of “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” 
and General Secretary Ban Ki-moon’s efforts to reform the humanitarian 
23 “Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” in Charter of the United Nations and Sta-
tute of the International Court of Justice (New York: UN, 1945), articles 33–38, hereafter 
Charter of the United Nations.
24 “Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and 
Acts of Aggression,” in Charter of the United Nations, articles 39–51.
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system in the direction of increased political involvement in transform-
ing the sources of suffering.25
In connection with UN peace operations, focus has also in-
creased on the protection of civilians to the extent where it is now an 
integrated part of the mandate for the mission (e.g., in South Sudan 
and Afghanistan).26 In other words, the international community is gen-
erally moving toward a broader acceptance of the idea that all forms 
of involvement—to be as humanitarian as possible in the strict sense 
of the word—also must be fundamentally political. In this sense, the 
changes made to the framework of the peace operations are in accor-
dance with a major shift in the framework for the involvement of UN 
organizations in conflicts and vulnerable states. The process has yet 
to be completed and is sensitive and controversial in many ways, but 
the combination of population growth and urbanization in the Global 
South, together with the development of the UN’s ambitions for more 
direct political action, will over time further emphasize the relevance 
of the peace operations in urban environments.
The work with peace operations includes the traditional obser-
vation and monitoring of the peace agreements and truces, ensuring 
buffer zones, patrolling, controlling access to the border between the 
territories of formerly warring parties, presence in connection with 
voluntary disarmament processes, and maintaining general law and 
order. All of this is more difficult in an urban environment, partly due 
to the unmanageable terrain of the city and partly because the peace-
keeping force, due to the population density, is at greater risk of being 
challenged by hostile actors (or spoilers) who will potentially be able 
25 Kofi Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” Economist, 16 September 1999, 1–2; Lakh-
dar Brahimi et al., Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Re-
port) (New York: UN, 2000); Ban Ki-moon, One Humanity: Shared Responsibility—Report 
of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit (New York: UN, 2016); and 
Alex J. Bellamy and Charles T. Hunt, “Twenty-first Century UN Peace Operations: Protec-
tion, Force and the Changing Security Environment,” International Affairs 91, no. 6 (2015): 
1,277–98, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12456.
26 OHCHR, Human Rights and the Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping: Approaches, 
Methodologies and Tools (Geneva: UN, 2015); and Jonathan Gilmore, The Cosmopoli-
tan Military: Armed Forces and Human Security in the 21st Century (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015). See also, “Protecting Civilians,” UN Peacekeeping.
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to threaten or destroy the basis for carrying out the operation. In ad-
dition to the parties themselves, including formerly warring military 
units, these actors will typically be organized criminal networks or oth-
er hostile groups that have no interest in creating or maintaining the 
emerging order. 
As emphasized above, these groups may be able to change the 
conditions concerning a permissive environment and territorial con-
trol, thereby creating new challenges calling for alternative and more 
heavy-handed solutions. For example, if the operational environment 
changes from permissive to the opposite—as illustrated by the tran-
sition from the light gray triangle to the left in figure 13.4—the oper-
ation will involve far greater risk, and it becomes necessary for the 
peacekeeping force to carry out offensive peacemaking activities to 
force the situation up into the dark gray parallelogram. In that case, 
the challenges involved in the peace operation will be reminiscent of 
some of the challenges related to the combat operation. Similarly, if it 
is not possible to maintain territorial control—as illustrated in figure 
13.4 by the light gray triangle to the right—the challenge will initially 
be to pacify and stress the criminal networks and other nonstate ac-
tors that might possibly have gained control over slums or ghettos.
Security forces can play an important role with respect to ad-
dressing such conflict scenarios. But their operational base is com-
plicated by the fact that their efforts are closely linked to the broader 
question about how the international community and the Western 
state model (that builds on and requires unambiguously legitimate 
power, positive law, and sovereign control over territory and popula-
tion) are put in play in situations with far more ambiguous, traditional 
authority structures and partial and otherwise troubled local security 
forces. There is also a risk that the room for maneuver available to 
the peacekeeping forces is limited by a narrow mandate and especial-
ly by insufficient military capabilities and will therefore be unable to 
deal with and quickly adapt to a negative development in the conflict 
situation. This occurred during UNOSOM I and II in Somalia in the 
early 1990s and the NATO Kosovo force in 2004, where a combination 
of formerly warring parties, criminal elements, and angry population 
groups destroyed or threatened to destroy the basis for carrying out 
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the operation via violent attacks on one another and/or the peace-
keeping forces. In both cases, the conflicts revolved around urban en-
vironments and the security forces lacked the necessary personnel, 
mandate, and military capabilities to handle the new, acute situation.27
Peace operations in urban environments are challenged by the 
same conditions as combat operations, particularly with respect to 
the complex terrain and high population density. Protecting a fragile 
peace and control over a city will therefore initially require operations 
with particularly robust personnel quantities. Since the size of the forc-
es should be set in relation to the local population, many of the world’s 
cities are already too large for Western security forces to control. In 
terms of capabilities, the operations must be able to switch between 
the original peaceful purpose, where the focus is primarily on police 
work, and the ability to withstand major challenges, such as massive 
urban uprisings and violent riots that threaten the operation. At worst, 
the security forces should be able to fight to get back on track within a 
carefully specified, situation-adapted framework for exercising force.28
Finally, peace operations in cities, particularly in the Global 
South, will clearly have to be able to understand, analyze, and address 
spoilers, such as organized criminal elements and the challenge from 
groups in the population in larger slums outside of state control. This 
places great demands on prior and ongoing intelligence gathering 
and analysis, just as it will be crucial for the military organization to 
think and act across the most basic distinctions that define an orga-
27 Paul F. Diehl, “With the Best of Intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and II,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 19, no. 2 (1996): 153–57, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610960843 
6001; and Collapse in Kosovo, Report No. 155 (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis 
Group, 2004): 44–52.
28 James Cockayne, “The Futility of Force?: Strategic Lessons for Dealing with Uncon- 
ventional Armed Groups from the UN’s War on Haiti’s Gangs,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 37, no. 5 (2014): 736–69,  https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.901911; 
Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “The Police-ization of the Military,” Journal of Political and Mili-
tary Sociology, no. 27 (Winter 1999): 217–32; Kristian Hoelschera and Per M. Norheim- 
Martinsen, “Urban Violence and the Militarisation of Security: Brazilian ‘ Peacekeeping’ 
in Rio de Janeiro and Port-au-Prince,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 25, nos. 5–6 (2014): 
957–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.945636; and Christoph Harig, “Synergy 
Effects between MINUSTAH and Public Security in Brazil,” Brasiliana–Journal for Bra- 
zilian Studies 3, no. 2 (March 2015): 142–68, https://doi.org/10.25160/v3.i2/d6.
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nization’s work and self-perception, namely the difference between 
combat and policing. Overall, peace operations in cities are resource 
heavy, and Western decision makers will increasingly have to get used 
to the fact that some cities are so large that it will be practically impos-
sible to stabilize them.
Dynamic Operational Mixing: Stabilization 
Because the operations triangle consists of a space defined by three 
vectors, each position inside the triangle represents a combination of 
operational efforts in a given moment. As these change over time, ac-
tual operations—planned or executed—can be envisioned as move-
ments across the triangle. This could be from a focus on warfighting 
to policing or from a large conventional footprint to a light special op-
erations one. 
The triangle therefore also enables us to depict large stabilization 
operations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Stabilization oper-
ations are by definition multidisciplinary. Unlike the three ideal-type 
military operations presented above, they do not tie specifically to any 
one set of either military or civilian instruments. Stabilization is instead 
achieved via interagency efforts, such as civil-military cooperation, 
which can be defined as an integrated approach in which all of the 
authorities or parts of an organization (e.g., the UN) actively support a 
given set of stabilization efforts and work together toward a commonly 
defined stabilization objective. This includes cooperation on planning, 
implementation, and gathering intelligence in connection with efforts 
related to politics, economic development, and security.
Integrated stabilization efforts can take place before, during, and 
after a conflict. The military instrument is merely one of many that can 
be applied in a given situation. While the stabilization operation can 
be seen in a narrow perspective, this operation type characteristically 
draws on both military and civilian instruments to create and subse-
quently maintain a measure of stability. For example, the sequence 
can begin with special forces gathering necessary intelligence or 
eliminating strategically important objectives, which might be fol-
lowed by carrying out actual battles to defeat and displace the ele-
ments at the root of the instability; finally, when the territorial control 
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has been achieved and stability restored, it is maintained largely by 
policing. The stabilization operation can therefore be understood as a 
dynamic that—in difficult cases—involves elements from each of the 
three operation types in the operations triangle.
In figure 13.5, arrow 1 illustrates the dynamic operational mix 
of stabilization. The movement here is from initial special operations 
(dark gray parallelogram) to major combat operations (left gray paral-
lelogram) to peacekeeping operations (top light gray parallelogram). 
Moving left from the dark gray parallelogram to the lower light gray 
triangle marks the transition from a nonwar state to an actual state 
of war in which special forces are deployed as an active element in 
combat operations, possibly as part of an indirect military approach. It 
is important to emphasize that the arrow merely displays the strategic 
intent with a gradual transition between forms of action, but the actual 
operation will often be carried out with a high degree of concurrency 
with respect to the instruments.29
29 Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch, Uendelig krig?: Danmark, samtænkning og stabilisering af 
globale konflikter [Infinite war: Denmark, the conception and stabilization of global con-
flicts] (Copenhagen: DJØF Forlag, 2015).
Figure 13.5 Stability operations.
Illustration by MCUP
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Dynamic Operational Mixing: Policing
In addition to the stabilizing dynamic, the operations triangle gives 
rise to an alternative dynamic relating to police work in a permissive 
urban environment. In such an environment, it is possible to present 
two scenarios for performing a police mission (see figure 13.5). 
First, slums or ghettos outside of conventional territorial control 
may constitute a security problem as a hotbed for criminal gang activ-
ity, drug trafficking, and/or corruption, which will be a constant source 
of instability. This problem scenario is the upper right, light gray tri-
angle in figure 13.5. Inasmuch as the source of the problem is intra-
state, with respect to the separation of military and police activities, 
the reestablishment of law and order is police work. The police face 
a dilemma, however, as the territorial control over the area that is re-
quired for normal civilian policing is lacking and the instruments avail-
able to the police are often insufficient. The local police might also be 
part of the problem, as in cases where the police perpetrate torture or 
other abusive treatment or are involved in corruption with local crim-
inal elements. Such a set of problems requires mixed capabilities in 
the form of, for example, constabulary forces. The obvious challenges 
here are that classic police work and police forces become militarized. 
In the worst case, such constabulary forces take the form of private 
and semiprivate death patrols, which obviously does not contribute to 
the creation and maintenance of legitimate order. Conversely, if legit-
imate territorial control is established, the scenario for police-related 
work shifts from the upper right, light gray triangle to the top darker 
gray parallelogram, as illustrated by arrow 2 in figure 13.5. Here, the 
need to pacify criminal networks and nonstate actors is replaced by 
the need to ensure the construction of a legitimate police force that is 
capable of maintaining law and order in its territory without succumb-
ing to corruption.
A significant element in a peace operation in a city lacking an 
effective and legitimate police force is therefore to contribute to the 
development of such capabilities, as seen in the example of the na-
tional police in Haiti, particularly in the capital Port-au-Prince. The 
contribution made by the Brazilian Army to pacifying and stabilizing 
Port-au-Prince within the framework of the UN Stabilization Mission 
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in Haiti (MINUSTAH) offers an example of a conventional force that 
has proven capable of flexibly and in a controlled manner adapting to 
different levels of conflict while cooperating with civilian authorities, 
international and local alike. In that sense, it is also an example of how 
military operations in cities instinctively challenge the distinctions be-
tween traditional military operations and politically oriented policing.30
A fundamental and coinciding challenge when an outside 
Western actor is facing the policing-stabilizing problem are the tacit 
assumptions concerning political order upon which the operational 
planning and practice are based. Western actors, including military 
actors, are formed by a specific political order. This is typically a single 
political authority with checks and balances, a unified legal system 
based on positive law, and therefore relatively clear legal, economic, 
and political rules and opportunities for legal recourse. By projecting 
this type of order with its built-in assumptions into the foreign opera-
tional environment, the intervening actors risk building on erroneous 
assumptions concerning the rational room for action available to the 
local actors and their set of values. The perception will be that order 
can and should be established on formal foundations; that is to say, it 
is based on a centralized, state-run, and vertically integrated enforce-
ment of law and order even when local conditions do not fit such a 
way of operating.
The city as phenomenon, particularly in the Global South, is of-
ten characterized by a blurring of the division between the formal and 
informal and a multiplicity of self-organized horizontal authorities out-
side of the control of the state.31 One such example is found in the 
transport sector in Nairobi, Kenya, which in the absence of an effective 
state apparatus is regulated by an organization that requires payment 
for, among other things, the protection of the roads and traffic. In West-
ern eyes, this seems illegitimate and would be regarded as a kind of 
blackmail or extortion; in reality, it works, is broadly accepted by the 
local population, and in practice is essential for the Kenyan capital to 
30 Hoelschera and Norheim-Martinsen, “Urban Violence and the Militarisation of Securi-
ty”; and Harig, “Synergy Effects between MINUSTAH and Public Security in Brazil.”
31 Warren Magnusson, Politics of Urbanism: Seeing Like a City (New York: Routledge, 
2011). 
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be able to function.32 Another example is the increasingly widespread 
use of private security companies to maintain law and order—the re-
sponsibility of the state in the Western context.33 Being open to the 
existence of alternatives to Western models of order is therefore an 
important condition for being able to understand and possibly influ-
ence the urban system, including by military means. 
In contrast to well-functioning, small Western cities and rela-
tively homogenous demographics, well-functioning public systems, 
controlled urban planning, quality construction, and relatively limited 
social inequality show that the urbanization of the Global South is far 
more complicated in the sense that it is largely uncontrolled and un-
planned. Cities are growing in places and in ways that have not been 
planned or even anticipated on the periphery of the existing urban 
environment. Without effective urban planning, residents are neither 
formally recognized nor are their practical needs met in the form of 
access to social services or basic infrastructure, such as sewage, 
utilities, or public transport. In that sense, the rapidly growing cities 
in the Global South are part of a process in which the pressure on 
already limited resources is exacerbating the problems, further ac-
centuating the tensions between formal state and informal social re-
lations and power structures. The result is seen in such megacities 
as Dhaka in Bangladesh and Lagos in Nigeria, which are marked by 
explosive growth, rudimentary infrastructures, massive social inequal-
ity, underdimensioned—and corrupt—public systems, and enormous 
slums. 
Exerting positive (peaceful) political influence in these kinds of 
urban systems in developing countries—let alone controlling them—
is almost impossible. The governments and city councils are already 
failing (by Western standards) in this regard in normal, everyday situa-
tions. This is important to remember when considering the challenges 
32 Jacob Rasmussen, “Inside the System, Outside the Law: Operating the Matatu Sector 
in Nairobi,” Urban Forum 23, no. 4 (2012): 415–32, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12132-012-
9171-z.
33 Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, “Security beyond the State: Global Securi-
ty Assemblages in International Politics,” International Political Sociology 3, no. 1 (2009): 
1–17, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2008.00060.x.
CHAPTER TH IRTEEN
342
resulting from exceptional political issues in the same environments, 
including security challenges. Clausewitz’s central warning about not 
viewing war as anything other than what it is can be expanded here 
to the entire operational environment: pronounced Western operative 
preferences for a specific kind of order constitute an important stra-
tegic risk with respect to understanding, planning, and operating in 
urban environments, particularly in the Global South.
CONCLUSION 
The percentage of the world’s population living in cities is increasing. 
By 2050, two-thirds of the world’s population will live in cities, espe-
cially in the Global South. When people move to the city, conflicts do 
as well. Urban environments are notoriously difficult for military forc-
es to operate in given that the urbanized terrain prevents situational 
awareness and provides opportunities for ambushes, the population 
density increases the risk of collateral damage and losses, and the 
critical infrastructure is particularly vulnerable. If Western military forc-
es are to maintain or strengthen their capacity to carry out military 
interventions that are operationally and politically effective and at the 
same time legitimate, it is necessary to think hard about urbanization 
and its consequences for military operations. In this chapter, we have 
introduced a model for an operations triangle. This model offers a sim-
plified but systematic perspective on the challenges facing urban op-
erations from a Western perspective. 
In the operations triangle, each corner represents a type of mil-
itary operation: combat operations, peace operations, and special 
operations. Like Clausewitz’s absolute war concept, these are ideal 
types that do not exist in reality. Instead, any actual military operation 
can be plotted somewhere in the triangle as a trade-off between the 
three corners. Operation types are to be understood as generic activ-
ities that a military force can be more or less optimized to go about; in 
that sense, a certain branch of the military does not “own” a particular 
corner.
Absence of legitimate and effective governance structures 
means that stabilization and policing to establish and support such 
structures will be in demand, but the conditions on the ground mean 
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that all operations may be necessary. A combination of combat, spe-
cial, and peace operations will likely be required for normative political 
reasons. Accordingly, it will be necessary for the military force to have 
the ability to dynamically shift modus between the operation triangle’s 
different operational requirements. 
Western military interventions will consist of a dynamic combi-
nation of all three operations. MOUT’s distinctive features challenge 
the three types in different ways and, at the same time, are prisms 
for the challenges facing Western military forces in general. Western 
strategic expectations regarding political efficiency generate interest 
in Western forces usually having to contribute to stabilization, leading 
operative dynamics from combat operations to peace operations. As 
force sizing for peace operations is measured against the local popu-
lation rather than the enemy force, growing cities in the Global South 
will often make it difficult and often outright impossible to muster the 
required force numbers. In this manner, the operations triangle also 
shows how the Western approach to military operations is pressed 
down toward the special operations corner of the triangle, which de-
mands a far smaller presence, and does not aim at taking terrain. 
The combination of the challenges from the urban physical ter-
rain—and the global growth in cities in general—and local residents, 
presses the traditional Western military operations down toward the 
special operations corner of the operations triangle; the operational 
environment will be extensive and complex and the usual objective of 
territorial control is therefore often unattainable. In the end, the city is 
a prism for challenges to the Western way of war. Urban operations 
challenge our conventional forces to fight in cityscapes, embrace 
peace-related security tasks, and think more like special forces.
344
C O N C L U S I O N
The Military Implications 
of Complex Terrain 
in Twenty-first Century Urban Areas
Benjamin Jensen, PhD
This book builds on the larger literature addressing the future of mil-
itary operations in dense urban terrain and megacities.1 The preced-
ing chapters reflect national security professionals grappling with the 
changing character of war. Thirteen practitioners, from government 
civilians to foreign and U.S. military personnel, spent one year in 2015 
conducting a series of studies and war games in an effort to under-
stand the complex terrain of the twenty-first century city. The results 
are published here. Yet, the question remains: What are the military 
implications going forward? 
This concluding chapter will read across these perspectives and 
offer a series of military implications for the U.S. military and national 
security enterprise. These recommendations envision suitable, fea-
sible, acceptable, and cost-effective steps officials can take between 
2019 and 2025. The inherent trade-off before senior leaders is clear. 
These recommendations prioritize preparing for smaller-scale con-
tingencies likely to emerge, often on short notice, in the urban litto-
rals over great power competition. The assumption is that, first, the 
1 The study took place one year after the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Strategic 
Studies Group researched megacities and David Kilcullen’s book, Out of the Mountain, 
appeared. These efforts have since grown to include a vibrant research effort at the Mod-
ern War Institute at West Point.
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most likely contingencies on the horizon will take place in middle- and 
low-income countries where political stability and economic opportu-
nity are in a death spiral that local elites take advantage of to consoli-
date power. Where these systemic collapses and power grabs overlap 
U.S. national security objectives, the military must be prepared to act. 
Second, one can assume that great power competition is more 
likely to resemble proxy war than direct conflict that risks strategic es-
calation into a nuclear confrontation. If the past is prologue, the new 
cold wars of the twenty-first century will again play out on the periph-
ery via gray zone competition.2 Yet, these struggles in the shadows 
will take place in the complex terrain of the new city. Therefore, the 
U.S. military and national security enterprise has a responsibility to be 
prepared to conduct coercive diplomacy campaigns, and more impor-
tantly, conflict preventing internal defense and development actions in 
dense urban terrain and megacities.
The conclusion will establish the military problem and use it to 
frame a central idea guiding doctrinal, organizational, training, mate-
rial, leadership, personnel, and facility reforms. These categories re-
flect the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System used 
to evaluate requirements and prospective solutions in the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense. The focus here is on doctrine, organization, training, 
and materiel. Overall, the density and connectivity of the complex ter-
rain in the new city necessitate a new theory of victory and supporting 
military organizations, capabilities, and integration through training 
and education.3 The U.S. government will need interagency task forc-
es able to observe and orient in relation to the overlapping networks 
of influence and interest that connect local populations often to glob-
al social, political, and economic flows. These future task forces will 
need to operate indirectly, what Sun Tzu called the unorthodox, to am-
plify key relationships and feedback loops present in the city to avoid 
large-scale deployments of personnel and equipment that will alter 
2 For an overview of this premise, see Benjamin Jensen, “The Cyber Character of Political 
Warfare,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 24, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2017): 159–82.
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the system.4 When closing with isolated enemy forces, this task force 
will need low-cost intelligence and precision-strike platforms able to 
connect to local networks and partners. 
These concept and capability changes will require alterations to 
training and education that stress the ability to think in terms of com-
plex systems and rapidly adjust concepts of operations in the face of 
new information. They will require that the military profession revisit 
the systems logic in publications such as Warfighting and John Boyd’s 
archival documents to integrate it with Bayesian updating and other 
big-data techniques.5 In other words, organizations like the U.S. Ma-
rine Corps will need to reimagine maneuver warfare for the density 
and connectivity of complex terrain on display in twenty-first centu-
ry cities. They will have to collect larger amounts of data and rapid-
ly assess patterns and trends to ensure they maintain speed to keep 
adversaries off balance. Information will enable new forms of recon-
naissance pull and attack-in-depth, but only if we sufficiently train and 
educate personnel to operate in a world defined by big data, narrow 
artificial intelligence, and machine learning applications.6 
THE MILITARY PROBLEM: 
DENSITY AND CONNECTIVITY
The preceding chapters illustrate how the density and connectivity of 
the modern city create a new type of complex terrain. The flows of the 
4 On the indirect approach, see Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: Faber & 
Faber, 1954). On the concept of the unorthodox in Sun Tzu, see Derrick M. C. Yuen, De-
ciphering Sun Tzu: How to Read the Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 2014).
5 For an overview of Boyd’s work, see Ian T. Brown, A New Conception of War: John Boyd, 
the U.S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 
2018). On the practical implementation of Bayes theorem, see Nate Silver, The Signal and 
the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail—But Some Don’t (New York: Penguin Press, 
2015); and Sharon Bertsch McGrayne, The Theory that Would Not Die: How Bayes’ Rule 
Cracked the Enigma Code, Hunted Down Russian Submarines and Emerged Triumphant 
from Two Centuries of Controversy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012).
6 For an overview of big data, see Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big 
Data: A Revolution that Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think (New York: Mariner 
Books, 2014). On the existing applications of AI/ML and prospects for the future, see Nils 
J. Nilsson, The Quest for Artificial Intelligence: A History of Ideas and Achievements (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Max Tegmark, Life 3.0: Being Human in the 
Age of Artificial Intelligence (New York: Vintage Press, 2018). 
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city can quickly overwhelm even large military forces. Because the city 
is connected, there is a constant war to define the narrative (i.e., the 
knowledge-power nexus). This war of influence will take place global-
ly. Even irregular competitors have strategic reach, a phenomenon on 
display in the campaign against Daesh/Islamic State. As seen in the 
Russian election hacking efforts in 2016, they can target your citizens 
(i.e., public opinion, conspiracy theories) and infrastructure (i.e., the 
information integrity of major social media platforms and trust in the 
election system itself).7 
A connected city can certainly generate transient mass. Large 
flash mobs can assemble on short notice and threaten key avenues 
of approach, enveloping friendly forces through riots and tying down 
units needed for other contingencies. Restricted rules of engagement, 
perpetuated by the larger war of influence, make crowd riot control a 
difficult, if not impossible, task for traditional military units.
These cities are home to multiple factions with competing inter-
ests that create flashpoints for political violence. Contentious politics 
are fractal. Violence occurs across the city in different sequences, set-
tings, and circumstances but reflects some prevailing patterns. Each 
city block has its own unique experience. Each group has a distinct 
array of grievances often mobilized by elites for economic and political 
gain. There are strange attractors, local warlords, and political bosses 
bounding power. Mapping these transactional patterns and resulting 
configurations is the first task of any potential intervention. It must 
start years beforehand to map how relationships change over time at 
the local level. 
In the complex terrain of the city, policy objectives and military 
ends fluctuate. Humanitarian assistance missions transform into coun- 
terinsurgency within days. Human and traditional security logics 
blur across the area of operations. As the system changes, missions 
change. Changing political logics create inherent tensions in military 
planning resulting in ambiguous ends, restricted ways, and minimal 
means. 
7 For an overview of the 2016 Russian election hacking effort, see Benjamin Jensen et al., 
“Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls: Cyber Strategy with a Russian Twist,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 42, no. 2 (2019): 212–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1559152.
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Warfighting functions experience enduring challenges amplified 
by the density and connectivity of the complex terrain, while command 
and control experiences diminishing marginal returns. Units find that 
they have to add additional nodes in their communication architec-
ture to integrate with local police, municipal services, etc., but each 
additional link slows the network, comes with security challenges, 
and complicates the flow of information. Each of these groups creates 
new coordination challenges and lines of effort, making mass and uni-
ty of effort an increasingly difficult prospect. 
Likewise, turning the noise of the city into actionable intelligence 
becomes increasingly challenging. Military units lack the language 
capabilities or understanding of local dialectics and slang to translate 
speech into meaning. Even with automated translators, a significant 
amount of context vital to understanding the population is lost. The 
population, in terms of the grievances and interests of factions that 
compromise the city, remains a mystery. Technical challenges limit 
a unit’s ability to integrate social media data with signals and intel-
ligence and conduct source operations in dense urban terrain. Ex-
isting security classification issues and a lack of interoperable data 
standards and trained data scientists in the military limit the ability of 
a force to create a holistic intelligence picture. They struggle to com-
bine open-source information that captures the changing sentiment 
of factions in complex terrain with targeted signals intelligence on the 
pattern of life and motives of key actions. Furthermore, there are cul-
tural and technical limitations to sharing data with the wide range of 
coalition actors required to maneuver in the city. 
Fire and maneuver become costly and restricted in the complex 
terrain of the city. As seen in Mosul, you have to break the city to take 
it; a campaign strategy that will not always be available in the future. 
Cities with high-rise buildings and unplanned, narrow streets make 
precision fires and mechanized maneuver more difficult, requiring 
units to dismount and close with the objective in a way that exposes 
them to tactical risks that can have strategic consequences. When the 
public sees the death of its legions, however, the appetite for foreign 
interventions can swing wildly. Ground units maneuvering through the 
complex terrain of the city often lack practical combined arms options. 
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In dense urban terrain, aerial and indirect fires tend to only hit the tops 
of buildings. Therefore, the building must be destroyed versus target-
ing an individual floor or room. These weapons also tend to be costly 
relative to adversary offense and defense options. For a fraction of the 
cost of a single Hellfire missile, an enemy combatant can broadcast a 
propaganda-themed version of the attack globally via targeted adver-
tising likely to play on key sentiments in different factions. That is, for 
small amounts of money, they can buy a global audience.8
Force protection concerns also limit mobility at the operational 
level. Urban terrain has a canalizing effect, increasing the risk of com-
plex ambushes at the tactical level that have campaign-level implica-
tions. Tension exists between wanting to engage the populace across 
the area of operations and resupplying/protecting smaller forward op-
erating bases. Furthermore, the golden hour, ensuring you can medi-
cally evacuate someone within an hour of injury, becomes tentative in 
this new complex terrain. Helicopters and ground evacuation are fur-
ther complicated by the narrow streets, high-rise buildings, and lack 
of open spaces.
THE CENTRAL IDEA: 
MAP THE CITY,  ACT INDIRECTLY 
The size, density, connectivity, and resulting complexity of large ur-
ban areas challenge traditional approaches to military operations in 
cities. A military force cannot isolate or control a densely populated, 
highly connected population. People either leave the city or remain 
trapped and prone to shifting loyalties as a means of survival, a dy-
namic that was on display in multiple military operations in the Middle 
East between 2004 and 2018.9 Rather, the goal of urban operations 
8 In fact, every time the United States uses three Hellfires (a common practice) to attack a 
target, it costs almost as much as the average price of an American family home, which 
was $376,800 in December 2018. See “Median and Average Sales Prices of New Homes 
Sold in United States,” U.S. Census. The cost per Hellfire missile is more than $115,000, 
depending on the model and when it was purchased. 
9 Note that shifting loyalties as a means of survival is a logic of political violence identified 
by Stathis Kalyvas in his research. See, Stathis N. Kalvyas and Matthew Adam Kocher, 
“How ‘Free’ Is Free Riding in Civil Wars?: Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action 
Problem,” World Politics 59, no. 2 (2011): 177–216, https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2007.0023.
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should be to reveal the dominant physical and cognitive feedback 
loops channeling resources and ideas in a city system. An emphasis 
on social mapping to reveal these relationships gives units the ability 
to intervene selectively to reinforce resiliencies in the city or to dis-
rupt malign elements through an indirect approach. By observing and 
orienting on these human connections, a military—often through its 
local partners—can turn the population on its adversary or collapse 
the adversary from within in a way that does not result in the complete 
destruction of the city.10
All maneuver, in seeking to achieve a position of advantage, must 
start with knowledge of the terrain, local factions, and how they col-
lectively manifest as a system. That is, military operations—from small 
teams conducting internal defense and development to conventional 
campaigns—must begin with an understanding of the complex terrain 
within the modern city. While this sounds so simple and intuitive, the 
current military is not equipped, mentally or materially, to do so. To that 
end, the following sections highlight these two key aspects—mapping 
the city system and acting indirectly—and use the insights to identify 
new material, organization, and training and education requirements.
Mapping the City
Mapping the city begins with understanding how people connect. 
These connections form networks. These networks are often shaped 
by key nodes, which channel resources and ideas, and create power-
ful elites capable of mobilizing local factions. Therefore, the first job of 
any interagency team—whether military, diplomatic, or development 
oriented—is to create a map of these relationships. This mapping can 
be achieved using existing, off-the-shelf software. Software packages 
that analyze spatial clusters, a common feature in multiple geospa-
tial analysis tools, and scour social media to assess sentiment scores 
and other content analytics among targeted populations become key 
intelligence resources for predicting unrest and identifying resilien-
cies. That is, mapping a city requires digital foraging: harvesting the 
10 On the importance of human connectivity as a defining feature of modern military oper-
ations, see Charles Cleveland et al., Military Strategy in the 21st Century: People, Connec-
tivity, and Competition (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2018).
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latent signatures of a city to reveal key relationships between the flow 
of resources and ideas. As Akrama outlines in his chapter, this turn 
to data-driven analysis parallels the evolution of modern policing and 
their use of hot spot, predictive, and community policing to identify 
patterns and trends as well as develop a more contextual sense of 
local interests.
For example, when analyzing a physical port facility (i.e., SPOD or 
seaports of debarkation), the routes dock workers take to work each 
day and where they tend to live based on social media, surveys, and 
geospatial data must also be assessed. Terrain cannot just be consid-
ered in terms of the SPOD to secure. How local networks enable that 
facility to operate and the lines of communication connecting them 
must also be considered, which requires an understanding of the pop-
ulation’s sentiment in these areas. A flash protest, triggered by false 
rumors on social media, could block dock workers’ access to work or 
even force them to flee their homes, causing a series of cascading 
effects. Disrupted lines of communication then slows throughput of 
the SPOD, causing food insecurity, economic dislocation, and even 
impacts the ability of a military force to sustain operations and support 
local partners. 
Mapping the city requires thinking of its complex terrain as a 
system. Complex systems focus on how relationships, with a particu-
lar emphasis on feedback loops, between component parts produce 
emergent effects.11 That is, unlike a linear system, inputs do not equal 
outputs. Small changes can produce large consequences that are of-
ten difficult to predict in advance. 
Multiple chapters in this book highlight the importance of as-
suming that the city is a system. Simpson builds on the City as System 
Framework to describe the campaign logic of Daesh/Islamic State.12 
11 On systems thinking in general, see Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political 
and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). The push for the U.S. 
Marine Corps in particular to think in terms of systems was a major goal of LtGen Paul 
K. Van Riper, who even after retirement taught an elective on systems theory at Marine 
Corps University. 
12 On the city-as-system framework, see Mark Lomedico and Elizabeth M. Bartels, “City as 
a System Analytical Framework: A Structured Analytical Approach to Understanding and 
Acting in Urban Environments,” Small Wars Journal (2015).
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Gerbacht sees system effects in the intersection of territoriality and 
grievances. Factions create new territorial boundaries that reflect 
their power and past grievances. These shifting boundaries have 
a significant impact on the complex terrain of the modern city and 
create information requirements for any task force seeking to shape 
events therein. Relihan calls for using “social radar” and crowd sourc-
ing to map these systems. Akrama stresses that the resulting intelli-
gence advantage that emerges from mapping this system drives the 
operations of small, flexible teams required to maneuver rapidly in and 
out of dense urban terrain. 
Reading across the chapters in this volume illustrates the follow-
ing requirements for U.S. military and/or other actors in the broader 
U.S. national security enterprise:
 • Material
 - Investments in commercial software packages to aggregate 
and analyze data on social relationships globally, or at a min-
imum, in key hot spots, including policies and procedures for 
the use of aggregated data and free software packages such 
as R and TensorFlow on government networks.
 - Investments in data storage infrastructure, including cloud-
based architectures, that allow teams to store aggregated 
data and maintain a baseline against which to assess emer-
gent patterns and trends in the operational environment; the 
associated policies and procedures should make it easy—not 
difficult—to move this data across networks, including shar-
ing with interagency and coalition partners.
 • Training and Education 
 - Create curricula on basic data science standards and meth-
ods as well as systems thinking in professional education that 
facilitates the proper employment of commercial data aggre-
gation and analysis; the military is not currently optimized to 
operate in a world of big data much less see complex terrain 
as a system.
 - Create distributed or resident reading lists on systems think-
ing that help professionals understand 1) what a system is 
and 2) how to analyze a system.
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In sum, the U.S. national security enterprise and military in par-
ticular need capabilities and concepts for aggregating big data and 
using it to map local systems. Military forces can only start to un-
derstand the city system once they reveal its tendency and potential 
based on the networks that define its boundaries. These networks 
can be mapped through digital forging, collecting unclassified, often 
open-source data, on the flow of goods and resources and the con-
nections they illuminate between groups. Yet, the modern military pro-
fessional is neither educated nor trained to deal with large data flows, 
nor is the information architecture outside of specialty intelligence 
applications designed to manage—much less assess—patterns and 
trends in this data. Military personnel, outside of a small number of op-
erations researchers, lack an understanding of basic statistics or how 
to operate even the simplest data analysis package, such as Microsoft 
Excel. They cannot identify patterns and trends much less build basic 
statistical or narrow AI/ML models to make probable assessments of 
future behavior in the city system. Put bluntly, the modern military—
and much of the larger U.S. national security enterprise at large—is 
data illiterate. 
As a result, the profession clings to outdated analytical tech-
niques and overly weights subjective judgment based on narrow inter-
pretations of historical cases enshrining the great man myth.13 Rather 
than deal with facts and tracing them back to possible causes—as 
Clausewitz recommends in his chapter on critical analysis—the mili-
tary profession vainly searches for secret logics in the past decisions 
of great commanders. We look for heroes to justify how we make deci-
sions under the stress and uncertainty that define military operations 
and, in the process, often slip into unintended biases. Operating in the 
complex terrain of the twenty-first century city requires first making 
the U.S. military and national security enterprise data literate.
13 For an overview of the great man myth, see Robert A. Segal, ed., Hero Myths; A Reader 
(New York: Wiley, 2000). For a defense, see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let 
Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesmen Back In,” International Security 25, no. 
4 (Spring 2001): 107–46, https://doi.org/10.1162/01622880151091916.
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Acting Indirectly
All of the chapters similarly stress that operations in the complex ter-
rain of the twenty-first century city will require smaller, more flexible 
force packages that can operate indirectly. The indirect approach is 
defined by Liddel Hart as one that maximizes surprise and directs its 
energy toward unexpected locations that throws the enemy off bal-
ance. For Hart:
To move along the line of natural expectation consolidates 
the opponent’s balance and thus increases his resisting 
power. In war, as in wrestling, the attempt to throw the op-
ponent without loosening his foothold and upsetting his 
balance results in self-exhaustion, increasing in dispropor-
tionate ratio to the effective strain put upon him. Success 
by such a method only becomes possible through an im-
mense margin of superior strength in some form and, even 
so, tends to lose decisiveness. In most campaigns the dis-
location of the enemy’s psychological and physical balance 
has been the vital prelude to a successful attempt at his 
overthrow.14
In the complex terrain of the modern city, conducting deliberate 
attacks along narrow fronts will exhaust the offense. The city allows 
defenders to create obstacle belts, defense-in-depth, and force the 
attacker to destroy the city to take it, setting the stage for a Pyrrhic 
victory at best. Given the connectivity, the defender can also envelope 
the physical attacker psychologically, distorting their advance through 
social media memes and turning, if effective, segments of the domes-
tic population against their own military. While this did not happen in 
the 2016–17 Battle of Mosul, likely owing to the efforts of Joint Task 
Force Ares to isolate Daesh/Islamic State in cyberspace, it is a risk in 
future urban operations.15
An indirect approach also relates to what Sun Tzu called the un-
14 Hart, Strategy, 5–6.
15 On Task Force Ares, see Michael Martell, ed., Joint Task Force ARES and Operation 
GLOWING SYMPHONY: Cyber Command’s Internet War against ISIL, Briefing Book 637 
(Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 2018). 
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orthodox in war.16 In the Art of War, Sun Tzu outlines the relationship 
between the orthodox, or the military forces arrayed for battle, and 
the unorthodox, often seen as deception and subterfuge. Traditional 
sieges are not optimal in classical or contemporary warfare. The sheer 
amount of forces required to dislodge forces defending in complex 
terrain creates strategic risk. Therefore, the force that finds creative 
ways to exploit existing relationships manifest in the territoriality of the 
city will move with the terrain, not against it. That is, you find ways to 
amplify key feedback loops and cut off certain relationships to isolate 
the enemy. An isolated enemy is prone to collapse.
This indirect approach is on display in multiple chapters in this 
book. At the most basic level, Borley highlights what Richard Sawyer 
would call the “Tao of deception,” or how to employ spies and other 
means to open fortresses and cities to advancing forces.17 Her chap-
ter demonstrates an enduring aspect of dislodging defenders in com-
plex terrain: trick them out. Farina illustrates how the connectivity of 
the modern city creates new opportunities of deception and shaping 
targeted populations. Spoofing networks, or injecting false informa-
tion into social media to alter perceptions, offers an innovative way to 
keep the adversary off balance.
In her chapter, Manning uses insights from the biology of inva-
sive species to develop a concept for symbiotic warfare. Applied to the 
complex terrain of the modern city, this concept envisions protecting 
critical infrastructure and key populations to deny your adversary the 
ability to survive. Put another way, a military must understand the local 
networks and dominant feedback loops in the city system to isolate 
the adversary. Once isolated, the adversary—much like the invasive 
species Manning explores—is denied the information and resources 
they need to survive. Cutting your enemy off from the networks that 
circulate resources and ideas in the city, while protecting the larger 
population’s access, creates an entirely new operational logic. 
Once the enemy is isolated, multiple chapters specify how to 
16 On the unorthodox as a defining feature of Chinese strategy historically, see Ralph D. 
Sawyer, The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China (New 
York: Basic Books, 2007). 
17 Sawyer, The Tao of Deception.
CONCLUSION
356
attack their critical vulnerabilities. First, maneuver is both physical 
and cognitive, integrating operations in the information environment 
seamlessly with more orthodox offense, defense, and stability tasks. 
Achieving a position of advantage requires balance. As Johnson and 
Markel illustrate in their chapter on the Battle of Sadr City, the simul-
taneous combination of offense, defense, and stability was the key to 
victory. Closing with the enemy in complex urban terrain requires iso-
lating the adversary and protecting the population. There is no city 
without the populace. There is no intelligence without groups and 
subgroups connecting to generate flow in the city. As multiple sep-
arate studies show, these interactions generate information and the 
military force that best accesses this information achieves a position 
of advantage.18 
Multiple chapters also develop the concept of attacking points 
of manipulation with joint combined arms. Points of manipulation are 
network connections vital to the adversary’s ability to operate in the 
complex terrain of the city. Put in center of gravity analysis terminolo-
gy, they are critical requirements. The objective of maneuver, both in 
the physical and cognitive sense, is to either neutralize or shape these 
points of manipulation to throw the enemy off balance. That is, you 
either deny the enemy illicit sources of finance or coopt the criminal 
networks to isolate them. Once again, understanding these networks 
and isolating them drives operational design and tempo. Even if the 
objective is to neutralize a point of manipulation the adversary relies 
on, every effort is made to protect the population of the city and limit 
cascading effects. In this way, when force is used, the preference is 
for a local partner to be in the lead supported by joint fires and intelli-
gence, a dynamic on display in the campaign against Daesh/Islamic 
State.
Second, operating in the complex terrain of the city creates new 
organizational and capability requirements for the U.S. military and 
national security community. With respect to organizational design, 
both Akrama and Frerichs note that the military force operating inside 
the city must be smaller, more flexible, and able to integrate with in-
18 Cleveland et al., Military Strategy in the 21st Century.
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teragency and Coalition partners at a lower level. Frerichs calls this 
approach distributed influence. 
These teams will also need organic fire support assets that help 
take advantage of windows of opportunity to attack isolated adversar-
ies. Fires in this respect favor precision over mass and need to be co-
ordinated at the company level and in support of distributed Coalition 
and interagency teams. 
There is still the question of how to build a C4ISR network to 
support this fires plan and maintain the type of intelligence collection 
at tactical levels required for developing pattern of life data and lim-
iting civilian causalities. The current inventory of precision weapons 
and networks that coordinate targeting adversaries with joint fires are 
too complex and costly to support smaller, distributed teams working 
beside local partners. Finding the right mix of forces and command 
echelon for these distributed operations requires experimenting with 
new organizations, a point highlighted by Lynch. 
If small teams employing joint fires and effects in support of lo-
cal partners is an optimal way to close with the enemy, the question 
remains how to sustain these distributed operations. Sustaining small 
teams requires a commitment to unmanned logistics and shifting from 
the iron mountain (i.e., large distribution area) to small drone delivery 
packages. Gerbacht in particular highlights the utility of unmanned 
aerial resupply systems like KMAX as a viable option.
Looking across the chapters at maneuver, fires, intelligence, 
sustainment, and command and control recommendations highlights 
the growing importance of unmanned systems tailored to create mul-
tidomain overmatch at lower echelons. The chapters show the im-
portance of fielding cheap, flexible unmanned intelligence and attack 
assets. To operate in the complex terrain of the city, the U.S. military 
should accelerate its adoption of robotics to reduce risk and expand 
area coverage. UAS, to include microvehicles, should be accessible 
for ISR, logistics, and attack missions at every echelon. These systems 
enhance a Coalition’s capability to identify and isolate the adversary 
(i.e., predators) without disrupting the population (i.e., prey). These 
systems should be cheap and flexible, allowing units to modify them 
for mission specific profiles. 
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When decisive action is required, opt for limited objective shap-
ing raids and reconnaissance pull. That is, pulse the system to deter-
mine tendency and potential before committing to larger operations. 
In this, if larger enemy forces do reveal themselves, counter enemy 
mass by being able to counteract them in multiple domains (i.e., air, 
ground, information) at lower echelons (i.e., mini-MAGTF with robot-
ics). This requires that lower-level units engage in dynamic targeting 
and leverage joint fires in support of local partners, replicating F3EAD 
(find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate) in conventional for-
mations. 
These recommendations produce the following requirements 
for U.S. military and/or other actors in the broader U.S. national secu-
rity enterprise:
 • Organization
 - Dedicate force structure to an experimental unit focused on 
operating in complex urban terrain and megacities; this unit 
would coordinate with rapid capability offices to address tac-
tical challenges associated with communicating in the city, 
sustaining operations, and dealing with the persistent chal-
lenge of superstructures (i.e., maneuvering in high-rise build-
ings) and tunnels.
 • Training and Education
 - Create live/virtual training environments that replicate ma-
neuvering in complex terrain and influencing competing net-
works in a modern city; these training environments need to 
replicate population sentiment, connectivity, and the various 
friendly, neutral, and enemy actors to capture the emergent 
city system.
 - Implement the 100-battle rule (for each actual battle you fight, 
practice 100 times); create a stable, unclassified wargam-
ing platform that allows military professionals to experiment 
with different maneuver approaches in complex urban terrain 
defined by competing influence networks, while replicating 
critical staff processes (e.g., IP over ethernet, sustainment 
planning, IO planning).
 - Develop digital case studies on recent urban campaigns 
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accessible in educational settings and for unit-level forums; 
these case studies should include U.S. as well as non-U.S. mil-
itary and nonmilitary operations.
 • Materiel 
 - Increase investment in small, multimission unmanned plat-
forms (e.g., ISR, strike, logistics) as well as the command 
architecture and airspace deconfliction required to operate 
them in large numbers (i.e., a swarm) at lower echelons.
 - Invest in capabilities to identify and map subterranean struc-
tures; similar to the multimission unmanned platforms, this 
should include strike packages to limit the risk to manned 
forces operating underground.
 - Create capabilities that help small units connect to local part-
ners and push as well pull intelligence for targeting joint ef-
fects.
 - Implement advise and assist packages that allow local part-
ners to generate effects at a higher rate (i.e., intelligence, fires, 
sustainment); these packages could be built from legacy 
equipment enhanced with new software packages that con-
vert old equipment into unmanned platforms.
While not a panacea, the U.S. military and broader national secu-
rity community requires new concepts and capabilities to operate in 
the complex terrain of the modern city. The main effort is defining the 
networks in the operational environment that highlight the larger terri-
toriality of grievance adversaries leveraged to challenge U.S. interests. 
Once we understand the system, we can identify the best indirect ap-
proaches to isolate adversaries and create the conditions for local 
partners to solve local problems with minimal U.S. assistance. When 
the U.S. military goes on the attack in the future city, its existing con-
ventional organizations lack the ability to integrate with Coalition and 
interagency partners, much less employ new swarms of unmanned 
vehicles that target an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities (i.e., points of 
manipulation). 
These chapters highlight the importance of prevention. In the 
new national security environment, most U.S. forces will be employed 
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in the contact layer. They will employ cooperation and competition 
mechanisms designed to advance U.S. interests globally. These forces 
should be able to support broader interagency and multinational crisis 
prevention activities before the United States has to commit ground 
forces to pursue elusive goals in costly campaigns. These chapters 
show that the modern city will be the key terrain of the future. Failing 
to prepare for operations in that complex terrain is an abdication of 
professional responsibility. 
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A P P E N D I X
The World’s Largest Megacities
The concept of a megacity as previously defined becomes more 
complex as the fabric of nations adapt to changing circumstances. 
According to the definition offered by the United Nations, a city with 
more than 10 million inhabitants is defined as a megacity. Elsewhere, 
however, the threshold has been made broader at between 5 and 8 
million. To further complicate the issue, a city can be confused with a 
metropolitan area. For example, the area known as “Metro Manila” in 
the Philippines has about 13 million inhabitants and is often referred 
to as a megacity. In actuality, the capital city of Manila has less than 2 
million inhabitants.
Normally, cities grow and shrink through natural urbanization as 
populations leave rural areas for the opportunities (e.g., employment, 
services, education, etc.) represented by the urban environment. But 
often, especially in countries such as China, political decisions are 
used to combine one or more existing cities that previously coexisted 
separately. Based on the newly formed common municipal law struc-
ture with unified administration, this indeed is a single city.
Governments and politics in the larger urban construct are not 
comparable with those of a small rural area. But the duties and re-
sponsibilities of these massive cities are also immense as seen by the 
discussion in the chapters above, where infrastructure and environ-
ment top of the list of problems found in each megacity and may serve 
as the tipping point for potential violence and war. For the purposes 
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of this discussion, governance refers to “the traditions and institutions 
by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the pro-
cess by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced; 
the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the insti-
tutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”1 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators project reports aggregate and 
individual governance indicators for more than 200 countries and ter-
ritories during 1996–2017 for six dimensions of governance and, for 
the purposes of our discussion, can contribute to the outbreak of ur-
ban warfare in a region: 
 • Voice and accountability; 
 • Political stability and absence of violence; 
 • Government effectiveness; 
 • Regulatory quality; 
 • Rule of law; and
 • Control of corruption.2
Other characteristics of a country that may impact regional safe-
ty include religion, employment, economy, land use, and transporta-
tion, among many others. The following list shows the 20 largest cities 
(megacities) by population for 2017–18, not summarized metropolitan 
areas or districts.3 Table 1 shows the data for individual criteria that 
may have contributed to or may contribute to violence in the region 
and the need for military intervention.4 By way of comparison, each 
megacity’s Worldwide Governance Indicators will be compared with 
those of the United States and the country listed by the 2018 Global 
Peace Index as the most peaceful region based on indicators for soci-
1 Daniel Kaufman et al., “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” World Bank, 2017.
2 Corruption data came from the “Corruption Perceptions Index,” WorldData and Trans-
parency International, 2017.
3 A nation’s presence on this list of megacities does not indicate that violence or warfare 
in the area is a given, but merely highlights how large the country’s cities are and how that 
population mass might impact peace at some point.
4 The data provided here was compiled based on statistics reported by WorldData in 
2017–18.
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etal safety and security, extent of ongoing domestic and international 
conflict, and degree of militarization—Iceland.5
MEGACITIES
 1.  Shanghai, China, East Asia
  Population: 24,152,700 (1,386,395,000 country)
 2.  Beijing, China, East Asia
  Population: 21,700,000 (1,386,395,000 country)
 3.  Istanbul, Turkey, Western Asia/Southeast Europe
  Population: 15,029,200 (80,745,000 country)
 4.  Dhaka, Bangladesh, South Asia
  Population: 15,029,200 (164,670,000 country)
 5.  Lagos, Nigeria, Western Africa
  Population: 14,234,000 (190,886,000 country) 
 6.  Moscow, Russia, Eastern Europe
  Population: 13,197,600 (144,495,000 country) 
 7.  Karachi, Pakistan, South Asia
  Population: 13,052,000 (197,016,000 country) 
 8.  Tianjin, China, East Asia
  Population: 12,784,000 (1,386,395,000 country)
 9.  Mumbai, India, South Asia
  Population: 12,442,400 (1,339,180,000 country)
 10.  São Paulo, Brazil, South America
  Population: 12,038,200 (209,288,000 country)
 11.  Shenzen, China, East Asia
  Population: 11,908,4000 (1,386,395,000 country) 
 12.  Delhi, India, South Asia
  Population: 11,034,600 (1,339,180,000 country)
 13.  Lima, Peru, South America
  Population: 10,852,200 (32,165,000 country)
5 For more information on this index, see Global Peace Index, 2018: Measuring Peace in 
a Complex World (Sidney, Australia: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018). For 2018, 
the United States dropped seven spots to 121, well behind Cuba (81) and China (114) 
and a much closer to the least peaceful country in the world, Syria (163). The top 10 most 
peaceful countries beginning with first: Iceland, New Zealand, Austria, Portugal, Den-
mark, Canada, Czech Republic, Singapore, Japan, and Ireland.
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 14.  Guangzhou, China, East Asia
  Population: 10,641,400 (1,386,395,000 country)
 15.  Seoul, South Korea, East Asia
  Population: 10,290,000 (51,466,000 country)
 16.  Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central Africa
  Population: 10,125,000 (81,340,000 country)
 17.  Lahore, Pakistan, South Asia
  Population: 10,052,000 (197,016,000 country)
 18.  Jakarta, Indonesia, Southeast Asia
  Population: 10,042,200 (263,991,000 country)
 19.  Tokyo, Japan, East Asia
  Population: 9,508,800 (126,786,000 country)
 20.  Cairo, Egypt, Northern Africa
  Population: 9,500,000 (97,553,000 country)
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Glossary of Select Terms, 
Abbreviations, and Acronyms
Black market economy An environment made up of criminal organiza-
tions that use a legitimate network to “clean” 
their money
Black swan An event that comes as a surprise, achieves a 
significant effect, and may be inappropriately ra-
tionalized after the fact
C2 Command and control is the authority a com-
mander has over forces to accomplish a mission
C4ISR Command, control, computer, communication, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
activities
COG center of gravity, a theory developed by Clause-
witz in On War that refers to a source of power 
that provides moral or physical strength, free-
dom of action, or will to act
Collective violence Situational, organized, or institutional violence 
by a group of similar persons.
Connectors An element that establishes a relationship be-
tween two or more nodes
Cyber levée en masse A mass networked mobilization that emerges 
from cyberspace with a direct impact on physical 
reality
Cybersecurity Defensive cyberspace operations
Dense urban terrain Urban areas with population densities that ex-
ceed the government’s ability to exert control
DO Distributed operations or a form of maneuver 
using small teams across a large area through 
separate but coordinated actions
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DUT Dense urban terrain, a subset of MOUT, or mili-
tary operations in urban terrain
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, 
Colombia’s largest guerrilla movement
Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas A tribal area in northwestern Pakistan that in-
cludes seven tribal agencies and six frontier re-
gions
Fires Using weapons systems to create lethal and 
nonlethal effects on a target
Force protection Preventative measures by a force to mitigate 
hostile acts
ECO Enhanced company operations, or reorganizing 
and augmenting a traditional rifle company to 
contribute to “enhanced” command and control, 
intelligence, logistics, and fires capabilities
Ethnic militancy Any nonstate belligerent (actor) systematically 
fighting based on ethnonationalism to defend 
and project the interests of an ethnic nationality
GCC Geographic combatant commander
Global commons Resource area that do not fall under the purview 
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Global domains Land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace
Global South The Third World
Governance The traditions and institutions that hold authority 
in a country
Fog of war An uncertain situational awareness during mili-
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HUMINT Human intelligence, or information covertly 
gathered to aid an operation
IO Information operations, or the use of informa-
tion, such as human networks, groups, and sub-
groups with religious, political, or cultural ties, to 
degrade an adversaries’ ability to act
ISIL  Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISR  Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, 
or a wide variety of systems used to acquire and 
process information
JAM Jaysh al-Mahdi, or a militant force created by 
Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr
JTF-LA Joint Task Force Los Angeles
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Lashkar-e-Taiba Largest and most active terrorist organization in 
Pakistan
MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Maneuver space The freedom to advance toward a desired space
Maneuver warfare Employing forces in combination with fires to 
achieve a position of advantage
Megacity A city with a population of 10 million or more
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit
MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, 
a Tuareg militant group that formed in October 
2011 and is presently one of the two largest mili-
tias in Mali
Mohajir Urdu-speaking Muslims
MOUT Military operations in urban terrain
MQM Muttahida Qaumi Movement or United National 
Movement
Multidomain 
combined arms Applying traditional fires with information oper-
ations across all domains (sea, land, air, space, 
and information)
Netizen Those who actively participate in the online 
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Network The structure created by several nodes and con-
nectors
Nodes The intersection of networks created by a per-
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OODA loop observe-orient-decide-act, strategy created by 
Air Force Colonel John Boyd to better under-
stand human reaction time
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neither rural nor urban
PMESII Features of an urban environment’s population 
or political, military, economic, social, informa-
tion, and infrastructure
Predictive policing Gathering data from a variety of sources for anal-
ysis
SIGINT Signals intelligence, gathering information by 
intercepting signals, such as communication, ra-
dar, and weapons systems
SWEAT-MSO Features of an urban environment’s infrastruc-
ture, or sewage, water, electricity, academics, 
trash, medical, safety, and other considerations
SWOC Symbiotic warfare operating concept
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Symbiotic warfare To control resources without disrupting the daily 
routine of a community
Transient mass The ability of a city system to block or contain 
friendly forces using organize groups or devices 
on short notice
TTP Tactics, techniques, and procedures
 Tehrik-e-Taliban is one of the largest militant or-
ganizations along the Afghan border
UAS Unmanned aerial systems
Urbanization A population shift from rural to urban areas
VOIP Voice over internet protocol, allows the user to 
make voice calls using a broadband internet 
connection instead of a land line
YPG Kurdish People’s Protection Units, militia and the 
primary component of the Syrian Democratic 
Forces and defender of Kurdish-inhabited areas 
of northern Syria
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